Sitrep for Aug. 18-22, 2025 (as of 9 a.m. UTC+3)

Frontline Situation Update

In the Pokrovsk direction, Ukrainian forces continue attempts to eliminate the Russian breakthrough near the town of Dobropillia. It is worth noting that earlier redeployed Ukrainian reserves counterattacked and managed to mop up the villages of Zolotyi Kolodiaz, Vesele, Rubizhne, and Nykanorivka (renamed Zapovidne after 2024). Now the Armed Forces of Ukraine are trying to cut off the salient at its base between Nykanorivka and the village of Maiak, while continuing to put pressure on the positions of the Russian Armed Forces that have fallen into encirclement.

Ukrainian military observer Kostiantyn Mashovets reported on Aug. 21 that the AFU has not fully mopped up the village of Kucheriv Yar, as Russian forces remain in the village. He cautioned that claims of encircling and defeating the RuAF are premature. At the same time, Commander-in-Chief of the AFU, General Oleksandr Syrskyi, announced the clearing of as many as six villages.

Researcher Playfra claims that both sides in this area are experiencing difficulties in moving armored vehicles—likely a conclusion he drew based on information from his sources in the AFU. In other words, the fighting in the area of Kucheriv Yar and further south is being carried out by infantry forces. Apparently, Russian drones did not reach Vesele, where the clearing was conducted with the use of armored vehicles, but they are already capable of striking further south. This has slowed the advance on this section of the frontline. Although part of the salient has been cut off, it is rather difficult to fully eliminate it with infantry forces alone.

In addition, the AFU’s 425th Skala Separate Assault Regiment is participating in an ongoing operation to mop up Russian soldiers who infiltrated the town of Pokrovsk. Videos have been published with accounts from captured Russian soldiers describing how they entered the city in small groups (as few as two men) and entrenched themselves in houses while awaiting further orders.

At the same time, in other directions the AFU continue, whenever possible, to use armored vehicles near the forward positions. A video has appeared showing the clearing of the town of Kupiansk, in which an AFU tank fires at the position of Russian soldiers in a private house (although fighting on the outskirts of Kupiansk is reported, this video was apparently published a month ago but was actually filmed back in November 2024, when Russian soldiers in armored vehicles broke into Kupiansk).

In the Lyman direction, Russian troops have advanced in the northern part of the village of Torske. In the neighboring settlement of Zarichne, the use of Ukrainian armored vehicles has also been recorded: a tank was firing direct fire at single detached houses where Russian soldiers were presumably hiding.

Slightly to the south—in the Siversk direction—significant advances by the RuAF have been noted in the area of the Serebrianske forestry on the border of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions over the past days. Fighting for the contested village of Serebrianka continues, and the village of Hryhorivka to the east of it appears to have almost entirely come under Russian control.

In the South Donetsk (Novopavlivka) direction, which Mashovets has identified as the most threatening for the AFU, Russian troops are actively advancing in the area of the villages of Filiia, Maliivka and Zaporizke in the Dnipropetrovsk region, as well as Temyrivka in the Zaporizhzhia region. However, successes by Ukrainian forces are also reported: it is claimed that after liberating the village of Andriivka-Klevtsove (known as Iskra until 2024), they entered the village of Tolstoi and have at least partially mopped it up—footage has been published showing AFU soldiers raising the flag.

Peace Talks

We believe that it is pointless to discuss specific proposals regarding the conditions of a ceasefire between Russia and Ukraine (and even security guarantees) until there is clarity about where exactly the future demarcation line will run, and since a compromise is currently unattainable due to Russia’s unwillingness to make significant concessions. Whether a meeting between Volodymyr Zelenskyy and Putin—and possibly Donuld Trump—will take place is still unclear (we consider it unlikely). However, Trump has already refused to organize such a meeting, according to The Guardian. It is obvious that no agreement will be reached in the near future. Trump once again stated that peace must be achieved "within two weeks."

The only open question now is whose side the US president will take when the negotiation process finally reaches a deadlock: either Trump will consider Putin to be non-negotiable and possibly increase support for Ukraine, or, on the contrary, reduce such support by accusing Zelenskyy of intransigence, or simply withdraw entirely from the process. At the same time, Putin is already rather successfully managing to delay the imposition of new sanctions.

