Sitrep for Oct. 31-Nov. 3, 2025 (as of 12 a.m. UTC+3)

Frontline Situation Update

Information has emerged about an operation by the Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, involving two UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters, carried out in the town of Pokrovsk, apparently on Oct. 29. It was around that time that the first reports about a certain "creative" operation by the GUR appeared in Ukrainian Telegram channels. Several days later, videos showing these helicopters on the outskirts of Pokrovsk were published, along with a self-exposing, baseless statement from the Russian Ministry of Defense claiming that all 11 GUR special forces troops who landed had been eliminated. In reality, each of the two helicopters can carry 11 infantrymen. Apparently, the Russian MoD hastily announced the failure of the Ukrainian operation immediately after the video featuring one helicopter was posted, basing its claim not only on the footage but also on reference data about the troop compartment capacity of the Black Hawk.

The appearance of the two helicopters was recorded, in particular, by a Russian “lurker” drone (such UAVs stream video from the roadside for hours to conserve battery power and take off to strike when they detect enemy vehicles). However, no strike on the helicopter followed. Most likely, time was lost due to checks and coordination, and the Black Hawk could not be intercepted.

Pro-Russian Telegram channels circulated a video apparently filmed by drones equipped with thermal cameras, showing strikes on unidentified individuals.

The video quality is insufficient to determine their affiliation, and the date and time of filming remain unknown. However, the geolocation matches the site of the Ukrainian landing. As of this publication, there is no reliable information on GUR special forces losses.

The landing took place on the northwestern outskirts of Pokrovsk, according to Wikimapia, near the buildings of the former Dmytriv Geological Exploration Directorate and slightly east of the Elektrodvyhun [Electric Motor] plant. At the presumed time of the landing, Oct. 29, DeepState maps indicated that the area lay along the boundary of the contested zone. The next day, however, that line shifted north, which may indirectly suggest that the special forces operated in the area for several hours to a day before withdrawing—a change reflected on the map.

We can only speculate about the purpose of this operation, as the official version has not yet been published. Usually, army special forces are deployed for targeted missions such as evacuating a high-ranking officer or an important intelligence source, extracting classified documents or escorting a commander to the frontline. The latter explanation seems quite plausible, since the operation did not emphasize stealth and involved conspicuous American helicopters. The theory that the goal was to locate and destroy positions—for example, those of Rubikon drone operators—seems unrealistic. There would be no reason to use Black Hawk helicopters for such a task. On the contrary, it would make more sense to infiltrate an area under enemy drone control as discreetly as possible. According to another theory, the operation aimed to unblock supply lines to Pokrovsk, which are located in the contested area. However, deploying such a small helicopter-borne landing force for that purpose seems questionable. They could only temporarily clear the area and could not hold off subsequent assault groups, especially given that, according to official data from the General Staff of the AFU, around 200 Russian troops were present in Pokrovsk. For such a task, it would make more sense to send a full AFU brigade, not just 22 soldiers. A group of that size could hardly achieve anything given the dense drone presence over the area, and even modern jammers no longer provide full protection. The idea of trying to "clear" the town with such a small force seems even more implausible.

Although most of these explanations seem unlikely, the special operation boosted morale among parts of Ukrainian society. It is worth noting that the GUR has previously carried out operations with propaganda objectives, such as landings in Crimea or attempts to capture the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant. In those cases, no military benefit was achieved, and the special forces suffered losses.

Around the same time, photos were published online showing GUR chief Kyrylo Budanov surrounded by Ukrainian servicemen, taken in Pavlohrad, a city located on the way to Pokrovsk, through which its supply lines pass. Rumors also circulated about Budanov’s presence in Pokrovsk and his personal command of the operation.

Journalist Yurii Butusov, who is now fighting in the ranks of the National Guard of Ukraine, shares our view that two special forces squads could not significantly influence the situation in the town and that in general, in modern warfare, one does not fly so demonstratively to the frontline. Butusov also recalled that the Ukrainian command had previously made incompetent tactical decisions to cover up mistakes with PR, without disclosing losses.

Meanwhile, the situation in the Pokrovsk direction continues to deteriorate. Russian soldiers have been recorded in almost all districts of the town, and, according to DeepState, practically the entire town is at a minimum a contested territory. The Ukrainian publication Hromadske cited assessments from Ukrainian soldiers, according to whom at least 60% of Pokrovsk is already under Russian control, and the entire "gray zone" marked on the DeepState map at the time of publication has also been occupied by the RuAF. Although DeepState updates control zones with some delay, it is worth noting that, for troops on the ground, the situation may appear more pessimistic than it actually is.

Recently, the RuAF have intensified efforts to encircle the Pokrovsk–Myrnohrad agglomeration. Currently, only about 3 km [2 mi] remain between the converging segments of the contested area north of Pokrovsk and southwest of Krasnyi Lyman—a narrow corridor through which Ukrainian troops could potentially exit the operational encirclement. The use of the main route heading west has become practically impossible. Although we expect the "gray zone" to close soon, full encirclement and capture or killing of all soldiers trapped in the pocket cannot be anticipated. In modern warfare, where Russian advances often involve small units, similar small Ukrainian groups may still be able to break out, despite the risks of drone strikes or firefights. Nevertheless, in our view, it is time for the AFU to abandon Myrnohrad and the area south of it. Ukrainian military sources cited by Hromadske believe both towns are effectively lost and recapturing them is nearly impossible as AFU reserves were deployed to the neighboring frontline section to stabilize and eliminate the Dobropillia breakthrough. Ukrainska Pravda has also described the situation as threatening for the AFU.

