Sitrep for July 13-17, 2026 (as of 10 a.m. UTC+3)
Ukrainian Defense Minister Resigns
The biggest news story this week has been the resignation of Ukrainian Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov. Technically, it was not a dismissal: following the resignation of Prime Minister Yulia Svyrydenko, the entire cabinet was automatically dissolved, and Fedorov was not invited to join the new administration. Publicly, however, he has already been blamed for failing to reform the territorial recruitment centers (TCCs) and the broader mobilization system. In recent weeks, clashes between civilians and TCC personnel have escalated. For instance, a riot against forced recruitment erupted in Lviv on July 8, and on July 14, recruitment officers assaulted a woman while attempting to detain a man.
It is worth noting that the TCCs do not answer to the defense minister; instead, they report directly to the Ground Forces and the Commander-in-Chief of the AFU, General Oleksandr Syrskyi. This point was underscored by Ukrainian milblogger Tatarigami from the Frontelligence Insight team, as well as Rob Lee, a Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute. The issues plaguing Ukrainian mobilization stem less from individual high-ranking officials than from the systemic flaws of the entire apparatus. These problems are so massive and deeply entrenched that they cannot be solved without comprehensive systemic reform. Even under an accelerated timeline, fixing them within a few months appears impossible, with a timeframe of a year or so being the more realistic horizon.
At the same time, sources indicate that the demand to overhaul the TCCs by fall is driven by speculation that Vladimir Putin might declare a general mobilization in late September. However, we have yet to see any compelling reasons for the Russian leadership to take it. Official reports from the frontline show the Russian Armed Forces advancing in all directions, albeit at a relatively slow pace. A total collapse of the frontline, akin to the events of early September 2022, remains difficult to envision for now, while Ukrainian counteroffensive actions remain localized.
The dismissal of Fedorov sparked protests across Ukraine. Against this backdrop, the former minister held a press conference in which he outlined his accomplishments while in office, explained the reasons for his dismissal and identified 11 major problems within the Ukrainian military. According to Fedorov, when he took over the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, he found an institution where no one was held accountable, commanders were rotated constantly, officers deemed disloyal were sidelined and major reform initiatives were routinely blocked. He said he had proposed dismissing Syrskyi and Chief of the General Staff Andrii Hnatov in order to improve the combat effectiveness of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the war against Russia. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy refused to remove Syrskyi, to which Fedorov responded that he would learn to work with him. According to the former minister, instead of focusing on resolving the AFU's systemic problems, the commander-in-chief engaged in political maneuvering and ultimately presented the president with an ultimatum: "Either him or me."
Zelenskyy stated that he was confident Fedorov would remain part of his team. Fedorov, however, revealed that he had been offered the position of presidential adviser but declined. According to The Economist, Zelenskyy also proposed appointing him as prime minister, an offer that Fedorov likewise rejected.
When Fedorov assumed the post of defense minister earlier this year, he unveiled an ambitious reform agenda for the ministry. His proposals included restructuring the Armed Forces' organizational framework, overhauling the appointment of commanders and introducing a new system for career advancement. These initiatives encroached on Syrskyi's area of responsibility and extended far beyond the MoD's traditional administrative functions, such as procurement of military equipment, including unmanned systems, logistical support for units and overseeing defense-industrial cooperation. At that time, we assessed that these reforms were likely to trigger a direct confrontation and could ultimately lead to the minister's resignation, as reaching an agreement with Syrskyi on such matters appeared exceptionally difficult. During his briefing, Fedorov openly acknowledged that Syrskyi had indeed been reluctant to cooperate or implement the proposed reforms.
Among the problems highlighted by Fedorov, one of the most significant was the distribution of supplies among units based on their loyalty to the General Staff and to Syrskyi personally, rather than operational requirements. This recalls longstanding criticism of the commander-in-chief over his alleged "personal guard"—assault regiments that were consistently given priority for supplies, reinforcements and troop rotations. Although Fedorov's team analyzed battlefield casualties to identify which formations were suffering the greatest personnel shortages and therefore required priority reinforcement, the military leadership reportedly disregarded those assessments. Every systemic reform initiative encountered protracted approval procedures, repeated demands to justify its necessity and persistent bureaucratic delays. One example cited was a program to establish baseline drone allocations for brigades, which remained stuck in the approval process for four months before receiving authorization.
