Sitrep for Sept. 12-15, 2025 (as of 8 a.m. UTC+3)

Frontline Situation Update

Ukrainian forces are reporting modest gains on the western flank of the Sumy direction near the village of Kostiantynivka. Their advance appears to have been facilitated by the redeployment of Russian naval infantry units to the Kostiantynivka direction in the Donetsk region.

In the Kharkiv region, in the Kupiansk direction, Russian forces carried out a new "pipeline operation," first reported on Sept. 11. According to available accounts, troops discovered an entrance to a gas pipeline near the village of Lyman Pershyi and used it to move to the village of Radkivka. At first glance, moving through a pipe from rear areas toward positions closer to the frontline seems unusual. However, given that the airspace in such areas is saturated with drones, using underground infrastructure makes sense. Moreover, the Russian Armed Forces no longer need to force the Oskil River, which the pipeline crosses. Any river constitutes a natural obstacle that slows troop advances, and crossings are easily detected by the enemy and become convenient targets for strikes, for example by drones.

Some pro‑Russian milbloggers praised the new pipeline operation, recalling the two previous ones in the town of Avdiivka (the Tsarska Okhota fortified area) in the Donetsk region and in the town of Sudzha in the Kursk region. In the first case, movement through the pipe had a tactical effect: it facilitated entry into a residential neighborhood and enabled the accumulation of forces for the gradual capture of the town. In the second case, according to our assessment, it did not lead to significant changes—the Ukrainian side even reported destroying assault groups at the pipe’s exit.

The General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine stated that three of four pipelines are already damaged and flooded, and the exit of the fourth is controlled by the AFU. Additionally, a new method of countering enemy infiltration through pipelines has emerged: Ukrainian troops are placing barbed wire inside the pipelines. Overcoming such an obstacle is quite problematic, especially if the pipe is long enough—as, for example, from Lyman Pershyi to Radkivka (reported to be 10 km [6.21 mi]).

So far, the appearance of Russian assault troops who used the pipe to approach the town of Kupiansk has not significantly affected the situation there. For about a month, small assault groups have been regularly infiltrating Kupiansk, attempting to gain a foothold there and filming videos with flags, while Ukrainian forces have been regularly destroying such groups. Nevertheless, on the DeepState map, the northern part of the town is now marked as under RuAF control. Moreover, DeepState significantly expanded the Russian-controlled zone precisely after the post about infiltration into Radkivka through the pipeline. It is worth noting that earlier, the AFU had managed to successfully counterattack the RuAF in the village of Myrove and on the outskirts of Kupiansk, while the RuAF had to conduct a special "flag photo op" in the town center following the publication of unrealistic maps during a meeting of the Russian MoD collegium.

In the Kostiantynivka (Toretsk) direction, RuAF units were detected in the dacha area southeast of Kostiantynivka, where they infiltrated from the village of Oleksandro-Shultyne. According to some reports, they also advanced near the villages of Stupochky and Predtechyne. No confirmed change in the frontline has yet been noted, only an expansion of the "gray zone," including between the above-mentioned salients. It is quite likely that Russian assault troops will soon begin to gradually infiltrate into the outskirts of Kostiantynivka, as has happened in Kupiansk and Pokrovsk.

In the South Donetsk direction, Russian forces captured the village of Temyrivka in the Zaporizhzhia region. It is located at the junction of three regions: Zaporizhzhia, Donetsk and Dnipropetrovsk. The RuAF are also gradually advancing near the village of Ternove (formerly Novopetrivske until 2016), which the Russian Ministry of Defense claimed to have taken, though there is no independent confirmation yet. Advances are also reported near the village of Berezove. These advances in the southern Donetsk region may be connected to the redeployment of additional Ukrainian forces slightly farther north—near the villages of Andriivka-Klevtsove, Zelenyi Hai and Tolstoi. Since then, the situation there has stabilized, but Russian forces have found a new "weak spot" in Ukrainian defenses. Despite the timing, there is no confirmation that these events are related.

In the previous sitrep, we mentioned cheap Russian Molniya fixed-wing kamikaze drones with payloads weighing up to 10 kg, capable of carrying, for example, an anti-tank mine. It has now emerged that these drones are equipped with 40-kilometer-long [24.9 mi] fiber optic reels, making them much harder to intercept.

The AFU’s 40th Coastal Defense Brigade has unveiled a new unmanned surface vessel, the Barracuda. It can be operated either autonomously along a pre-programmed route or remotely by an operator, and can be used for supply deliveries as well as passenger transport.

A video has been published showing Iskander-M short-range ballistic missile systems on a highway in the Kaliningrad region. These systems have long been deployed in the area and have repeatedly been deployed during exercises as a show of force. It is worth noting that the Zapad-2025 exercises will continue until Sept. 16, though some of the equipment may remain stationed in Belarus afterward.

On Sept. 13, Romanian forces detected a drone in their national airspace and scrambled two F-16 fighter aircraft to intercept it. Romania’s defense minister Ionut Mosteanu stated that the fighters were prepared to shoot down the Russian UAV, but it turned back and flew toward Ukraine. This is not the first time drones have entered Romanian airspace. As noted in a previous sitrep, available information does not prove that UAV incursions into Polish and Romanian airspace were deliberate. However, the drones’ ability to deviate from and then return to their programmed routes indirectly suggests that these incidents were not accidental.

Donald Trump stated that he is prepared to impose severe sanctions on Russia if all NATO member states stop purchasing Russian oil. At present, only Hungary, Slovakia and Turkey import it—countries whose leaders maintain good relations with Trump, giving him leverage to pressure them directly. For now, however, it seems more likely that he is seeking new pretexts to avoid imposing sanctions on Russia.

Sabotage Acts

On the evening of Sept. 13, Andrey Klychkov, the governor of Oryol region, reported that two Rosgvardia [the Russian National Guard] personnel were killed and another was fatally injured after an explosive device detonated on railway tracks.

On Sept. 14, two railway track explosions occurred in different districts of the Leningrad region. In the Luzhsky district, a locomotive with 15 "empty tank cars" derailed; no casualties were reported.

In the Gatchina district, a single locomotive derailed and the driver, trapped in the cab, was killed.

That same day, RBC-Ukraine sources reported that the railway track sabotage operations in the Oryol and Leningrad regions were carried out by the Main Directorate of Intelligence (GUR) of the Ukrainian Defense Ministry and Ukrainian special forces. The claimed purpose was to disrupt railway traffic used for military transport. We find this claim implausible, since damaged railway tracks are usually repaired within one or two days. Even the destruction of small bridges previously carried out by the GUR had no significant impact on the war, as the structures were restored within weeks.

Authorities in the Belgorod region have still not confirmed that the woman who died on the morning of Sept. 12 at a bus stop in Belgorod—as we reported in the previous sitrep—was killed by the fall of a booster stage of a missile launched by the Russian Pantsir-S1 surface-to-air missile and anti-aircraft artillery system.

The first confirmation has appeared that the electronic Draft Register is now operational in Russia. On Sept. 11, border guards did not allow a 28-year-old man to leave the country for a vacation in Turkey. Three days earlier, he had received a digital draft notice for a medical evaluation scheduled for Oct. 22, and a travel ban was displayed on the Gosuslugi public services portal. It is not yet clear whether the register has been implemented nationwide or how fully the databases are synchronized. More information will likely become available in about two weeks, after the start of the fall conscription campaign.

We recommend avoiding regular conscription by any possible means. It is much better to receive a fine or, in rare cases, a suspended sentence than to risk being disabled or killed in the war.

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