Sitrep for Oct. 3-6, 2025 (as of 8:30 a.m. UTC+3)
Frontline Situation Update
In the South Donetsk direction, in recent days, the Armed Forces of Ukraine counterattacked the Russian Armed Forces in the Dnipropetrovsk region, liberating the villages of Sosnivka and Khoroshe and regaining control over several positions in the villages of Sichneve (known as Yanvarske until 2024) and Novoselivka. Meanwhile, Russian forces continued to advance south of Sosnivka and in the area of the village of Ternove.
Our attention was drawn to a dispute between the 110th Separate Mechanized Brigade of the AFU and the Ukrainian monitoring project DeepState regarding developments in the same direction. Last summer, they had already argued over the capture of the village of Novooleksandrivka, after DeepState admitted that it had not been fully captured.
In response to a video published by Russian soldiers showing their advance in the village of Verbove in the Dnipropetrovsk region, southwest of Sosnivka, the command of the 110th Brigade stated on its Telegram channel that enemy soldiers who had entered the village for propaganda purposes were eliminated after recording the video with flags, and that Verbove itself had allegedly been cleared.
The attached video shows drone dropping munitions onto several Russian soldiers, the display of a Ukrainian flag in the village center, and a demand directed at DeepState to recolor the map. On the project’s map, the village has been marked as contested since Sept. 28, and we agree with that designation.
The Russian video provides grounds to note an advance toward Verbove, but the presence in different parts of the village is insufficient to assert that it has come under Russian control. At the same time, the Ukrainian video showing strikes on assault troops and the display of the flag does not allow Verbove to be classified as territory under AFU control.
Such statements by the 110th Separate Mechanized Brigade of the AFU appear to be a consequence of the policy of the Ukrainian command, which does not encourage the abandonment of territories. Earlier, the commander of the 20th Army Corps of the AFU, responsible for the same direction, was dismissed for losing positions. Consequently, Ukrainian commanders are reluctant to retreat and instead seek to use flag photo ops to refute reports of Russian advances.
French investigator Clément Molin analyzed satellite data with traces of airstrikes and produced a map illustrating how the priorities and attack directions of the RuAF changed in the Pokrovsk and partly Kostiantynivka directions between May and September.
By comparing images from different days, one can draw conclusions about the dynamics of combat operations: where airstrikes intensify, the RuAF will most probably soon transition to the offensive, while where there are no airstrikes, Russian positions are likely to be located, since air forces do not strike their own personnel. Thus, the maps in Moulin's thread show:
- The RuAF advance on the eastern flank toward the towns of Rodynske and Bilytske, accompanied by airstrikes
- Then dispersion of strikes across the entire direction, up to the line between the village of Shakhove and the town of Druzhkivka
- The Dobropillia breakthrough, for the acceleration of which a nearly record number of bombs were dropped
- Its localization and the remaining Russian positions on this section where there are no craters from airstrikes
- Less intensive strikes in the Pokrovsk direction to complicate Ukrainian logistics and maintain the remaining Russian forces on the salient, and new intensification of bombardments east of the Dobropillia salient in the direction of Druzhkivka, and even advancement toward the village of Sofiivka
Ukrainian and Russian Strikes
The Russian campaign of strikes against energy infrastructure across almost all regions of Ukraine continues.
In the early hours of Oct. 3, the largest attack on oil and gas infrastructure since the beginning of the full-scale invasion occurred. According to representatives of Naftogaz [the largest national oil and gas company of Ukraine], 35 missiles, a significant part of them ballistic, as well as 60 drones, were launched at their facilities in the Kharkiv and the Poltava regions. The Ministry of Defense of Russia stated that the gas production infrastructure was targeted because it supports the operation of the Ukrainian military-industrial complex. On Oct. 5, the MoD reiterated the same statement. We believe that they will not succeed in achieving this goal, since the same substations often supply not only the above-mentioned enterprises but also civilian facilities. Furthermore, under wartime conditions, power will be redistributed if necessary, so that military facilities do not remain without electricity. In an extreme case, they could have acquired their own generators and backup systems. Striking gas production facilities is particularly absurd, as it is impossible to predict the purposes for which the extracted gas will be used.
It is worth noting that although the massive attack involving Shahed-136 (Geran-2) loitering munitions was again directed partly at the western regions of Ukraine, there was no reports of a large number of Gerans deviating from their route or "incursions" into neighboring countries, such as Poland. At the same time, we are confident that Ukraine used the same electronic countermeasures as a month ago. This further indicates the deliberate nature of the previous incident.
According to Volodymyr Zelenskyy, in the early hours of Oct. 5, during a massive air strike, 5 people were killed and at least 10 others were injured (according to our data, at least 19) in the Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Zaporizhzhia and other regions.
The strike also hit the Sparrow industrial park in Lviv. We found no information regarding the location of any military facilities there.
