Sitrep for Oct. 17-20, 2025 (as of 9 a.m. UTC+3)

Frontline Situation Update

Russia’s offensive appears to be developing most actively in the Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhzhia regions. According to the researcher Playfra, Russian forces have captured the village of Novomykolaivka in the Zaporizhzhia region—a change not yet reflected on the DeepState map.

They also appear to have largely taken control of the village of Poltavka (the Russian Ministry of Defense has claimed full capture and released footage with Russian flags) and are advancing along the western bank of the Yanchur River.

It seems that the same group of soldiers is shown raising flags in different parts of the village, suggesting they can move freely through it, which in turn points to a shortage of Ukrainian forces in this sector of the frontline.

A bit farther north, at the confluence of the Solona and Yanchur rivers, lies the village of Okhotnyche, which had a population of 20 in 2001 and only 4 residents remaining in 2025 (compared to 16 in Poltavka). The DeepState project shows Russian advances near Okhotnyche, though the village’s labeled point appears to be placed on the opposite bank of the Yanchur River, near the northern edge of Poltavka.

West of the village of Verbove, the RuAF have expanded the contested area at least as far as the Yanchur River. Russian soldiers were spotted in the riverside village of Pryvillia, which the MoD claims to have captured. In addition, an airstrike was carried out on the second bridge over the Vovcha River in the village of Pokrovske, located northwest of Verbove.

Advancing along the western bank of the Yanchur River, the RuAF are gradually approaching the highway connecting Pokrovske and Huliaipole—a key supply route for the AFU. For this reason, it is crucial for Ukrainian troops to maintain a defensive line along the river, as it offers a natural barrier that helps stabilize the situation. Similarly, any successful river crossings of the Vovcha followed by further advances would create additional challenges for the AFU.

Russian progress in this sector has been notably faster than in other areas, prompting the redeployment of at least one Ukrainian brigade to reinforce the area. However, these efforts have so far failed to significantly slow the Russian advance. This is largely because, having detected a weakening in Ukraine’s defenses along this stretch of the front, the RuAF have redirected additional troops there, including units of the 90th Tank Division and several other brigades previously operating in the Pokrovsk direction.

In the Pokrovsk direction, the situation for the AFU continues to deteriorate, although Russian forces have not yet managed to seize the mines north of the village of Udachne. If they succeed, they will be able to position their UAV operators there, within range of the road connecting the towns of Pokrovsk and Pavlohrad—one of the few remaining supply routes available to Ukrainian forces in this direction. In addition to this route, the AFU may, albeit with greater risk, use the highway to Kramatorsk, which passes through Rodynske, Bilytske and Dobropillia. Rain and fog, on the one hand, hinder Ukrainian reconnaissance UAVs from detecting RuAF armored vehicle columns in advance; on the other hand, they may enable the AFU to more safely use the road near the Dobropillia salient because the airspace contains fewer enemy drones on such days. Therefore, it is crucial for Ukrainian forces to prevent the expansion of the salient to the west.

Furthermore, the RuAF have extended their control zone south of Pokrovsk and continue to penetrate various parts of the town.

Previously, they ambushed Ukrainian forces near the railway in the central part of the town, then advanced eastward toward the railway station, with the 7th Air Assault Corps of the AFU later reporting the destruction of attacking troops near the station. The entire area mentioned above is already classified as contested by Playfra. Near the station, a Ukrainian drone filmed the bodies of killed civilians: an elderly man on the road, an elderly woman with bags who had been riding a bicycle, and another civilian on the rail tracks. A wounded girl can be seen on the roadside near the deceased man. At the end of the video, a passerby picks her up and carries her to safety. The footage resembles scenes from Bucha. All these murders and injuries of civilians are unquestionably war crimes. It can be assumed that Russian soldiers have decided to kill all witnesses out of fear that the enemy might discover their location. These horrifying images highlight the danger that civilians face by remaining in frontline territories. Evacuation, even if forced, is a necessary measure.

In the Lyman direction, Russian troops continue attempting to advance toward the village of Yampil, and some RuAF soldiers have already reached the town of Lyman—the contested area there has significantly expanded.

Ukrainian and Russian Strikes

A video has surfaced that allegedly shows an Iskander missile hitting a Patriot air defense system in the area of Pavlohrad, Dnipropetrovsk region. Due to the low video quality, it is hard to determine whether there was a secondary detonation, or to confirm with certainty that we are indeed seeing radar units, launchers and the command post of the Patriot system rather than their decoys. It is worth noting that the AFU have recently been experiencing a serious shortage of PAC-3 interceptor missiles and difficulties defending against ballistic missile strikes. The possible loss of a Patriot system or part of it would significantly weaken Ukraine’s air defenses.

