Sitrep for Oct. 13-17, 2025 (as of 10:30 a.m. UTC+3)
Frontline Situation Update
In the Dobropillia direction, our assessment—as well as that of Ukrainian military observer Kostiantyn Mashovets—continues to differ from the DeepState map. We believe that the Russian Armed Forces have nearly regained control over the territory of the Dobropillia breakthrough and are continuing attempts to expand it. On the DeepState map, over the past few days, the area marked as occupied by Russian forces around the village of Kucheriv Yar and between the villages of Nove Shakhove and Shakhove has been further reduced. We have not seen any video evidence confirming these changes; it is possible that the project’s analysts obtained this information from their own sources or are deliberately publishing distorted data.
The situation near the village of Dorozhnie remains unclear. A video has been published showing a Ukrainian drone strike on a Russian position in a partially destroyed building on the village’s northern outskirts. It is not evident whether this reflects a permanent Russian presence or merely their occasional activity. Nevertheless, many military analysts agree that at least part of Dorozhnie remains under Russian control, even though DeepState maps mark the village as being in the Ukrainian rear.
At the base of the Dobropillia salient and slightly to the east, both sides are attempting offensives in the area of the Kazennyi Torets River. Russian forces are trying to carry out mechanized assaults under weather conditions unfavorable for UAV operations, while Ukrainian troops are repelling them. Depending on how much the overcast conditions interfered with aerial reconnaissance, FPV drones and artillery of the Armed Forces of Ukraine struck vehicles either near Ukrainian positions (for example, near the village of Volodymyrivka) or in the Russian rear (such as near the junction between the villages of Malynivka and Vozdvyzhenka).
Researcher Clément Moulin, studying current mechanized assaults, noted that Russian armored columns are forced to move along roads because of fortifications—anti-tank ditches, concrete pyramids, barbed wire and minefields. This predictability makes the work of Ukrainian drone operators easier. In some cases, large anti-tank ditches and barbed-wire barriers proved to be nearly impassable for infantry, forcing foot soldiers to stick to routes where obstacles had been cleared or where small bridges had been laid across the ditches.
In summary, all these attacks aimed at villages of Volodymyrivka, Shakhove and Sofiivka failed. In some instances, troops managed to dismount before the columns were destroyed, but they were unable to capture any territory. Contrary to expectations, Russian naval infantry took part in these assaults. These units were deployed to this sector at the end of summer. Previously, we expected their task would be to advance toward towns of Druzhkivka and Kostiantynivka, but presumably, due to difficulties faced by the 51st Combined Arms Army of the RuAF, they were redirected toward the Dobropillia direction.
To determine the exact frontline, we continue to monitor the situation and expect new evidence to come out: videos of attacks, drone strikes and flag displays. The analysis is not easy because the breakthrough area is relatively compact, while the contested zone remains quite wide.
Russia’s Ministry of Defense announced the capture of the villages of Kozatske (formerly Moskovske) and Balahan, meaning that the RuAF are successfully advancing toward the town of Myrnohrad, according to the Russian command. Additionally, the MoD reported that the village of Novopavlivka, located near the northeastern outskirts of Pokrovsk, was captured. However, available data is insufficient to classify it as a contested area. Thus, while there are indeed attempts to advance in the Pokrovsk direction, calling them successful would be a significant overstatement.
According to OSINT analyst Playfra, Ukrainian forces pushed Russian troops out of the dacha settlements southeast of Kostiantynivka in the Kostiantynivka direction. Playfra previously marked the dacha settlements as controlled by the RuAF, but now designates them as a contested area. The buildup in the dacha area was intended for a further assault on the Santurynivka neighborhood in Kostiantynivka. This intention was further confirmed by shelling and strikes on the area. However, the intensity of these attacks has recently decreased because there are no longer any positions from which to launch an assault on the town in the near future. Nevertheless, Russian units continue reaching the eastern outskirts of Kostiantynivka from the village of Predtechyne. There is also continued activity near Oleksandro-Shultyne and Ivanopillia.
In the Dnipropetrovsk region, Russian troops released footage of strikes and flag-ops from the village of Oleksiivka, north of Verbove. This suggests that the village has been captured, as the MoD claimed. Additionally, a video surfaced of a Russian airstrike on a vehicle bridge over the Vovcha River in the village of Pokrovske, leaving the bridge nearly destroyed. The purpose of this strike is to disrupt the AFU's supply in this area.
Meanwhile, the AFU may have captured the village of Oleksiivka in the Sumy region. Judging by the footage from the past few days, they have liberated most of the village, if not the entire village, as a result of counterattacks.
The AFU General Staff published a video featuring Asian-appearing military personnel surrounded by numerous FPV drones. They claimed that North Korean troops are still present in the Kursk region, conducting aerial reconnaissance and assisting in adjusting fire on Ukrainian positions in the Sumy region. The information was reportedly obtained through intercepted communications between North Korean operators and Russian soldiers firing from MLRS systems. However, we are skeptical of this information, as communication has been the weakest link in the past between Russian and North Korean forces. We previously reported on the presence of a limited number of North Korean troops in the Kursk region.
