Sitrep for Sept. 29-Oct. 3, 2025 (as of 10:30 a.m. UTC+3)

Frontline Situation Update

The Russian Armed Forces continue their offensive in the border areas of the Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhzhia regions. In recent days, they captured the villages of Olhivske in the Zaporizhzhia region, as well as Berezove and Kalynivske in the Dnipropetrovsk region.

In the Dobropillia direction, Russian forces have advanced almost to the outskirts of the village of Sofiivka, located north of the village of Shakhove and east of the village of Kucheriv Yar. A video has surfaced showing Russian troops moving toward Sofiivka from the village of Poltavka, advancing north along the river of the same name. This push is significant because if the RuAF capture Sofiivka and reach the Kazenyi Torets River, they will cut the supply route used by Ukrainian forces east of the river, affecting the area around the villages of Volodymyrivka and Pankivka. Another approach to Shakhove runs westward across territory where Russian soldiers are already present.

Independent analysts assess the situation differently in the western part of the salient near the village of Zapovidne (formerly Nykanorivka, until 2024). Recently, Russian soldiers advanced as far as the village of Dorozhnie. DeepState believes the Armed Forces of Ukraine still control Zapovidne, whereas other sources claim the village is contested or nearly captured—pro-Russian outlets even claim most of it is under Russian control. A video shows a Russian drone striking Ukrainian armored vehicles transporting troops near Dorozhnie. Some observers interpret this as evidence that Zapovidne has fallen to Russian forces. However, this conclusion is questionable: modern drones can operate over long distances, and their pilots do not need to be based in the nearest settlement.

DeepState also reports that the AFU repelled Russian forces from the village of Nove Shakhove and pushed forward near the village of Zolotyi Kolodiaz.

In the Kostiantynivka direction, according to researcher Playfra, Russian forces have seized the village of Kleban-Byk on the eastern shore of the Kleban‑Byk Reservoir. On the western shore lie the villages of Oleksandro-Kalynove and Yablunivka, where RuAF advances were previously noted. If Ukrainian forces still hold positions south of the reservoir, they face a very difficult escape from this semi‑encirclement: either crossing the reservoir by boat or attempting to slip through Russian positions.

Some OSINT projects have summed up the results of September, each calculating, according to their own methodology, how much territory the RuAF and the AFU advanced. For example, DeepState reported that in September 259 sq. km [100 sq. mi] were captured, almost half the territory gained in August.

By contrast, the pro-Russian project Slivochny Kapriz [Creamy Caprice] claimed that more territory was taken in September than in August (492 sq. km [190 sq. mi]).

Meanwhile, the Finnish analytical group Black Bird Group estimated the RuAF’s gains at 398 sq. km [154 sq. mi], slightly less than in August.

These differing results reflect differences in calculation methods. We have long observed that Ukrainian analysts tend to mark territorial changes with a delay, depending on the operational situation. For example, in the case of the town of Kostiantynivka, Playfra’s map appears to reflect the situation more accurately. Pro-Russian OSINT analysts, on the other hand, often overstate advances, basing their maps on video geolocations. Even if just one or two members of assault units reach certain positions, Slivochny Kapriz marks them as RuAF-controlled, when in reality such areas should be classified as "contested" at best. A telling example is a post about a "strike on RuAF positions north of the town of Dobropillia"—the attached video provides no evidence of territorial gains. In some cases, we do indeed rely on this project’s geolocations, although they only show places where Russian assault troops have managed to penetrate.

According to the Black Bird Group, the slower RuAF advances in September may be explained by force reorganizations. We assume this may have been caused by the recent redeployment of units, which typically require time to resume active combat operations. It is also possible that other units in the most active sectors were rotated and replenished.

In the Novopavlivka direction, in the village of Zelenyi Hai, a video recorded drone strikes on private houses. This footage has been interpreted in fundamentally different ways. The Ukrainian Telegram channel SHALIN concluded that Russian soldiers had entrenched themselves in those houses and that the village had been recaptured, while DeepState described it as an unsuccessful attempt by Russian troops that the AFU repelled. Reports indicate that the settlement has long been in a "contested" zone, although DeepState’s map marks it as partially controlled by the RuAF. In today’s realities, however, an FPV drone strike on a particular location does not necessarily mean the area is contested.

Ukrainian and Russian Strikes

As expected, Russia is increasingly targeting Ukraine's energy infrastructure. In recent days, strikes on energy facilities in various regions have been recorded:

• In the early hours of Oct. 1, during a combined strike on the city of Kharkiv, TPP-5 was reportedly hit;
• That same night, an electrical substation in Slavutych in the Kyiv region was struck;
• Strikes on the Sumy and Chernihiv regions led to disruptions in power supply;
• In the early hours of Oct. 3, as a result of strikes on the Poltava region, energy infrastructure facilities were damaged. and Naftogaz [Ukraine’s largest national oil and gas company] called the attack on gas production facilities the largest since the start of the war.

It has also been confirmed that the  Sept. 28 strikes on a CHP plant and electrical substation in the Belgorod region were carried out with GMLRS rockets launched from HIMARS MLRS—we previously noted the crater, unusually large for drone strikes.

It also became clear that in the early hours of Sept. 29, the Ukrainian Navy struck the Elektrodetal plant in the Bryansk region, about 120 km [75 mi]) from the border, with R-360 Neptune subsonic cruise missiles.

