Sitrep for Oct. 10-13, 2025 (as of 7 a.m. UTC+3)

Frontline Situation Update

In its latest update, the DeepState map has published a version of the frontline near Dobropillia that is diverging ever further from our own assessment. In the past, we noted that DeepState updates tended to lag behind real developments. Now, however, while we see the situation around the Dobropillia salient continuously worsening, DeepState’s analysts still report growing successes for the Ukrainian army.

On Oct. 13, the map showed Ukrainian advances near the village of Dorozhnie, as well as in Nove Shakhove, Kucheriv Yar, Zolotyi Kolodiaz and Poltavka. It is worth noting that we had previously reported on the buildup of Russian troops in Dorozhnie, Russian control over Nove Shakhove, attacks between Zolotyi Kolodiaz and Kucheriv Yar and an advance north from Poltavka toward Novopavlivka—whereas DeepState was reporting counterattacks in that area—aimed at capturing Sofiivka. Overall, the trend appeared to favor the Russian army’s recapture of the entire Dobropillia salient, as it stood in mid-August, and its continued expansion. This assessment is supported not only by combat and drone footage, which helps trace the direction of assaults and identify the positions of both sides, but also by satellite imagery showing the shifting pattern of Russian airstrikes. As Russian forces advance, their air force stops bombing the territory already under their control. We are also closely following analyses of the frontline from other researchers, many of whom share a view similar to ours regarding this sector. At this stage, we have found no confirmation of the changes reflected on DeepState’s map, though we acknowledge that such evidence may emerge later.

A video showing Russian infantry being pushed back as they attempted to cross the New Donbas fortification line appears to contradict the DeepState map, which indicates that Russian forces have been driven south of Zolotyi Kolodiaz. Discrepancies are also evident near Nove Shakhove, most of which independent researcher Playfra classifies as contested. DeepState, however, once again marks the nearby village of Zapovidne (known as Nykanorivka until 2024) as almost entirely under Russian control.

In the previous sitrep, we reported on Russian assaults toward the villages of Shakhove and Volodymyrivka, during which Russian units used armored vehicles to exploit deteriorating weather conditions. That trend has continued: new footage shows strikes on a Russian armored column near Volodymyrivka. Unlike in earlier instances, the vehicles advanced from the direction of the village of Popiv Yar rather than Novotoretske. Analysts suggest the column's intended target was Shakhove. However, after reaching a destroyed bridge over the Kazenyi Torets River, Russian forces were forced to turn back and attempted to attack Volodymyrivka from the north. Most of the armored vehicles and motorcycles were destroyed, though some soldiers may have taken shelter in nearby houses. According to Playfra’s map, much of Volodymyrivka remains contested.

Meanwhile, DeepState reports that the AFU launched counterattacks east of Shakhove and Kucheriv Yar.

A video has also been published showing Russian infantry in the town of Rodynske—a development of significance, as it effectively contributes to the gradual semi-encirclement of the town of Myrnohrad. It is worth noting that the RuAF are advancing toward the town from the direction of Novoekonomichne.

In addition, Russian troops have recently been advancing from the village of Udachne toward the mines located north of it. From there, they are expected to move toward the highway connecting the towns of Pokrovsk and Pavlohrad. Thus, the RuAF aim to cut off all supply routes: the road through Rodynske will soon be severed, leaving only the highway to Pavlohrad and, slightly farther north, the road through the village of Hryshyne.

In the Kupiansk direction, Russian troops continue their attempts to reach the Yuvileinyi neighborhood in southwest Kupiansk, where the highway leading to the village of Shevchenkove passes. This remains the last all-season supply route for the Ukrainian grouping on the left bank of the Oskil River, as the road to Borova has already been cut. The only alternatives may be dirt roads.

Russian advances continue in the Zaporizhzhia region, where the RuAF have crossed the Yanchur (Yanchul) River near Poltavka and entered the village. It is unclear whether Ukrainian forces will be able to build a defense along this river to hold back further Russian attacks. Reportedly, part of the Russian reinforcements have been transferred to this area, including units from the western flank of the Pokrovsk direction.

