Sitrep for Nov. 14-17, 2025 (as of 10:00 a.m. UTC+3)

Frontline Situation Update

In recent days, a new video from the Pokrovsk direction has emerged that has significantly impacted our assessment of the situation. Initially, footage emerged showing munitions being dropped from a UAV onto Russian troops geolocated at a farm north of the town of Pokrovsk.

Initially, we were unsure how the troops ended up there. The location can be accessed from both Pokrovsk and the Krasnyi Lyman area (the farm is located between the villages of Krasnyi Lyman and Hryshyne). However, another video later appeared showing strikes on Russian positions in the northern part of Pokrovsk, from which it can be concluded that the Russian Armed Forces were in fact moving toward the farm from the town. This point is important because the farm is located beyond the Hryshynka River, along which units of the Special Operations Forces and the 425th Skala Separate Assault Regiment had been building a defensive line to contain the Russian advance from Pokrovsk and prevent Russian forces from closing the pincers. Now, however, evidently, they have breached this line, turning the territory between Krasnyi Lyman and Pokrovsk into a contested zone, meaning that the situation in the Pokrovsk–Myrnohrad pocket is becoming truly critical.

Moreover, it became known that the RuAF managed once again to capture the southern part of the town of Rodynske, which Ukrainian forces had previously liberated during a counterattack. On the DeepState map, this part of the town is still not even marked as contested.

Reports indicate that Ukrainian aviation bombed the road on the eastern outskirts of Pokrovsk, along which Russian soldiers on light vehicles were moving under the cover of fog. We believe it is far more difficult to destroy a road completely with airstrikes than, for example, a bridge. Even if large craters appear on the road surface, soldiers on motorcycles will still be able to bypass them.

In an interview with Bloomberg on Nov. 13, Volodymyr Zelenskyy stated that "nobody is pushing them [Ukrainian soldiers] to die for the sake of ruins" and that he would support "any decision of how to manage situation" of the soldiers and commanders of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the Pokrovsk direction, emphasizing that “the most important thing for us is our soldiers.” Given the severe shortage of personnel, it indeed becomes more important to preserve resources rather than holding cities that have been almost entirely destroyed by combat operations.

However, already on Nov. 14, the Commander-in-Chief of the AFU, General Oleksandr Syrskyi, stated that "measures have been developed to counter Russia’s plans to capture Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad." This sounds strange, because at this stage such plans make almost no sense, and the only reasonable option is to withdraw all Ukrainian forces from the agglomeration. This should have been done under the cover of fog, instead of conducting rotations and resupply, as some sources reported. At this point, all maps—both pro-Ukrainian and pro-Russian—show that the situation in the Pokrovsk direction is extremely dangerous and requires the immediate withdrawal of troops to avoid heavy losses.

Military analysts Michael Kofman, Konrad Muzyka and Franz-Stefan Gady have visited Ukraine once again. According to their reports, the current level of development in unmanned technologies has made the situation in Pokrovsk worse compared to Avdiivka. Avdiivka was captured in February 2024, and because the decision to withdraw came too late, the AFU suffered heavy losses. Had the withdrawal been timely, the losses would have been smaller. However, there were fewer drones back then, whereas now fiber-optic drones can operate at ranges of 15 to 20 km [9–12 mi].

If the situation in Pokrovsk were unfolding with the technology available in February 2024, the retreating Ukrainian forces would be vulnerable to drone strikes only within a limited area. Now, however, the danger zone extends much farther, so losses among AFU units pulling back will also be higher. Given the AFU’s difficult recruitment situation, the impact will be significant. It is necessary to shift to a more mobile defense to minimize losses, because after withdrawing from Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad, the defense will have to continue on new lines—and if the losses prove too high, there will be no one left to hold them.

In the Novopavlivka direction, Russian troops took advantage of weather conditions and, under the cover of fog, attacked the village of Novopavlivka in the Dnipropetrovsk region with a column of armored vehicles, which the AFU noticed at the last moment. According to the DeepState, the RuAF established a pontoon crossing over the Vovcha River between the villages of Yalta and Dachne, then advanced with a column of approximately 10 military vehicles. Moreover, as analysts noted, they managed to bring landing parties to Novopavlivka at least twice. It is unclear whether the Russian soldiers will be able to gain a foothold in the village, and whether they can hold the resulting "corridor" from the crossing. Even if they fail, the experience of the Dobropillia breakthrough proved that drone-supplied soldiers can withstand encirclement for quite a long time.

