Sitrep for Aug. 8-15, 2025 (as of 9:30 a.m. UTC+3)

Frontline Situation Update

The most significant changes over the past week took place in the Donetsk region. In the Dobropillia sector of the Pokrovsk direction Russian forces broke through Ukrainian defenses and reached the villages of Zolotyi Kolodiaz and Vesele, forming two narrow salients. To consolidate their gains and advance further, they will need to expand and fortify these salients to prevent the Armed Forces of Ukraine from cutting them off.

Since Aug. 9, the Russian Armed Forces have advanced near the village of Nykanorivka (on Aug. 13, the Russian MoD announced the capture of the villages of Nykanorivka and Suvorove, which has been called Zatyshok since 2024). On Aug. 11, they quickly broke through to the village of Nove Shakhove and then to Zolotyi Kolodiaz, which they did not fully capture.

Reports indicated that Russian troops managed to cut the road leading from Dobropillia to the city of Kramatorsk, but Ukrainian forces successfully counterattacked and unblocked it (although the route may still be vulnerable to drone strikes). The 1st Azov Corps of Ukraine’s National Guard (which includes, among others, the 12th Special Forces Brigade "Azov" of the NGU) stated that as a result of Ukrainian counterattacks, more than 200 Russian soldiers were killed or wounded, which contradicts the statements of the Operational Strategic Group Dnipro that only small Russian assault groups had infiltrated the area.

A video has emerged showing Russian soldiers captured on this section of the frontline. Strikingly, all appear to be between 20 and 28 years old—an age profile not typically observed.

Reports of Russian losses, as well as information about the redeployment of the Azov Brigade, the 93rd AFU Brigade and other units to the Dobropillia direction, underscore the seriousness of the situation.

We assess that this breakthrough is aimed at completing the encirclement of the town of Pokrovsk and possibly Dobropillia, in order to compel Ukrainian forces to withdraw. There are statements that Russian troops have already entrenched themselves in the eastern districts of the town of Rodynske, with fighting ongoing for control of the town.

It is worth noting that Russian forces have breached a key Ukrainian defensive line in the Donetsk region—known as "New Donbas"—whose fortifications are reinforced with concrete. Should Russian troops secure a foothold along this line, dislodging them would be extremely difficult.

French researcher Clément Moulin has calculated that between Pokrovsk and the town of Kostiantynivka, 3,200 Russian glide bomb airstrikes were recorded over the past three months, 1,400 of them between July 11 and Aug. 11. As we have previously noted, the geolocation of the strike shows that they are highly accurate, with bombs hitting directly along forest lines.

We regard what has happened as a breakthrough, even though it was carried out mainly by unmounted infantry—in line with the "infiltration" tactics described by Commander-in-Chief of the AFU, General Oleksandr Syrskyi, which arose from an acute shortage of infantry in the Ukrainian army. Western analysts Michael Kofman and Rob Lee have also spoken extensively about this approach. After an infiltration into the Ukrainian rear, assault troops—which we still believe is a more accurate term than "sabotage and reconnaissance groups"—must gain a firm foothold in the positions they have taken (which, so far, appears not to have happened) before continuing the advance. As always, when a narrow salient forms, its flanks must be reinforced and forces built up as quickly as possible—one cannot keep indefinitely pushing forward, lengthening the salient, even if operational space has been reached. For this reason, we consider claims that this Russian maneuver does not constitute a breakthrough to be unfounded. Arguments such as the absence of armored vehicles (breakthroughs occurred before their invention in the late First World War), the lack of continuous forward movement, or the current difficulty in holding positions (it is possible the AFU could soon eliminate the incursion) are not persuasive.

The conditions for such a breakthrough have been in place for some time, with a shortage of infantry the most serious problem for the AFU—one that is unlikely to be solved quickly. Aside from tightening mobilization, one possible solution would be to reduce AFU presence in less critical sectors.

Even if this breakthrough is swiftly reversed, we do not rule out that it could happen again, as Russian forces are continually probing for weak points in the Ukrainian defenses.

