Sitrep for Oct. 20-24, 2025 (as of 11 a.m. UTC+3)
Frontline Situation Update
Recently, there has been some activity along several fronts, but one of the most widely circulated reports about Russian advances appears to have little to no factual basis. The Kremlin-aligned news outlet Mash claimed that Ukrainian forces suffered heavy losses—up to 500 troops—in fighting for Karantynnyi Island (part of the city of Kherson). The report alleged that the operation took place under the cover of electronic warfare systems, which supposedly jammed Ukrainian Starlink communications.
This claim is implausible: the technical features of Starlink make it nearly impossible to jam, which is precisely why the system is so effective. If Russia had indeed developed such EW capabilities, their use would have been detected in other sectors of the frontline, which has not been the case.
Later, the Russian-appointed governor of the Kherson region, Volodymyr Saldo, picked up the story. He claimed that Russian reconnaissance and airborne units had crossed the Dnipro River, established a bridgehead on the island, and shared footage purportedly filmed by Russian soldiers. Unlike the Mash post, which showed strikes on the island, Saldo’s video depicts servicemen meeting in some kind of shelter, approaching an unidentified shoreline by boat, and raising the Russian Airborne Troops flag amid ruins in an unverified location.
The Russian TASS state-owned news agency also reported on this alleged advance but later deleted all mentions of it, citing a "withdrawal of information by the Russian Ministry of Defense."
It is worth noting that Karantynnyi Island is partly within the city limits of Kherson and overlaps with its Korabelnyi district, which includes both an island section (home to the Korabel neighborhood) and a large mainland area. Thus, Russian troops could indeed have landed on the island, but only in its western part, which lies outside the city proper.
The Armed Forces of Ukraine later published a rebuttal recorded in the Korabel neighborhood on the eastern part of the island, apparently responding to Mash’s post (which did not specify which "western part of Kherson" was meant) and to Saldo’s claims. While Saldo asserted that Russian forces had taken control of part of Kherson, he referred to an industrial area and some dacha settlements, adding that fighting was ongoing for the Korabel neighborhood—that is, the Russian Armed Forces are constantly striking the enemy using various means of destruction. In reality, however, it is civilians who constantly suffer from shelling and strikes in different parts of the Korabelnyi district.
Although it is possible to cross the Dnipro River with small forces to conduct short-term operations, it is unrealistic to expect a large-scale redeployment of troops or, for instance, an attempt to capture the city of Kherson, as logistical support for such an operation would be impossible to ensure effectively.
In the Dobropillia direction, Ukrainian forces have been successfully counterattacking Russian troops for some time. It is worth noting that earlier, the RuAF had nearly managed to retake the territory of the initial breakthrough. The AFU launched an offensive from the north in the area around the village of Kucheriv Yar, recaptured part of the positions, recorded a video displaying their flag, and captured some Russian soldiers.
Although some reports claim the village has been fully liberated and over 50 POWs captured, the video shows only a handful of men. Both sides are known to exaggerate their victories and the enemy’s losses. For now, most analysts believe Kucheriv Yar has been only partially liberated, while Russian forces continue to push in from the south.
The RuAF, in turn, have occupied several apartment buildings in the town of Rodynske, continuing their attempts to encircle the town of Pokrovsk from the northeast. In doing so, they are also trying to expand the Dobropillia salient at its base—westward and southwestward (toward Rodynske, the village of Chervonyi Lyman and the town of Bilytske)—as well as northeastward, toward the villages of Volodymyrivka and Shakhove. The latter effort has so far been unsuccessful, as have the Ukrainian attempts to cut off the salient at its base. Ukrainian forces continue to hold Volodymyrivka, as indicated by new Russian airstrikes visible on satellite imagery. Overall, the situation appears to have improved for the AFU in this direction.
According to Ukrainian military analyst Kostiantyn Mashovets, Russian marine units, tasked with preventing Ukrainian forces from cutting off the salient and simultaneously attempting to expand it, are advancing along the eastern bank of the reservoir chain—from the village of Poltavka toward the village of Novomykolaivka—in an effort to sever the supply road leading from the town of Druzhkivka. Earlier, Russian forces attempted a similar attack on the village of Sofiivka, but were repelled.
The situation for the AFU in Pokrovsk continues to worsen. Although DeepState only notes a small expansion of the contested area with a narrow advance up to the railway station, the pro-Russian Slivochnyy kapriz [Creamy caprice] Telegram channel, based on video footage featuring Russian soldiers, believes that the control zone of the RuAF has reached the railway line in the section previously mentioned in our last sitrep, and has now expanded slightly north of the railway branch. Russian soldiers did cross the railway, but it is still too early to speak of complete control over this section. Nevertheless, it is clear that a significant part of the city is already under the RuAF control, and the complete capture of Pokrovsk appears to be only a matter of time. Many analysts believe that the battle for Pokrovsk has entered its decisive stage. It is uncertain whether the AFU will leave the city soon. Against the backdrop of ongoing Russian attacks, the fighting could drag on for weeks.
In the Kostiantynivka direction, Russian forces have made some gains in recent days. According to researcher Playfra, the RuAF re-entered the Yahidka dacha area from which they had recently been pushed out by the AFU, and were even spotted on the outskirts of the town of Kostiantynivka in the Santiurynivka area. Playfra considers this the beginning of the battles for the city.
In the town of Siversk direction, recent reports indicate Russian attacks involving large numbers of armored vehicles and motorcycles in the area of the villages of Verkhnokamianske and Serebrianka.
Alongside ordinary tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, and armored personnel carriers, an upgraded version of the so-called "turtle tank"—nicknamed the "monster tank"—equipped with an impressive slat armor featuring protruding metal elements for additional protection against drones, was spotted at the head of one of the columns. Such measures proved justified: reportedly this tank withstood strikes by at least 25 kamikaze drones before being stopped.
