Sitrep for Nov. 17-24, 2025 (as of 10:00 a.m. UTC+3)
Frontline Situation Update
Regarding the town of Kupiansk, Russian sources have repeatedly claimed in recent months that the town has been encircled, "cleared" or fully captured—most recently by General Valery Gerasimov, Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces. However, according to the DeepState map, the frontline has remained largely unchanged over the past week. A close review of the video released by the Russian Ministry of Defense as purported evidence of full control over the town shows that it was filmed in areas that have long been under Russian control, primarily on the right (western) bank of the town. Almost no footage comes from the southeastern districts, where the main fighting continues. Therefore, despite the difficult situation for the Armed Forces of Ukraine in this area, we see no significant changes on the ground.
Fighting continues on the southern outskirts of the town of Siversk, although it remains unclear whether Russian soldiers are entering from Zvanivka or Vyimka. Railway branches leading into Siversk run through both villages, and the RuAF can advance along them. Notably, on the DeepState map, Zvanivka is still not marked as contested, even though more than a month has passed since the Donetsk region prosecutor’s office reported the execution of civilians there by Russian soldiers; footage with Russian troops has been geolocated in the village, and on Nov. 22 the Russian MoD declared it captured. While we cannot confirm this claim, Zvanivka should at least be classified as contested.
In the Siversk direction, dense fog is still being reported, and the Russian side is attempting to use it to advance. Similar weather conditions have been observed in the Kostiantynivka direction.
In the Dobropillia direction, in recent days, the RuAF have been actively advancing toward the Kazennyi Torets River near the villages of Volodymyrivka and Pankivka, and have once again attempted to attack the village of Sofiivka. Their goal, as we believe, is to gain control of the route passing through Sofiivka and to move along it toward the village of Shakhove, where, according to some reports, Russian forces are accumulating. Researcher Playfra considers that the attacks on Sofiivka are aimed at further advancing toward Druzhkivka; previously such a task was thought to have been assigned to the naval infantry redeployed to this area at the end of summer. Indeed, earlier this year it was revealed that there are practically no Ukrainian fortifications west of Kostiantynivka and south of Druzhkivka, between the Kryvyi Torets and the Kazennyi Torets rivers.
Earlier, we reported that the RuAF had captured the southern part of the town of Rodynske in the Pokrovsk direction. They are now advancing in the northern part of the town as well, continuing to form the northwestern "claw" around the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad agglomeration. The situation in the town of Pokrovsk has not fundamentally changed over the past week: Russian forces are observed in various parts of the town and on its outskirts. According to our assessment, the contested areas between Pokrovsk and Rodynske have already merged, although this has not yet been reflected on the DeepState map. However, it is not only premature but technically incorrect to speak of a "pocket." Given the current manpower shortages in the RuAF, a full encirclement like in 2022 is impossible. In 2025, there are not enough soldiers, vehicles or weapons to fully control the edges of a "pocket." Thus, despite the fact that Ukrainian forces in the "pocket" have found themselves in a rather dangerous position, they still retain the possibility of withdrawal.
To the west of Pokrovsk, near the village of Kotlyne, a video was recorded showing the execution of five Ukrainian prisoners of war: in the footage, a Russian serviceman shoots from close range into the heads of prisoners lying face-down. The audio in the recording is clearly overdubbed: one can hear approving comments from those watching the video on a screen. Although the exact geolocation of the video is unknown, we rely on the statement of the Donetsk Regional Prosecutor’s Office that the war crime occurred specifically near Kotlyne. Based on this, it can be assumed that either the 15th or 30th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade of the RuAF was involved.
In the Dnipropetrovsk region, the RuAF are advancing toward the village of Pokrovske and the N-15 highway connecting Zaporizhzhia and Donetsk. The Russian MoD has claimed the capture of the villages of Tykhe, Vidradne and Radisne, which, according to DeepState, lie well outside the contested zone. We remain skeptical of their full capture, but the footage provided does confirm the presence of Russian soldiers there, meaning the villages should at least be classified as contested.
In the Huliaipole direction, the situation remains critical for the AFU. Russian soldiers are gradually approaching the town of Huliaipole from the east. Reports have emerged of Ukrainian reserves being redeployed to this sector, but so far without notable effect. Ukrainian authorities evacuate civilians, Russian drones are continuously attacking vehicles on roads near Huliaipole, and air-dropped bombs are regularly hitting the town itself.
Ukraine’s Special Operations Forces claim to have shot down a Russian helicopter using a long-range FP-1 drone. Since the video was streamed directly from the drone carrying out the strike, the recording cuts off before impact, making it impossible to confirm the result from the footage alone. Although the Ukrainian SOF report that a Russian Mil Mi-8 helicopter was downed, it could also have been a Mil Mi-28N attack helicopter—the low quality of the video makes it impossible to distinguish between the two. If confirmed, this would be the first known instance of a helicopter being targeted by a long-range UAV rather than a faster, more maneuverable FPV drone. Pro-Russian milblogger Kirill Fyodorov denies that the helicopter was shot down. This remains plausible if, for example, the drone struck a rotor blade and only caused minor damage to the helicopter from debris. However, obituaries for the crew may yet appear.