In the early hours of Oct. 4, several power-supply facilities in the Chernihiv region were damaged. According to Chernihivoblenergo, 50 thousand subscribers were left without electricity. A large number of such hits indicates the inability of Ukrainian forces to fully resist them. In this connection the Chernihiv Regional Military Administration called on residents to sign up for the air-defense forces, which are short of personnel, especially operators of anti-aircraft drones.
On Oct. 4, the RuAF attacked a suburban train in Shostka, Sumy region, with a Shahed-136 (Geran-2) loitering munition. A second drone missed a nearby long-distance train and struck the platform (Ukrainian Railways [Ukrzaliznytsia] reported that the second train was also damaged).
As a result, one person was killed and nine were wounded. Pro-Russian bloggers are trying to justify the strike by claiming it hit a military locomotive because it was covered with anti-drone nets, and that the passenger car in that train was actually intended to carry a military-cargo escort rather than civilians. In fact, in Russia (dating back to pre-revolutionary times) cargo escorts are usually transported in freight-looking cars, and there are no special "military" locomotives.
We believe the situation in Ukraine is similar (although in 2018 there were reports of specialized cars for servicemen escorting military cargo in Ukraine, we did not observe them in practice, and their appearance is noticeably different from the car that was struck). Ukrzaliznytsia have recently begun equipping all locomotives with anti-drone nets to protect them against UAV strikes. The video of the strike and its aftermath shows no signs that this was anything other than a regular long-distance passenger train: there are no military vehicles, no flatcars for transporting weapons, and no soldiers.
On Oct. 5, a video emerged showing a strike on the center of Kramatorsk, a city located just over 20 km [12.4 mi] from the frontline. The high video quality suggests that the strike was carried out by a fibre-optic-guided drone. The target was a Mitsubishi L200 pickup truck belonging to Ukrainian forces. On Sept. 15 we noted that Russian Molniya drones with warheads of up to 10 kg may be equipped with 40 km [24.8 mi] fiber-optic reels. However, this does not mean the RuAF can effectively control the area's roads—that would require large numbers of drones to saturate the airspace.
On Oct. 4, the AFU’s Special Operations Forces reported the destruction of a Buyan-M small missile ship in Lake Onega, Karelia [Russia’s constituent republic]. The strike was likely carried out by an aerial drone, reportedly hitting the engine compartment; the extent of the damage remains unknown. The ship carries Kalibr cruise missiles, but the Russian Navy’s ability to use them is limited by the number of available missiles rather than launch systems. According to the Special Operations Forces, the vessel was being transferred from the Baltic Sea to the Caspian Sea; its compact size indeed allows it to navigate the Volga–Baltic Waterway.
On the evening of Oct. 5, the AFU struck the Luch power substation in Belgorod region. Reports mentioned a missile threat, and GMLRS rockets launched from HIMARS MLRS may have been used. As a result of the strike, about 40,000 people were left without electricity, and some villages lost water supply as well. In the morning of Oct. 6 (after the sitrep was recorded), it was reported that Luch was hit again — two people were killed, and new power outages occurred. In addition, in the early hours of Oct. 6, a Ukrainian missile struck the Klintsy CHP plant in Bryansk region. The Russian Ministry of Emergency Situations reported disruptions in heating and power supply without specifying the cause; a missile alert had been issued.
According to The Telegraph, some Ukrainian officials believe that a potential US government shutdown could delay arms deliveries to Ukraine. However, later Foreign Ministry spokesperson Heorhii Tykhyi denied that negotiations or shipments had been halted.
Tensions in Europe
A court in Helsinki ruled that Finland has no jurisdiction to prosecute the crew of the oil tanker Eagle S, which was detained by Finnish border authorities in December 2024 after it damaged undersea cables. The severed cables were located outside Finland’s territorial waters, making it impossible to hold the crew criminally liable.
Sources told Fox News that NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte clashed with Estonian Prime Minister Kristen Michal after Estonia invoked Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which allows member states to request consultations if they perceive a threat to their security. Rutte reportedly argued that repeated appeals under Article 4 could dilute the treaty’s impact and that a new mechanism is needed to address Russian provocations. As Michael Kofman has noted, wars do not begin over isolated incidents—they begin when political leaders want them to. It is worth remembering the incident when a Russian bomber entered Turkish airspace from Syria and was shot down, without leading to a hot war between the countries.
On the morning of Oct. 3, German police reported the appearance of a drone in the western part of Frankfurt Airport and detained a 41-year-old Croatian national. He faces a misdemeanor charge, and authorities are investigating the purpose of the drone flight.
On Oct. 4, operations at Vilnius Airport were suspended for several hours after a cluster of balloons appeared in the sky. Lithuania’s National Crisis Management Center said the country’s airspace had been violated by 25 weather balloons, often used by smugglers. They had crossed from Belarus carrying a payload of 12,000 packs of cigarettes.
As we have previously noted, some instances of airspace violations in Europe may be deliberate Russian provocations, while others are likely ordinary incidents that would once have gone largely unnoticed.
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