Sitrep for Sept. 15-22, 2025 (as of 10:30 UTC+3 a.m.)
Frontline Situation Update
Last week, the situation deteriorated in the Kupiansk direction: the Russian Armed Forces pushed forward in the town of Kupiansk, with new videos emerging from various parts of the town, including near the hospital. They partially surrounded the village of Kindrashivka and also began advancing eastward toward the town, moving through the area of the village of Stepova Novoselivka toward the village of Petropavlivka.
In the Kostiantynivka direction, fighting continues south of the Kleban‑Byk Reservoir. DeepState reports progress near the village of Katerynivka, which, according to some sources, has changed hands several times.
In the area of the Dobropillia salient, the Armed Forces of Ukraine have liberated the village of Pankivka and recaptured additional positions near the village of Volodymyrivka. The RuAF are attempting to advance around the village of Shakhove, apparently aiming to link up with forces encircled near the village of Kucheriv Yar.
Pro‑Russian outlets report advances on the southwestern outskirts of the town of Pokrovsk from the village of Leontovychi (known as Pershe Travnia until 2024). However, we classify the stretch from the village of Zvirove to the town proper as a contested area.
In the South Donetsk direction, Russian forces made limited local gains over the weekend without altering the overall operational picture.
In the Sumy region, Ukrainian forces from the 225th Separate Assault Regiment are fighting near the village of Oleksiivka—a video showing a Ukrainian flag in the area and strikes on enemy positions has been published. However, in our assessment, this territory has not yet reached a contested status. Notably, alongside the combat footage, a screenshot was posted from the pro-Russian Northern Channel Telegram channel, which claims ties to the Group of Troops "North." The screenshot predicts that Oleksiivka will inevitably fall and complains that the heavy losses the RuAF’s 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment suffered while fighting for the village of Kindrativka were offset by bringing in unprepared troops which were often recruited from marginal segments of society.
It is also worth noting that Northern Channel appears to be part of a Ukrainian information‑psychological operation. Presenting such complaints in an official RuAF Telegram channel would be impossible, and they are more typical of milbloggers or individual servicemen. Nevertheless, Northern Channel (nearly 35,000 subscribers) presents itself as the official channel of the Group of Troops "North." The actual channel of this group is Severnyi Veter [Northern Wind] (over 116,000 subscribers), whose posting style is much closer to the official rhetoric of the Russian Ministry of Defense.
Western Assistance
On Sept. 19, The Atlantic reported that the United States is reluctant to sell a number of scarce items to European buyers. In particular, Denmark did not finalize a contract for the Patriot system (intended for its own defense, not for transfer to Ukraine) and instead ordered the roughly comparable European SAMP/T system as an alternative. Until now, Denmark’s air defense consisted only of medium-range NASAMS surface-to-air missile systems. Although the US Department of State approved the Patriot deal on Aug. 29, Denmark withdrew on Sept. 12, citing long delivery times and political considerations.
According to The Atlantic’s sources, the decision to prioritize domestic needs over export orders is linked to Elbridge Colby, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, who has repeatedly argued that America’s own military requirements must come first. This raises concerns that the US may deny allies access to scarce weapons until Pentagon stockpiles are replenished. Colby was also previously involved in decisions to freeze certain arms deliveries to Ukraine.
We believe this policy of the Trump administration could make allied countries hesitant to procure arms from the United States, as Washington risks being perceived as an unreliable partner. It remains unclear how these shifts might affect the mechanism of military assistance to Ukraine, under which European allies purchase US-made weapons.
At the same time, officials in the Trump administration have frequently reversed course or contradicted one another. For example, Colby has emphasized that the US’s top military priority is China and the Indo-Pacific region. Yet, according to The Washington Post, Trump declined to approve $400 million in free military aid to Taiwan, despite its role as a key partner in countering China. As a result, Taiwan, like Europe, may now be forced to finance its own weapons purchases.
Ukrainian and Russian Strikes
Bloomberg, citing its sources in Russia, reported that, after his meeting with Trump in Alaska, Putin concluded that the US did not intend to fully intervene in the conflict. Putin concluded that there was no need to make concessions and that he could escalate the war to force Ukraine and Europe to eventually agree to a ceasefire on his terms. This allegedly led to an increase in air strikes against Ukraine. We disagree with this conclusion. When serious negotiations involving Russian representatives take place, the intensity of Russian air strikes noticeably decreases, possibly to create a more "peaceful" image. Thus, in our opinion, once the negotiations ended, the intensity of RuAF strikes simply returned to previous levels.
In the early hours of Sept. 20, during a combined air strike on Dnipro, a Russian Kh-101 cruise missile hit a multistory residential building. Currently, one civilian fatality and 36 injured civilians are confirmed.
Judging by the video of the strike, the missile did not deviate from its trajectory and was not intercepted by air defense. The exact target cannot be reliably determined. A technical school, which the RuAF may have considered a location for housing AFU military personnel, is approximately 350 meters [383 yd] from the building. About 600 meters [656 yd] away is apparently an energy infrastructure facility, and slightly further is a post office, which the RuAF often target. However, none of these locations lie on the missile’s trajectory. Therefore, we must assume that the attack on the residential building was deliberate. It is worth noting that terrorizing the civilian population tends to unite society rather than generate anti-government sentiments demanding an immediate and unconditional end to the war.
