Sitrep for Sept. 10-14, 2026 (as of 10:00 a.m. UTC+3)

Frontline Situation Update

Rybar, a prominent pro-Russian Telegram channel, appears to have acknowledged the loss of the Shandryholove salient: in its Sept. 9 sitrep, it reported a deterioration in the situation, with the salient marked as a combat zone, while by Sept. 13 its map showed that the Russian Armed Forces had lost control of the territory. At the same time, it reported that fighting was taking place around the base of the salient, including in the area of the village of Kolodiazi, while individual groups were reaching the Zherebets River. This further confirms that the Armed Forces of Ukraine were able to cut off the salient and are apparently continuing to clear it.

It is worth noting that the importance of these actions is that they make Russian advances in the Lyman direction more difficult, preventing the completion of the partial encirclement of Sloviansk and Kramatorsk and the cutting off of AFU logistics from the northwest. Russian forces are unable to capture large cities head-on without such an encirclement: they can continue sending assault troops there for a very long time, but as long as logistics routes remain intact, Ukrainian forces will destroy most of them.

Now that the situation for the RuAF on the northern flank of the Sloviansk–Kramatorsk direction has deteriorated, the prospect of capturing the last urban agglomeration in the Donbas has become even more remote: this will no longer happen in 2026, and the RuAF may not manage to capture it even by the end of 2027. Whether they can do so will depend, among other things, on recruitment rates.

German economist Janis Kluge, drawing on regional budget data, found that recruitment into the RuAF in August was 20 percent lower than in August 2025.

Even with a year-end acceleration as all regions strive to meet their quotas, recruitment for the year is still likely to be about 5-10 percent lower than last year. That shortfall is not critical for the frontline, but the trend shows that attracting new contract soldiers with cash alone is growing harder. Regions are also finding it increasingly difficult to allocate money for recruitment: Russia’s constituent republic of Sakha (Yakutia) postponed a scheduled pay raise for public-sector workers, tying the delay directly to the need to fund sign-up bonuses for contract soldiers. In Volgograd, the authorities canceled a youth festival to save money while raising bonuses for signing a contract. Some regions have also begun sharply cutting their own compensation for families of those killed in the war—relatives had received regional compensation on top of the federal payment (nearly 15 million rubles [$178,100]). Now, for example, the Orenburg region will no longer pay that regional compensation; Bashkortostan [Russia's constituent republic] cut it over the course of a year from two million rubles [$23,800] to 100,000 rubles [$1,190]; Kirov and Omsk cut it to 500,000 rubles [$5,950]; and Ulyanovsk cut it to 50,000 rubles [$590]. The savings will apparently be redirected toward sign-up bonuses for contract soldiers, as the year-end deadline to meet the recruitment plan approaches. Some regions are also raising rewards for recruiters: the Irkutsk region raised its reward to a record 1.5 million rubles [$17,800], even as the one-time sign-up bonus for Russian contract soldiers recently dropped from 2.1 million [$25,000] to 1.8 million rubles [$21,400]. Apparently so few people now want to go to war for money that regional authorities have decided to bet on those who can, by whatever means, persuade men to sign a contract. As the reward grows, so will the incentive to use aggressive and illegal methods. As with debt collectors, it is easy to imagine intermediaries turning to coercion—reports of such actions keep appearing.

On the one hand, none of this makes it more likely that the authorities will announce a new wave of mobilization in the near future (for example, right after the elections). On the other hand, if the trend continues, Russian authorities will have to seriously consider how to increase personnel strength next year.

Ukrainian and Russian Strikes

On Sept. 12 and 13, the Ukrainian Air Force issued sitreps twice a day. As we have already noted, Russian strikes have at times become almost round-the-clock.

