Sitrep for Nov. 24-28, 2025 (as of 11:30 a.m. UTC+3)

Frontline Situation Update

In the Huliaipole direction, in the eastern part of the Zaporizhzhia region, the situation for Ukrainian forces remains extremely difficult. It is worth noting that combat operations in the region are currently taking place around the town of Huliaipole, slightly to the west in the Orikhiv direction, and also near the village of Stepnohirsk (this sector is more often referred to as the Zaporizhzhia axis).

The Russian Armed Forces continue to advance toward Huliaipole and generally toward the Haichur River, on which the town is located: they have seized the village of Zelenyi Hai and are advancing near the village of Rivnopillia. Russia’s Ministry of Defense has announced the capture of the village of Zatyshshia (west of Zelenyi Hai), and videos featuring Russian flags have been published; however, it remains unclear whether Russian soldiers will be able to gain a foothold there.

Because Huliaipole lies in the Haichur River valley, the RuAF advance is expected to slow as they approach the water barrier. Capturing the larger left-bank part of the town is more difficult than the right-bank part. The Armed Forces of Ukraine can use the river to establish a defensive line, preventing the enemy from rapidly seizing the remaining part of Huliaipole.

A servicemember from the 102nd Separate Brigade of Ukrainian Territorial Defense Forces published a Facebook post complaining about the lack of response from senior command to appeals from forward positions. According to him, the positions that had long been held came within the effective range of enemy weapons from nearly all sides, forcing troops to maintain all-around defense without resupply. Because Russian forces infiltrate in small assault groups, it is often impossible to know whether they are nearby or have managed to get into the rear. Due to a catastrophic shortage of personnel, soldiers often remain at their positions for more than a month—longer than ideal—which has a negative impact on combat readiness.

Another problem, he wrote, is the sheer shortage of drones needed to maintain situational awareness—the Russian military has far more. The soldier concludes that the brigade’s leadership is not trying to preserve the lives of its personnel.

He also reported that the 225th Assault Regiment, redeployed to the Huliaipole sector, failed to stabilize the situation, in part because of poor communication: troops often could not tell where their own lines were and where Russian forces had advanced. According to the assault troops, in addition to their primary combat tasks, they were ordered to act as a blocking detachment for territorial defense units—to force them back into position if they began to fall back, and to open fire if they refused. The author even claimed to have personally witnessed assault troops detain fighters from the 77th Battalion who were attempting to leave their positions, force them to the ground and threaten to shoot them unless they returned.

These are not the only recent references to blocking detachments in the Huliaipole sector; the issue has been widely discussed in recent weeks. The Ukrainian military leadership, however, denies it entirely.

It was in this context that we were struck by a post from DeepState, a source we hold in high regard. The update on the Huliaipole front was titled "One Step Away from Losing Huliaipole—How Timely Decisions Saved the Town From Occupation." In it, the analysts argued that developments over the past week could have led to the town’s fall this month, but that "thanks to the correct decisions by military commanders, a major tragedy was avoided." They were referring to the rapid redeployment of additional forces from the 225th Assault Regiment and a mechanized brigade, which immediately began constructing a new defensive line directly in front of Huliaipole. The analysts wrote that "instances of friendly fire were recorded due to unauthorized withdrawal and general chaos"—an apparent attempt to explain the above-mentioned accounts of blocking detachments. As a result of the reinforcements and improved coordination with command, DeepState concluded, the situation "was stabilized—chaos in the battle lines has almost entirely disappeared," Russian advances toward Huliaipole slowed sharply and a new defensive line took shape.

This assessment surprised us greatly. In recent weeks we have seen no sign of any slowdown on this axis; even DeepState’s own map, as we noted earlier, shows advances near Rivnopillia, which directly affect the broader situation, as they will ultimately complicate Ukraine’s logistics. And unlike Huliaipole, Rivnopillia sits on higher ground. It is worth noting that one of the last remaining usable roads is the route that passes through Zaliznychnе—a road that will become increasingly dangerous as Russian drone operators draw closer.

