Sitrep for Oct. 24-27, 2025 (as of 7:30 a.m. UTC+3)
Frontline Situation Update
In the Dobropillia direction, Ukrainian forces have continued mopping-up the northern part of the salient over the past few days. They have fully liberated the villages of Kucheriv Yar, Sukhetske (north of the town of Rodynske) and Zatyshok (known as Suvorove until 2024) and have also advanced near the village of Nove Shakhove. It is worth noting that Ukraine’s efforts to eliminate the Dobropillia salient are driven by the need to secure supply routes leading toward the town of Druzhkivka and the city of Kramatorsk.
Meanwhile, Russian forces advanced near the villages of Novotoretske and Volodymyrivka, where Russian naval infantry carried out mechanized assaults. Fighting continues with mixed results for control of Rodynske—Russian troops remain present there, but most of the town is contested.
The situation in the town of Pokrovsk itself is approaching a critical point. Russian troops are increasingly being spotted north of the railway line, along the road leading to the city of Pavlohrad. Supplying Ukrainian forces via this route has become difficult: while it has not been physically cut off, it now lies within Russian weapon range, and Russian soldiers are frequently observed along it. The road through the village of Hryshyne remains relatively accessible, but travel there is still dangerous. To completely block Ukrainian supply routes to Pokrovsk, the Russian Armed Forces would need to concentrate troops inside the town.
According to Ukraine’s General Staff, Russian forces have "used inter-positional space and infiltrated small infantry groups," concentrating around 200 soldiers in Pokrovsk. In effect, this statement acknowledges a critical shortage of Ukrainian manpower, which prevents the establishment of a continuous defensive line. The gaps between Ukrainian strongpoints—the so-called inter-positional space—are precisely the areas through which Russian troops are advancing.
According to Ukrainska Pravda, which cited Ukrainian soldiers on the ground, at least 250 Russian assault troops are currently in the town. Logistics have become extremely difficult due to the heavy presence of Russian drones. To deliver supplies to frontline positions, Ukrainian troops have to walk 10-15 kilometers [6.21-9.32 mi] on foot under constant UAV surveillance and attacks, including from so-called lurking drones that monitor the area with cameras and launch as soon as movement is detected.
The situation in the Pokrovsk direction has not developed rapidly but has been unfolding gradually over several months. Back at the end of July, we noted that Russian assault troops, rather than sabotage and reconnaissance groups, were infiltrating the town, taking advantage of the shortage of personnel in the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Although Ukrainian forces managed to eliminate some of these assault groups, others entrenched themselves in buildings. Thus, over time, Russian soldiers gradually accumulated inside the town, preparing for further advances toward its central and northern parts. As a result, the fall of Pokrovsk appears inevitable. However, how soon this will happen depends on how many resources the AFU command allocates to defend the territory. At the same time, we do not expect to see urban combat involving large numbers of infantry, as was the case in the town of Bakhmut. Instead, the RuAF are likely to gradually push Ukrainian troops out. Even if that does not happen, the AFU may still be forced to withdraw due to supply shortages.
Thus, only those who believed the AFU General Staff’s statements that all infiltrating "saboteurs" had been promptly eliminated can now be surprised with a sudden deterioration of the situation in Pokrovsk.
The worsening situation there also threatens the nearby town of Myrnohrad, whose supply lines run through Pokrovsk. This could lead to the chaotic retreat of Ukrainian forces, including from Myrnohrad itself. We consider it likely that the Ukrainian command will order its troops to hold their positions to the end, despite the risk of being encircled and the need to rely solely on drones for resupply.
The RuAF are also advancing south of Myrnohrad, having captured the villages of Balahan, Kozatske (known as Moskovske until 2024) and Promin. The Russian Ministry of Defense reported capturing the first two villages two weeks ago. Russian drone operators have been observed operating directly from Balahan—an unusual deployment, as both Ukrainian and Russian drone teams (such as Rubikon, whose members’ lives are evidently valued more than those of regular unit operators) typically work some distance from the front line, in safer positions. Nevertheless, such a forward placement has its advantages: the drones can fly farther and more actively disrupt Ukrainian supply efforts.
Russian airstrikes also continue in both the Dobropillia and Pokrovsk directions. As researcher Clément Molin noted, although air-dropped bombs are still being used in the Pokrovsk area, the main focus has recently been shifted to the town of Druzhkivka and the village of Sofiivka, where Russian naval infantry are attempting to advance.
In the neighboring Kostiantynivka direction, the situation is beginning to resemble the gradual deterioration seen in Pokrovsk earlier this summer. As in Pokrovsk, RuAF assault groups are now penetrating into the Santurynivka neighborhood in Kostiantynivka. Although official reports suggest all assault troops have been eliminated, new Russian units continue to arrive steadily, leading to a gradual accumulation of Russian forces within the town’s limits.
In the Lyman direction, a video recorded on Oct. 24 by Ukrainian 425th Skala Separate Assault Regiment claims that they have fully mopped-up Torske, despite the village having been under Russian control for some time, along with a significant part of the neighboring Zarichne. The footage shows AFU soldiers clearing basements, taking prisoners and raising the Ukrainian flag in the village center. While the video appears convincing, some analysts question the claim, noting that the 425th Regiment has recently been involved in flag photo ops that often result in heavy losses. In the early hours of Oct. 27, new footage emerged showing Russian forces removing the Ukrainian flag from Torske, along with bodies of killed Ukrainian soldiers.
