Sitrep for Dec. 1-5, 2025 (as of 9 a.m. UTC+3)

Frontline Situation Update

According to DeepState, the Russian Armed Forces have advanced in the town of Vovchansk in the Kharkiv region, which Russian authorities declared captured late on Dec. 1. The town is divided by the Vovcha River into two parts. Until recently, the RuAF controlled almost the entire right-bank part (which, according to some reports, is now nearly cleared) and a small area in the western part of the left bank.

However, they have not yet been observed in the southeastern districts, while in recent days they have begun appearing in the southwestern parts. This is corroborated, among other things, by Ukrainian airstrikes on positions in that area of the town.

The claim of full control over the towns of Vovchansk and Pokrovsk was made ahead of Putin’s meeting with Steven Witkoff and Jared Kushner in Moscow, in order to showcase the RuAF’s successes on the battlefield. To reinforce these statements, Russian soldiers were sent into areas that had not yet been captured to plant flags. This became known thanks to footage from Ukrainian drones: they recorded the bodies of soldiers with Russian flags lying next to them, and it was reported that four such attempts were prevented.

In the Kupiansk direction, it is worth noting that in early autumn Russian forces used a pipeline to amass personnel near the villages of Radkivka and Kindrashivka and made significant gains in the town of Kupiansk all the way to the Yuvileinyi neighborhood, where the only remaining supply route toward the village of Shevchenkove runs. Despite Ukrainian claims that the pipeline exit had been destroyed, the RuAF continued to build up forces near the town, and by late October the road was effectively blocked. This is especially important because the lack of supply routes calls into question the fate of the entire AFU bridgehead on the left bank of the Oskil River from Kupiansk to the village of Kolisnykivka—an issue that has been actively discussed within Ukrainian society.

In recent days, the AFU have successfully counterattacked Russian forces in Kupiansk: they have cleared the Yuvileinyi neighborhood, and fighting is underway in the central and northern parts of the town.

Meanwhile, claims of its complete capture were made as early as Nov. 20. RuAF positions in Kupiansk are vulnerable to flanking strikes in the area of Kindrashivka. If the AFU command can allocate the resources, it may be possible to cut off the salient, which would significantly complicate the situation for the Russian assault troops in the town.

In the Kostiantynivka direction, there have been no significant changes in recent days: Russian forces continue to attack the southern outskirts of the town of Kostiantynivka. According to researcher Playfra, both sides are actively mining the roads used for adversary movement: the AFU employ mines on the railway and dirt roads leading to the settlement, while the RuAF focus on the supply routes within the town. It appears that these tasks are being carried out remotely, using UAVs. The mines used may include anti-personnel mines such as the PFM-1 "Butterfly" anti-personnel landmine (aka "Petal"), which are effective not only against personnel but also against motorcycles, and anti-tank mines (including improvised ones, not necessarily heavy models like the TM-62). Given the effectiveness of these mine defenses, several European countries have begun to withdraw from the Ottawa Convention that bans anti-personnel mines.

Additionally, Playfra shared a screenshot of a video frame from a Ukrainian drone flying through dense fog, with the road's contours only barely visible. This raises the question: Why has the widespread use of thermal imaging drones, which were actively employed in 2023 and 2024, become less common in foggy weather recently?

In the Dobropillia direction (between Pokrovsk and Kostiantynivka), Russian forces continue attempts to transfer armored vehicles across the Kazennyi Torets River, likely aiming to advance toward Zapovidne (Nykanorivka), Rodynske and Krasnyi Lyman. Ukrainian forces actively destroy tanks and other vehicles in this area, including near the village of Razine.

In the Pokrovsk direction, as we previously noted, the contested area from Krasnyi Lyman to Pokrovsk has effectively merged.

Pokrovsk has been declared captured, but unlike in Vovchansk, the Russian soldiers sent to plant a flag in the town completed their mission. Nevertheless, Ukrainian forces may still carry out counterattacks in the town—for example, clearing buildings near the railway station—so it is premature to state that the RuAF have full control of the town. However, it is unlikely that the Armed Forces of Ukraine have the capability to recapture it. It is only a matter of time before the Ukrainian command gives the order to withdraw from the Pokrovsk–Myrnohrad agglomeration.

In the town of Myrnohrad, the situation remains difficult for the AFU: supplies can be delivered only by UAVs and ground robots; armored vehicles and cars cannot be used, and infantry soldiers often fall into ambushes. According to sources of Diana Butsko, a journalist from the Ukrainian hromadske media outlet, the AFU are attempting to break through to the Ukrainian garrison in Myrnohrad and have already achieved some progress. Since at least Nov. 29, the AFU marines have been fully encircled, and their attempts to break out in recent days have failed. The military says that continued control of Myrnohrad is possible only if the de-blocking operation succeeds and Rodynske and Krasnyi Lyman remain under AFU control. It is unlikely that Ukraine has enough forces for this.

In the Zaporizhzhia region, according to the Russian Ministry of Defense, on Dec. 2 the RuAF captured the village of Dobropillia, located northwest of Huliaipole on the road leading to the village of Pokrovske. Pokrovske, in turn, lies along the N-15 highway connecting the cities of Zaporizhzhia and Donetsk. To prove this, the MoD published drone footage of Russian soldiers with a flag, filmed from a fairly close distance. The unusual angle was due to weather conditions—because of the fog, it was simply impossible to film them from afar.