During the nighttime attack on Sept. 12, ballistic missiles were used, among other weapons, and none were intercepted. One possible explanation is that they flew through an area not covered by Patriot SAM systems. In some cases, the Air Force reported the share of jet-powered Shaheds (during the daytime attack on Sept. 13, they accounted for less than 5 percent, while on Sept. 12 they made up almost 10 percent), while in others it merely mentioned their use. At the same time, Volodymyr Zelenskyy claimed that "a significant portion" of the 2,100 UAVs launched over the previous week were jet-powered. Thus, based on open-source information, it is still impossible to determine how many such drones Russia is launching against Ukraine.

In his address, Volodymyr Zelenskyy said that Russia had effectively expanded the scope of the war to the economic sphere. Facilities essential to civilian life are now being targeted, including warehouses storing food and medicines. Strikes on gas stations, passenger trains, residential buildings, and civilian enterprises are also continuing.

In particular, according to the Russian MoD, the Zaporizhstal steelworks in the city of Zaporizhzhia, Interpipe Steel in Dnipro, ArcelorMittal Kryvyi Rih in the city of Kryvyi Rih, as well as the Pivnichnyi and Novokryvorizkyi Mining and Processing plants in Kryvyi Rih, were hit in recent days. The ministry stated that Zaporizhstal is one of the main suppliers of sheet metal products used to manufacture protective structures and armor for military vehicles, as well as body-armor plates. However, none of this makes the plant a legitimate military target. The strike was carried out with four ballistic missiles, and four employees were injured.

In addition, during a UAV strike on a military-industrial complex enterprise in Kryvyi Rih, which, according to the MoD, manufactures metallurgical products for the production of weapons and military vehicles, two people were killed. According to Russian claims, Interpipe Steel produced raw materials for dual-use products, while the mining and processing plants extract, process, and agglomerate iron ore for the production of metallurgical products used in military manufacturing. In the latter case, the target was not even metal, but iron ore used to produce metal, which, in turn, can be used to manufacture military products. It is worth noting that Ukraine obtains most of its military vehicles from abroad, although some are manufactured domestically, such as the 2S22 Bohdana 155mm wheeled self-propelled howitzer. Thus, strikes on heavy industry are unlikely to provide Russia with any significant military advantage.

In the Zhytomyr region, the RuAF struck the Polish-owned Cersanit plant, which manufactures ceramic tiles and sanitary ware. This plant has no connection whatsoever, even indirectly, to the military industry.

The Russian MoD also claimed on Sept. 11 that it had struck data centers in Kyiv, the Kyiv region, the Khmelnytskyi region and the Dnipropetrovsk region, including the BeMobile data center in Kyiv, which it accused of transmitting intelligence data, among other things, and operating "in the interests of the AFU." We doubt that the AFU actually uses civilian data centers open to the general public. On Sept. 12, the Russian MoD published footage of a strike on what it described as the "InterCars data processing center in Kyiv." Since this is an unusual name for a data center and we were unable to identify a data center operating under that name, we assumed that the post might contain an error. We found that an auto-parts distributor named InterCars is located in the Khmelnytskyi region. According to the company’s website, one of its branches is located in Kyiv, while the BeMobile data center is situated in an adjacent building.

The following day, Russian forces attacked the UkrAvto Odesa dealership complex on the Kyiv–Odesa highway, which houses dealerships for Mercedes-Benz, KIA, Ducati, and Maserati. Against this backdrop, a strike on an auto-parts business no longer appears implausible. Nevertheless, BeMobile still appears to have been the more likely target, with the footage apparently mislabeled. With all these strikes, the RuAF are expanding their list of targets to include evidently civilian enterprises of importance to the Ukrainian economy.

Russian forces continue to attack Ukrainian gas stations—a practice that has been systematically observed since around July of this year. Since there are practically no oil refineries left in Ukraine, strikes on gas stations have likely become the Russian response to the AFU’s campaign against oil refineries on Russian territory.

The first strike on a gas station in Kyiv took place on July 12. Two people were killed and another 12, including a 12-year-old boy and a first responder with the State Emergency Service of Ukraine, were injured in two successive strikes. In addition, gas stations were attacked in the Rivne and Zhytomyr regions, as well as near the Yahodyn border-crossing point in the Volyn region, on the border with Poland. Whereas Russian forces previously targeted gas stations predominantly in frontline and border areas, this campaign has now spread to western Ukraine.