These kinds of operations, which lead to disproportionate losses, further worsen the AFU’s manpower shortage, especially as orders to hold settlements "to the last" continue. Many analysts, including ourselves, criticize this tactic employed by the Commander-in-Chief of the AFU General Oleksandr Syrskyi.
In the Kupiansk direction, the situation has also become critical: Russian forces have effectively taken control of the supply route through the Yuvileinyi neighborhood in Kupiansk, which leads toward Shevchenkove. The main concern now is the fate of the Ukrainian bridgehead on the left bank of the Oskil River, as its isolation from steady supplies leaves Ukrainian troops in a highly vulnerable position.
Ukrainian and Russian Strikes
Russian strikes on Ukrainian energy infrastructure continue. Near the city of Kramatorsk, the RuAF attacked a third wind turbine in four days, following earlier strikes on Oct. 22 and 24.
Strikes on railway infrastructure also persist. On Oct. 25, a video appeared showing a strike—reportedly from Oct. 23—on locomotives at a depot in the town of Lozova, Kharkiv region. Another video, released on Oct. 26, showed the aftermath of a strike on a locomotive in the Sumy region.
On Oct. 26, a Russian drone hit a passenger bus in the Sumy region, killing one person and injuring 13 others, including two children.
On Oct. 25 and 26, Kyiv came under intense combined air attacks. In the early hours of Oct. 25, two people were killed and 13 were injured; in the early hours of Oct. 26, three civilians were killed and 33 were injured, including seven minors.
On Oct. 25, the AFU once again targeted the Balashovskaya substation in Russia’s Volgograd region. A previous strike on this substation occurred on Oct. 16, alongside other attacks on key substations in western Russia.
According to the Russian Ministry of Defense, 34 Ukrainian UAVs flying toward Moscow were shot down in the early hours of Oct. 27. One was intercepted over Kommunarka, an urban-type settlement within the city of Moscow.
On Oct. 24, a strike targeted the Belgorod Reservoir dam. Initial reports claimed that HIMARS MLRS rockets were used in the attack. However, video footage shows attempts to intercept drones—judging by the sounds, anti-aircraft guns were firing at them, apparently positioned directly on the dam. This evidence suggests that the strike was carried out not by HIMARS rockets, but by drones. Ukrainian officer Robert "Madyar" Brovdi, commander of the AFU’s Unmanned Systems Forces, stated that "the visit was carried out by the ‘birds’ of the 1st Center of the Unmanned Systems Forces." We assume that both UAVs and rockets may have been used in the strike. Footage of the aftermath and satellite imagery show uncontrolled water discharge and initial flooding in nearby areas. Some Ukrainian Telegram channels suggest that the strike was intended to flood Russian positions near the town of Vovchansk.
French President Emmanuel Macron announced that France is preparing to deliver a new batch of Mirage 2000 fighter aircraft and Aster-series surface-to-air missiles for the SAMP/T air defense system "in the coming days." The first three aircraft were delivered in early 2025.
Footage has appeared showing tests of various anti-drone nets for UAZ Bukhanka vans. Apart from the fact that such protection looks rather absurd on an unarmored vehicle, its effectiveness is likely very limited, unlike on armored vehicles, where heavy protection can actually help keep the crew safe.
It is worth noting that last week, a video appeared of a so-called monster tank, which reportedly withstood hits from at least 25 drones. On Oct. 25, photos of another similar "beast" were published.
At a meeting with General Valery Gerasimov, Chief of the General Staff of the RuAF, Vladimir Putin was briefed on what officials described as a successful test of the 9M730 Burevestnik missile. According to Gerasimov, the test took place on Oct. 21, with the missile flying for "about 15 hours" and covering a distance of 14,000 kilometers [8,700 miles].
The Burevestnik is a long-range cruise missile powered by a nuclear propulsion system—a concept both the United States and the Soviet Union pursued in the 1950s. In theory, such a reactor allows a missile to follow complex, extended flight paths that can bypass air defense systems. However, the exhaust emitted by the engine leaves behind a trail of radioactive particles. Tests conducted in the United States in the 1960s showed that missiles of this kind contaminate large areas with lethal doses of radiation during launch and flight. As a result, they can only be launched from sparsely populated regions, and their trajectories must avoid flying over allied or neutral territories. Both Washington and Moscow eventually abandoned these projects in favor of conventional jet-powered missiles. In the 2000s, Russia revived the program. The Burevestnik’s testing has been linked to an explosion at a range near Severodvinsk in Russia’s Arkhangelsk region in August 2019, which killed at least five people. At the time, Rosatom, Russia’s state nuclear corporation, said the blast involved a missile engine powered by a radioactive isotopic source.
A second case of travel restriction from Russia due to an electronic draft notice has been reported. In Saint Petersburg, on Oct. 22, a young man received an SMS notification about a draft notice "for medical examination procedures" scheduled for Oct. 28. He purchased a plane ticket to Istanbul for Oct. 23 but was stopped by border officers during passport control. They informed him that a "travel-ban flag" had been placed in the system. This incident confirms that the electronic Draft Register is now operational in Moscow, Saint Petersburg and the Krasnodar region.
We need your support to continue our efforts. Please consider making a monthly donation to CIT through our fundraising page or Patreon.