Sitrep for Nov. 3-7, 2025 (as of 7:30 a.m. UTC+3)
Frontline Situation Update
The Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine has released a video showing the Timur Special Unit landing from two UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters on the northwestern outskirts of the town of Pokrovsk. The footage depicts combat scenes, including the clearing of one of the Elektrodvyhun [Electric Motor] plant buildings, detecting, and apparently suppressing a machine gunner’s position. The agency also at least partially revealed the objectives of the operation: to unblock supply routes and link up with special forces units advancing toward the paratroopers.
According to some researchers, north of Pokrovsk, units of the Special Operations Forces and the Armed Forces of Ukraine, including the 425th Skala Separate Assault Regiment, established a defensive line roughly along the Hrishynka River (which leads to the village of Hryshyne) to prevent the Russian Armed Forces from completing an encirclement and to maintain a corridor for the withdrawal of Ukrainian troops. In that case, it appears that the special forces landed from helicopters to seize the most critical positions, after which reinforcements arrived to hold back the enemy offensive, since 22 paratroopers alone would clearly be insufficient for this task. Whether such a large and demonstrative helicopter landing was justified remains difficult to assess for now. It would have been safer to carry out the operation covertly, but that would have taken longer. The helicopters provided the element of surprise.
A Sentinel-2 satellite image of the area between the northern outskirts of Pokrovsk and Hryshyne reveals the marks left by air-dropped bombs. The strikes from October 19 to 29 are marked in yellow, and the strikes from October 29 to November 3 are marked in red. The latter strikes appear closer to the Hrishynka River, confirming the presence of Ukrainian positions there.
In addition, the 425th Skala Separate Assault Regiment staged another flag photo op in Pokrovsk (previously, they carried out similar actions in the village of Torske in the Lyman direction).
The unit’s fighters reached the city council building in the center of Pokrovsk and raised the Ukrainian flag. This does confirm that the RuAF do not control the central part of the town, although most researchers had little doubt about that already.
The Russian MoD confirmed what we have repeatedly noted: commanders attach drone operators to small assault groups and use drones to adjust their movements and direct them into the Ukrainian rear.
In Myrnohrad, the situation is becoming even more dangerous for the AFU than in Pokrovsk, as the town is already semi-encircled, making it extremely difficult for Ukrainian forces to retreat if necessary. Russian forces continue to attack enemy positions under the cover of bad weather, as rain and fog make drone use more challenging. However, this does not guarantee success; videos have emerged showing strikes on columns of Russian armored vehicles advancing toward Myrnohrad from two sides: the village of Razine and the Kozatske-Balahan area. Both mechanized assaults were repelled.
Similarly, the RuAF are attempting to take advantage of unfavorable weather conditions during their offensive in the Lyman direction.
The AFU are continuing to mop-up the Dobropillia salient, successfully recapturing several positions around the village of Shakhove. These successes may allow Ukrainian reserves to be redeployed from this sector to strengthen the Pokrovsk direction.
In the Kostiantynivka direction, according to researcher Playfra, the RuAF are once again accumulating military personnel in the Yahidka dacha area and continue to shell the Santurynivka district, thereby preparing the ground for further combat operations. In addition, Russian soldiers continue to concentrate in the villages of Pleshchiivka and Nelipivka, northeast of the Kleban-Byk Reservoir. In the near future, we do not expect increased pressure on the town of Kostiantynivka. Currently it seems that the Russian Ministry of Defense’s highest priority remains the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad agglomeration; afterward, they will likely aim to fully capture the town of Kupiansk, and only then switch to Kostiantynivka.
In the Oleksandrivka direction, in the Zaporizhzhia and Dnipropetrovsk regions, where the RuAF have recently achieved the most rapid advances, the offensive continues along the Yanchur River. Ukrainian forces were unable to use the water barrier to establish a defense line, and now the RuAF appear to have secured positions on its left bank.