Western Assistance
Another Ramstein-format meeting of Ukraine’s allies took place, at the end of which new packages of military aid were announced—mainly under the PURL program (Prioritized Ukraine Requirements List). The Netherlands, Canada, Germany, Norway, Sweden, Belgium and other allied countries pledged between $5 million and $500 million each, bringing the total announced assistance to roughly $2 billion. As is always the case, the key question remains how quickly the AFU will actually receive this aid: how soon funds will be disbursed and how rapidly equipment can be procured or produced.
The PURL program is also connected to discussions about potential Tomahawk missile deliveries to Ukraine. Volodymyr Zelenskyy is said to be considering that financing mechanism alongside a "mega deal," potentially using frozen Russian assets. By "mega deal," an agreement is apparently meant between the United States and Ukraine on mineral extraction and a US-backed joint fund. This option has been discussed recently in connection with purchases of various weapons.
It is worth noting that talks on granting Ukraine an EU "reparations loan" have stalled because Belgium, where the Euroclear depository is located, has demanded that risks be shared among all EU countries. According to a Bloomberg source, the EU—or a group of member states—will provide guarantees to Euroclear and Belgium against possible Russian claims. The EU intends to reach a political agreement on the use of these assets at a meeting in Brussels next week, after which it will begin work on a mechanism to release funds by the second quarter of 2026.
The Kiel Institute for the World Economy, which tracks military assistance to Ukraine, reported that the volume of aid has decreased substantially in recent months. Despite the signing of a July 14 agreement on Ukraine’s PURL between the United States and NATO, total military aid in July and August declined by 43% compared with the amount delivered in the first half of the year.
A new joint US-Ukrainian development, the Artemis ALM-20 drone, has been reported. This advanced competitor to the Shahed-136 (Geran-2) loitering munition is claimed to have a 1,600 km [994 mi] range and a 45 kg [99 lb] warhead, and has already been tested on targets in Russia. Production will be located in Ukraine, the United States and Germany; the cost of the drone has not yet been disclosed.
Next week, final tests of systems designed to counter air-dropped bombs with Universal Gliding and Correction Module (UMPK) will take place as part of a NATO competition.
Following the Trump’s statement about the need to discuss with Putin the possible transfer of BGM-109 Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles (TLAM) to Ukraine, their phone conversation took place. Afterward, during a press conference, Trump said that these missiles are also needed for the United States of America and that Pentagon stocks cannot be depleted. This is far from the first case when, after a conversation, Trump sharply changes his position to reflect the opinion of his last interlocutor. There are also cases where Trump interpreted hints as a final decision. For example, on Oct. 15, he stated that Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi had assured him earlier that day that India would stop buying oil from Russia. However, later official statements appeared that Trump and Modi had not discussed this topic.
During the phone conversation, Trump and Putin agreed to meet in Budapest.
Ukrainian and Russian Strikes
In the early hours of Oct. 16, Russia launched the maximum number of ballistic missiles since the start of the full-scale invasion against Ukraine: 26 Iskander ballistic missiles and two Kinzhal air-launched ballistic missiles. The strikes primarily targeted power substations again.
According to Ukrainska Pravda, citing sources in the energy sector, Ukrainians should prepare for prolonged emergency and scheduled power outages.
It is worth noting that even short-term blackouts in parts of Ukraine require Russian forces to expend significant quantities of munitions. The same applies to Ukrainian attacks: until Ukraine possesses a comparable number of drones and missiles, it is reasonable to expect that large Russian cities are unlikely to experience sustained blackouts, though temporary outages in border regions remain likely.
In the early hours of Oct. 16, Ukrainian UAVs targeted the Balashovskaya substation in Russia’s Volgograd region, a key facility for interregional power transmission. The attack disrupted electricity supplies to several settlements in the Volgograd and Voronezh regions.
Conscription, Mobilization and Contract Military Service
German economist Janis Kluge has published a new analysis of Russia’s recruitment pace based on regional budget data—a methodology previously discussed in our sitreps. According to his calculations, nearly 100,000 people signed contracts with the MoD in the third quarter of 2025, or about 33,000 per month, slightly exceeding the totals from the first and second quarters.
It is worth noting that Vazhnyye Istorii [IStories, an independent Russian investigative outlet], based on federal budget expenditure data, reported a significant decline in army enlistment during the second quarter of 2025—a claim we viewed skeptically. If accurate, the reduction would likely already be reflected on the frontline. Since no decrease in combat intensity has been observed, it is probable that the federal budget data either distorted or that the payment structure for recruits has changed.
In 2025, at least six regions reduced the sign-up bonuses for concluding contracts with the MoD: the Ulyanovsk and Samara regions, as well as Russia’s constituent Republics of Tatarstan, Chuvashia and Mari El, all located in the Volga Federal District. In addition, the government of Saint Petersburg retroactively canceled a 1.6 million ruble [$20,200] payment for volunteer fighters in the BARS (Special Combat Army Reserve) units. These changes may reflect tightening regional budgets, even as other regions continue to increase their payouts.
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