Among other things, Fedorov pointed to a culture of persistent dishonesty within the military. He said he was accused of orchestrating politically motivated investigations targeting Syrskyi and was portrayed in a negative light. According to Fedorov, senior officials and journalists are often susceptible to such rumors, reacting emotionally and accepting a convenient version of events without critically assessing the available evidence or carefully verifying the sources.
Some of Fedorov's proposals seem unusual for a defense minister. For example, he developed the concept of "drone-assault units," in which infantry would be deployed only after drones had largely cleared enemy positions. He also proposed implementing a doctrine that prioritizes preserving personnel and straightening the frontline where the terrain and tactical situation permit. Naturally, all of this encroached on the commander-in-chief's area of responsibility and predictably met with resistance.
Fedorov's resignation prompted Deputy Commander of the Ukrainian Air Force Pavlo Yelizarov, known for the "Lasar's Group" drone unit, to leave his post. Moreover, he submitted a request for discharge from military service altogether, not merely from his position as deputy commander. According to Yelizarov, there is now no point in continuing military service. At the time of his appointment as deputy commander of the Air Force, Western experts noted his strong qualifications and extensive experience. With his departure, the Ukrainian military has now lost two highly qualified senior professionals.
If one considers the long-term consequences of Fedorov's dismissal, including the potential loss of public confidence in the military leadership, even the most pessimistic scenario does not point to a complete collapse of Ukraine's defenses, but rather to a significant slowdown in the current trend along the frontline. Had Fedorov remained in office, a stable pattern might have emerged in which the AFU consistently recaptured more territory each month than the RuAF seized. In the baseline scenario without Fedorov, the pace of territorial changes is likely to continue fluctuating around zero, as it has over the past several months, making it much harder for Ukraine to achieve a sustained net reversal of Russian advances.
His dismissal could also slow the delivery of military aid from Ukraine's partners. In several instances, favorable outcomes for Kyiv were achieved largely through Fedorov's personal relationships with allied governments, as in the case with Starlinks. In particular, Ukraine could face greater difficulties in procuring PAC-3 interceptor missiles for Patriot air defense systems, concluding drone procurement agreements with European countries, obtaining artillery and armored vehicles for the AFU, and organizing defense production in partner countries. Those personal relationships were Fedorov's key advantage over other potential candidates for the post of defense minister.
For now, Zelenskyy has tasked Major General Yevhenii Khmara, head of the Special Operations Center "А" of the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU), with serving as acting defense minister. His appointment, along with that of the foreign minister, was supposed to be approved by the Verkhovna Rada, but lawmakers recessed until Aug. 18. Prime Minister Koretskyi later announced that Khmara had been appointed acting defense minister, while Andrii Sybiha was named acting foreign minister.
Khmara is a widely respected general who oversaw Spiderweb Operation. However, directing combat operations has little in common with the day-to-day responsibilities of a defense minister, whose work is primarily administrative, bureaucratic, logistical and diplomatic.
Pro-Russian war bloggers reacted very positively to Fedorov's dismissal. They appear to recognize that his reforms helped the AFU effectively resist the RuAF in recent months.
Ukrainian and Russian Strikes
In response to Ukrainian strikes on vessels in the Azov and Black Seas, the RuAF have been attacking ports and ships in the Odesa region. Footage has been published showing a strike on a cargo ship en route to the port of Chornomorsk, as well as damage to port infrastructure in the Odesa region.
The Financial Times reports that the attacks on the port of Odesa have disrupted supply chains and contributed to rising global grain prices. Reuters, citing the Ukrainian Agrarian Council, reports that Ukraine has lost about one-third of its grain export capacity due to the intensification of Russian strikes on its Black Sea ports.
In our previous sitrep, we suggested that Ukraine had run out of PAC-3 interceptor missiles. It is possible that the AFU have recently received a new batch. On July 11, none of the six incoming ballistic missiles were intercepted. However, on July 14, five out of eight missiles were intercepted, and on July 16, three out of eight were shot down. This was likely a very limited shipment, and the Ukrainian Air Force appears to be trying to stretch its supply for as long as possible by calculating missile trajectories and intercepting only those heading toward the highest-priority targets.