The New York Times and The Economist reported that Trump revoked security clearances from 37 current and former intelligence service employees. Many of them worked on analyzing Russia or foreign threats to US elections, which, according to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence under Tulsi Gabbard, constitutes politicization or the use of intelligence as a weapon to advance partisan goals, or a violation of the rules for handling and protecting classified information. This decision, in addition to significantly reducing the level of Russia-related expertise within the US administration, sends a clear signal to American intelligence service employees that the subject of Russia is dangerous, and investigating its influence on American politics may lead to punishment or dismissal.

President Volodymyr Zelenskyy announced the successful test of Ukraine’s new FP-5 Flamingo cruise missile. The weapon features striking specifications: a range of 3,000 kilometers [1,864 mi], a circular error probable of 14 meters [45 ft], and a warhead weighing 1,150 kilograms [2,535 lbs].

Zelenskyy called it "the most successful missile" Ukraine possesses. But how effective it will be in practice remains unclear: such a large missile will be easily visible to air-defense radar, and its subsonic speed would allow Russian fighter jets to shoot it down with relative ease. At the same time, Ukraine has shown that Russian air defenses are "porous," repeatedly breaching them with a wide range of drones, including large, aircraft-type UAVs.

Mass production of the missile is expected to begin by early 2026. Some reports claim that one FP-5 is currently being built per day—about 30 a month—with plans to scale up by October to seven per day, or roughly 200 a month. If production reaches that level and a significant share of the missiles strike their targets, their impact on the war could be substantial.

Footage from the assembly line also showed FP-1 drones, which now account for 60 percent of all Ukrainian strikes on Russia. Each UAV costs about $55,000 and is produced at a rate of 100 per day. Their warhead weighs 60 kilograms [130 lbs] which is similar to that of a Shahed-136 loitering munition, which carries between 50 and 90 kilograms [110-200 lbs] depending on the version.

Ukrainian and Russian Strikes

Following recent diplomatic engagements involving Trump, Putin and Zelenskyy, Russia has significantly escalated its aerial campaign against Ukraine. In the early hours of Aug. 21, the Ukrainian Air Force reported one of the largest coordinated attacks of the war, with Russia launching over 500 drones and 40 missiles, including 4 Kinzhal hypersonic missiles and 2 Iskander ballistic missiles, as well as 19 Kh-101 and 14 3M-54 Kalibr cruise missiles. This suggests that the intensity of the attacks may be scaled down in response to political considerations.

One of the facilities targeted in the attack was the Mukachevo-based factory operated by the American company Flex, located in the Zakarpattia region. To the best of our knowledge, the plant is not affiliated with the defense sector and produces electronics for major global brands, including Google, Nike, Lenovo, Philips and Nespresso. The strike highlights that the presence of American corporations on Ukrainian soil does not inherently guarantee security. Notably, during a coordinated assault in the early hours of June 10, 2025, a Boeing office in Ukraine was also hit—yet this incident failed to prompt any discernible response from the United States.

Attacks on Russian enterprises related to the oil industry continue. In the early hours of Aug. 21, Ukrainian drones struck the Novoshakhtinsk oil refinery in the Rostov region.

In the evening of Aug. 21, they attacked the Unecha oil pumping station in the Bryansk region. The station is one of the key nodes of the Druzhba pipeline, and it had already been attacked by the AFU on Aug. 6 and Aug. 12.

In the early hours of Aug. 21, Ukraine’s Special Operations Forces struck a fuel train near the Dzhankoi station in Crimea, causing the train to catch fire. It also became known about the strike on Aug. 19 against a fuel train heading to Dzhankoi through the occupied part of the Zaporizhzhia region near the town of Tokmak.

On Aug. 20, a Bayraktar UAV struck a boat near the village of Zaliznyi Port in the Kherson region. It is claimed that Russian infantry were on board, but we cannot independently confirm this information. It is worth noting that the use of these drones is possible only in areas where the threat from Russian air defense is minimal, for example, over the Black Sea.

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