Sitrep for Sept. 22-26, 2025 (as of 10 a.m. UTC+3)
Frontline Situation Update
In the Lyman direction, the Russian Armed Forces are advancing toward the village of Yampil from the Serebrianske forestry. Early footage from Yampil’s northeastern outskirts shows Russian soldiers gradually appearing. As in other cases, it is reasonable to expect a gradual infiltration of assault units that will accumulate before ultimately capturing the village.
The most significant frontline changes this week occurred in the South Donetsk direction, where Russian forces captured the villages of Novoivanivka in the Zaporizhzhia region and Novomykolaivka in the Dnipropetrovsk region, advancing westward from them.
According to researcher War Unit Observer, additional troops were transferred to this sector from the southwestern part of the Pokrovsk direction. This raises the question of whether the remaining Russian units can hold the weakened sector around the villages of Udachne and Kotlyne.
It is worth noting that the RuAF managed to cross the Vovcha River near the village of Ivanivka in the Dnipropetrovsk region, north of the village of Zelenyi Hai. In this sector, the border between the Donetsk and Dnipropetrovsk regions runs along the river itself.
The significance of the development lies in the fact that Russian troops not only crossed the waterway but also breached the New Donbas fortification line, which they had previously reached only in the Dobropillia direction. Although they have not yet established a firm foothold there, the situation nonetheless raises serious concerns.
In the Kostiantynivka direction, Russian assault troops continue to turn up in the dacha settlements southeast of Kostiantynivka. By doing so, they are closing in on the town’s administrative boundaries and preparing to move onto its outskirts later, using the same infiltration tactic.
The Russian Ministry of Defense posted a high‑resolution map of frontline changes covering the period from Jan. 1 to Sept. 25 on its official Telegram channel—a format that previously appeared only in the ministry’s video releases.
Beyond the poor cartographic design, which makes it hard to align this map with other sources, it is outright misleading. First, it completely omits any contested areas, effectively labeling many disputed territories as Russian-controlled. In addition, there are glaring errors; for example, in the Dobropillia direction, the map shows Russian forces positioned west of the town of Rodynske, a claim that does not correspond to the reality on the ground.
According to the DeepState map, the frontline passes east of the town. Although reports indicated that the RuAF had reached Rodynske, the advance was halted during counterattacks. A similar situation occurred in Kupiansk: the Russian MoD claimed that two-thirds of the town had been captured, but the poor quality of the map makes this impossible to confirm. Not only independent researchers but also pro-Russian bloggers doubted these claims.
In the Lyman direction, near the village of Shandryholove, where Russian troops were advancing, drone footage shows a drone attack on a person in civilian clothing who was running after a soldier. Ukrainian drone video indicates that the civilian was hit by a kamikaze drone, which another soldier unsuccessfully tried to shoot down with an assault rifle. Apparently, this soldier was trying to cover those running ahead of him, and after the drone hit the civilian, he ran away. Video from another angle, filmed by a Russian drone, shows the victim's clothing, in particular, blue pants. The Ukrainian footage also features a person in similar clothing: before the attack, standing in front of a house entrance next to a soldier. The same or a similar person can also be seen in the very beginning moving along the road with a group of servicemen. These frames do not allow us to conclude that the person was being held hostage.
The Ukrainian drone footage also contains an audio overlay, reportedly of intercepted Russian radio traffic with orders from a commander to kill all civilians during the mopping-up of Shandryholove, except for children. While the people shown in the video may not be those referred to in the audio, the impression created for viewers is that they are.
We cannot confidently say that any of the civilians shown in the Ukrainian video is a minor mentioned in the intercept. Nor can we confirm that the drone strike victim was an underage female.
After the first drone strike on the person in civilian clothing, soldiers ran up to the victim and stood nearby for some time. When they moved a few meters away, a second strike was delivered on the person lying on the ground, which is quite an unusual choice, as military personnel should in any case be the priority target. The servicemen then entered the yard of a residential building, where the soldier whom the civilian had been running after had previously hidden, and the victim began to crawl in the same direction.
The video of these strikes was first published on Sept. 17 by a Telegram channel of Russian soldiers, which indicates that the drones carrying out the strikes were most likely Ukrainian.
The recording of the interception, if authentic, indeed shows Russian war crimes. However, we cannot verify its authenticity. The fact that the audio is overlaid on a video of a UAV strike against a civilian may indicate an attempt by Ukrainian forces to shift attention away from their own possible war crimes. A single strike against a civilian can occur due to an error, for example, because of interference in the video transmission from the drone. But the second strike is not a crime only if it was clearly established that the target was not a civilian but a soldier in disguise.
In any case, this is another example of how dangerous it is for civilians to remain in frontline settlements.
In the Kursk region, North Korean military personnel are apparently present, but no longer in the role of infantry as before. This became known from a video by the wife of a soldier, who complained that her husband, a sapper, was reassigned to assault troops. This happened because sappers from North Korea arrived for mine-clearing in the Kursk region, replacing Russian soldiers. It was previously reported that North Korea might send sappers and workers to Russia.
Ukrainian and Russian Strikes
Researchers reported that in the Kherson region, Russia has begun to use cluster munitions for multiple rocket launchers produced in North Korea, presumably the 240mm North Korean M1991 system. It should be noted that the use of cluster munitions in residential areas is prohibited, even if there is a military target present.
