Sitrep for Dec. 15-19, 2025 (as of 10 a.m. UTC+3)

Frontline Situation Update

In the Dobropillia direction, as noted by the Playfra researcher, Russian forces are advancing toward the village of Sofiivka, and have also expanded their presence on the western bank of the Kazenyi Torets River in the area of the villages of Maiak, Pankivka and Shakhove. The pressure of the Russian Armed Forces in this area has noticeably increased—in addition to Sofiivka, they are attempting to advance around the former Dobropillia salient in order to retake positions there.

These attacks have a strategic objective: next year, the area around Sofiivka—as the advance moves toward the town of Druzhkivka—should become the southwestern flank of the offensive on the city of Kramatorsk. Unlike the Siversk and Lyman directions, where Russia has made noticeable gains, the RuAF have not achieved significant success in the Dobropillia and Kostiantynivka directions. Therefore, we expect that commanders there will try to accelerate their advance in the near future.

In the town of Kostiantynivka, Russian forces have not yet been able to make any noticeable progress. Fighting is still taking place on the southern outskirts. Meanwhile, in the town of Siversk they continue to advance successfully: most of the town has already been captured, and the Armed Forces of Ukraine have pulled back to the high ground west of it.

Since winter has fully arrived on the frontline, the leaves have fallen and snow covers the ground in many areas, making it much easier to track the movement of infantry and vehicles. Therefore, in the coming months one can expect an overall slowdown in advances, which in turn means that launching an offensive toward the Sloviansk–Kramatorsk agglomeration will not be possible any time soon. As a result, the command is likely to demand faster gains regardless of losses.

In the towns of Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad, the situation has not changed much in recent days. Russian forces are still trying to break through toward the village of Hryshyne: videos have appeared showing Russian soldiers attempting to gain a foothold in private houses on the outskirts of the village, where Ukrainian drone operators quickly detect and attack them. As a result, the area is currently contested.

On Dec. 17, Commander-in-Chief of the AFU, General Oleksandr Syrskyi announced that Ukrainian forces had regained 16 square kilometers as a result of a counteroffensive in the northern part of Pokrovsk. However, it remains unclear which specific territories he was talking about, as even the DeepState map, which often reflects the situation in a manner complimentary to the AFU General Staff, showed no such changes. The General Staff's maps often differ greatly from reality.

In the Dnipropetrovsk region, according to the Russian MoD, the RuAF captured the villages of Herasymivka and Pishchane. However, unlike in several other instances, no videos with Russian soldiers and flags were even recorded in these villages. Available footage only shows Russian drone strikes on Ukrainian positions, suggesting these claims were likely made for end-of-year reporting purposes.

Additionally, on Dec. 16, the RuAF launched another mechanized column assault on the village of Novopavlivka. Despite the fog, Ukrainian drones equipped with thermal imagers successfully targeted the Russian vehicles.

In the Zaporizhzhia region, Russian forces advanced south of Huliaipole, penetrated the town center from that direction, and consolidated positions on its eastern outskirts.

The situation on the Zaporizhzhia axis was discussed at an expanded board meeting of the Russian MoD on Dec. 17. During a presentation by General Valery Gerasimov, Chief of the General Staff of the RuAF, on captured territories, a map was shown with the incorrect location of the village of Mala Tokmachka—it was depicted southwest of Orikhiv when it should have been shown southeast. Notably, the MoD announced the capture of Mala Tokmachka on Nov. 16. It is quite possible the error occurred because the cartographer confused it with Mali Shcherbaky, west of Orikhiv: the latter is currently on the frontline according to DeepState, while the Russian MoD declared its capture back in late March.

Building full-scale fortifications near the frontline is currently impossible due to the large number of enemy drones, therefore Ukrainian forces construct them at a safe distance instead. However, improvised barriers made of logs, barbed wire (concertina wire), and tanglefoot wire can be set up near the line of contact relatively quickly and covertly, creating nearly impassable obstacles for both vehicles (including heavy armor) and infantry. Slowed-down vehicles and soldiers become easy targets for Ukrainian drones. Such barriers can be seen in a video from the Lyman direction. Notably, the forest was cut down about a year ago to impede the advance of Russian forces.

