Sitrep for Oct. 6-10, 2025 (as of 10:00 a.m. UTC+3)

Frontline Situation Update

In the Sumy region, Russian forces have been advancing from the village of Novomykolaivka toward the village of Varachyne. Fighting in this area has seen mixed results—in mid-September, the Armed Forces of Ukraine successfully counterattacked near the village of Kostiantynivka, pushing the enemy back to a water barrier. Now, however, the Russian Armed Forces have resumed their offensive and captured several Ukrainian positions.

In the Pokrovsk direction, according to Ukrainian military observer Kostiantyn Mashovets, Russian forces have captured the village of Novoekonomichne, reached the mines in the Myrnohrad area, taken the village of Krasnyi Lyman, and are now advancing toward the town of Myrnohrad from that side as well. In addition, according to his reports, the RuAF still control the village of Dorozhnie, about which there had been earlier disputes. We also believe that the village of Zapovidne (known as Nykanorivka until 2024) may have been captured. In Dorozhnie, Mashovets reports, Russian forces are amassing for an offensive on the town of Bilytske.

Mashovets also stated that the RuAF continue to hold the village of Nove Shakhove, which the AFU had claimed to have liberated earlier this month, and are advancing toward the village of Zolotyi Kolodiaz. Russian airstrikes also indicate fighting in this area: the strikes are being carried out northwest of Zolotyi Kolodiaz but not in the village or in Kucheryv Yar, where Russian forces are present. From this, we infer that active clashes are occurring in the sector between Zolotyi Kolodiaz and Kucheryv Yar, while farther northwest, near the village of Petrivka, the Russian command likely believes that Ukrainian forces are gathering. This suggests that the RuAF are seeking to regain control over the entire area where the so-called Dobropillia breakthrough previously occurred.

Nevertheless, contested areas that constantly change hands remain at the base of the salient and farther east. For example, in the area of the villages of Novotoretske and Boikivka, AFU ambushes on Russian infantry were observed, as well as Russian attempts to advance from that area toward the village of Shakhove with a column of four tanks and nine other armored vehicles, and later toward the village of Volodymyrivka with six motorcycles and three armored vehicles carrying infantry.

Reports indicate that the AFU repelled both attacks; however, this shows that the RuAF are counterattacking in the area where Ukrainian forces had attempted to cut off the Dobropillia salient at its base.

According to DeepState, Russian soldiers are actively exploiting deteriorating weather conditions with heavy precipitation and fog that prevent drone operators from launching their aircraft. It is precisely in such "no-fly" weather that armored vehicles become easier to deploy. It appears that Russian forces have greater resources in this sector, which could place Ukrainian troops in a precarious position, despite DeepState's maps showing Russian soldiers encircled in two locations.

The publication Ukrainian Pravda released an article detailing how the Dobropillia breakthrough developed, featuring commentary from Ukrainian military personnel on that front. Most notably for our purposes, the command structure took too long to recognize the scale of Russian soldiers penetrating behind the AFU lines. It is worth noting that we're referring to those same sabotage and reconnaissance groups that were actually small assault units of the RuAF. According to military sources, such groups operating along the sparse frontline can even fire upon Ukrainian soldiers at positions far removed from the line of contact.

Reports indicate that one of those responsible for the situation that developed in the first half of summer, ultimately leading to the breakthrough, is Colonel Marchenko, commander of the Pokrovsk Tactical Group. During meetings, it reached a point where individual commanders who clearly understood the situation on the frontline were forced to remain silent and agree with Marchenko, who refused to acknowledge the actual state of affairs.

Another problem is that despite reports from troops at their positions (and entries in the Delta situational awareness and battlefield management system) indicating that the enemy was clearing house by house, commanders insisted that all enemy soldiers in that sector had already been eliminated by drone operators, and that only an insignificant number of saboteurs had broken through. It's saying that we often see precisely such comments under videos documenting Russian soldiers penetrating one settlement or another. As it turned out, all these gradual "infiltrations" were preparation for the Dobropillia breakthrough.

The New York Times also cited analysts from the Ukrainian DeepState monitoring project, who said they had hesitated to publish information about the Russian breakthrough near the town of Dobropillia, fearing it might weaken Ukraine’s position in future negotiations. This once again highlights that updates to the project’s map are often delayed not only for operational security reasons but also for political ones.

After news of the Dobropillia breakthrough became public, the command of the Khortytsia operational-strategic group rushed to reassure the public, claiming that only a small Russian unit of five to ten soldiers had breached the line—too few to seize and hold territory. But the salient soon expanded to the point that it enveloped Ukrainian forces stationed in Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad—roughly three brigades—effectively leaving them partially encircled by Russian troops.

The Ukrainian army’s inability to completely "cut off" the Dobropillia salient is partly due to the effective work of Russian drone units, notably Rubikon, similar to the Kursk operation. These units can down fixed-wing reconnaissance drones at long range and disrupt Ukrainian logistics up to 15–20 kilometers [9-12 mi] away by targeting large UAVs that deliver ammunition and supplies to troops on the frontline. In one reported case, Ukrainian drone operators lost all of their aircraft, leaving them unable to resupply their positions in time.

