Sitrep for Dec. 5-8, 2025 (as of 9 a.m. UTC+3)

Frontline Situation Update

In Kupiansk, the Armed Forces of Ukraine continue to counterattack Russian forces in the central and northern parts of the town. Although in the eastern part only an occasional presence of the Russian Armed Forces had been noted—which did not prevent the town from being declared captured on Nov. 20—and no presence had been observed to the east of Kupiansk at all, the Russian Ministry of Defense unexpectedly announced the capture of the village of Kucherivka, located near the town’s eastern outskirts. Russian soldiers have not been observed there. However, the capture of the neighboring village of Petropavlivka was announced at the same time as the statement about Kupiansk, and at the end of the month Russian troops did appear in Petropavlivka.

In Kupiansk, near the railway station, a video filmed in early December shows combat involving foreign volunteer fighters—they appear to be speaking Brazilian Portuguese.

In the Siversk direction, the situation for the AFU continues to deteriorate. At the moment, roughly half of the town of Siversk lies within the contested area.

DeepState has finally placed the village of Zvanivka in the contested zone, which extends to the village of Sviato-Pokrovske, southwest of Siversk.

In the Kostiantynivka direction, the Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces had managed to capture first the village of Klynove and then the village of Bezimiane. The Russian command also has no grounds for such statements. If the RuAF had actually carried out this maneuver, they would have been observed in one of the populated areas along the route to the locations mentioned above. The capture of Klynove and Bezimiane would have resulted in supply difficulties for Ukrainian troops in the town of Kostiantynivka, since from these villages it would be possible to carry out drone strikes on the main supply road running through the village of Oleksiivo-Druzhkivka. Such changes cannot go unnoticed, and so far we have not observed any signs of RuAF advances in this sector.

In the Pokrovsk direction, Russian forces have reportedly managed to fully capture the village of Rivne, located between the towns of Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad. Unlike previous statements from Russia’s MoD, this claim appears to be accurate: judging by available information, Ukrainian troops have withdrawn from Rivne, and Russian soldiers can be seen in various parts of the village. Nevertheless, we believe that the area between the two towns still remains contested.

The situation in Pokrovsk, according to commanders of the AFU assault troops, looks much more optimistic than in our own assessment. The commander of the 7th Airborne Assault Corps, Brigadier General Yevhen Lasiychuk, stated that although the situation is difficult, the assault troops supposedly control the northern part of the town and are present in the central part, preventing further Russian advances. According to him, the demarcation line runs along the railway.

Indeed, according to the DeepState map, the zone controlled by the RuAF ends precisely at this railway line. However, it is worth noting that the main defensive line of the AFU and units of the Main Intelligence Directorate lies farther north, along the Hryshynka River. Nevertheless, since mid-November, Russian forces have periodically penetrated this defensive line, which demonstrates that Ukrainian forces were unable to make it continuous or could not hold it in certain sectors. As for the central part of Pokrovsk, the claims about halting the enemy’s advance contradict footage showing Russian armored vehicles operating there. We tend to believe that in this part of the town, the AFU maintain only episodic presence, conducting raid-style actions to disrupt the Russian buildup.

At the same time, the Ukrainian assault troops themselves describe the situation as far less optimistic and even speak of the encirclement of Myrnohrad. In our previous sitrep we reported on a Hromadske article dedicated to this topic.

In the Dnipropetrovsk region, it is worth noting that Russian soldiers were present in the villages of Tykhe, Vidradne and Radisne, apparently without establishing a firm foothold. On Dec. 7, the 67th Mechanized Brigade of the AFU reported they had mopped-up Tykhe. However, the DeepState project has not expanded the "gray zone" in this area within the past two weeks.

Russian troops continue to attack the northeastern outskirts of Huliaipole but so far they have been unable to consolidate their positions. Their progress appears to have slowed, though it is premature to speak of a stabilization of the situation. The redeployment of Ukrainian assault units to this sector seems to have had an effect—this was also reported by researcher Playfra. According to his data, the AFU have managed to establish an improvised defensive line in this direction.

A recently circulated video was accompanied by a claim that on Nov. 27, servicemen of the 30th Separate Mechanized Brigade of the AFU had allegedly blown up a dam near the village of Pryvillia, east of Kostiantynivka, to halt the advance of Russian forces. This dam forms a small pond next to the village. Some time after this claim appeared, a rebuttal followed. DeepState announced that the brigade’s information resources had been hacked and that the AFU had not blown up the dam. At the same time, the post about the explosion was removed from the Telegram channel called "30th Separate Mechanized Brigade." On the brigade’s Facebook page, representatives denied any connection to that Telegram channel and said the dam had been struck by Russian air-dropped bombs.