In addition to the aforementioned Facebook post, another serviceman from the 102nd Brigade commented on the situation in a similar vein on the DeepState Telegram channel, citing a lack of coordination, incidents of friendly fire and threats of execution for retreating. He also claimed that fighting is already underway on the outskirts of Huliaipole and that the 225th Regiment is not participating. These accounts indicate persistent communication problems, as well as attempts by assault troops to prevent other soldiers from withdrawing from endangered positions.

Colonel Valentyn Manko, head of the AFU Assault Troops Directorate, stated on Nov. 23 that assault troops had successfully held their lines, while the 33rd Separate Assault Brigade's Telegram channel reported that the RuAF's plans had been thwarted and the situation near Huliaipole had stabilized. Despite all these claims, the gradual westward shift of the frontline has not stopped, and even DeepState confirms cases of friendly fire. Whatever the causes—poor communication, chaos on the approaches to the town or orders to establish blocking detachments—stabilization remains elusive.

Researcher Playfra has reported on the construction of a Ukrainian defensive line from Huliaipole to Pokrovske using modern principles and proper positioning. The purpose of building fortifications behind Huliaipole is to create obstacles—rather than trenches and dugouts typical of other defensive lines—to impede the enemy's advance toward the village of Horikhove.

In the Novopavlivka direction, some time ago a Russian armored column reached the village of Novopavlivka in the Dnipropetrovsk region under the cover of fog and deployed infantry there. Although reports indicate that the area was cleared, videos continued to emerge showing strikes on Russian soldiers in the village and later their attempts to cross the Solona River, which runs through Novopavlivka. The RuAF are also advancing further south, near the village of Dachne on the border with the Donetsk region.

In the Siversk direction, the RuAF are attacking Siversk from the south, east and northeast, with active fighting underway.

On the Lyman direction, Ukrainian military observer Kostiantyn Mashovets reported that after a month of intense fighting, the AFU have apparently withdrawn from most of the town of Yampil, moving southwest. Russian forces continue their offensive toward the town of Lyman.

In the Pokrovsk direction, it is worth noting that, in our assessment, the contested area between the town of Pokrovsk and the village of Krasnyi Lyman has effectively closed, complicating supply and evacuation for the AFU. At the same time, a full encirclement is almost unattainable under current wartime conditions. Although the opportunity to withdraw all forces from the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad agglomeration has passed, the AFU can still fight their way out, but at significant cost.

Most of Pokrovsk is now effectively captured. Russian forces are present near the railway station, where Ukrainian drones are striking troops and equipment, while Ukrainian forces continue to hold positions in the northern part of the town. For this reason, it is inaccurate at present to claim that Pokrovsk has been fully taken, and the AFU will likely hold their remaining positions to the last in order to preserve the town’s status.

Ukrainska Pravda has published a report on the situation in Pokrovsk, stating that the town’s defenders are running out of infantry, and fighting with drones alone is impossible. According to authoritative military sources who wished to remain anonymous, high-level decision-making is becoming increasingly delayed and ambiguous. The Russian army maintains air superiority in terms of drone numbers both along the frontline and up to 10-20 km [6.21-12.42 mi] behind it. At the same time, the frontline is not collapsing, and there is still a chance to hold the line of contact—but this requires intensified mobilization, timely competent and decisions by the command, honest reporting to corps commanders and the Chief of the General Staff, as well as regaining the initiative in the air.

It is worth noting that AFU General Staff maps available to the public do not reliably reflect the situation. For example, on the Nov. 26 map, the Russian-controlled area does not even touch Pokrovsk. If troop-management decisions are being made based on such maps, it is unsurprising that no withdrawal order has been issued for the town positions. Ultimately, however, this leads to greater losses.

Maps published by the Russian MoD also distort reality, but in the opposite direction, and are released very rarely, the latest dating back to Sept. 25.

We believe that Ukraine will not be able to win this war solely through military means. However, by addressing personnel shortages, improving troop management and coordinating overall combat operations, the AFU can strengthen their positions and buy time to apply pressure on Russia through other channels, including economic sanctions, diplomatic pressure from the US and Europe, strikes on oil refineries and gradually pushing toward more favorable conditions for halting the war.

