Sitrep for Sept. 1-5, 2025 (as of 10 a.m. UTC+3)
Frontline Situation Update
At a recent meeting of the Ministry of Defense board, General Valery Gerasimov, Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, stated that the town of Kupiansk was completely blockaded and half captured by Russian forces—implying that it would soon fall under full Russian control. However, shortly after his remarks, even pro-Russian Telegram channels rushed to refute this claim. In response, in early September, footage from Kupiansk appeared online, filmed in different parts of the town, including the central area, showing groups of 2 to 3 Russian soldiers with a Russian flag. It is highly likely that all or nearly all of these soldiers were subsequently struck by Ukrainian FPV drones—corresponding footage was later published by the Ukrainian side, after which AFU soldiers retrieved the flag. Nevertheless, the very fact that Russian troops are able to penetrate even the central part of Kupiansk, effectively "infiltrating" between Ukrainian positions, is significant. A similar situation has developed in the town of Pokrovsk: although most of the assault troops there were eliminated, some fighters have gradually managed to gain a foothold, and the AFU no longer fully control the town.
Special attention should be paid to Ukrainian statements that Russian soldiers are disguising themselves in civilian clothing to infiltrate the town. In much of the Kupiansk footage, due to poor video quality, it is difficult to distinguish between dark civilian clothing and military camouflage. However, in one video with a flag, people in light civilian clothing can be clearly seen, making it unlikely that they were wearing standard uniforms. Under international humanitarian law, wearing civilian clothing for infiltration or reconnaissance is not, in itself, a war crime (perfidy), as long as the disguise is not used to carry out a surprise attack on enemy forces. For example, conducting reconnaissance in civilian clothing is permissible, but the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War explicitly states that if a soldier disguised in this way is captured by the enemy, he will lose his combatant status, which normally protects lawful fighters from prosecution solely for participating in hostilities. Instead, he will be treated as a civilian who illegally crossed the border with a weapon, which constitutes illegal possession of arms.
At present, we can only state that fighting for Kupiansk is already underway with varying degrees of success. Recently, the Ukrainian army recaptured positions west of the town near the village of Myrove (known until June 5, 2025, as Myrne, and until 2024, as Moskovka). It is worth noting that at the end of 2023, the Kindrashivka village military administration renamed Moskovka to Myrne. In September 2024, the Verkhovna Rada renamed the village of Pervomaiske, also in the Kupiansk district, to Myrne, and in June 2025, it renamed the village of Moskovka, which for some reason was listed under its old name, to Myrove; perhaps the parliament did not notice that Moskovka had already been renamed by the local administration. Fighting in this sector continues. The RuAF published a video showing a Russian flag in the Myrove area, claiming that they had recaptured the village. However, pro-Russian blogger Anatoly Radov reported that Russian troops are facing difficulties in expanding the salient, primarily due to intensive Ukrainian UAV strikes.
In the Lyman direction, over the past week, the RuAF have formed a salient toward the village of Drobysheve (near the village of Derylove) and advanced near the village of Zarichne. All of this, combined with the ongoing fighting in the Serebrianske forestry and the potential Russian advance toward the village of Yampil, indicates a gradual approach of the frontline to Lyman and an increasingly difficult situation for Ukrainian forces in this sector.
In the Pokrovsk direction, the situation around the Dobropillia breakthrough has largely stabilized over the last two weeks, with local Ukrainian gains reported near the villages of Zapovidne (formerly Nykanorivka until 2024), Nove Shakhove and Volodymyrivka. After the sudden RuAF breakthrough, the AFU managed to promptly localize and partially mop-up the resulting salient, while Russian forces failed to capitalize on their initial success—unable to gain a foothold, expand the wedge or reliably secure the flanks, although some limited advances by the RuAF have been observed there in recent days.
According to a Ukrainian military officer running the Officer Telegram channel, the reason for this stabilization is that the Russian army succeeded in regrouping and pulling reserves to the frontline, while at the same time, Ukrainian forces also transferred reserves to this sector.
It is worth separately mentioning an interview of Rob Lee, military analyst and Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, conducted by The Kyiv Independent. In it, he touched on an important point: over the past two years, the role of drones in this war has been widely discussed. Reports have periodically emerged claiming that they account for up to 80–90% of all personnel and equipment losses. However, this heavy reliance on drones also carries a significant vulnerability: if the enemy manages to suppress a significant portion of drone operators in a given sector, preventing them from operating freely, this would seriously weaken the AFU and allow Russian forces to advance more effectively.
According to Lee, Ukrainian brigades operating in several sectors, including the Pokrovsk direction, have faced serious challenges in recent months. In one case, a brigade lost 40% of its drone operator positions shortly after deployment; in another, losses reached 70%. Importantly, these figures refer not to the personnel or drones themselves, but to the destruction of launch positions or the inability to remain in areas suitable for UAV operations. This indicates that Russian forces have focused on detecting Ukrainian drone operators and striking their positions with FAB glide bombs equipped with UMPK [Universal Gliding and Correction Module] kits, as well as drones operated by specialized units such as Rubicon. Additionally, reports based on Russian POW testimonies indicate that some Russian soldiers are assigned priority missions to infiltrate Ukrainian rear areas, identify UAV operator positions and engage them directly.
