Sitrep for Dec. 19-22, 2025 (as of 9:30 a.m. UTC+3)

Frontline Situation Update

In the Kupiansk direction, the situation has become extremely unfavorable for the Russian army. Although the town of Kupiansk is officially listed as captured, even pro-Russian mil-bloggers acknowledge that this is not the case. Pro-Russian military correspondent Vladimir Romanov marked what is effectively an encirclement of Russian forces in the town on his map, while the Slivochny Kapriz [Creamy Caprice] project showed a salient with a very narrow base, meaning that troops in the center are almost completely surrounded. Meanwhile, there have been no official statements claiming that the current fighting is aimed at relieving the encircled Russian units in central Kupiansk.

At this point, it is hard to imagine how the Russian Armed Forces could break a corridor to the encircled troops: there are very few resources available for an advance from the direction of the village of Holubivka. The Group of Troops "West," which is responsible for this axis, is already overstretched along the frontline all the way to the equally important Lyman direction. It is worth noting that this sector is expected to become the northern flank of a future offensive toward the Sloviansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration, and diverting forces from it would visibly weaken the Russian pressure there. In our view, bringing Kupiansk under full control should be the top priority for the commander of Group of Troops "West," but any feasible course of action would come at the expense of Russian capabilities in other directions.

In the Siversk direction, Russian forces are advancing west of the Bakhmutka River both south of the town of Siversk—in the areas of the villages of Sviato-Pokrovske and Vasiukivka (with DeepState marking the village of Zvanivka as captured)—and north of it, near the village of Dronivka. Siversk itself is now almost entirely under Russian control.

In the Pokrovsk direction, the town of Myrnohrad remains a contested zone. On the DeepState map, since Dec. 20 the town center has no longer been marked as being under the control of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. As Ukrainian soldiers note, the whole Myrnohrad and the surrounding areas now consist of a patchwork of Russian and Ukrainian positions. Fighting is also taking place near the villages of Hryshyne and Udachne west of Pokrovsk.

West of Udachne, fighting is ongoing for the village of Novopidhorodne in the Dnipropetrovsk region. A video reportedly filmed on Dec. 14 shows a building being blown up where allegedly RuAF soldiers were concentrating. Russian sources described the video as a strike on an AFU position. However, Ukrainian serviceman Andrii Babichev of the 93rd Mechanized Brigade—better known for his vlog Moto Life UA—stated that the village has already been captured by Russian forces. We assume that the RuAF will next turn north toward the village of Serhiivka and the Pokrovsk-Pavlohrad highway in order to further complicate Ukrainian supply lines in this direction and gradually advance toward Hryshyne.

In Pokrovsk, Russian soldiers have been observed engaging in looting, despite the threat to their lives from Ukrainian drones.

In the Huliaipole direction, the situation for Ukrainian forces continues to deteriorate. The RuAF are advancing in the town of Huliaipole and are approaching the road leading toward the village of Zaliznychne—the last supply road for Ukrainian troops. Once it is cut, the situation for the AFU will become even more difficult.

In Zaliznychne, civilians are being evacuated, although some of them—especially elderly people—continue to refuse to leave despite the clear danger. Russian drones have been recorded over the village. For example, in a video dated Dec. 15, a volunteer evacuation team came to Zaliznychne to pick up an elderly woman at the request of her daughter from the city of Zaporizhzhia. The woman refused to leave until the very end. As is often the case with elderly civilians, remaining in her own home mattered more to her than the escalating threat around her. These people are not waiting for the Russian army; rather, they fear abandoning their homes and livelihoods. Some openly say they would rather stay and die in their own houses. In this case, the woman agreed to evacuate only after her daughter threatened to come personally, even under the risk of drone strikes.

The DeepState project published a post accusing officers of the 102nd Territorial Defense Brigade of sabotage. According to the post, some officers allegedly encouraged their soldiers to flee the frontline. As a result, the brigade’s troops were reportedly unable to hold their positions, leading to a critically deteriorated situation in that sector.

Territorial Defense Forces are auxiliary units which, according to doctrine, are not intended to hold key sections of the frontline, conduct mobile combined-arms defense, repel large-scale mechanized assaults, or counter enemy artillery and armored formations. Their designated role is to hold the second line of defense, reinforce regular AFU brigades, secure rear areas and flanks, and protect lines of communication. This also includes so-called "gap plugging" in the defense—temporarily holding positions until regular units arrive.

In practice, however, reality often diverges from doctrine. Territorial Defense brigades are regularly deployed to forward positions, where they are required to hold entire sectors of the front on a permanent basis, often with little to no armored vehicles, which they typically lack, and without adequate artillery support. On the one hand, this practice is clearly driven by a shortage of combat-ready regular brigades, limited reserves, and political pressure to hold the frontline at any cost. On the other hand, it is fundamentally unfair to place responsibility for failures on the Territorial Defense Forces and accuse them of being incapable of carrying out missions for which these units were never designed.

At the same time, Russian forces deliberately seek out weak points in Ukrainian defenses in order to launch offensives, and these weak points are often sectors held by Territorial Defense brigades.

The 102nd Brigade held positions near Huliaipole for an extended period and sustained heavy losses. It should have been withdrawn to the rear long ago for replenishment and recovery. Instead, it was blamed for failing to withstand the Russian offensive. In our view, it would be more logical to place responsibility on the assault units that failed to stabilize the situation in this sector.