Ukrainian forces, despite the constant threat from drones, continue to use armored vehicles, for example, in the towns of Kupiansk, Vovchansk, Siversk and other populated areas. Recently, a video emerged showing a Ukrainian HMMWV equipped with similar protection in the form of slat armor cage with protruding unraveled steel cables.
The Donetsk region prosecutor's office reported the execution of civilians by Russian soldiers in the village of Zvanivka south of Siversk. According to a woman survivor, armed RuAF servicemen burst into the house, demanding information on Ukrainian military positions. As they were told nothing, the military left, but soon one of them returned and opened fire on civilians. This suggests the contested area has extended southward toward Siversk.
In Kupiansk, Russian military personnel managed to reach the Yuvileinyi neighborhood. We have already noted that the last "all-season" supply route for the Ukrainian grouping on the left bank of the Oskil River passes there.
Some analysts assert that the battles for both Kupiansk and Pokrovsk are in their decisive stages, with Russian infantry gradually accumulating and capturing district after district.
In the town of Vovchansk, in the Kharkiv region, Russian forces have crossed the Vovcha River and advanced as far as the village of Synelnykove.
In the Orikhiv direction, on Oct. 20, the RuAF carried out mechanized assaults involving tanks, armored personnel carriers, and motorcycles on three fronts advancing from the villages of Nesterianka, Robotyne and Novopokrovka towards the village of Mala Tokmachka. The vehicles were destroyed, but the infantry managed to dismount. It remains unclear whether the soldiers took cover or were killed.
Thus, over the past week, we have observed advances by both Ukrainian and Russian forces in the Dobropillia salient, increased activity in the Orikhiv and Vovchansk directions, the battles for Pokrovsk and Kupiansk entering a decisive phase, and the beginning of fighting for Kostiantynivka.
Ukrainian and Russian Strikes
On Oct. 22, two Russian drones struck the city of Kharkiv, hitting, according to Volodymyr Zelenskyy, a kindergarten. One municipal worker was killed, and ten others were injured; no children were harmed thanks to a teacher who managed to take them to a bomb shelter in time.
The War on Fakes Telegram channel affiliated with Russia’s MoD, claimed the strike targeted a UAV assembly workshop, and that the nearby building was not a children’s facility but rather the Honey café and a law office. In reality, footage of the strike shows a UAV diving directly into the building housing both the kindergarten and the café, which operate as a single establishment.
We believe this strike is yet another example of the RuAF’s lack of target reconnaissance and verification. For instance, it is possible that Russian intelligence came across a social media post showing café staff collecting donations for the Ukrainian army and used that information to justify the strike.
Western Assistance
Swedish Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson has formally confirmed the delivery of two Saab 890 airborne early warning and control AWACS aircraft to Ukraine, a transfer first announced in May 2024. Their arrival is expected to significantly strengthen Ukraine’s air defense capabilities by allowing more precise and comprehensive monitoring of airspace.
Ukraine and Sweden have also signed a memorandum of intent for the potential purchase of 100 to 150 Gripen E fighter jets for the Ukrainian Air Force.
Trump said he would not transfer Tomahawk missiles to Ukraine, explaining that training personnel to operate them would take at least six months. That, he said, would mean American troops would have to launch them in the interim—something Washington refuses to do.
The US Treasury Department has announced new sanctions against Rosneft and Lukoil, citing Russia’s lack of "serious commitment to the peace process" aimed at ending the war in Ukraine. Trump said he felt "the time had come," adding that the impact of the sanctions would become clear within six months.
Putin, in turn, said the new restrictions would not significantly affect Russia’s "economic well-being," arguing that reduced Russian oil supplies would instead trigger a sharp rise in global energy prices, including at gas stations.
The European Union simultaneously introduced its 19th sanctions package. Among its key measures, the bloc plans to gradually phase out imports of Russian liquefied natural gas, curb European tourism to Russia, and ban transactions with Alfa-Bank, several other Russian financial institutions, and banks in neighboring countries.
It is worth noting that the European Union is discussing the possibility of providing Ukraine with a "reparations loan." This mechanism envisions the creation of a special fund that would issue bonds backed by expected reparations from Russia. At present, negotiations have stalled, as Belgium, where the Euroclear depository is located, has agreed to proceed on the following three conditions:
- full distribution of legal risks among EU member states;
- guarantees in case the funds have to be returned;
- similar actions by other countries where Russian assets are also held.
EU member states have postponed until December 2025 their decision on whether to use frozen Russian assets to finance the "reparations loan."
The Lithuanian authorities reported that on Oct. 23, a Russian Sukhoi Su-30 and Ilyushin Il-76 strategic airlifter spent about 18 seconds in the country’s airspace, flying roughly 700 meters over its territory. Two Spanish Eurofighter Typhoon jets were dispatched to intercept the violation. The Russian MoD denies that any border incursion took place.
Wall Street Journal sources within the US administration claim that the United States has lifted a key restriction on Ukraine’s use of long-range Storm Shadow missiles. In Nov. 2024, President Biden authorized the "limited" use of long-range ATACMS tactical ballistic missiles, though the exact conditions for their deployment remain undisclosed. It is worth noting that these missiles contain US-made components, and therefore the use of such weapons for certain targets requires US approval. The lifting of restrictions could in theory allow the AFU to strike deeper into Russian territory. Donald Trump, in his social media post, wrote: "The US has nothing to do with those missiles, wherever they may come from, or what Ukraine does with them!" Vladimir Putin stated that in the event of long-range strikes on Russian territory (for example, with Tomahawk missiles), the response would be "very serious, if not shocking."
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