According to one Ukrainian soldier, the scale of the Russian infiltration sometimes made it difficult to determine which side held numerical superiority: "It turns out they’re not the sabotage group here—we are."

In the Kostiantynivka direction, Russian forces, as noted by OSINT analyst Playfra, are attempting to expand their presence under Kostiantynivka, gradually attacking the outskirts of the town and the section between the villages of Oleksandro-Shultyne and Ivanopillia.

The RuAF have also advanced in the Zaporizhzhia region, capturing the villages of Novovasylivske and Novohryhorivka, and reaching the Yanchur (Yanchul) River. Playfra's map marks Ukrainian fortifications that have come under Russian control. Now the RuAF have the opportunity to accumulate there for further advancement.

Shelling, Strikes and Sabotage

Both sides continue aerial strikes on energy facilities. In the early hours of Oct. 6, Ukraine struck energy facilities in the Belgorod and Bryansk regions. In addition, on Oct. 6, Ukrainian UAVs attacked an oil refinery in Tyumen. This is the new most distant attacked Russian facility—over 2000 km [1243 mi] from the border with Ukraine.

In the early hours of Oct. 6, the RuAF hit an energy facility in the Chernihiv region. On Oct. 8, the RuAF struck the DTEK factory in the Donetsk region, which enriches coal for thermal power plants, for the third time.

In the early hours of Oct. 10, numerous energy infrastructure facilities were targeted in various regions of Ukraine. As a result of strikes on Kyiv, part of the city as of midday remained without electricity and water supply.

Additionally, Russia continues to attack Ukrainian railway infrastructure. In the early hours of Oct. 7, the locomotive depot in Poltava was struck, and on Oct. 8, freight trains and railway tracks were attacked in the Nizhyn area of the Chernihiv region. We doubt the expediency of strikes on tracks, which are easily repaired in a few hours, and on locomotives, of which, according to statistics for 2018, 2020, and 2021, Ukrainian Railways (Ukrzaliznytsia) have quite a lot.

On the morning of Oct. 7, in the Leningrad region, train traffic was halted on the Strogonovo–Mshinskaya section. Suburban trains were operated in reverse mode, and buses were arranged for passengers. The Russian Railways [Russian fully state-owned railway company] explained the disruption by "technical reasons." Freight and passenger trains were rerouted, resulting in delays of several hours. Ukrainian media, citing intelligence sources, reported that the explosion on the railway track, which caused a train carrying military cargo to derail, was carried out by the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense and the Ukrainian Special Operations Forces.

Pro-Russian bloggers claimed that the AFU used Flamingo missiles and published photos of debris fragments matching their size.

However, the Ukrainian Real War Telegram channel noted that at least one of the photos contained a spelling error and concluded that all the photos of the alleged Flamingo missile debris were fake. However, we disagree that such a conclusion can be made with confidence based on a single spelling error. Furthermore, it is what purpose would be served by the labor-intensive construction of such a missile mock-up, complete with numerous microchips, and its subsequent "planting."

Prior to this incident, only one instance of the use of Flamingo missiles has been reported, and there has been no confirmation of their mass production thus far.

In response to a journalist’s question about the supply of Tomahawk missiles to Ukraine, Trump stated that he had "sort of made a decision," but did not specify what that decision was. He added that he wants to know exactly how the Ukrainians plan to use the missiles before approving the deliveries, since he does not seek escalation.

According to Josh Helin, an analyst and project lead in the Finnish Black Bird Group OSINT project, the United States has only a few ground-based Tomahawk batteries, which were introduced into service only in 2023. Therefore, he doubts that these missiles will be supplied to Ukraine. Russian international relations expert Vladimir Frolov suggested that, in fact, Trump might have been referring to ATACMS tactical ballistic missiles rather than Tomahawks (in his response, Trump does not specify the missiles in question).

During his meeting with Ilham Aliyev, Putin admitted that the Russian air defense system was responsible for the downing of the Azerbaijan Airlines passenger jet on Dec. 25, 2024. He offered his condolences to the families of the victims and promised that Russia would provide compensation. According to Putin, the crash was related to a Ukrainian drone in the sky. The missiles did not hit the passenger jet directly, but rather self-destructed nearby, damaging the aircraft with shrapnel. This is a standard self-destruction mechanism of the Pantsir-S1 surface-to-air missile and anti-aircraft artillery system, and the missiles did indeed explode in the air near the plane. Photos of the aircraft's fuselage show marks consistent with prefabricated shrapnel.

The Ukrainian Hochu Zhit [I Want to Live] project, associated with Ukraine’s Main Intelligence Directorate, published a report containing what is claimed to be "obtained" data on Russian army losses over eight months of 2025. According to the report, Russia lost 281,550 personnel killed, wounded, or missing in action over 243 days. However, the report does not clarify whether the table is an original document from Russia’s Ministry of Defense or a compilation of information gathered by the project from several documents. Assuming the document is original, its format is highly unusual for the MoD and raises numerous questions. Furthermore, our analysis of the provided table using statistical methods revealed that the distribution of the last digits does not align with the data resulting from summing monthly reports. The signs of falsification we identified prevent this document from being used as a reliable source of information about the scale and structure of losses.

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