Sitrep for Nov. 10-14, 2025 (as of 10:30 a.m. UTC+3)

Frontline Situation Update

In recent days, the most significant Russian advance has occurred in the Zaporizhzhia region, where the situation for the Armed Forces of Ukraine has become increasingly difficult. The offensive of recent weeks has created a salient around the town of Huliaipole and the villages of Chervone, Zelenyi Hai and Zatyshshia.

On Nov. 13, the Russian Ministry of Defense announced the capture of the village of Danylivka in the Dnipropetrovsk region, but the released flag-raising video is insufficient proof. Nevertheless, given current trends on the Huliaipole and Oleksandrivka directions, we have little doubt that the Russian Armed Forces will be able to gain a foothold there in the near future.

Danylivka is located on the road leading from the village of Pokrovske to Huliaipole, along the Haichur River, which confluences with the Yanchur. This road connects Huliaipole not only with Pokrovske but also with the N-15 highway (Donetsk-Zaporizhzhia), one of the key supply routes for the entire AFU grouping on this section of the frontline. Thus, the only remaining supply route to Huliaipole is the road leading southwest through the village of Zaliznychnе, and the RuAF will try to cut this as well.

In the longer term, the capture of Huliaipole, located in low terrain, would open the way for Russian forces toward the town of Orikhiv, with virtually no major settlements in between other than Zaliznychnе. This would later allow a westward advance across open fields that may not be adequately fortified.

All of this fits the broader strategy the RuAF have pursued in recent years. They attack different sections of the frontline in search of weak points in the enemy’s defenses: probing various sectors of the frontline to locate weaknesses in Ukrainian defenses, then redeploying additional forces to exploit these gaps and advance as far as possible before the AFU can bring in reserves, if any are available. This is exactly what has unfolded in recent months at the junction of the Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhzhia regions. Once opportunities for advancement emerged, the RuAF redeployed to the Huliaipole and Oleksandrivka directions in late September, bringing in units of the 41st Combined Arms Army, the 90th Tank Division and several other brigades, including some from the western flank of the Pokrovsk direction (near the villages of Udachne and Kotlyne). We already mentioned this in a previous sitrep, but at that time it was unclear whether the actions in the south would turn out to be a diversion from Pokrovsk.

We have previously expressed concern that the AFU may lack the reserves needed to reinforce the defense in the Huliaipole direction. Judging by the incoming reports, the forces stationed there were virtually unable to resist the offensive actions, even the settlements captured by the RuAF show less destruction than is typical. At times, it gives the impression that Russian troops are entering settlements that were already abandoned. The town of Huliaipole itself is important as a major logistical hub—at least for as long as it is still able to serve that role.

The deterioration of the situation in the Zaporizhzhia region has sparked debate within Ukrainian society, particularly after Colonel Valentyn Manko, head of the AFU Assault Troops Directorate, stated—on the eve of the fall of the village of Uspenivka—that Russian forces had been halted there. He later claimed the clearing of the villages of Solodke and Rivnopillia, which by that time had already been almost entirely captured. Manko also declared that the Russian advance in the area had been stopped. He is, firstly, already known for a previous scandal involving the publication of classified maps, and secondly, the 425th Skala Separate Assault Regiment, notorious for staged flag-plantings, operates under his command.

We identify several reasons why the situation in the Zaporizhzhia and Dnipropetrovsk regions has become so unfavorable for the AFU. First and foremost, there is a shortage of personnel. Second, a number of attached battalions from various AFU brigades are fighting in this sector under the command of the 110th Separate Mechanized Brigade. In July 2025, most of the leadership of the 110th Brigade was killed in a Russian strike on its command post, and the new command has apparently failed to establish an effective defense. Previously, the Commander-in-Chief of the AFU, General Oleksandr Syrskyi, dismissed commanders operating in the Novopavlivka direction, presumably for losing positions, which may have contributed to the emergence of embellished and misleading reports (we have discussed similar issues before).

Volodymyr Zelenskyy visited the Zaporizhzhia region, specifically the Orikhiv direction, to meet with military personnel. Following the trip, he stated that he had “set tasks for the military” and that more resources would be sent to the Zaporizhzhia axis. What exactly this entails is unclear; it likely refers to equipment, munitions and drones, but not personnel.

Correcting the critical situation in Huliaipole is quite difficult. Reinforcing the sector with two or three brigades would help, provided they are fresh rather than exhausted by prolonged fighting. However, the AFU appears to lack such units in reserve. Those that are available are engaged in the Pokrovsk and Dobropillia directions.

In the Pokrovsk direction, the AFU continue to hold a defensive line along the Hryshynka River, while Russia’s primary objective remains to close the pincer around the area by advancing toward the village of Rivne, situated between the towns of Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad. On the southeastern edge of Pokrovsk, videos surfaced showing Russian soldiers entering the town in light vehicles under the cover of fog, moving precisely in the direction of Rivne. Judging by how freely they maneuvered, Ukrainian forces no longer appear to be present in that part of the town.

It is likely that most of Pokrovsk has already fallen, with fighting now concentrated on the northern outskirts of the town, as Ukrainian troops attempt to prevent Russian forces from completing the encirclement and trapping the remaining Ukrainian units inside the urban area.

A new CIT analysis examines how the impact of poor weather and the muddy season on combat operations has evolved from World War II to the present day.