The Ukrainian government has established a Coordination Headquarters for Energy Protection—a command center uniting the efforts of the Ministry of Energy, Ukrenergo [the state-owned electricity transmission system operator in Ukraine and the sole operator of Ukraine's high-voltage lines], Naftogaz [Ukraine’s largest national oil and gas company], the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the State Emergency Service of Ukraine (SES), regional military administrations, communities, and infrastructure operators. Its mission is to coordinate the construction of protective structures around energy and transport facilities, for example, building reinforced concrete coverings around transformer substations and protecting them with special mesh or sand-filled gabions.

The media outlets Ukrainska Pravda, whose article was briefly mentioned in our previous sitrep, and Vazhnyye Istorii [IStories, an independent Russian investigative media outlet] have released articles on the readiness of Ukraine’s power grid for Russian attacks during the 2025-2026 winter season. Some experts claim that the infrastructure is now better protected than in previous years, and attacks should cause less destruction. At the same time, it is noted that Ukrenergo’s energy facilities remain insufficiently protected.

In the early hours of Oct. 18, the AFU struck the 500 kV Veshkayma substation in the Ulyanovsk region, which serves as a connection point between the power grids of Russia’s constituent republics of Mordovia and Chuvashia, as well as the Ulyanovsk and Samara regions. The facility transmits "significant volumes of electricity," including power generated by the Syzran and Zhiguli hydropower plants, to central parts of the country. Governor of the Ulyanovsk region Aleksey Russkikh reported that the power supply continued as normal and that the substation’s operations were restored in the shortest possible time. However, UlNovosti sources claim that there were consequences and that it is too early to speak of the facility's operations returning to normal.

According to the Oko Gora Telegram channel, over the past week, Ukraine has attacked four electrical substations on Russian territory: Arzamasskaya, Balashovskaya, Veshkayma and Vladimirskaya. All of these substations are key transmission hubs that receive and distribute power from hydropower plants, thermal power stations and nuclear power plants to central regions of Russia, including toward Moscow and major industrial centers. These sequential strikes reduce the throughput capacity of the corridor, increase the risk of cascading outages, and create challenges for logistics and industrial production.

Peace Talks

The Financial Times has reported that during a meeting in Alaska on Aug. 15, Vladimir Putin tried to give Donald Trump a history lecture about Rurik, Yaroslav the Wise and Bohdan Khmelnytsky. Trump was reportedly displeased, raised his voice several times, cut the meeting short, and canceled a planned lunch.

On Oct. 17, Trump met with Volodymyr Zelenskyy. Ukraine once again failed to secure the delivery of Tomahawk missiles. According to sources cited by Reuters, The Washington Post, and the Financial Times, Trump pressured Zelenskyy during the meeting to accept Putin’s terms. Zelenskyy refused to cede any territory to Russia voluntarily. Afterward, Trump publicly called for a cease-fire along the current frontline, a position Zelenskyy supported.

At the same time, WP and FT sources reported that during a phone call on Oct. 16, Putin proposed a territorial exchange under which Ukraine would give up the Donetsk and Luhansk regions within their administrative borders in return for Russian withdrawal from occupied areas of the Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions. However, Zelenskyy suggested that Putin only proposed to halt the offensive in the Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions, while the United States interpreted this as an opportunity for the return of Ukrainian territories. A meeting between Marco Rubio and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov is expected later this week to discuss a potential summit in Budapest.

Meanwhile, The Washington Post published an investigation based on Chinese customs data showing that exports of fiber-optic cables have broken records for several consecutive months, reaching 191,000 kilometers [119,000 mi] of cable in May, 209,000 km [130,000 mi] in June, and soaring to 528,000 km [328,000 mi] in August.

Exports of lithium-ion batteries, likely used to power drones, also surged over the summer. In contrast, Ukraine received just 116 kilometers [116 mi] of cable in August.

The article mentions several major suppliers, one of them being the Russian ASFPV LLC company, also known as PGI Technologies. The company posts pictures of its Chinese factories, which manufacture fiber-optic drones and cable reels. The site also features letters from the Russian MoD expressing an interest in purchasing the company’s drone-detecting scanners.

Another example is the Stribog company in Saint Petersburg, which offers machinery for winding fiber-optic cables. The homepage of its website, with the revealing URL "дрон-фпв.рф" ("drone-fpv.rf"), displays photos of production facilities that were clearly taken in China. The company’s blog promotes a new 20-kilometer-long fiber optic cable reel, which was allegedly developed by Chinese engineers.

While there is no doubt that the Chinese government does not curb such supplies, this can hardly be qualified as direct support of Russia by the Chinese state.

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