As another illustration of the weather in eastern Ukraine, a video emerged showing thick fog that affects UAV aerial reconnaissance. The researcher Playfra also published a typical October-November satellite image of the frontline hidden by clouds.

Now, let's take a closer look at the reports by Kofman and Muzyka following another trip to Ukraine. First, Kofman focuses on changes in the structure of losses of the Ukrainian army: there are now fewer losses among the infantry and more among support roles, particularly among drone operators and those responsible for logistics. This does not mean a reduction in risk for soldiers in forward positions. Rather, it highlights the general shortage of infantry and the increase in direct strikes targeting drone crews.

Although drones receive a lot of media attention, the importance of mine-explosive barriers and traditional artillery should not be overlooked. In this context, allies should increase their supply of artillery munitions, especially long-range ones, to Ukraine since it is too dangerous to place artillery systems in close proximity to the frontline.

Kofman also mentioned the resumption of RuAF mechanized assaults. This happened mainly due to bad weather hindering UAV flights. According to him, "hedgehog tanks" equipped with a large amount of slat armor, used in such assaults can withstand up to 30 to 40 FPV drone attacks. The record is 70 hits withstood by a Russian tank.

As the analyst noted, winter works against infiltration tactics: there is little natural cover, Russian air operations become less frequent, and infantry has a harder time advancing. It is unclear why far fewer UMPK-equipped glide bombs are used in winter, but the drop-off has also meant fewer civilian casualties.

Much of the Russian advance has been recorded at the junction of the Zaporizhzhia, Dnipropetrovsk and Donetsk regions—and in recent weeks that pace has quickened. In Kofman’s view, Ukraine’s defenses around Huliaipole appear increasingly fragmented, suggesting the area is a low priority for both sides.

He also noted that Russian fatality rates have risen sharply this year, while the number of wounded has decreased, largely because survival rates have fallen. Evacuating wounded troops from continuous-fire "kill zones" has become far more difficult, meaning Russia’s gains this year have come at the cost of heavy, irreversible losses. The same applies to Ukraine: under constant FPV-drone strikes, Ukrainian forces also struggle to evacuate their wounded.

A recently published interrogation video shows a Ukrainian POW, described as a GUR special operator, who took part in the UH-60A Black Hawk insertion on the outskirts of Pokrovsk. He said he was wounded by drone strikes after landing and crawled into a shelter, where Russian troops later found him because an evacuation could not be organized. Ukraine, for its part, has begun using ground drones equipped with armored capsules to retrieve wounded soldiers.

Kofman also contends that Russia’s irreversible losses—more than 25,000—have nearly matched its monthly recruitment rate of 30,000 to 35,000. As a result, in 2025 the Russian military has had to focus on replacing casualties rather than expanding its forces; in 2024, by contrast, new units were still being formed. Russia may face a situation in 2026 where losses outpace recruitment. We are cautious about making such forecasts, as earlier expectations, including that recruitment would slow by spring 2025, did not materialize.

Kofman argues as well that Ukraine needs a large, relatively low-cost arsenal of "medium-range" systems covering the 30 to 300 kilometers [18–185 miles] range. Ukraine has FPV drones for ranges up to about 30 kilometers, and long-range drones and missiles for strikes beyond 300, but a gap remains for targets between 100 and 150 kilometers [60–95 miles] from the front line: units can identify targets in the Russian rear but cannot reach them. In recent weeks, Ukraine has employed more FP-2 drones at medium range, hitting a Shahed depot at Donetsk airport, the Rubicon headquarters in Avdiivka, and stockpiles in Crimea, though the systems may be too expensive for widespread use. Ukrainian military expert Serhii "Flash" Beskrestnov has likewise argued that the AFU need affordable strike drones with a range of 50 to 100 kilometers [30–95 miles].

