Sitrep for Oct. 27-31, 2025 (as of 10:30 a.m. UTC+3)
Frontline Situation Update
Recently, primary attention has again shifted to the town of Pokrovsk, where the situation for Ukrainian forces continues to deteriorate. DeepState analysts have significantly expanded the contested area on the map, both within and beyond the town. It now reaches the outskirts of the village of Hryshyne, northwest of Pokrovsk. This area includes the two remaining supply routes to Pokrovsk—one running northwest toward the city of Pavlohrad and another to the north through Hryshyne itself. Russian soldiers have already been observed along both roads.
Citing Ukrainian military sources, DeepState reported how the Armed Forces of Ukraine are conducting street-clearing operations in the northern part of Pokrovsk. Russian assault troops that have entered the town are trying to avoid direct combat and use radios to warn one another so that those in the AFU’s path can hide in nearby buildings and later return to their previous positions when the danger has passed. This kind of "hide-and-seek" tactic arises from the AFU’s personnel shortage, a problem we have repeatedly noted as a major obstacle to effective urban defense.
At first, the AFU attempted to establish a defensive line along the railway. However, this effort failed, and Russian soldiers began increasingly penetrating north of it. They have been observed on the northern and northeastern outskirts (near the village of Rih), as well as to the northwest, where on Oct. 29, a Russian flag was raised—but soon destroyed—on the Pokrovsk stele. As is always the case in such situations, the flag photo op served primarily a propaganda purpose; such videos hold significance only when accompanied by evidence of a sustained troop presence in the area.
Under these conditions, defending the remaining part of Pokrovsk—let alone recapturing it—appears impossible. Its fall is inevitable and only a matter of time. Clearing such a large urban area with the forces currently available is unfeasible. The task would be far simpler in a wooded or open area; however, in a town, every building can serve as cover, preventing drones from detecting and targeting infantry—as researcher Playfra also noted. In urban warfare, this factor now works against the AFU because of their critical shortage of manpower.
A new video has appeared confirming the presence of some Russian drone operators directly on the frontline—unlike the AFU, which places such units in the rear. The footage is an intercepted video feed from a Russian drone showing it flying over the center of Pokrovsk and returning to a half-ruined building, where the operator catches it. The operator is dressed in civilian clothing, but we do not believe he is a non-combatant (for example, a journalist). Recently, Russian assault troops have often changed into civilian clothes to be less noticeable and operate more effectively in urban areas, while Russian war correspondents generally prefer to wear military camouflage.
The Russian Armed Forces are also trying to advance toward Pokrovsk from the direction of the village of Krasnyi Lyman in order to complete the encirclement of the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad agglomeration. Assault troops have been observed on the northern and eastern outskirts of Myrnohrad and near a mine on the southeastern edge of the town.
After Russian forces reached the supply roads of the agglomeration, the situation for Ukrainian units in the villages of Lysivka, Sukhyi Yar and Novopavlivka—south of Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad—became more difficult. Journalist Yuliia Kyryienko-Merynova from the TSN TV channel reported this, as well as the overall critical situation in this direction, on her Facebook page. Currently, the only way to supply the agglomeration and nearby villages is on foot, in order to avoid being spotted by the enemy.
Some, including the Ukrainian military, fear that the loss of Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad could have grave consequences, as there are virtually no fortifications behind these towns, and a flat road leads directly to Pavlohrad. However, we do not believe that the capture of Pokrovsk, Kostiantynivka or Kupiansk would significantly accelerate the Russian advance. The capture of salient areas around these towns could occur rapidly if the AFU decide to withdraw in order to preserve personnel. Even in that case, however, the RuAF would not gain the capability to launch a large-scale offensive toward Pavlohrad, Kharkiv or especially Kyiv. It is worth noting that earlier fears—that the capture of Avdiivka, Toretsk or other towns would allow Russian forces to enter open operational space—have repeatedly proven unfounded. The RuAF’s shortage of personnel and armored vehicles almost entirely rules out the possibility of an operational-strategic breakthrough.