However, this also suggests that the fog enabled the Russian soldiers to infiltrate the area. The AFU General Staff made a similar statement, adding that the RuAF did not actually occupy the village and that the group sent to plant a flag was allegedly quickly eliminated. In response to the Russian footage, Ukrainian soldiers recorded their own propaganda video with a flag. However afterwards, they were tracked and attacked by a Russian drone. As in many other cases, the soldiers sent on this task were from the AFU assault units.

Russian front-line mapping projects have published their November statistics. According to DeepState, Russian forces seized 505 square kilometers [195 sq. mi] of Ukrainian territory over the past month—almost twice as much as in October (267 square kilometers [103 sq. mi]).

The pro-Russian Slivochny Kapriz project put the newly controlled area at 506.5 square kilometers. The near-identical numbers are striking: DeepState often lags in reflecting conditions on the ground, while Slivochny Kapriz tends to jump ahead of events; in October, their estimates diverged by nearly a factor of two.

The independent Finnish Black Bird Group OSINT project calculated that Russia captured 528 square kilometers [204 sq. mi] in November.

Konrad Muzyka, director of Rochan Consulting, assessed Russia’s gains at 700 square kilometers [270 sq. mi]. By that project’s accounting, this was Russia’s second-largest month of territorial advances since January 2024.

The discrepancies stem from how different teams interpret the same evidence collected. If soldiers appear on video walking through a settlement, that can be read as a confirmed advance, the settlement shifting into a contested area, or merely a small assault group slipping through—an action that may not indicate control over an area.

We have previously noted that each winter the number of air-dropped bombs used by Russia’s Aerospace Forces falls sharply. According to the Ukrainian General Staff, Russia dropped 3,648 bombs in November 2025—a 32 percent decline from October’s 5,328. Our working hypothesis follows the explanation offered by Michael Kofman: short daylight hours and poor winter weather force pilots to rely on instruments, reducing the number of sorties. The drop in the use of air-dropped munitions is one reason Russian troops have begun advancing more slowly.

Western Assistance

Last August, the Prioritized Ukraine Requirements List (PURL) was established as a mechanism for supplying military aid to Ukraine. Under this initiative, Ukraine draws up priority lists of needed equipment, while European NATO allies finance the purchase of that weaponry from the United States. It has now emerged that, as part of this initiative, Norway, Germany and Poland will fund a military aid package for Ukraine worth $500 million; the Netherlands will contribute €250 million [$291 million], while Canada will provide $200 million.

NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte announced that under the PURL initiative, the alliance member states have purchased $4 billion worth of weapons from the US for Ukraine since August, which is approximately $1 billion per month. This pace is expected to be maintained in December and next year.

Unfortunately, this is still significantly less than the US assistance allocated in 2023-2024. The allocation of major financial aid for Ukraine in 2026 is currently stalled, as the main working option (a reparations-backed loan) is being blocked by Belgium. A resolution of this issue is not expected until Dec. 18.

Researchers from the Skhemy [Schemes] project (part of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty) explored satellite images from Planet Labs and created an interactive map of Russian strategic targets hit by the AFU: military, oil refining and gas processing plants, as well as oil depots and terminals. The images of oil depots and oil storage facilities do indeed show the aftermath of major fires (we cannot assess their economic impact), while the damage to the Saransk Mechanical Plant in Mordovia or the oil terminal in Tuapse does not look significant in the images. For this reason, the headline describing the strikes as "unprecedented in scale" seems somewhat exaggerated to us.

It is reported that on Dec. 4, drones from the Prymary [Ghosts] special unit of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ukrainian MoD struck a Russian MiG-29 fighter jet at the Kacha military airfield in Crimea. These types of fighter jets are not being used in the war. Based on the location, we believe that the aircraft was decommissioned; otherwise, it would have been relocated to another airfield.

The Dutch newspaper Trouw, using the Dronewatch platform, compiled a map of approximately sixty drone-related incidents that occurred in eleven European countries over the past three months. The journalists noted significant confusion, uncertainty, and frequent false alarms. In the vast majority of cases, no concrete evidence of Russia’s involvement was presented. In approximately forty cases, the origin of the drones was unclear, and no evidence was found indicating that any drones had entered the airspace. For instance, the flying object with lights that was recorded over Zaventem Airport in Belgium on Nov. 4 turned out to be a police helicopter. Two other "drone incidents" near Belgian military bases in the following days also proved to be false alarms—they involved a police helicopter and a landing DHL cargo plane. In late September, reports of drones halted air traffic in Oslo, affecting thousands of passengers. Police later found no confirmation that drones had actually been flying. The same happened with reports from Gothenburg Airport in Sweden in early November. In South Limburg (the Netherlands) and Billund (Denmark), residents mistook stars for UAVs. Norwegian police concluded that a suspicious drone near an oil platform in the North Sea was likely a ship. It has been confirmed several times that drone flights were the work of hobbyists, including tourists unfamiliar with local regulations. For example, in an incident involving a drone flying over government buildings in Warsaw, Polish police detained a Ukrainian man and a 17-year-old girl from Belarus. However, no evidence of espionage was found. In the cases involving Moldova, Romania and Poland, where drone debris was discovered, Russia’s involvement has been confirmed, but the large number of incidents in other countries were not Russian provocations.

We have previously reported that "drone incursions" may actually be hobbyist UAV flights near restricted facilities.  This has always happened but attracted far less attention until recently.

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