Sitrep for Jan. 12-16, 2026 (as of 10:30 a.m. UTC+3)

Frontline Situation Update

This week, the Russian Armed Forces seized another small area in the border part of Ukraine’s Sumy region—the village of Komarivka, located north of the main Russian bridgehead. As we have repeatedly noted, the border area effectively constitutes a contested zone, so crossing the border and entering the village evidently posed little difficulty. At the same time, Komarivka is located far from the main Russian bridgehead, and its capture is militarily impractical. Advancing deeper into Ukrainian territory and opening up a new direction of attack would clearly require additional resources, which the RuAF already lack. The reason for announcing the capture of Komarivka became more or less clear after a statement by General Valery Gerasimov, Chief of the General Staff of the RuAF, who claimed that Russian forces had seized eight settlements in the first two weeks of the new year. Apparently, for the sake of this same report, the village of Hrabovske was declared captured only on Jan. 5, although in reality it had been occupied before the New Year.

Gerasimov also stated that in the Kupiansk direction, the Group of Troops "West" is "continuing the elimination" of Ukrainian units allegedly encircled on the eastern bank of the Oskil River, and that the "liberation" of the village of Kupiansk-Vuzlovyi is nearing completion. He further claimed that after the "liberation" of Kupiansk in November last year, the AFU made several attempts to demonstrate their supposed presence in the town, including by placing flags on administrative buildings using drones. However, this is not merely routine exaggeration or propaganda rhetoric. Rather, Gerasimov’s statements amount to a demonstrative denial of the actual situation, which is evident even to pro-Russian audiences. In his narrative, there simply was no successful Ukrainian counteroffensive that resulted in the clearance of most of Kupiansk. Yet quite recently, Ukrainian forces liberated part of the town center, where Russian assault units had previously been encircled, and raised the Ukrainian flag over the town hall. Kupiansk-Vuzlovyi, meanwhile, remains deep in the Ukrainian rear, rather than on the line of contact as Gerasimov claims.

In the Borova direction, slightly south of Kupiansk, the RuAF advanced near the village of Lozova, while the capture of Bohuslavka remains unconfirmed.

In the Lyman direction, the situation for the AFU continues to gradually deteriorate. Russian troops have been reported near the village of Pryshyb, located on the left bank of the Siverskyi Donets River northwest of the town of Lyman. RuAF units are also present near the village of Yarova and the town of Sviatohirsk. According to some reports, Yarova has already been captured by Russian forces, although we have not yet seen confirmation of this. A video has been published showing a Russian strike on a pontoon crossing near the village of Bohorodychne, intended to disrupt Ukrainian supply routes.

In the Kostiantynivka direction, Russian forces continue to build up near the villages of Stepanivka, Illinivka and Berestok, in order to infiltrate the western outskirts of the town of Kostiantynivka in small groups. Reports indicate attempts to bypass the town along the banks of reservoirs to reach the village of Oleksiievo-Druzhkivka, with the aim of cutting off the supply road for Ukrainian forces in Kostiantynivka. However, it remains a contested area, into which RuAF soldiers penetrate using infiltration tactics.

In addition, Russian troops have begun infiltrating the northeastern outskirts of Kostiantynivka as well, advancing from the villages of Stupochky and Predtechyne. Moving first along the road and then through wooded areas, they are entering the Hora residential district.

Kostiantynivka now appears to be facing a scenario similar to that previously implemented in Pokrovsk: over many months, Russian forces gradually—and often seemingly unnoticed—build up their presence using infiltration tactics, before moving to seize district after district. As in Pokrovsk, the capture of Kostiantynivka is likely to begin from the southwest, following the pattern of Russian advances from the villages of Pishchane, Zvirove and Leontovychi (known as Pershe Travnia until 2024). It is worth noting that during these months of preparation in Pokrovsk, the AFU regularly reported the destruction of one or another "sabotage and reconnaissance group" that had entered the town. In the case of Kostiantynivka, the situation is further complicated by the activity in this area of the RuAF Rubikon UAV unit, which is capable of significantly disrupting logistics, supply and troop rotations.

On the Zaporizhzhia axis, the RuAF continued their advance near Huliaipole. As previously reported, Russian forces forded the Haichur River north of the town, and have since managed to straighten the frontline, bringing a significant part of Huliaipole under Russian control. Although the RuAF have long claimed the town’s complete capture, fighting is still ongoing on its outskirts. A Ukrainian serviceman who runs the Telegram channel Huliaipole Spotter released footage of a UAV strike on a Russian MT-LB multi-purpose armored vehicle on one of the town’s streets, followed by the detonation of the munitions it was carrying. This confirms the expansion of the RuAF’s control zone, as previously Russian military vehicles were destroyed even before entering the town.