Rochan Consulting analyst Konrad Muzyka also published a report on the results of this trip. We will highlight the most interesting points that were not included in Michael Kofman’s conclusions. Muzyka writes that Russia’s drone capabilities have significantly increased. Regular units now use a large number of FPV-drones, including long-range wired variants, and employ increasingly advanced electronic jamming. Shahed-136 (Geran-2) loitering munition, which is being used increasingly against tactical targets in combat zones, has become much more effective compared to last year due to improved tactics and onboard systems. At the same time, the RuAF retains its advantage in artillery: Russian weapons are positioned far beyond the reach of Ukrainian counterbattery fire, allowing them to conduct constant speculative fire at areas of interest, while Ukrainian units do not have large stocks of munitions and only fire at confirmed targets. In addition, Muzyka also provides data showing that more than half of Russia’s territorial gains in Ukraine now fall on the Oleksandrivka and Huliaipole directions, although these two sectors account for only 17% of all recorded Russian ground assaults (we previously cited a similar estimate by DeepState). This discrepancy underscores serious problems with the Ukrainian defense.

Bild journalist Julian Röpcke once again published a highly alarmist post, stating that if the Ukrainian government or Western partners do not change the strategic position, Russia will gradually win this war. We do not fully understand what he means by "strategic position," but we agree that for now, Russia is winning the war, albeit very, very slowly.

According to Röpcke, against the backdrop of Russia’s growing dominance in fiber-optic systems, deliveries of Western armored vehicles are becoming useless. We, on the contrary, believe that if armored vehicles are being lost, it is necessary to replenish them to provide protection for infantry against drones. It is worth noting that, according to statistics from the pro-Russian platform Lost Armour, most drones used are still radio-controlled.

In addition, Röpcke predicted that a possible annual record for territorial losses may be set in November and that a RuAF offensive in the areas of major cities, such as Dnipro and Zaporizhzhia, could occur within one to two years, or possibly even within a few months. However, we have not seen any signs that Russian advances have significantly accelerated in November, and we do not agree that the RuAF could reach Dnipro or Zaporizhzhia in a matter of months. Under favorable conditions, this could happen in roughly two years.

Ukrainian and Russian Strikes

New details emerged about the strike on Novorossiysk in the early hours of Nov. 14: its targets were positions of an S-400 surface-to-air missile system located at military unit 26345. Satellite imagery of the aftermath shows various debris. According to researchers from the Japanese team AS-22, two S-400 launchers were definitively destroyed, the destruction of a third was not confirmed, and a fourth was likely a decoy. The radar was also highly likely damaged.

It is worth noting that air-defense protection of Novorossiysk is important in part because Russia’s Black Sea Fleet was redeployed there. In addition, a strike was carried out on the Sheskharis export oil terminal; the extent of the damage is unknown, but on Nov. 16 Reuters, citing two industry sources, reported that oil loading at the port of Novorossiysk had resumed. The AFU General Staff stated that the strike was conducted with a longer-range, extended modification of the Neptune missile, the Long Neptune, and released a video of the launch from a new ground-based system.

The AFU General Staff also showed the launch of Bars cruise missiles for the first time. The missile was first unveiled in April 2025, with stated characteristics including a flight range of 700 to 800 km [435–500 mi] (the Flamingo's range is 3,000 km [1,860 mi]), a warhead weight of approximately 50 to 100 kg [110 to 220 lbs] (the Flamingo's is 1,000–1,150 kg [2,200 to 2,500 lbs]), and an estimated flight speed lower than that of a typical cruise missile: 500 to 600 km/h [310–373 mph] (the Flamingo reaches up to 950 km/h [590 mph]).

Vadym Skibitskyi, Deputy Chief of the Main Intelligence Directorate of Ukraine, told Reuters that Russia plans to produce 120,000 glide bombs this year. Meanwhile, according to AFU General Staff data for August, September and October, Russia’s Aerospace Forces use about 4,000–5,000 glide bombs per month, or up 60,000 per year.

Thus, if Skibitskyi’s assessment of Russian production volumes is accurate, the current production rate is double the consumption rate, with half of the bombs being stockpiled for future use. It is also worth noting that the number of air-dropped bombs used decreased significantly in previous winters for unclear reasons, and a corresponding reduction is expected this year as well.

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