In the event of a freeze in combat operations, Ukraine would need to construct similar barriers in the buffer zone, as well as mine the territory, dig trenches, install concrete pyramids, and so forth — to create virtually insurmountable obstacles in case of a renewed Russian offensive.

A video has been released showing a Russian Molniya fixed-wing kamikaze drone dropping incendiary devices; reports indicate that the purpose is to damage anti-drone netting protecting Ukrainian supply routes. What surprised us is that the UAV does this from a significant altitude (hundreds of meters), which, in our assessment, reduces the effectiveness of the incendiary devices: they may scatter before reaching their target, or the wind could blow them off course. We have seen no reports of significant damage to the netting as a result of such attacks, nor any corroborating video footage.

At the aforementioned MoD collegium, Russia's Minister of Defense Andrey Belousov also stated that over 38,000 motorcycles, ATVs and buggies have been delivered to the troops this year. We had previously assumed that most such vehicles were purchased by volunteers, with Chinese DesertCross buggies being a rare exception, but we lack reliable data on this.

Also, according to Belousov, more than 90% of the wounded arriving from a combat zone are saved by medical personnel. This figure may sound like a completely implausible figure, more typical of the US Army during operations in Iraq or Afghanistan, but entirely impossible in the conditions of a modern full-scale war. However, it makes sense if one assumes it's a statistical trick: 90% of the wounded who make it to hospitals survive, but it's unclear what percentage of the wounded make it to medics alive. Based on the available data, most severely wounded personnel likely die in forward positions because, as previously mentioned, the chances of survival are almost nonexistent without rapid medical assistance. Those who survive are mainly individuals who sustained non-life-threatening injuries and were able to wait for evacuation, often for several days, without receiving proper medical care, and these are precisely the easiest to save.

Furthermore, Belousov stated that over the past two years, the evacuation time for servicemen with complex injuries to facilities providing high-tech medical care has been reduced from 40 to 36 hours. This may mean that severely wounded personnel (e.g., those with combined injuries) are first taken to a stabilization point, where they receive initial treatment. Then, within 36 hours, they are sent for full surgical treatment, which may include amputation. According to the minister, this has become possible because troop groupings have almost fully received medical equipment. In particular, 86% of the requirement for armored vehicles has been met. However, we have not observed the RuAF widely using medical armored vehicles over the past couple of years.

Ukrainian and Russian Strikes

The RuAF attacked bridges in the Odesa region: in the village of Zatoka on Dec. 14 and in the village of Maiaky on Dec. 18. According to Serhii "Flash" Beskrestnov, a Ukrainian military expert, whose assessment we share, the purpose of the strikes was to cut off the western part of the region from transport links with Romania. One of the attacks killed a woman.

As a result of a Russian strike on energy infrastructure in the Odesa region in the early hours of Dec. 13, more than one million customers were left without electricity. On Dec. 17, the Odesa Regional State Administration declared a state of emergency of national level; at least 50,000 residents of the region were still without normal living conditions on that day. As of today, the town of Artsyz still has no power, with electricity expected to be restored by approximately Dec. 26.

In the early hours of Dec. 18, during a UAV raid on Rostov-on-Don, an oil tanker named Valeriy Gorchakov was damaged in the port; reports indicate two civilian deaths and three injuries.

On Dec. 15, SBU’s Sub Sea Baby underwater drones attacked a Russian Project 636.3 Varshavyanka-class submarine at the Novorossiysk naval base. Satellite images before and after the explosion have appeared, showing partial collapse of the pier; however, the extent of damage to the submarine cannot be assessed from open sources, as the strike hit its submerged section. The fact that the submarine remained in port while two others departed suggests it was damaged—otherwise it would have been redeployed. This was the first attack using this type of drone; nothing is currently known about it beyond its name. Naval OSINT analyst H. I. Sutton published a short video with a preliminary analysis of the possible consequences of the attack.

