Sitrep for Nov. 7-10, 2025 (as of 10:30 a.m. UTC+3)

Frontline Situation Update

In the Kharkiv region, in the Kupiansk direction, fighting continues in multiple neighborhoods of the town of Kupiansk. According to Ukrainian military analyst Bohdan Myroshnykov, both the Ukrainian and Russian Armed Forces control roughly one-third of the town, while the remaining area is heavily contested. At the same time, Ukrainian soldier Stanislav "Osman" Bunyatov reports significant logistical problems on the left bank of the Oskil River in the Kupiansk and Lyman directions. Since the road to the village of Shevchenkove has become practically inaccessible, Ukrainian troops are establishing temporary crossings over the Oskil River to supply their bridgehead on the left bank. To the southwest of the village of Kupiansk-Vuzlovyi, Russian forces have destroyed one of these crossings.

In Kostiantynivka, as shown on a map by researcher Playfra, the RuAF have begun to entrench themselves near the Santurynivka neighborhood, located on the town’s southeastern outskirts. The map marks with red dots the geolocations of videos showing strikes on Russian troops along the railway line. As in other sectors, the RuAF are trying to advance along railway routes whenever possible, then enter populated areas and gradually move through them.

In Pokrovsk, the fiercest fighting continues in the northern part of the town, near the Ukrainian defensive line described in the previous sitrep. There, units of the Main Intelligence Directorate special forces, Special Operations Forces, and the 425th Skala Separate Assault Regiment, as well as paratroopers and marines, are trying to contain the Russian advance and prevent an encirclement.

Combat operations also continue near Myrnohrad, where the situation for the AFU is becoming increasingly difficult. The moment may soon come when Ukrainian forces will have to withdraw from the area. Reports have already emerged of Ukrainian withdrawals from positions near the villages of Novopavlivka and Sukhyi Yar. Statements by Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi describing the situation in the Pokrovsk direction as difficult but controllable appear primarily intended to reassure the public. His plan has also drawn skeptical reactions from observers.

As before, the most significant Russian advances are observed in the Zaporizhzhia and Dnipropetrovsk regions along the Yanchur River. Russian forces have reportedly captured the villages of Pavlivka and Uspenivka and advanced to Solodke. The Russian Ministry of Defense has also announced the capture of Rybne, though available footage showing combat and Russian flags in the village does not provide sufficient confirmation. According to DeepState, in October, this area accounted for 69% of all territory seized despite representing only 16% of assault actions. The acute shortage of personnel in this sector remains evident, with a lack of “emergency” brigades capable of stabilizing the situation—likely because most are already engaged in the Pokrovsk and Dobropillia directions.

Serhii "Flash" Beskrestnov, a Ukrainian military analyst, said the decision to hold the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad agglomeration is driven in part by the strategic value of nearby high ground: having drone operators positioned on those heights markedly extends the radio horizon.

From the media activity of the Rubikon unit, which has become known for operating fiber-optic–tethered drones, one might assume that such systems now make up the bulk of deployed unmanned aircraft, and thus conclude that the premium on elevated positions has diminished. Statistics compiled by the pro-Russian site Lost Armour, however, suggest otherwise.

An interview with an instructor from the Typhoon National Guard’s special forces drone unit published in Defense News, reinforces that radio-controlled drones remain more effective than tethered systems. Success rates for fiber-optic drones, the instructor said, rarely exceed 40% to 50%. Performance depends on the intensity of artillery fire, which can sever cables, weather conditions, such as wind strength and direction, and the density of friendly FPV drone traffic, which can accidentally damage the tether. Tethered systems also require a different piloting approach and careful route planning to avoid roads, power lines and other obstacles that could cut the fiber; furthermore, the spools make the drones larger and slower, and therefore easier to shoot down.

At the same time, some FPV drones now employ multiple receivers operating on different frequencies and using antennas with varied polarizations—linear and circular—to defeat jamming. That redundancy pays off: if one frequency or polarization is suppressed, the aircraft can remain controllable via an alternate channel. Using two or three separate receivers on distinct bands, combined with mixed-polarization antennas, substantially raises the odds of maintaining a stable link even when subjected to intense electronic warfare.

Armored vehicles equipped with additional protection against drone attacks continue to appear on the frontline. Both Russian and Ukrainian forces are modifying their tanks into so-called hedgehogs by welding bundles of protruding unraveled steel cables onto protective grates. We reported on similar innovations as early as October.

Ukrainian and Russian Strikes

Both sides continue to target energy infrastructure. On Nov. 9, Ukrainian forces struck a substation in Taganrog and the Voronezh Thermal Power Plant, causing power outages. Missiles were reportedly used in the Voronezh strike, potentially Flamingo or Storm Shadow missiles, as the city lies about 200 km [124 mi] from the border. Photos show extensive damage at the site.