A video has been published showing the use of a RBK-500 cluster bomb with the Universal Gliding and Correction Module (UMPK) in the village of Hryshyne, northwest of Pokrovsk. This is a relatively rare case, possibly because in the 2025 stage of the conflict there are fewer large concentrations of personnel and military equipment to be targeted by cluster munitions.

We have previously reported on the installation of drone defense nets along roads. Recently, footage emerged showing a Russian drone in Kupiansk using a thermite mixture to burn through such nets. However, the footage does not clearly demonstrate how effective this method truly is.

A former Wagner Group member who runs the Condottiero Telegram channel claims that, after two months of training at a military range, soldiers from North Korea have been redeployed to the Huliaipole direction. We have seen no confirmation of this information. Since soldiers from the Eastern Military District are involved in fighting there, it is possible that Buryats, for example, were mistaken for Koreans.

Ukrainian and Russian Strikes

A child wounded in the attack on Ternopil on Nov. 19 has died. This brings the death toll to 35, including seven children. Along with the strikes on the Congress Center of Sumy State University on April 13, 2025 and on the Ohmatdyt hospital in Kyiv on July 8, 2024, this is one of the deadliest attacks recorded by our team since we began tracking strikes on civilian infrastructure.

According to a press release from the UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine, the number of people killed by long-range weapons increased by 26% to 548 between January and October 2025, compared with the same period in 2024, while the number of people injured rose by 75% to 3,592. These figures differ greatly from our own data. According to the tally of our volunteers, 2,245 people were killed and 13,435 more were injured during the specified period, including in the occupied territories. Excluding the occupied territories, 1,979 people were killed and 11,888 were injured. The reason for the nearly fourfold difference in casualty numbers is unclear.

According to New York Times sources, US Army Secretary Daniel Driscoll informed diplomats that Russia is stockpiling long-range missiles. While we cannot independently verify this information, we can confirm that the markings on the missile debris found following the attack on Ternopil suggest that the missile was manufactured in the fourth quarter of 2025. In our view, this suggests that Driscoll's account may be inaccurate. Previously, we observed that fewer ballistic missiles were used in the summer than during the large-scale attacks on energy infrastructure in the fall-winter period.

A video has been published showing Kalibr cruise missiles being launched from Russian ships near Novorossiysk in the early hours of Nov. 25.

In the early hours of Nov. 25, Ukrainian drones attacked Novorossiysk, with one of them striking the 12th floor of a 20-story residential building. According to the Astra Telegram channel, it flew over the territory of a military unit and crashed into the next high-rise building. A video was also published showing a failure of the Russian air defense system: an anti-aircraft missile lost altitude and crashed into structures near another residential building. According to RBC-Ukraine sources, the attack damaged a Project 1171 large landing ship that was moored at the pier of the naval base in the port. Earlier, the AFU General Staff claimed that oil loading standers—devices used for loading oil onto tankers—had been hit in Novorossiysk. On Nov. 26, OSINT researcher Tom Bike published satellite imagery of the port of Novorossiysk showing the ship being towed by two tugboats. He believes the vessel in question is indeed the Project 1171 large landing ship being moved for repairs after the Ukrainian strike.

A military court in Rostov-on-Don has sentenced eight defendants to life imprisonment in the case of the bombing of the Crimean Bridge on Oct. 8, 2022. They were charged with carrying out an act of terror and transporting explosives, and two of them were additionally charged with smuggling explosives. In reality, these people were performing routine work related to cargo logistics and did not know they were unwittingly facilitating an act of terror; many of them even voluntarily contacted law enforcement after the incident. None of the defendants plead guilty, even partially. In 2023, head of the Security Service of Ukraine Vasyl Maliuk stated that Ukrainian intelligence services did not inform intermediaries about the nature of the operation: "We… used so many people in an unwitting fashion. The Russians 'closed' 22 people… although in reality they were doing their usual everyday work."

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