The RuAF also advanced in the Kostiantynivka direction, specifically near the village of Poltavka, northeast of the town of Myrnohrad and near the village of Maiske, northwest of the town of Chasiv Yar.

In the Novopavlivka direction, the Russian forces, judging by a RuAF-released video showing their flag, have captured the village of Andriivka-Klevtsove (formerly Iskra until 2024), as already stated by the Russian MoD. This is an area where Ukrainian forces could withdraw from certain positions, in some places to straighten the frontline, thereby reducing its length and enabling the redeployment of troops to the Pokrovsk (Dobropillia) direction. The current situation stems from the fact that the remaining Ukrainian-held territory in this direction consists largely of open fields, which are practically pointless to hold. Should the AFU retreat beyond the Vovcha River, maintaining a defensive posture would become somewhat easier.

The Ukrainian Navy's intelligence reported a radio interception in which Russian soldiers discussed the loss of a Sukhoi Su-30SM multi-role fighter jet near Snake Island. The cause of the incident remains unknown, and Ukrainian forces have not claimed responsibility for shooting it down. The pro-Russian Telegram channels Fighterbomber [associated with the Russian Air and Space Force] and Voevoda veshchayet [run by a Russian Aerospace Forces helicopter pilot] have published mournful posts hinting at the loss of the crew.

Ukrainian and Russian Strikes

Ukrainian UAV strikes on Russia’s border regions are ongoing. On the morning of Aug. 14, during an aerial attack on Belgorod, a drone struck a passenger car, reportedly injuring three people. Some supporters of Ukraine stated that this was the result of Russian electronic warfare, but video footage shows no clear evidence of this. Such drone strikes on vehicles in border areas occur regularly, with daily casualty figures sometimes comparable to those in the Ukrainian-controlled part of the Kherson region, where Russian soldiers conduct daily "human safari" attacks.

Possible intended targets of the Belgorod strike could have been the administration building or the courthouse, neither of which are military objectives. Intercepted FPV-drone footage from the area was also published, and on Aug. 15, UAV raids on Belgorod continued. Even if a legitimate military target were nearby, conducting such strikes in daylight, when civilians are present, is wrong.

Moreover, such attacks, occurring on the eve of negotiations, play into Putin’s hands by allowing him to tell Trump that a withdrawal from the Kharkiv region is impossible, as it would complicate the situation in the Belgorod region.

On Aug. 14, a UAV hit a residential building in Rostov-on-Don, injuring 13 people. The fact that the impact was on the upper edge of the building suggests the strike was unintentional. A possible intended target could have been the headquarters of the Southern Military District.

In the early hours of Aug. 15, a drone hit a residential building in Kursk, killing one woman and injuring 17 others. The impact was near the center of the building. Reports indicate that the building is located close to the Kursk railway station and not far from the airport. Vazhnyye Istorii [IStories, independent Russian investigative media outlet] suggested that the intended target could have been a factory or a MoD recruitment office.

Western Assistance

Trump has described his planned meeting with Putin as a first preliminary discussion to be followed by a second meeting, which would include Zelenskyy and could potentially result in a ceasefire agreement. Europe is to be excluded from both meetings, with the US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent even saying that Europe will have to accept everything Trump is doing as a given. "It is time for our European counterparts to put up or shut up," he said. We assess that the very fact of such a meeting would represent a political win for Putin, as it would mark a partial end to his international isolation. Should Trump later withdraw from the negotiation process, this could undermine Europe’s resolve to continue supporting Ukraine.

Germany is going to finance the third package of US weapons supply to Ukraine under NATO’s new Prioritised Ukraine Requirements List (PURL) initiative, although its contents have not yet been disclosed. It is worth noting that the first package under PURL included the supply of Patriot and other air defense systems, while the second one provided artillery systems and munitions.

We need your support to continue our efforts. Please consider making a monthly donation to CIT through our fundraising page or Patreon.