In connection with that topic, it is worth noting that Russia’s Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Protection Troops are capable of creating aerosol screens using specialized smoke-generating vehicles. These screens, like natural fog, can obscure positions from drones. However, because the vehicles involved—typically large trucks such as KamAZ models—cannot approach the frontline without becoming targets for UAV strikes, their use has remained constrained. On Nov. 13, to mark the branch’s professional holiday, the Russian MoD released a video claiming that such aerosol screens are now deployed using UAVs and ground robots, releasing smoke both at locations where Russian forces plan to maneuver and at alternate sites to create decoys. We have not previously seen this practice on the frontline, suggesting the segment may have been prepared for the holiday rather than reflecting standard procedures. In most cases, the best we have observed were smoke grenades mounted on vehicles.

Over the past week, numerous videos have appeared purporting to show Ukrainian soldiers surrendering or breaking out of encirclement in the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad urban area. Many of these clips are almost certainly AI-generated.

In one example, a wheelchair—whose presence on forward positions would already be suspect—appears to move on its own, and the flags attached to the chair do not look real. The audio is out of sync with lip movements, and the overall motion appears artificial, consistent with AI generation.

In another video allegedly showing the interrogation of Ukrainian POWs, several inconsistencies raise doubts about its authenticity. The lighting is improbably well-set for a basement near the frontline, while the audio is poorly recorded. In addition, the speech does not always match the lip movements, and multiple micro-cuts are visible. We also note that all the soldiers are wearing clean and undamaged uniforms. Taken together, these factors lead us to conclude that the video was most likely generated—or, if not, then staged.

Some of the supposed video addresses by Ukrainian soldiers also appear to be generated. For example, in one video filmed in a trench, the interior looks as if it has undergone high-quality renovation, and the revetment does not match what is actually used on the frontline. For other videos, we cannot state definitively whether they were created with neural networks or simply staged, but we are certain they are not authentic. These clips likewise show spotless uniforms, and the soldiers’ behavior is atypical for forward positions—one of them walks along an open road without showing any concern about FPV drones, which would be reckless even in fog.

Verification is further complicated by the common practice of publishing such videos not only on Telegram channels but also in the media without any links to the original sources.

One likely motive behind creating and spreading these videos is the intent to influence the battlefield situation and persuade the remaining Ukrainian troops in the area that they urgently need to abandon their positions.

In September, it became known that North Korean personnel were still present in the Kursk region—DPRK sappers were replacing Russian soldiers who had been reassigned to assault units. On Nov. 13, the pro-Kremlin newspaper Komsomolskaya Pravda published a report on the work of North Korean sappers in the Kursk region. It was also reported that they are trained in counter-drone measures.

Increasing evidence has emerged of the use of FP-5 Flamingo cruise missiles. The General Staff of the AFU reported that in the early hours of Nov. 13, a number of targets in Russia and occupied territories were attacked with Flamingo missiles, releasing footage of the launches. During that night, one missile was intercepted over the city of Oryol; footage shows numerous burning debris falling to the ground—likely due to the missile's composite plastic casing, which disintegrates into pieces in the air and ignites. The largest launch site for the Shahed-136 (Geran-2) loitering munitions is known to be located near the village of Tsimbulova in the Oryol region.

In the early hours of Nov. 10, there was possibly a Flamingo missile attack on Tuapse, although some sources claim R-360 Neptune subsonic cruise missiles were used. A large crater was visible on the beach after the strike. Unmanned surface vessels were employed at the same time.

In the early hours of Nov. 14, Novorossiysk was targeted. The attack struck the oil terminal at the Sheskharis transshipment complex and military unit 26345, which houses several launchers of the C-300/С-400 SAM systems and the Pantsir-S1 surface-to-air missile and anti-aircraft artillery system. Judging by the powerful secondary detonation in the footage, an ammunition storage facility was also hit.

Conscription, Mobilization and Contract Military Service

German economist Janis Kluge has published a new estimate of recruitment rates for the war based on regional budget data (we described the methodology in previous sitreps). According to his calculations, nearly 38,000 people signed contracts with the MoD in October, which is higher than the recent monthly average of 30,000 but below the 41,000 who signed up in October last year. Kluge notes that figures for the final months of the year may be somewhat inflated, as the budget cycle typically results in larger payments toward year's end.

He also offered an explanation for why regions in the Volga Federal District reduced their sign-up bonuses for military contracts. It appears that these regions already met high recruitment targets by October, attracting more volunteer fighters than the national average while spending a substantial share of their budgets. As a result, regional authorities likely decided to scale back incentives toward the end of the year.

Additionally, Kluge attempted to estimate Russian casualties using a similar budget-based approach. Budget data from 13 regions includes information suitable for analyzing compensation payments to families of killed soldiers. This estimate is substantially less precise than his recruitment figures: these regions account for only 17.8% of Russia’s population. Still, in recent months, they have been paying compensation for more than 50 killed servicemen per day on average (for example, in October 2025, the 13 regions paid out compensation for 53 deaths per day). Although payments fluctuate significantly and the sample includes one outlier region (Bashkortostan), the data supports the estimate of more than 200 Russians killed in action per day on average.

Analyst Michael Kofman notes that the Russian government typically sets an annual quota for recruiting volunteer fighters but may revise requirements in mid-summer. He added that the recruitment plan for 2025 is lower than last year's—another possible reason for reduced payments in several regions.

One indication that residents of Russia’s poorest regions are disproportionately represented among contract soldiers is the number of recent high-school graduates killed in the war against Ukraine. According to Valentina Bazarova, an activist with the Free Buryatia Foundation, 117 men from Buryatia under the age of 20 have been killed in action.

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