Ukraine's new Prime Minister, Serhii Koretskyi, speaking before the Verkhovna Rada prior to his appointment, emphasized that this winter could become the most difficult since the start of the full-scale war. In our previous sitrep, we noted that Russia traditionally shifts its focus during the second half of the year toward strikes on energy infrastructure, as well as the gas production and distribution sectors, in an attempt to disrupt heating, electricity and water supplies ahead of winter and trigger a humanitarian crisis. It is important not to fall into the survivorship bias of assuming that because Ukraine endured previous harsh winters, it will inevitably manage this one as well. Russian missile strikes, including with ballistic missiles, on energy infrastructure have a cumulative effect, and the damage becomes more severe with each successive wave.
The Security Service of Ukraine has released footage showing unmanned surface vessels attacking two Russian shadow fleet tankers in the Black Sea. According to the report, during the attack, Russian aircraft attempted to destroy the maritime drones using machine guns and air-dropped bombs, but without success. Meanwhile, a day earlier, the Russian MoD published a compilation showing unmanned surface vessels being destroyed with Lancet loitering munitions, air-dropped bombs and small arms fire. It is worth noting that each side publishes only footage that reflects favorably on its own performance while omitting unsuccessful engagements. To obtain a more complete picture, it is necessary to consult a variety of sources.
Footage has also been published showing a US-made Hornet drone striking a Sukhoi Su-24 tactical bomber at Saky Air Base in Crimea. Judging by the footage, the aircraft appears to have been decommissioned, as part of the cockpit canopy and a section of the vertical stabilizer were missing. It is worth noting that the distance from AFU positions in the Kherson region to Saky Air Base is nearly 200 kilometers [124 mi], and it remains unclear how the drone managed to cover such a long distance. One possible explanation is that balloons were used to assist the flight, especially since there have previously been reports of such experiments.
According to Ukrainian military expert Serhii "Flash" Beskrestnov, relay stations in Belarus are likely still being used periodically during attacks on Ukraine. On July 15, during an attack on the town of Malyn in the Zhytomyr region, a Shahed-136 (Geran-2) loitering munition jet flew along the border with Belarus. It then flew over a highway to Korosten, turned around and flew directly over the railway to Malyn, where it attacked a gas station. This behavior is typical of a UAV being manually piloted using its onboard camera. The distance from the attack site to the Russian border is 260 kilometers [161 mi], which is too far for a direct radio link. Additionally, there were no other UAVs in the air at that time that could have served as relay stations.
At the Pennsylvania Defense and Innovation Summit, CIA Director John Ratcliffe said that the agency's intelligence aligns with some open-source reports estimating the current average life expectancy of a Russian recruit on the battlefield in Ukraine at 20 to 30 minutes. This information actually came from a post on an anonymous Telegram channel with 5,000 subscribers. The authors cited an article that supposedly referenced an independent study. The New York Post later cited this publication, apparently supplying Ratcliffe with false data. Aside from the dubious source and the claim's overall implausibility, it is also unclear from what point the authors believe those 20 to 30 minutes should be measured.
According to the Vyorstka media outlet, volunteers delivering humanitarian aid to Russian soldiers in the combat zone have had difficulty organizing travel due to the fuel shortage. Although this could lead to localized difficulties, it does not indicate widespread and significant problems for the military. Russian military expert Yan Matveev published a video showing border guards on the Crimean Peninsula thanking the volunteer organization Dva Mayora [Two Majors] for helping procure equipment used to transport fuel, and argued that the group was supplying fuel to the military. We would note, however, that the video refers to equipment for transporting fuel, not to fuel itself. Moreover, the recipients are border guards, not military personnel directly involved in frontline operations. We therefore continue to believe that fuel shortages do not have a direct impact on combat operations. While they may have some limited effect on the war, for example, by complicating troop rotations in certain sectors of the frontline or making it more difficult to refuel generators, we have not observed any significant operational impact.
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