Russian forces continue to intensively attack Ukrainian trains. Ukrainian Railways (Ukrzaliznytsia) clarified the circumstances of the recent strike on a locomotive at Yahodyn station on the border with Poland, near which the aforementioned gas station was also hit. Shortly before the attack, a diplomatic train carrying security advisers from several EU countries, as well as former European leaders, including Boris Johnson, had departed from there. Another train, carrying former CIA Director David Petraeus, remained at the station, but after an air-raid alert was issued, the passengers were evacuated 15 minutes before the strike. As a result, no one was injured. Ukrzaliznytsia does not rule out that the diplomatic train itself may have been the target.

On Sept. 12, the RuAF also attacked a passenger train in the city of Lutsk. The Russian MoD does not conceal the fact that it strikes trains, claiming that they are used for AFU logistics. However, the published footage regularly shows ordinary passenger trains, and strikes are increasingly hitting not only locomotives but also the railcars themselves.

Russian strikes on first responders and facilities of the State Emergency Service of Ukraine also continue. On Sept. 12, a first responder was wounded in a double-tap strike in Kramatorsk; in Zaporizhzhia on the same day, Russian forces struck the building of a local unit of the State Emergency Service of Ukraine; and on Sept. 13, four first responders were injured in a similar attack in the Donetsk region. This practice has been observed since at least last year: Russian forces strike fire stations, rescue vehicles, and ambulances and carry out follow-up strikes after emergency services arrive. In addition, delayed-detonation munitions are used, creating an additional threat to first responders and civilians being evacuated. The systematic nature of such attacks indicates that in many cases, emergency services are selected as targets, while the "From Mariupol to the Carpathians" Telegram channel regularly states explicitly that such strikes are deliberate in the city of Kherson and the Kherson region.

Commenting on strikes on shopping centers, gas stations, data centers, transport and pharmaceutical enterprises, food warehouses, and other civilian facilities, Russian President’s spokesman Dmitry Peskov stated in an interview with Pavel Zarubin that Russian forces "did not strike everything indiscriminately" until Kyiv, through its actions, "opened Pandora's box." This is untrue: Russian strikes on shopping centers, first responders, and other civilian infrastructure have been occurring since the start of the full-scale war. What has changed is primarily their scale and focus.

Following the start of the Ukrainian campaign against Wildberries and Ozon warehouses in July of this year, Russian forces quickly expanded the list of targets to include food and pharmaceutical warehouses, civilian trains, road transport companies, data centers, and gas stations. The Russian MoD openly acknowledges many such strikes, invariably claiming that the facilities hit were linked to the AFU, military logistics, or production. At the same time, the ministry remains silent about attacks on shopping centers, which have recently often occurred during the day when visitors are inside. We consider strikes on civilian objects that do not make an effective contribution to combat to be war crimes.

In early summer, what was happening could be described as a "war of the cities": amid relatively low activity on the frontline, both sides increasingly relied on long-range airstrikes. Since mid-July, fighting has intensified again, but the campaign against civilian infrastructure in the rear continues to expand.

As an alternative historical analogy, one can consider the medieval term chevauchée, French for "horseback ride." During the Hundred Years' War, it referred to devastating raids in which participants destroyed settlements, crops, and supplies, drove off livestock, and undermined the enemy's economy. At the same time, such raids were intended to demonstrate to the population that their sovereign was unable to protect them. Today's "Putin's chevauchée" pursues similar objectives: inflicting maximum economic damage on Ukraine, paralyzing civilian life, undermining public trust in the Ukrainian authorities, and increasing the cost of supporting the country for its Western allies.

In the early hours of Sept. 11, Ukrainian Flamingo cruise missiles struck the Volgogradpromproekt enterprise in Russia's Volgograd region. The plant manufactures combustion catalysts for solid rocket propellant used, among other things, in Iskander ballistic missiles and Zircon missiles. The facility is subject to US sanctions, and its links to Russian defense and missile programs are confirmed by a Russian court ruling.