The salient in the Dobropillia direction has been almost completely mopped up in the western part up to the villages of Dorozhnie and Zapovidne (known as Nykanorivka until 2024), and up to the village of Shakhove in the east. Additionally, the AFU advanced further near Nove Shakhove. Meanwhile, the 51st Combined Arms Army of the RuAF, operating alongside naval infantry units, is attempting to hold the remaining part of the salient at its base and is also attacking from Krasnyi Lyman toward Rodynske and Pokrovsk. Ukrainian military observer Kostiantyn Mashovets has also suggested that Volodymyrivka has been captured, though we are not yet ready to confirm this claim.
No significant changes have been observed in the Kostiantynivka direction this week. Russian forces remain present in the Yahidka dacha area and occasionally reach the Santurynivka neighborhood.
In the Kupiansk direction, the Russian Ministry of Defense claimed to have captured the village of Sadove in the Kharkiv region, though no independent confirmations have been published so far.
Putin said that Russian forces were ready to cease fire for several hours and allow foreign and Ukrainian journalists to enter Pokrovsk, Myrnohrad and Kupiansk—provided they submitted a request to the Ukrainian military command. According to him, this would allow reporters to "verify" that Ukrainian troops are surrounded. We believe the Russian army could use such a temporary ceasefire to rotate assault troops that have penetrated these towns, deliver supplies and evacuate the wounded, thereby strengthening its foothold. The statement may also have been a response to posts by pro-war bloggers who mocked a report by General Valery Gerasimov, Chief of the Russian General Staff, claiming that 10,000 Ukrainian soldiers were encircled in Pokrovsk and Kupiansk. The earlier announcement of the capture of the village of Sadove may have been intended to support that narrative.
Ukrainian and Russian Strikes
Russian strikes on energy infrastructure continue. On Oct. 30, one of the targets was the Dobrotvirska Thermal Power Plant in the Lviv region, which has been attacked multiple times in previous years, likely as part of efforts to deprive Ukraine of the ability to import electricity from European countries. Energy and critical infrastructure facilities were also hit in the cities of Chernihiv and Dnipro, as well as in the Ivano-Frankivsk and Vinnytsia regions. During an airstrike on the Sloviansk Thermal Power Plant, two workers were killed and five others were injured.
A Slovak defense company has announced the delivery to Ukraine of the small Wolf 25 AD self-propelled anti-aircraft gun, equipped with a 25mm Oerlikon KBA cannon. In June, the Future Army outlet reported that Ukraine was testing two prototypes of the short-range air defense system, with an option to purchase several hundred vehicles to protect logistics infrastructure from small and medium-sized drones. The Wolf 25 AD combines the Slovak-made Wolf 4x4 armored vehicle by Deftech with the Mangart 25 AD turret from the Slovenian firm Valhalla Turrets. The announcement suggests the tests were successful and deliveries have begun.
Pro-Russian pro-war blogger Kirill Fyodorov reported that a Russian Kamov Ka-52 attack helicopter was lost during a mission to repel a drone raid, killing the crew. The incident likely occurred during the Ukrainian UAV raid, including in the Moscow region, in the early hours of Oct. 27. Unconfirmed reports suggest the Ka-52 may have been shot down by a Russian fighter jet that mistook it for a Ukrainian drone.
Following the attack, a video surfaced showing a fast-moving, elongated object. Some commentators claimed it was a Flamingo missile, but given the poor quality of the footage, we are not prepared to draw any conclusions—it could have been either a missile or a drone.
Seven Russian regions have already reduced sign-up bonuses for contracts with the MoD. All of them, except for Saint Petersburg, are located in the Volga Federal District. It is assumed that the reductions were coordinated to prevent volunteer fighters from signing contracts in neighboring regions offering higher bonuses.
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