In the Sumy direction, the AFU are still present in the southern side of the village of Oleksiivka. In September or the first half of October, they evidently had managed to retake part of the positions. This is one of those rare cases where the DeepState map depicts the situation of Ukrainian forces less optimistically than the pro-Russian resource Slivochny Kapriz.
Ukrainian and Russian Strikes
On the evening of Nov. 5, Special Operations Forces of the AFU, the 414th Brigade of the Unmanned Systems Forces, and an unnamed unit of the Missile Forces and Artillery attacked a storage facility for Shahed-136 (Geran-2) loitering munitions at Donetsk airport. Despite various reports, it remains unclear what kind of weapon was used. It is worth noting that the existence of storage and launch sites for Shahed-136 (Geran-2) and Gerbera UAVs on the territory of the former international airport became publicly known several months ago. According to the Dos’ye Shpiona [Spy Dossier] Telegram channel, the site stored up to 1,000 Geran-2 loitering munitions and more than 1,500 warheads. These figures seem exaggerated to us, since the Shahed-136 (Geran-2) loitering munitions are quite large, and accommodating such a quantity would require much more space than the structures seen in satellite images. Although there is footage of a secondary detonation, it is not yet possible to assess the damage. We assume that a limited number of UAVs were stored at the airport for launches in the near future.
Western Assistance
Latvia has transferred 21 Patria armored personnel carriers to Ukraine—half of the number it pledged for the year—as well as 12 CVR(T) reconnaissance vehicles.
NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte said the alliance has now surpassed Russia in munitions production. In early July, however, he stated that Russia was producing in three months roughly three times the amount of munitions NATO countries produce in a year. Based on publicly available data, we cannot confirm or refute either claim and view both statements as politically motivated.
Ukraine’s 33rd Mechanized Brigade released footage of the TerMIT ground robotic system in field conditions. The tracked robot is seen transporting supplies to frontline positions—followed, somewhat counterproductively, by barking dogs, inadvertently revealing its position.
Over the past week, both Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin have threatened to resume nuclear testing. For now, only delivery systems have been tested: Russia tested its 9M730 Burevestnik cruise missile on Oct. 21, while the United States conducted a Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missile test on Nov. 5. Yet during a luncheon with Central Asian leaders at the White House, Trump asserted that his doctrine on the matter was “denuclearization,” saying he had already discussed the possibility of nuclear disarmament with both Putin and Xi Jinping.
We do not believe that Russian soldiers deserve sympathy, but given the ongoing discussion, we would like to clarify certain terms once again. Referring to Russians who voluntarily sign contracts with the Ministry of Defense as mercenaries is incorrect, since Russia is a party to the conflict. Mercenaries can include, for example, citizens of India, as India is not involved in this war. At the same time, North Koreans sent to the frontline to perform their official duties under orders from their own government do not fall under this definition.
It is also incorrect to label all Russian servicemen fighting in Ukraine as war criminals. As we have previously mentioned, international humanitarian law provides for the so-called combatant immunity, which means that mere participation in the war does not make a soldier a war criminal. It should be noted that the Ukrainian judicial system follows this principle: Russian soldiers are convicted only in cases where it has been proven that they have indeed committed war crimes—for example, in cases involving the execution of POWs.
At the same time, a court in the Kyiv region acquitted Yevgeny Murzintsev, a Rosgvardia (Russian National Guard) officer, in absentia in a case concerning the violation of the laws and customs of war. He had been accused of stealing from a private home in the village of Blystavytsia, near Bucha, where he was stationed from February to March of 2022. While the court found evidence of Murzintsev’s presence in the Kyiv region convincing, it did not find sufficient grounds to conclude that he was the officer who stole the victim’s belongings.
At the same time, on the Russian side, we observe the opposite situation—the judicial system classifies Ukrainian POWs as members of terrorist organizations, disregarding their combatant immunity. On Oct. 31, the Southern District Military Court sentenced 42-year-old Ukrainian POW Andriy Humeniuk to 19 years of imprisonment. According to the prosecutor’s office of the self-proclaimed "LPR," in April 2023, Humeniuk voluntarily joined the Aidar Battalion, which has been declared a terrorist organization in Russia.
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