In this sector of the frontline, Russian forces are currently not advancing very actively. However, Ukrainian Telegram channels have reported that Russian troops are allegedly preparing to advance toward the village of Malynivka, east of Kramatorsk, to intensify drone strikes on the city.

Russian forces also carried out a strike on the Pechenehy dam in the Kharkiv region. It is worth noting that a dam is built across a river to block its flow and create a reservoir, while a levee runs along a river to adjust its course or protect settlements from flooding. We assume that the target of the strike was the road running over the dam; destroying it would complicate supply and logistics for Ukrainian forces in the eastern Kharkiv region, around Vovchansk and Velykyi Burluk, in the direction where, according to Ukrainian military observer Kostiantyn Mashovets, Russian forces are planning to advance.

It has emerged that the F-16 fighter jets transferred to Ukraine have been outfitted with launch adapters that allow them to fire Hydra rockets upgraded with APKWS guidance kits. The Ukrainian military has already used these rockets successfully from ground-based launchers to shoot down Russian drones. Yet it is worth recalling that in June, 20,000 APKWS kits produced under the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI) were diverted by Pete Hegseth to American aviation units in the Middle East, citing an emergency. It remains unclear whether APKWS deliveries to Ukraine have since resumed.

Video has surfaced showing a Magura unmanned surface vessel, equipped with AIM-9 Sidewinder missiles, being struck by a Lancet drone. Such missiles enable these maritime drones to shoot down Russian aircraft.

Additional footage shows a Ukrainian interceptor drone detonating next to a Shahed-136 loitering munition.

Ukrainian and Russian Strikes

In the early hours of Dec. 7, Russian ballistic missiles with cluster munition warheads struck the city of Kremenchuk in the Poltava region; video footage shows multiple flashes and explosions. According to Ukraine's Ministry of Energy, the strikes on Dec. 6-7 targeted energy infrastructure facilities. We doubt that cluster munitions are more effective for attacks on energy facilities than high-explosive fragmentation munitions. Rather, it is likely that such munitions were used for a so-called double-tap strike aimed at firefighters and energy workers arriving to extinguish fires and restore the facility. This year, we have reported many targeted attacks on Ukrainian first responders.

On the morning of Dec. 6, a RuAF strike on the Dnipropetrovsk region destroyed a warehouse containing medical supplies belonging to the Med-Servis pharmacy chain. Since this is far from the first attack on such facilities, it is reasonable to assume that its direct aim was the destruction of medication stockpiles intended for the civilian population. We see no military purpose in such a strike.

In the early hours of Dec. 6, Russia struck the Kyiv region, including the railway station and depot in the town of Fastiv.

The Economist has published an analysis offering a meta-assessment of Russian losses based on combat intensity, frontline shifts and casualty estimates compiled by independent open-source researchers. According to their tally, from Feb. 24, 2022 onward, between 1 million and 1.35 million Russian soldiers have been killed or wounded, amounting to roughly one percent of the country’s pre-war population of conscription-age men. The outlet assesses the number of those killed at between 200,000 and 580,000.

Meanwhile, according to US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, 100,000 Russian service members were killed in just the first half of 2025. The name-by-name database of Russian losses maintained by Mediazona, BBC News Russian and a volunteer network had recorded 153,000 dead as of Dec. 5. Using these figures, our formula indicates that the RuAF have lost more than 300,000 personnel killed—a number within the range published by The Economist. We stopped publishing our own estimate of wounded casualties some time ago, as the figures were frequently misinterpreted by readers. Judging by current trends, Russian fatalities in 2025 will exceed those of 2024, when more than 90,000 soldiers were killed—an annual record for the war. This year, the total is likely to surpass 100,000, though a more precise estimate will only be possible by mid-2026. Mediazona has alsoreported that as of Dec. 1, Russian courts had received nearly 90,000 petitions seeking to have servicemen declared killed or missing in action.

Taking this opportunity, we note that the increase in the number of casualties this year is largely driven by the saturation of the combat zone with drones. As a result, the so-called "golden hour" has effectively disappeared: it has become nearly impossible to evacuate a wounded soldier within the first 60 minutes after sustaining a severe injury—the period when their chances of survival are highest. In the summer, US military personnel, based on Ukrainian data from early this year, wrote about the need to revise battlefield medical care standards. According to one Ukrainian unit, only 22% of wounded soldiers are evacuated within two hours, while more than 50% are evacuated only after six hours or more.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has published the results of its inspection of the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant sarcophagus, which was hit by a drone in February 2025. According to the experts, the sarcophagus "lost its primary safety functions, including the confinement capability." However, the experts concluded that currently there is no permanent damage to its load-bearing structures or monitoring systems. Even so, the facility requires "comprehensive restoration," which cannot be carried out during the wartime. Without such restoration, precipitation will enter the New Safe Confinement and cause corrosion of the temporary sarcophagus built in 1986.

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