Satellite imagery and photos show a partial collapse of one of the buildings and broken windows in other buildings. Another missile apparently missed, judging by a crater roughly 170 meters from the impact site. This was likely due to insufficient guidance accuracy, although it is impossible to determine this from the imagery. The extent of the damage remains unclear, but the strike continues Ukraine's campaign against Russia's missile industry and marks another documented use of the Flamingo missile.

Ukrainian strikes on Russian oil refineries continue. On Sept. 13, the TANECO refinery in Tatarstan [Russia's constituent republic] and the oil refinery in Slavyansk-on-Kuban in the Krasnodar region were attacked. Satellite imagery of the latter shows signs of a large fire.

In Taganrog, the strike hit the area of the airfield, where a tank farm caught fire. The Dos’ye Shpiona [Spy Dossier] Telegram channel reported that a Pantsir-S1 surface-to-air missile and anti-aircraft artillery system, which had recently returned to service after repairs, was hit again. However, it is unclear whether it was destroyed or merely damaged again. According to the channel, the airfield is now protected by neither Pantsir-S1 systems nor S-300 and S-400 SAM systems, although mobile fire teams may still be deployed there. In addition, a warehouse belonging to Atlant Aero, a company that manufactures Molniya drones, was hit.

Serhii "Flash" Beskrestnov, an adviser to the president of Ukraine on defense technology development, suggested that Russian forces are taking advantage of bad weather to launch Shahed attacks against western Ukraine. Heavy cloud cover, fog, and precipitation make it more difficult to detect UAVs from the ground and destroy them with mobile fire teams, aircraft, and interceptor drones. It is also possible that some air-defense assets have been redeployed to Kyiv to protect against jet-powered Shaheds, weakening air defenses in the western regions.

The KiberBoroshno Telegram channel combined a satellite image of cloud cover, a precipitation radar map, and the routes of Russian UAVs in the early hours of Sept. 12. The northern and western regions of Ukraine were covered by dense clouds at the time, while skies over the east and the Dnipro region remained clear. The drones’ routes ran primarily beneath the clouds: through the Chernihiv region and then westward via Korosten toward Volyn. However, this is only a single episode so far, so the correlation between the routes and cloud cover does not yet prove that this is a new tactic and may be coincidental. The use of such a tactic can be confirmed only if similar attacks are repeated systematically.

Oleh Ivashchenko, head of the Main Directorate of Intelligence [HUR] of Ukraine's Ministry of Defense, told The Times in an interview that Ukrainian intelligence had identified six relay stations near the Belarusian border that provide communications for Russian drones and allow them to operate deeper into western Ukraine. Earlier, Ukrainian authorities warned Belarusian officials that they would destroy such facilities if they were not shut down. According to Ivashchenko, the relay stations stopped operating for some time afterward, but some later resumed operation. This may explain why Russian Shahed routes run as close as possible to the Belarusian border, where the drones can maintain communications with their operators. A similar pattern can be seen in infographics posted by the Strategic Aviation Telegram channel on Sept. 12 and Sept. 13: UAVs flew either over frontline regions or along the border with Belarus.

French analyst Clément Molin described this strike as the first large-scale attack on western Ukraine since May 2026 and noted the return of a significant number of conventional piston-engine Shahed-136 [Geran-2] loitering munitions following a prolonged campaign in which primarily jet-powered UAVs were used against Kyiv and other targets. The exact proportion of the various drone types cannot be assessed, as the Ukrainian Air Force does not publish such statistics. However, on some days, it has indicated that jet-powered drones were in the minority.

Video has emerged showing the use of the Ukrainian Stugna-P ATGM system against UAVs. The type of missile employed is not specified, although a specially modified RK-2P-3 missile designed for this role was publicly presented last week. The primary challenges remain the timely detection of targets and accurate missile guidance; it is still unclear how effective such a solution will be.

We need your support to continue our efforts. Please consider making a monthly donation to CIT through our fundraising page or Patreon.