dispatches
September 8

Sitrep for Sept. 5-8, 2025 (as of 7:30 a.m. UTC+3)

Frontline Situation Update

In the Pokrovsk direction, the Ukrainian army has recently begun actively counterattacking in the Dobropillia breakthrough, advancing in two sectors near the villages of Razine and Novotoretske. It appears that Ukrainian forces intend to cut off the main part of the Dobropillia salient along the Kazenyi Torets River by advancing from the north and south. The river serves as a natural defensive line that makes it easier to hold the territory. In addition, the Armed Forces of Ukraine likely cleared another section of the salient cut off from the main forces west of the village of Kucheriv Yar and south of the village of Zolotyi Kolodiaz. This area is now marked as contested. Ukrainian military observer Kostiantyn Mashovets also reported on these successes of the Ukrainian army.

In the area of the village of Boikivka near Novotoretske, a video was filmed showing a Ukrainian soldier using a military ruse. He was part of a unit clearing the area of Russian infantry and was already aware that Russian troops were infiltrating villages mostly in small groups with almost no communication between them. As a result, fighters often do not know who is nearby, and identification is reduced to simple phrases like “Hey, we’re friendlies.” The Ukrainian soldier took advantage of this when he encountered two enemy soldiers while moving alone. Realizing that neither he nor they had distinctive markings, he greeted them as if he were one of their own and calmly continued on. To dispel doubts, he even pointed to a drone in the sky, saying it was his and was guiding him to positions. The ruse worked, and the soldiers accepted him as a comrade despite the lack of insignia. When the Ukrainian soldier asked for a smoke, the Russians suggested moving off the open ground toward their positions. Letting them go ahead, the Ukrainian then used the opportunity to shoot both of them with his assault rifle. This kind of ruse is not considered a war crime, since the AFU soldier did not disguise himself in enemy uniform or use enemy military insignia, but simply relied on quick thinking in conditions where camouflage looked similar.

Last time we reported on the intensification of the Russian Armed Forces’ offensive in the Lyman direction. However, in addition to offensive actions, strikes by Russian drones on the Izium-Sloviansk highway have also increased. At first, reports concerned strikes on civilian vehicles, which resulted in civilian deaths and injuries, but there have also been reports of strikes on a bus, a KAMAZ truck (unclear whether civilian or military), and a GAZ-66 truck (apparently military). We assume that these strikes became possible thanks to the RuAF’s advance toward the village of Novoselivka. Currently, the distance from the salient in this area to the highway is about 25 km [15.5 mi]. Russian drones used for such strikes already fly to a distance of up to 30 km [18.5 mi], although this is close to the maximum flight range (cases of strikes at similar distances have already been recorded, for example, in the area of the town of Druzhkivka). It is practically impossible to saturate the airspace with drones at such a distance, so it is premature to talk about full fire control (within range). However, it is possible to deliver quite sensitive strikes on Ukrainian vehicles. This is related to the fact that the highway leading to Sloviansk is important for the supply of the AFU in this direction.

A video has emerged showing a mopping-up operation of Russian positions in private houses by a tank of the 3rd Army Corps of the AFU. It was filmed in the village of Shandryholove.

In the Siversk direction, Russian troops have advanced in the Serebrianske forestry, which is now practically completely captured. This is preparation for an advance toward the village of Yampil and a subsequent offensive on the town of Lyman. Capturing this town is necessary for the offensive on Sloviansk.

In the south of the Donetsk region and in the bordering areas of the Dnipropetrovsk region, some frontline changes are also noted: according to DeepState, the RuAF advanced in the area of the villages of Vorone, Horoshe and Sosnivka. In fact, the first two are already under Russian control. We reported about the probable capture of Vorone back in late August, and the researcher Playfra stated that Sosnivka came under Russian control on Sept. 4, however, later the AFU counterattacked there.

Russia's Ministry of Defense announced the destruction of a Swedish Archer self-propelled howitzer. Freeze-frames from the video indeed show the system's distinctive outline. Notably, Russian soldiers claimed that they received target data from certain allies regarding this strike. This likely refers to neighboring units of the RuAF or aerial reconnaissance, rather than pro-Russian local residents, since SPH positions are located in fields where there should be virtually no civilians. Based on footage of the aftermath, the Archer was either completely burned or seriously damaged. According to military sources, three drones carried out the strikes.

It is worth noting that Archer is an SPH developed in the early 2000s, has a high rate of fire and is less vulnerable to counter-battery fire than other systems. Previously, such systems had already been targeted:

  • In February 2024, a strike was reported, probably by a Lancet (judging by the mention of "X-operators"), but there was no footage of the consequences;
  • In March 2024, video appeared of a strike on an SPH near Siversk; The Oryx project documented the damaged system;
  • In October of that year, video surfaced of the aftermath of a strike on an SPH, during which, according to reports, the crew was unharmed..