Ukrainian and Russian Strikes
On the morning of Nov. 19, the RuAF struck the town of Ternopil with Kh-101 cruise missiles. The attack’s primary target was the Orion radio factory, which took five direct hits. Two other missiles veered sharply off course and caused extensive destruction: one slammed into a residential building, destroying half of it, and the other landed in the courtyard of another apartment block, igniting a fire. In one case the missile drifted off its azimuth; in the other, off its range—a sign of malfunctioning in the inertial navigation system used during the terminal phase of the flight. The missiles’ circular error probable spans tens of meters, meaning that while half will land within that radius, the rest may stray significantly farther. We are confident that these frequent misses are well known not only to researchers but also to Russia’s MoD. For that reason, anyone planning a strike on the factory should have factored in the probability of hitting residential housing and selected a more accurate weapon.
Contrary to claims that the Orion plant had long since ceased operations, it actually continued producing communications equipment for the military—though, as Ukrainian military expert Serhii "Flash" Beskrestnov put it, mostly "primitive telephone sets, casings and wiring." While its production of military goods makes it a legitimate target, planners must also consider what military advantage its destruction might yield. In this case, even a total loss of the factory and a halt to radio production would offer Russia only negligible benefits, nowhere near enough to justify the collateral damage. Striking such a low-priority target, in our view, cannot justify the civilian deaths. The imbalance between the limited military value of the target and the harm inflicted on civilians appears obvious, and we therefore assess the strike as a war crime.
In video footage of the missile’s final approach toward the residential building, the engine’s whine is audible and decoy flares can be seen ejecting from the missile. While some observers argue that this shows it had not been engaged by air defenses, it is, in fact, possible for a surface-to-air missile to detonate at some distance and damage its target only lightly with fragments, leaving the engine running and the missile capable of releasing flares. However, had its control surfaces been damaged, we would not have seen the straight, stable flight path captured in the footage. We therefore agree that, in this case, the missile was not hit by air defenses.
At the time of this sitrep, 34 people have been confirmed killed and 94 wounded as a result of this strike, with six more reported missing. This is the second-deadliest attack on civilian infrastructure since our team began tracking such strikes in January 2024. On April 13, 2024, a strike on the university’s Congress Center building in Sumy killed 35 people, and on July 8, 2024, the attack on Kyiv’s Okhmatdyt Children’s hospital resulted in 34 fatalities. Under these circumstances, we doubt that Ukrainian society is prepared to accept the clause on blanket amnesty for all war crimes contained in the Russian-American proposal, or to simply forgive such attacks.
Mutual strikes on both sides’ energy infrastructure continue. Last week, they led to serious disruptions in Ukraine: in Kyiv, power outages lasted 14-18 hours. By the end of the week, retaliatory strikes affected energy facilities both in the Russian Federation and in the occupied territories.
In the early hours of Nov. 23, Ukrainian UAV struck electrical substations in the "DPR," triggering blackouts in Shakhtarsk, Zugres, Dokuchaievsk and Chystiakove.
Explosions were also reported in Crimea, where an air-raid alert was declared; however, information on consequences is based solely on local sources.
The same night, UAVs struck the Shatura GRES power plant in the Moscow region, causing a fire, followed by a second strike later that day. Heating supply in Shatura was disrupted; according to Moscow region governor Andrey Vorobyov, 20 modular boiler units were deployed to restore it. No power outages were reported.
"Peace Plans"Â
In our view, the discrepancies in the US-Russian draft agreement to end the war stem from inconsistencies within the Trump administration itself, the lack of an institutional approach and the involvement of non-professionals without diplomatic experience in the negotiations, such as Steve Witkoff. As The Guardian noted, sections of the document read as though translated poorly from Russian. According to US senators, Secretary of State Marco Rubio initially told them that the US had nothing to do with the text and that it was exclusively a Russian proposal. However, in public statements he stated the exact opposite, asserting that the peace plan had been "developed in the US" on the basis of proposals from both Russia and Ukraine.
One of the most discussed provisions is the proposed cap of 600,000 personnel for Ukraine’s armed forces. The current strength of the AFU is unknown; in January 2025, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy reported that it was 880,000, the same figure he cited in January 2024. It is unclear whether he was referring to the full authorized strength, including civilian employees or only active-duty personnel. If such a cap were introduced, it is reasonable to expect a compensatory increase in the size of the National Guard, police and other security agencies that fall outside the AFU structure.
The Agentstvo [Agency] independent media outlet compared the US and European "peace plans." The European version notably omits a pledge against NATO expansion and does not require Ukraine to renounce joining the alliance. It also proposes a higher personnel limit for the Ukrainian military—800,000—and only in peacetime. Security guarantees differ substantially as well: the European plan proposes commitments that resemble NATO’s Article 5, with a joint monitoring group consisting of Ukraine and European states. By contrast, the American version is closer to Article 4, implying consultations in the event of an attack but no guarantee of military assistance. The two versions also diverge in their approaches to Ukrainian reconstruction and the criteria for Russia’s reintegration into the global economy. We believe that both proposals contain provisions unacceptable to one side or the other. Accordingly, we do not expect these negotiations to produce a viable outcome.
We need your support to continue our efforts. Please consider making a monthly donation to CIT through our fundraising page or Patreon.