In the early hours of Dec. 19, Ukrainian drones struck the Orlovskaya Thermal Power Plant. The governor of the Oryol region, Andrey Klychkov, said that the attack damaged a municipal infrastructure facility in the city of Oryol, potentially causing short-term disruptions to heating, electricity and hot water supplies.

The Chief of Operations of the Swedish Navy, Marco Petkovic, reported that European militaries have observed armed paramilitary security personnel aboard tankers belonging to Russia’s shadow fleet in the Baltic Sea. According to Ukrainian intelligence, these Russian guards are tasked with monitoring the captains of the vessels. One Western intelligence source confirmed this information, stating that they "ensure that their contractors act in line with the Kremlin’s interests." CNN reports that at least some of the Russian nationals present on these tankers cooperate with Moran Security, a Russian company well known from the early period of the Wagner Group’s activities. Some of them are mercenaries who previously worked for the Wagner Group and Russian private military companies.

Western Assistance

On Dec. 18, the European Council discussed financing Ukraine for the next two years, aiming to secure €90 billion of the €137 billion needed to support the country. Among the options considered were financing through the EU budget and a reparations-backed loan secured by frozen Russian assets. Ultimately, the first option was agreed upon—a loan backed by the EU budget itself rather than by the budgets of individual member states. The Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia will not participate in financing this loan.

Ukraine will be required to repay the loan only if it receives reparations from Russia, while the EU reserves the right to use frozen Russian assets to cover the debt. As we understand it, the loan includes both military assistance to Ukraine and support for its state budget. €45 billion per year may seem like a substantial amount, but it is worth noting that between 2022 and 2024, military aid to Ukraine alone averaged €41.6 billion annually.

Bloomberg also reports that the European Council intends to introduce "Buy European" rules for this loan, requiring Ukraine to spend at least half of the allocated funds on weapons purchases in Ukraine, the EU and several partner countries outside the EU, such as Norway. This would limit Ukraine’s ability to purchase weapons from the United States.

On Dec. 16, Ukraine’s allies convened another Ramstein-format meeting, after which new packages of military assistance were announced. Czechia said that, under the Czech initiative, funding had been secured for 760,000 artillery shells for delivery in 2026. Poland pledged to supply 155mm artillery ammunition. Germany plans to allocate $13.5 billion in 2026 to finance air defense systems, drones and artillery rounds. Norway committed nearly $7 billion for American-made air defense systems and for the purchase of shells through the Czech initiative. Britain announced $800 million in funding for air defense systems, missiles and anti-drone turrets.

Last week, we reported on a lawsuit filed by Russia’s central bank against the Euroclear depository in the Moscow Arbitration Court. In that context, officials warned that if the European Union were to confiscate frozen Russian assets, Moscow would respond with retaliatory measures, including the seizure of Western funds held in Russian banks, the arrest of Western companies’ assets and similar steps by jurisdictions friendly to Russia.

Whether Ukraine will receive security guarantees comparable to NATO’s Article 5 remains unclear. Media reports, including remarks attributed to Germany’s chancellor, Friedrich Merz, have suggested that the EU and the US may have agreed to provide such guarantees. But absent a statement from President Donald Trump, it all remains rather uncertain. It is worth noting that Article 5 requires a political decision by NATO that an armed attack has indeed occurred; an attack on one member is treated as an attack on all, triggering an obligation to assist. The article has been invoked only once, after the Sept. 11 attacks, and even then it was activated following political assessment rather than automatically. The assistance provided varied, ranging from troop deployments to the dispatch of airborne early warning aircraft, intelligence support and logistics. Article 4 of the NATO charter, by contrast, provides for consultations when any member believes its territorial integrity, political independence or security is under threat.

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