Ukrainian forces are now also striving to detect and eliminate Russian UAV operators as quickly as possible. However, this was not always the case. Before the appointment of Robert "Madyar" Brovdi as commander of the AFU’s Unmanned Systems Forces and the introduction of his reforms, there was a widespread reluctance to prioritize strikes against UAV positions. The main reason was the AFU’s internal "e-points" system: destroying vehicles earned significantly more e-points than targeting infantry, and especially more than eliminating drone operators. These points could then be spent by soldiers on acquiring new drones.
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty published a lengthy article on Ukrainian missiles that included several comments made by Conflict Intelligence Team. The FP-5 Flamingo cruise missile is believed to be either a copy or a modification of a British-Emirati design bearing the same designation, with similar reported specifications. Using photogrammetry, we estimated the Flamingo’s length at 9 to 11 meters [30-35 ft], its caliber at about one meter [1 ft]—comparable to the Kalibr cruise missile—and a wingspan of roughly six meters [20 ft]. That makes it significantly larger than, for example, the SCALP-EG/Storm Shadow or the Kh-101. Based on its physical dimensions and the apparent use of an Ivchenko AI-25 jet engine, we concluded the missile could plausibly achieve a range of 3,000 kilometers [1,800 mi]—about three and a half hours of flight at 900 km/h [560 mph]. Even so, we have yet to see confirmation of either the stated range or the claimed warhead weight of more than one ton [2,200 lbs], and the missile’s only reported use has not been officially acknowledged but cited through secondary sources. Satellite images of the aftermath did little to clarify which weapon was employed.
The AI-25 engines were historically produced primarily by the Motor Sich plant, which has regularly been targeted by Russian strikes. As of 2018, approximately 6,500 engines of this family had been manufactured since production began in 1967. How many of the already produced engines are currently available to Ukraine, and what production volumes are possible under such conditions, remains unknown.
The manufacturer of the Flamingo missile, the Ukrainian Fire Point company, has recently been at the center of controversy. On Aug. 29, The Kyiv Independent, citing its sources, reported that the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU) is investigating Fire Point for allegedly inflated contract costs and exaggerated delivery volumes. The company has confirmed that an investigation is underway but has denied all allegations.
Fire Point has also announced the development of its own ballistic missiles, the FP-7 and FP-9, along with air-defense systems. The FP-7, designed for launch from a ground platform, is intended for striking targets at medium range—up to 200 kilometers [125 mi]. The FP-9 is said to be capable of reaching deep into the rear, with a declared range of 855 kilometers [530 mi]. Developing a ballistic missile with such reach is a complex task, and until successful tests are conducted, we remain skeptical of these claims.
The Danish outlet DR reported that Fire Point plans to produce solid rocket fuel at Skrydstrup Air Base, where Denmark’s F-35s are stationed. Production is scheduled to begin on Dec. 1, 2025. It is possible that this announcement relates not only—or not primarily—to booster production for the Flamingo, but also to the development of the newly proposed ballistic missiles.
Ukrainian and Russian Strikes
On Sept. 4, the MoD reported a strike with an Iskander short-range ballistic missile on what it described as "transport vehicles with enemy UAV launchers." The video shows several white vehicles parked on a dirt road in a field, with no visible signs showing that they were military. It later became known that the vehicles belonged to the Danish Refugee Council's humanitarian mission, whose staff were carrying out mine-clearing work in the Chernihiv region. As a result of the strike, two mission employees were killed and eight others were injured. This incident serves as yet another example of the Russian army's lack of proper target reconnaissance. The Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs strongly condemned the strike.
On Sept. 2, a Russian FPV drone struck a civilian bus in the town of Kostiantynivka in the Donetsk region, injuring the bus driver and two passengers.
Western Assistance
John Healey, UK Secretary of State for Defense, announced that the UK had bought over ÂŁ1 billion worth of weapons for Ukraine, using money raised from immobilized Russian assets. According to Healey, the purchases made over the last 50 days include:
- 4.7 million rounds of small arms ammunition for Ukraine’s soldiers;
- 60,000 artillery shells, rockets and missiles;
- More than 2,500 drones;
- More than 200 electronic warfare systems;
- 100 light weapons;
- 30 vehicles;
- Additional counter-drone and air defense equipment.
On Sept. 3, the 50-day ultimatum issued by Donald Trump expired. Back in mid-July, Trump had warned that unless the parties reached a peace agreement within that period, he would impose significantly tougher tariffs on Russia.
On Sept. 1, The Financial Times, citing its sources, reported that because of Russia GPS interference, the pilots of the aircraft carrying European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen were forced to use paper maps to land at Plovdiv Airport in Bulgaria. Later, Flightradar24 announced that the aircraft's transponder reported stable GPS signal quality throughout the entire flight. According to the Government of Bulgaria, an investigation revealed no signs of GPS interference.
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