In the western part of the Zaporizhzhia axis, Russian forces continue advancing in the village of Stepnohirsk and along the former shoreline of the Kakhovka Reservoir near the village of Prymorske. Researcher Playfra reports that about 100 Russian soldiers present, including a significant number of drone operators, are present in the contested zone in Prymorske. Most Ukrainian troops have withdrawn toward the village of Malokaterinivka. Russia’s Ministry of Defense has claimed the capture of the village of Novoboikivske (with neighboring Lukianivske allegedly captured earlier), but there is no confirmation of this.

Ukrainian military observer Kostiantyn Mashovets suggests, and we agree, that in the west of Zaporizhzhia region, Russian forces plan to move along the Dnipro River, then along the Konka River toward the village of Komyshuvakha, with the objective of placing the H-08 highway under fire control. This would cut off the supply of Ukrainian forces in the town of Orikhiv, with further plans to attack it from several directions—for example, from the southeast, from the village of Mala Tokmachka, as well as from the west. It should be noted that the H-08 highway lies beyond the Konka River, which will be difficult to ford, so the road is likely to be taken under fire control by drones. However, it is hard to predict how the situation will develop. Ukrainian forces are likely anticipating a Russian advance toward Komyshuvakha, and if they manage to prevent it, the RuAF may turn toward the city of Zaporizhzhia.

A report has been published on the 10th Guards Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Protection Troops of the RuAF which, among other things, shows the deployment of aerosol screens using a motorcycle. We have not previously observed this method of using smoke grenades.

Ukrainian and Russian Strikes

In the early hours of Jan. 14, a Ukrainian UAV attacked the Nevinnomyssk Azot plant in the Stavropol region; the facility has previously been struck at least four times. Repeated attacks clearly demonstrate that the drones primarily used by Ukraine for long-range strikes are equipped with warheads too small to inflict significant damage on the plant or halt production.

In the early hours of Jan. 13, the Atlant-Aero plant in Taganrog was attacked. The facility produces Molniya UAVs and components for Orion drones. Satellite imagery of the aftermath shows several destroyed buildings. Mashovets wrote that, according to some reports, over the eight months of 2025 Russia invested more than $1 billion in the production of Molniya UAVs, manufacturing as many as 900,000 units.

As we noted in the previous sitrep, this winter is significantly colder than previous ones, meaning that every strike on Ukraine’s overstretched power grid has more severe consequences. Prolonged power outages are being observed, along with disruptions to heating and water supplies. In some residential buildings in Kyiv, water that was not drained from shared systems caused heating pipes to burst. On Jan. 15, large-scale outages were reported in the city of Kharkiv; according to Volodymyr Zelenskyy, hundreds of thousands of residents were left without electricity and heating.

Following the attacks on the Belgorod region in the early hours of Jan. 9, many areas experienced power disruptions lasting several days.

On Jan. 14, while repelling a Ukrainian air attack, an anti-aircraft missile hit a residential high-rise building in Rostov-on-Don, killing a man. We are confident that the impact was not caused by a drone, because video footage shows the glow from the missile's operating engine and a trail starting from the ground. The missile's deviation from its course was likely caused by a technical malfunction.

A video has been published showing the interception of a Shahed-type loitering munition equipped with an R-60 air-to-air missile by an interceptor drone. Such missiles can be used against helicopters or light aircraft attempting to intercept drones, but no such successful use has been reported so far.

Ukrainian military expert Serhii "Flash" Beskrestnov reported that on Jan. 15, control of a BM-35 loitering munition via Starlink was recorded for the first time. It is expected that Starlink terminals may soon appear on Shahed drones as well. In November 2025, Starlink equipment was found in a downed drone resembling the Molniya UAV, and in December, a photo of a Molniya-2 UAV equipped with a Starlink terminal emerged.

Former Ukrainian Defense Minister Denys Shmyhal has become Ukraine’s Minister of Energy and First Deputy Prime Minister.

Mykhailo Fedorov is the new Minister of Defense of Ukraine, having previously served as Minister of Digital Transformation. In his speech to the Verkhovna Rada [Ukraine’s Parliament] before taking office, he stated that his goal is to change the system by carrying out army reform, improving infrastructure at forward positions, eradicating lies and corruption, fostering a culture of leadership and trust, and ensuring that people who deliver real results are rewarded with opportunities for career growth. Fedorov said he and Volodymyr Zelenskyy share a clear understanding of the goals of the war. Those who help achieve these goals will receive the necessary resources to move forward, while those who fail to do so will leave the system.

As in many other countries, Ukraine's Minister of Defense is a civilian position. The minister is responsible for logistics, partnership agreements, procurement and so on. The army itself is commanded by the Commander-in-Chief of the AFU, General Oleksandr Syrskyi. Therefore, Fedorov’s statements about army reform and potential changes to the command structure seem like an intrusion into Syrskyi’s area of responsibility.

In an interview with Reuters, Donald Trump reiterated his claim that it is Zelenskyy, rather than Putin, who is delaying a peace agreement. However, we do not place much significance on this statement because we believe it is just another emotional outburst by the US president who may soon shift the blame back to Putin.

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