According to sources cited by The Wall Street Journal, Donald Trump authorized the provision of intelligence data to Ukraine for missile strikes on Russia’s energy infrastructure and urged NATO allies to provide similar support. It remains unclear which facilities Trump was referring to. We also do not know what additional intelligence for strikes on infrastructure Ukraine may receive from its allies, since the coordinates of fixed facilities are already available through open sources. What Ukraine may gain access to is information about air-defense coverage of specific targets or operational satellite data for damage assessment.

The Financial Times reported that Russia has upgraded its Iskander-M and Kinzhal hypersonic missiles to evade Patriot air-defense systems. According to the paper, the missiles can now maneuver in a distinctive way during the terminal phase of flight. By the Financial Times’ tally, the interception rate of Russian ballistic missiles dropped from 37 percent in August to 6 percent in September. But those figures do not account for whether the strikes targeted cities protected by Patriot batteries. Data from Ukraine Battle Map suggest the decline is largely due to a shortage of PAC-3 interceptors; Ukraine has recently been supplied with PAC-2 missiles, which are not designed to counter ballistic threats.

Russia’s MoD released video of a combined strike using an Iskander missile and drones against what it claimed were 20 trucks carrying 100 Liutyi drones in the Chernihiv region, readying for a mass launch. In reality, grain trucks were parked on the paved apron of a small agricultural airfield awaiting loading. The drivers noticed approaching Shahed drones and tried to scatter, but realizing they could not get away in time, left their vehicles. One later returned and was killed in the missile strike. Testimonies from drivers suggest the drones "hunted" the departing trucks—indicating that operator-guided unmanned aircraft were used in the attack.

Pro-war Telegram channels had already written (1, 2) about radio-controlled Shaheds with homing systems, citing as an example a strike on a moving locomotive in the Chernihiv region in the early hours of Oct. 1. At the time, Russia’s MoD claimed fuel tankers had been damaged, while the local prosecutor’s office released photographs showing that a grain car had been hit.

It is worth reminding that this week the possibility of transferring American Tomahawk missiles to Ukraine was discussed. Reuters sources consider such a delivery unlikely. We assess that Trump is more likely to fully distance himself from the Russia-Ukraine war than to provide a new type of weapon that might spark a fresh round of escalation. At the Valdai Forum, Vladimir Putin warned that if Ukraine were to use Tomahawk missiles, it would damage Russia-US relations.

At the same venue, Putin blamed Europe for the continuation of hostilities in Ukraine, arguing that European financing and arms supplies are prolonging the war.

BBC News Russian claims that Europe should prepare for a possible large-scale war. Experts say the Russian economy is increasingly mobilized for war, which is boosting Russia’s military potential. We do not expect such an escalation in the coming years, since Russia currently lacks the resources to provoke a military conflict with NATO. However, if the war in Ukraine becomes frozen, the risk of a war with a European country could become realistic within 5-10 years and would merit preparation.

Pete Hegseth gathered all US generals at Marine Corps Base Quantico in Virginia and urged them to prepare for war. Some commentators linked this statement to the Russia-Ukraine war and concluded that Hegseth sees Russia as the principal threat. This interpretation is incorrect: the United States regards China, not Russia, as the primary long-term competitor. Hegseth’s remarks were less a forecast of imminent war and more a reflection of a rightward shift in political culture, a renewed emphasis on militarism, and a focus on masculinity.

On Sept. 27, French authorities detained the Russian "shadow fleet" tanker Boracay, which had previously been held by Estonia. The vessel was recently spotted near the Danish coast during a drone threat. According to MarineTraffic, on Sept. 20, the tanker departed from the port of Primorsk, passed through the Baltic and North Seas, entered Danish territorial waters and then proceeded west through the English Channel. After Boracay rounded the northwestern coast of France, it was followed by a French naval vessel. The tanker then changed course, heading east toward the French coast, and later dropped anchor near the port of Saint-Nazaire. French authorities opened an investigation after the crew failed to prove ownership and did not follow orders. President Emmanuel Macron said this is the approach that should be used against all Russian "shadow fleet" tankers to deny Putin revenue for the war. The following day, the vessel was released. At the Valdai Forum, Putin called the detention "piracy," adding that in such cases "pirates are usually destroyed."

In our previous sitrep, we reported discussions about an EU "reparations loan" for Ukraine. Negotiations have since stalled, as Belgium—home to the Euroclear depository—insisted that the legal and financial risks be shared among all EU member states. Belgium fears it could otherwise bear full responsibility and be forced to reimburse Russia in the event of a lawsuit. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen confirmed that the risk should indeed be distributed across all EU countries.

As a countermeasure to the potential seizure of Russian assets, Putin signed a decree to accelerate the sale of state-owned companies through a special procedure. The decree is intended to fast-track sales of various companies, domestic and foreign. Should the EU proceed with confiscating Russian assets, Moscow may respond with symmetrical measures, according to Bloomberg sources. Hundreds of Western companies still continue to operate in Russia, including UniCredit SpA, Raiffeisen Bank International AG, PepsiCo Inc. and Mondelez International Inc.

A video recording has appeared showing a Ukrainian FPV drone hitting a Russian Mil Mi-8 helicopter. The pilot and paratroopers were apparently killed, while the navigator and radio operator were injured.

This is not the first time a helicopter has been hit by a drone, but we believe the tactic is unlikely to become widespread: it requires prior knowledge of the helicopter’s location and the ability to rapidly launch and guide the UAV onto the required intercept course.

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