In the early hours of Nov. 8, during a massive air attack, Russian forces launched 458 drones and 45 missiles against Ukrainian territory, 32 of which were ballistic (Iskander-M, North Korean KN-23 or Kinzhal). According to Yurii Ihnat, spokesman for the Air Force Command of the AFU, Russia has increasingly relied on ballistic missiles this year to raise its hit rate. It is worth noting that intercepting such missiles remains extremely difficult due to their high speed; only Patriot systems with PAC-3 interceptors or SAMP/T are capable of countering them.

During this air attack, the Zmiivska Thermal Power Plant in the Kharkiv region and the Trypilska Thermal Power Plant in the Kyiv region were hit. Centrenergo, a major producer of electric and thermal energy in central and eastern Ukraine, reported that its electricity generation was halted as a result. It is worth noting that this is not the first time. Ukraine has three thermal power plants in total. The Vuhlehirsk plant was captured in 2022, while the other two had already been struck by the RuAF, causing blackouts. In the spring of 2024, both the Zmiivska and Trypilska plants were almost completely destroyed, and their restoration took about a year.

On the evening of Nov. 8, large-scale power outages were reported in Kyiv and Kharkiv.

To further strain the power grid, Russian forces have been striking key power substations in eastern Ukraine, which serve as critical nodes for distributing electricity to various populated areas. Ukraine has employed a similar tactic in its own strikes against the Russian power grid. In addition, various power plants—responsible for stabilizing the grid during peak load periods—have been repeatedly targeted by Russian attacks, according to a recent article by the Texty outlet. Earlier reports also mentioned strikes on substations that transmit energy from nuclear power plants, which supply Ukraine’s base-load electricity demand.

To disrupt the heating supply in Ukrainian cities, Russia has also been targeting the natural gas sector. Strikes on gas fields in the Poltava and Kharkiv regions in early October resulted in a loss of about 60% of Ukraine’s gas production. In addition, Russia has attacked gas compressor stations, such as the Orlivka station, in an effort to block gas imports from Europe and leave Ukrainian cities without heating.

It is worth noting that several weeks ago, reports announced the establishment of a Coordinating Headquarters for Energy Protection, tasked with overseeing the construction of protective structures around key energy and transport facilities.

In addition to strikes on energy infrastructure and civilian facilities, the RuAF continue to strike other civilian sites as well. Following a hit by a Russian Shahed-136 (Geran-2) loitering munition UAV on a residential building in Dnipro in the early hours of Nov. 8, three people were killed and 13 others sustained injuries, including two children.

In our last sitrep, we reported on a strike on a Shahed loitering munition storage facility at Donetsk airport on the evening of Nov. 5. A satellite image of the aftermath has since been published: one building appears completely destroyed, and another significantly damaged. This indirectly confirms information from the Dos'ye Shpiona [Spy Dossier] Telegram channel, which claimed that the warhead storage facility for these drones had been completely destroyed.

Serhii "Flash" Beskrestnov, mentioned above, suggested that to combat drone attacks, Ukraine will likely need to revisit the issue of mobile communications restrictions. In Russia, for about a month now, foreign SIM cards registered in the country have been denied data services for the first 24 hours, with only telephony available. Russia is also discussing the introduction of a similar rule for SIM cards that have been offline for more than 72 hours.

Western Assistance

France is sending old fishing nets to Ukraine to protect against Russian drones. They are used to build shelters along roads. Despite the fragility of the material and the fact that Russian drone operators use a tactic in which one drone creates a hole in the net through which subsequent drones fly, even fabric nets make drone use more difficult and provide a certain degree of protection. The Guardian noted that deep-sea nets made from horsehair are much stronger than conventional ones.

Axios reports that due to the government shutdown, the US has suspended arms shipments to NATO allies intended for Ukraine. According to the outlet’s sources in the State Department, the suspension affected the supply of, in particular, AIM-120 AMRAAM missiles, Aegis Combat Systems and HIMARS MLRS.

Sanctions

We consider the European Commission’s restrictions on issuing multiple-entry Schengen visas to Russian citizens to be an ineffective and populist measure. Unlike complex, unpopular but effective measures to support Ukraine (for example, using frozen Russian assets to finance loans to Ukraine), the introduction of visa restrictions requires neither political nor financial costs and easily gains voter approval.

Another example of ill-considered sanctions against Russia is the US measures targeting Lukoil. According to Politico, the authorities of Bulgaria and Romania are seeking ways to exempt Lukoil oil refineries operating in their countries from US sanctions. The oil refinery in Burgas supplies about 80% of the Bulgarian fuel market, and its shutdown threatens fuel shortages and an economic crisis. The oil refinery in Ploiești accounts for about 20% of the Romanian fuel market, but stopping the plant could negatively affect fuel supplies to neighboring Moldova. Furthermore, fuel from these plants is also supplied to Ukraine.

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