Ukrainian servicemen also report on Russian assault troops penetrating the interpositional space often compel UAV operators or mortar crews to engage in firefights, despite the expectation that they should not be on the frontlines. In some cases, troops entering a position are unaware whether it has been seized by the RuAF.

In the Zaporizhzhia and Dnipropetrovsk regions—now referred to as the Oleksandrivka direction by the Ukrainian General Staff—the RuAF continue advancing along the Yanchur River towards the villages of Pokrovske and Oleksandrivka. The Russian MoD has announced the capture of the village of Novooleksandrivka, with footage released showing strikes on the area.

Ukrainian and Russian Strikes

The AFU continue to attack main power substations in western Russia. In the early hours of Nov. 1, blackouts were reported in Tula and the Moscow region. Commander of the AFU Unmanned Systems Forces, Ukrainian officer Robert "Madyar" Brovdi, stated that in the early hours of Nov. 2, five substations were hit.

The AFU Navy reported that R-360 Neptune subsonic cruise missiles were used in the strike on the Oryol Thermal Power Plant in the early hours of Oct. 31. It should be noted that these strikes on energy infrastructure by both sides have no significant impact on the course of the war. However, since the Ukrainian leadership has made a political decision to respond to blackouts with blackouts, even scarce assets such as cruise missiles are being used.

In addition, Volodymyr Zelenskyy told Le Figaro that the Flamingo missile has already been used in real operations nine times.

Ukraine’s Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha said Russia has used 9M729 missiles in recent months to strike Ukrainian targets. Another Ukrainian official added that Russia has been deploying these missiles since 2022 and has used them 23 times since August 2025. One such strike, he said, hit the village of Lapaivka in the Lviv region on Oct. 5.

A military source told Reuters that the 9M729 missile had traveled 1,200 kilometers [750 miles] before reaching its target. Reuters obtained—but did not publish—photographs from the site of the strike that included missile debris bearing the 9M729 marking. Jeffrey Lewis, a senior research associate in global security at the Middlebury Institute, examined the images with Reuters analysts and concluded that the wiring layout, engine and casing matched those of a 9M729 missile. The labeling, he said, made the identification even more plausible.

The Ukrainian Polkovnyk Henshtabu [Colonel of the General Staff] Telegram channel also shared a photo of debris marked 9M729 but did not specify whether it was related to the Oct. 5 strike or used for illustration.

While we trust Lewis’s assessment, we would like to interpret the accompanying annotated map. The map shows two circles with the impact point at the center: a red one with a 500-kilometer [310 miles] radius and a blue one extending 1,200 kilometers [745 miles]. For the missile that struck Lapaivka to have a range of under 500 kilometers—and thus comply with the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty—it would have had to be launched from within the red circle. However, that area is entirely under Ukrainian control, therefore the missile must have been launched from within the blue circle.

This supports long-standing US accusations that Russia violated the INF Treaty by developing the 9M729 missile for the Iskander system with a range exceeding 500 kilometers. We consider it highly unlikely that a longer-range version of the missile was developed only after the treaty’s collapse, since such a modification would almost certainly have resulted in a new designation.

At a meeting with Volodymyr Zelenskyy, Head of the Security Service of Ukraine Vasyl Maliuk stated that in the summer of 2024, the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) and the Main Intelligence Directorate of Ukraine’s Ministry of Defense carried out a joint operation in which one of the Oreshnik missile systems was destroyed at the Kapustin Yar training area. According to Maliuk, this occurred even before the missile was first used. There were reports of strikes on the training area and the airfield in Akhtubinsk on July 8 and 9, 2024, but video footage and satellite imagery of the aftermath showed only burning grass and a damaged building. We cannot confirm the destruction of the missile system, and it is unclear why this alleged success was not reported earlier.

Late last week, several Telegram channels claimed that the Pentagon had approved the delivery of Tomahawk missiles to Ukraine, having concluded that this would not affect US combat readiness. In fact, that approval had taken place even before Trump’s meeting with Zelenskyy on Oct. 17. Meanwhile, on Nov. 2, Trump once again stated that he was not considering the transfer of Tomahawks to Ukraine—at least for the time being.

On Nov. 1, the nuclear missile submarine Khabarovsk was launched in Severodvinsk. The submarine is designed to carry the 2M39 Poseidon torpedo. The concept behind the development of this torpedo, as well as its predecessors in the 1960s, was to generate a massive tsunami and zones of radioactive contamination. Later calculations and experiments showed that generating a tsunami by means of an underwater thermonuclear explosion off the coast of North America was militarily impractical, since the US West Coast is shielded from such a wave by mountain ranges, while the East Coast’s shallow waters would dissipate its energy.

Zelenskyy also announced that Ukraine had received two additional Patriot fire units from Germany, which had been promised in mid-summer.

AFP, citing statistics from the Ukrainian Air Force, reports that Russia carried out a record number of missile strikes on Ukraine in October—270, which is 46% more than in September. At the same time, according to data from the Ukrainian project Militarnyi, around 170 missiles of various types are produced per month. This can be explained by the fact that not all of the missiles produced during the summer were used—some were stockpiled for a campaign of strikes against energy infrastructure.

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