Similar situations have occurred before. For example, in the Vovchansk direction, where the 123rd Territorial Defense Brigade was accused of failing to hold a sector of the front that included a key supply road to Vuhledar.

Meanwhile, in the border area of the Sumy region, the RuAF entered the village of Hrabovske in the Krasnopillia district, which had been held by the 119th Territorial Defense Brigade. Taking advantage of the brigade’s lax discipline—fighters reportedly drinking with locals, making obscene gestures at Russian drones and generally neglecting security measures—the RuAF not only captured five servicemen but also, according to reports, abducted around 50 civilians.

Using Territorial Defense Forces to hold border areas, especially in the quietest sectors of the front, is generally reasonable. However, had this occurred in the Chernihiv region rather than the Sumy region, such consequences would most likely not have followed.

Ukrainian and Russian Strikes

Attacks on bridges in the western Odesa region continue, aimed at cutting transport links with Romania. On Dec. 19, the bridge in the village of Maiaky was struck with cluster munitions, though the rationale for using this type of munition against a bridge remains unclear. A photograph has circulated that reportedly shows a ferry crossing being towed toward Maiaky. Fuel trader Dmytro Leushkin noted that strikes on bridges in the Odesa region could deprive Ukraine of up to 60% of its fuel imports. It is uncertain whether the necessary volumes can be delivered by rail.

On Dec. 20, the SBU struck two Sukhoi Su-27 fighter jets at the Belbek airfield in Crimea. It is claimed that one of the aircraft was hit while positioned on the runway and ready for takeoff. The geolocation of the footage does not correspond to areas of the airfield where decommissioned aircraft are stored, suggesting that operational fighters were targeted. It should be noted that the Su-27 is an outdated aircraft and is used only sparingly in the current war, most likely for air patrols over the Black Sea. Russia’s primary combat aircraft are the Su-30SM, Su-35S and Su-34. In the early hours of Dec. 18, the SBU also struck an actively used Mikoyan MiG-31 at the same airfield with drones, as well as air defense assets.

On Dec. 19 and 20, the AFU struck electrical substations in the Belgorod region, and on Dec. 20, in the Rostov and Kursk regions. In parts of the Belgorod region, electricity consumption restrictions were imposed on Dec. 20 and 21.

On Dec. 15, a Turkish F-16 shot down an unidentified UAV, which was reportedly out of control and approaching Turkish airspace. On Dec. 19 and 20, two Russian reconnaissance UAVs—an Orlan-10 and a Merlin-VR—crashed in Turkey. Such deep incursions into Turkish territory are difficult to explain; we assume these drones were searching for Ukrainian unmanned surface vessels in the Black Sea and, after losing contact with their operators, continued flying on a straight course until running out of fuel.

On Dec. 19, the SBU attacked a tanker of the Russian "shadow fleet" in the Mediterranean Sea. This tanker, which was en route to the port of Ust-Luga, was attacked between Crete and Libya, after which it turned around and headed toward Egypt. The launch location of the aerial drone used in the attack is unknown.

Fresh photographs have emerged of the tanker Valery Gorchakov, which was attacked in the early hours of Dec. 18 in Rostov-on-Don. The vessel is partially submerged and surrounded by containment booms; no salvage operations are visible.

Ukraine has reached an agreement with Portugal on the joint production of "underwater drones." Portugal—a major maritime power in the early modern period and a pioneer of the Age of Discovery—will also allocate $29 million annually to the purchase of Ukrainian-made weapons and invest $59 million in the PURL mechanism, which allows allied countries to finance the purchase of US weapons for Ukraine.

The Come Back Alive foundation said it had modernized 16 ZSU-23-4 Shilka self-propelled anti-aircraft guns for Ukraine’s National Guard. These systems, armed with four automatic cannons, had been considered obsolete because of advances in electronics and were therefore little used in this war. As part of the upgrade, outdated radar stations were replaced with modern, multifunctional systems; the analog fire-control computer was swapped for a digital one; and new navigation systems, converters and other equipment were added. As a result, target processing time was reduced from 18 seconds to 0.2 seconds, the maximum detection range more than doubled, and the number of simultaneously tracked targets increased from one to 20. If the foundation’s statement is interpreted correctly, the modernization of all 16 systems cost just 400 million hryvnias—roughly $600,000 per unit, a fraction of the cost of acquiring new air-defense systems. The upgraded units are being used for point air defense, primarily against drones and, likely, cruise missiles.

We previously reported that several regions of the Volga Federal District significantly reduced their sign-up bonuses for military contracts toward the end of the year. We, along with other experts, assumed that by October these regions had reached high recruitment figures, enlisting more volunteer fighters than the national average, while at the same time spending a substantial share of their budgets. As a result, a decision was likely made to conserve funds toward the end of the year. On Dec. 19, the head of one of these regions—Mari El [Russia's constituent republic]—Yury Zaitsev, announced that starting Jan. 1, 2026, a payment of 2.5 million rubles [$31,000] will be provided for signing a contract in Mari El (2.1 million rubles [$26,100] from the regional budget and 400,000 rubles [$4,970] from the federal budget). This is consistent with our hypothesis, as a new reporting period begins on Jan. 1 and the regions will receive new recruitment targets.

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