Western Assistance

The United Kingdom, together with Ukraine, plans to produce interceptor drones. The Octopus project aims to reach a production rate of 2,000 drones per month “in the near future.” This may sound impressive; however, it is worth noting that over the past week, Russia has launched 3,100 drones, 92 missiles and about 1,360 glide bombs against Ukraine. If this pace continues, Russia will be able to deploy roughly 12,000 drones per month, meaning far more interceptor drones will be required.

The Netherlands has allocated a €200 million aid package for the purchase of anti-drone systems for Ukraine and also plans to invest €110 million in the joint production of long-range strike drones.

Theo Francken, Belgian Minister of Defense and Foreign Trade, has published photos of the first four ordered F-35 fighter jets, which are scheduled to arrive in Belgium on Oct. 13. According to him, this delivery will make it possible to begin transferring Belgian F-16s to Ukraine.

It has also been reported that Italy previously transferred two companies of B1 Centauro armored vehicles to Ukraine (each company presumably consisting of 8-12 vehicles). They are currently deployed in northern Ukraine near the Ukraine-Belarus border.

Last week, in response to a journalist’s question about supplying Tomahawk missiles to Ukraine, Trump said that he had "sort of made a decision." On Oct. 12, he stated that he might transfer Tomahawks to Ukraine, but first wants to speak with Putin, setting a condition that if the war does not stop, the missiles will be handed over. We expect that during such a conversation, Putin will again pretend to be actively cooperative and try to negotiate. Nevertheless, we do not rule out the possibility of Trump ultimately transferring Tomahawk missiles to Ukraine.

The Financial Times reported that the United States has been sharing intelligence with Ukraine for several months and helping to carry out long-range strikes on energy facilities and oil refineries inside Russia. According to a source in the US administration, Ukraine selects the targets for strikes, and the US provides intelligence about the vulnerability of these facilities, assisting with operational planning, for example, by advising on flight routes, altitude, timing and UAV tactics. We previously assumed that if such assistance were indeed provided, it would likely take this form. Meanwhile, other participants in the operation claim that America also "designates priority targets for Ukraine." Such wording can be interpreted both as recommendations to strike a specific target because it is less defended, or, for example, as a proposal to prioritize attacks on oil refineries rather than railway infrastructure. Overall, this approach—applying economic pressure on Putin—is consistent with Trump’s plan to force Russia into a deal on the war in Ukraine.

Ukrainian and Russian Strikes

At present, attacks on energy infrastructure continue on both sides. In Russia, most strikes are concentrated in the Bryansk and Belgorod regions, with the latter experiencing intermittent power outages. The RuAF, in turn, continue to strike targets in Ukraine—including with high-cost precision weapons such as Iskander short-range ballistic missiles and Kinzhal air-launched ballistic missiles—aiming to disable power generation facilities. In the early hours of Oct. 10, the reported target was the main generator hall of the Dnipro Hydroelectric Station. Photographs show damage to the roadway and an electrical substation located on the headwater side of the dam. Still, the extent of damage to the main generator at the bottom of the dam remains unclear.

On the morning of Oct. 11, in the Chernihiv region, Russian drones first attacked a vehicle carrying energy workers conducting repairs, then struck another maintenance crew’s vehicle and subsequently hit a team of firefighters from Ukraine’s State Emergency Service who had arrived to assist. Two people were killed and three others were wounded in these strikes.

In the early hours of Oct. 12, Russian forces targeted an electrical substation in the Boryspil district near Kyiv.

On Oct. 11, Russian forces reportedly used a FAB-250 air-dropped bomb equipped with a Universal Gliding and Correction Module (UMPK) to strike a church in the town of Kostiantynivka, Donetsk region. Two people were killed and five others were wounded in the attack. We geolocated the impact site and found no suitable military targets nearby.

In our previous sitrep, we reported on the ongoing Russian strikes against Ukraine’s railway infrastructure, including tracks and locomotives. Oleksiy Kuleba, Deputy Prime Minister for the Restoration of Ukraine and Minister for Communities and Territories Development, stated that since early August, Russia has carried out more than 300 attacks on railway infrastructure. Most of these strikes caused train delays lasting several hours, but the damage was promptly repaired.

The Frontelligence Insight team, founded by Ukrainian military analyst Tatarigami, has published a detailed report on Russia’s tank production plans for the coming years, based on leaked documents. Their findings align with our own assessment of current production levels and future projections.

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