On Sept. 23, the AFU struck a milling and specialized tool plant in Belgorod, injuring six people. Photos show a crater, suggesting that the strike was likely carried out by a missile, such as a GMLRS, rather than a UAV.
On Sept. 24, the Prymary special operations unit of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense struck two Antonov An-26 transport aircraft and ground surveillance radars in Crimea. Satellite images indicate that at least one aircraft was indeed hit.
On Sept. 25, the RuAF launched an Iskander missile strike on the Honcharivske training ground in the Chernihiv region, which is located approximately 113 kilometers from the Russian border. Casualties have been reported.
On Sept. 25, the Ukrainian Air Force reported that it managed to shoot down a Sukhoi Su-34 fighter-bomber aircraft, which had been carrying out strikes with guided aerial bombs on the city of Zaporizhzhia. The pro-Russian Telegram channels Fighterbomber and Voyevoda Veshchaet, both associated with the Russian Air and Space Force, published mournful posts indicating that one of the bomber’s crew members had been killed.
On the evening of Sept. 24, Denmark closed the airspace over Aalborg Airport due to "unidentified drones," which the country’s authorities do not link to Russia. The UAV-focused outlet Dronemagasinet suggested that Danish authorities may have mistaken a training flight of a light single-engine aircraft for a "drone intrusion." Normally, training aircraft do not enter major airport zones, but in theory this is possible: part of pilot training includes night flying, and the instructor may also have been ferrying the aircraft between airports.
On Sept. 26, reports again emerged of airspace closure over the same Aalborg Airport due to a suspicious drone-like object. We believe this resembles Russian false flag attacks (for example, locals with UAVs could be found on forums and offered payment for flights in some restricted area). An alternative explanation is that such incidents with amateur UAVs near prohibited facilities have always occurred but previously attracted little attention, whereas after the events in Poland and Estonia they have become more resonant and suspicious.
Speaking at the UN General Assembly, Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov stated that NATO and the EU have declared war on Russia through Ukraine and are directly participating in it. As we noted in the previous sitrep, given this position of the Russian authorities, it is misleading to compare current airspace violations over European countries by Russian aircraft with the earlier case of a Russian bomber entering Turkish airspace from Syria and being shot down.
At a press conference in Poland, representatives of defense manufacturer Fire Point announced that prior to launching serial production of the FP-5 Flamingo cruise missile, the company acquired a substantial stock of used Ivchenko AI-25 turbofan engines. Each unit reportedly has a remaining service life of up to 10 hours—insufficient for aviation use but adequate for post-repair testing and the missile’s operational flight phase, which lasts approximately 3.5 hours. Company officials claimed that thousands of such engines are available and that Fire Point procured them in advance to ensure uninterrupted production over several months. In parallel, the company is constructing a new facility for manufacturing engines from scratch. However, we believe that the claim of a reserve stock numbering in the thousands appears difficult to verify and may be overstated. It’s plausible that the figure was strategically inflated to attract investor interest and secure funding for the production ramp-up.
President Trump’s statements on the war in Ukraine continue to send mixed signals, prompting speculation that he is attempting to distance himself from a conflict he has been unable to resolve. After suggesting that Ukraine, backed by the European Union, could reclaim its full territorial integrity, Secretary of State Marco Rubio reaffirmed the administration’s longstanding position: that the war will not be settled on the battlefield, but through negotiations. Despite expressing goodwill toward both Ukraine and Russia, Trump has notably refrained from proposing any concrete measures to bolster Ukraine’s defense. His remarks omitted mention of additional weapons, financial assistance, intelligence sharing, or technological support. His call for sanctions against Russia has also drawn skepticism, as it hinges on implausible conditions—such as demanding that NATO countries impose sweeping tariffs on China. In a separate exchange, Trump declined to clarify whether the United States would back NATO in the event of an attack on Russian aircraft within alliance airspace, stating only that it "depends on the circumstances."
Photos have emerged showing Bradley infantry fighting vehicles in service with the 13th Operational Brigade of the National Guard of Ukraine. The vehicles were likely included in the latest shipments of US military aid approved by the Biden administration under the Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA).
According to EU officials close to the talks, the European Union is considering offering Ukraine a "reparations loan" of up to €130 billion [$152 billion].
Most of the roughly €210 billion [$246 billion] worth of Russian assets held in Europe are in Belgian central securities depository Euroclear and were frozen at the start of the full-scale invasion. Officials said €175 billion [$206 billion] of the assets in Euroclear have now matured and become cash that could be the basis of the new loan. The reparations loan mechanism is likely to include a Special Purpose Vehicle to which the immobilized Russian cash from Euroclear could be transferred in exchange for zero-coupon bonds issued by the European Commission with the guarantees of EU and possibly G7 governments. EU member states or private investors could purchase these bonds. Ukraine would repay them in the future after receiving reparations from Russia, or EU countries would be obligated to repay them. Officials said that before the EU would move ahead with the reparations loan, it would want to repay the €45 billion [$50 billion] G7 loan agreed last year.
Last week, reports emerged that the US was reluctant to sell certain in-demand defense systems to European buyers. Specifically, the Pentagon reportedly declined to approve the sale of Patriot air defense systems to Denmark. However, the US State Department approved the deal on Aug. 29. On Sept. 12, Denmark withdrew from the purchase, citing long delivery times and political considerations. Had Elbridge Colby wanted to block the deal, he would have needed to request a formal withdrawal of the State Department’s export approval from Senator Marco Rubio—something he did not do.
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