The missile used in this strike was reportedly equipped with a cluster munition warhead. In fact, the warhead contained prefabricated shrapnel in the shape of rectangular parallelepipeds, which are visible in photographs provided by local residents. Impact marks from the shrapnel can be seen on the roof of the building. Last spring, the Polkovnyk Henshtabu [Colonel of the General Staff] Telegram channel reported on the modified Kh-101 missile equipped with such a warhead, and it is likely that this variant was used in the strike.
On the morning of Sept. 22, Russia launched an airstrike against the city of Zaporizhzhia. Three civilians were killed and four others wounded.
On the morning of Sept. 20, oil refineries in Russia were once again attacked, specifically in Saratov and Novokuybyshev. Ukrainian milblogger Tatarigami believes that repeated strikes on these refineries indicate that Russia has been unable to organize proper air defense for these facilities.
On Sept. 19, three Russian MiG-31 fighter jets entered Estonian airspace. Russia’s MoD claimed that there was no violation, saying the fighters were conducting a planned transfer flight from Karelia [Russia’s constituent republic] to an airfield in the Kaliningrad region, strictly in accordance with the International Rules of Airspace Use, without violating the borders of other states. According to the ministry, the flight path crossed neutral waters of the Baltic Sea, over 3 kilometers [1.86 mi] from the island of Vaindloo. We believe this is yet another Russian provocation aimed at gauging Estonia's and NATO's responses to such actions.
Trump stated that he does not like when such things happen, since they could lead to serious problems. Later, when asked by a journalist whether the USA would help defend Poland and other European allies if Russia continues its escalation, Trump answered in the affirmative.
Czech President Petr Pavel declared that the violation of airspace by Russian fighters was "extremely irresponsible behavior" and also "grounds for activating defense mechanisms," up to the point where such an aircraft could be shot down. At the same time, he added that "no one, neither on our side nor on the Russian side, would want that."
We consider it inaccurate to compare "accidental" incursions of Russian aircraft into NATO airspace with the incident in which a Russian bomber entered Turkish airspace from Syria and was shot down. The Kremlin considers European countries not only as Ukraine’s allies, but also as participants in the war. However, Turkey was a Russian partner, and preserving the relationship with Turkey was important.
Poland and Romania plan to purchase the Turkish MEROPS (Multispectral Extended Range Optical Sight) aerial surveillance system for protection against UAVs. The system can be mounted on helicopters and drones, and it is effective against small targets. Resembling an advanced pair of binoculars, it has multiple modes, target auto-lock, and tracking capabilities.
On Sept. 19, it became known that the Pentagon demanded journalists publish only information approved by the department. Media representatives will only be allowed to visit the Pentagon building if they provide written consent not to publish classified information or less sensitive documents that are not considered state secrets.
Based on open sources, Mediazona [independent Russian media outlet] and BBC News Russian, together with volunteers, have prepared a special report marking the third anniversary of the start of partial mobilization on Sept. 21. According to the journalists, at least 15,000 mobilized soldiers have been killed during the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Of these, 42% died within the first year after the announcement of partial mobilization (it is unclear how many of the deceased mobilized soldiers had a status that was not identified by the journalists). Although the mobilization was supposed to apply only to individuals with prior military experience and specific military specialties, these restrictions were often ignored in practice. Consequently, individuals with legal draft deferrals were also drafted.
Draft offices often limited themselves to formal medical evaluation or dispensed with them altogether, automatically considering mobilized men fit for service even in the presence of chronic diseases. During mobilization, the criteria for recruitment into the "elite" troops also ceased to apply: men were assigned to the airborne or naval infantry units even if they had previously failed to meet height or physical fitness requirements.
Since 2024, mobilized soldiers have been forcibly transferred to contract service, likely due to the need to fulfill the recruitment plan for contract soldiers.
It is worth noting that due to the dangerous situation for the Russian army in the Kharkiv region caused by the AFU counteroffensive in the fall of 2022, some mobilized soldiers were thrown into combat operations with practically no training, and many of them were killed in the first weeks of service. In 2023, mobilized soldiers were used more cautiously and less frequently deployed to forward positions, but by the fall of 2023 they were again used in offensive operations alongside other units. At the same time, it remains unknown how many mobilized soldiers have not yet been transferred to contract service.
Since the current situation on the frontline is favorable for the Russian army—the RuAF are either holding their positions or advancing—we do not expect a second wave of mobilization this year. At the same time, preparations for various systems that will allow a more effective second wave if necessary are ongoing: digitalization of draft offices, creation of the electronic Draft Register, as well as exercises to practice mobilization and employment deferral at enterprises. If mobilization resumes, it is likely that, after receiving a draft notice, it will no longer be possible to leave the country since border services will immediately receive information about the exit ban.
On Oct. 1, the regular conscription campaign begins, and we once again recommend avoiding it by any means necessary. Receiving a fine or a suspended sentence, though rare, is far better than becoming disabled or killed in war.
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