One cannot judge the success of an FPV drone strike from the footage alone; the degree of damage can only be assessed from video or photos of the strike's aftermath. A video has been published showing three Ukrainian anti-aircraft drones catching up with a Gerbera UAV. Explosions from at least the first two did not cause significant damage.

Ukrainian military expert Serhii "Flash" Beskrestnov recently showed a component of Russian UAVs (currently mainly reconnaissance Supercam models) that has been put into mass production. This component allows the drones to evade anti-aircraft systems. It’s a special radio receiver that detects video transmission from a nearby drone and initiates an evasive maneuver upon detection.

Ukrainian and Russian Strikes

According to a report from the Air Forces of the AFU, in the early hours of Sept. 7, a total of 13 missiles and 810 UAVs were launched against Ukraine. Russian forces set a new record for the number of drones launched in a single night. Ukrainian officials, such as the Mayor of Kyiv, Vitalii Klytschko, stated that some homes were damaged by the debris of downed drones. In many cases, these were likely fragments of UAVs shot down and destroyed in the air, but they could also have been drones whose tail assembly was only slightly damaged by air defenses; when they fall, they detonate, causing significant destruction. We consider it important to distinguish clearly and report precisely whether incidents involve falling debris or intact drones.

At present, in some cases it remains unclear whether the damage was caused by falling debris or by a direct hit. One such case was the strike on a horse-riding club in the Fastiv district of the Kyiv region, where seven horses were killed. According to a staff member, three Shahed-136 (Geran-2) loitering munitions struck the facility, rather than fragments of a downed drone. We geolocated the club and found that the Vasylkiv military airfield, which pro-Russian media had described as a base for F-16 fighter aircraft, is located five kilometers away [3 mi]. This distance is too far for a random deviation, but it’s theoretically possible there was an error in route programming or successful GPS spoofing.

A strike on a residential building in Kyiv killed a 32-year-old woman and her three-month-old son and severely injured her husband. According to eyewitnesses, the Shahed-136 blast threw them from the sixth floor, which indicates a direct hit rather than falling debris.

The Ukrainian Oko Hora OSINT project visualized reports from the Air Forces of Ukraine on the drones shot down by Ukrainian air defense. In August, according to official data, only 16.5% of the drones launched by Russia reached their targets (i.e., were neither shot down nor lost to radar, though it remains unclear into which category the Air Forces place those that ultimately struck residential buildings). The project also noted that the total number of launches in August was lower than in July, linking this to the Putin–Trump summit at the beginning of the month.

Russian forces continue to experiment with airstrikes. It is worth reminding that in early August they struck for two consecutive days with aerial bombs at the automobile bridge connecting the Korabel district, located on an island, with the city of Kherson. On Sept. 7, Russian Shahed-136 loitering munitions targeted a railway bridge across the Dnipro near the city of Kremenchuk. According to pro-Russian Telegram channels, the purpose of the strike was to disable the bridge’s power supply. It is not entirely clear what effect this might have on transport as in the absence of power, diesel locomotives would be used, while damage to the bridge’s lifting mechanisms would affect only navigation, which is likely not very active anyway.

Ukrainian police warn that Russian forces are scattering Kherson and other inhabited areas along the Dnipro river with PFM-1 "Butterfly" anti-personnel landmines (aka "Petal"). These mines are hard to detect and pose a grave danger to civilians.

Western Assistance

It became known that the ERAM missiles, of which the US State Department approved the sale of more than 3,000, cannot be delivered in large numbers in the near term. According to Aviation Week, Ukraine will receive only 10 missiles in October, another 830 by October 2026, and the remaining 2,500 in subsequent years. Although ERAMs are new and promising missiles, their potential impact on the frontline in the near future is negligible due to the minimal deliveries.

German economist Janis Kluge states that in August about 35,000 people signed contracts with the MoD. Based on data from 37 regions that publish reports on regional budget expenditures, he determines the number of signed contracts in each of them and extrapolates the figures to the remaining regions. Kluge’s analysis does not show a significant drop in the number of recruits in the second quarter of 2025, contrary to what Vazhnyye Istorii (IStories, independent Russian investigative media outlet) wrote based on national budget data. The discrepancy is likely due to irregular spending patterns at the national level. Although national data has certain advantages over regional data, such as covering all of Russia and accounting for the consistent national bonus throughout the year, making the calculations more reliable, it is less resilient to technical changes in budget execution.

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