Sitrep for Dec. 8-13, 2025 (as of 9:30 a.m. UTC+3)

Frontline Situation Update
In the Kharkiv region, the Armed Forces of Ukraine continue counterattacks against the Russian Armed Forces in the town of Kupiansk. By the end of the week, Ukrainian forces had already liberated a significant part of the town, were attacking Russian positions on the northern outskirts, and had also advanced northwest of Kupiansk. During the offensive, the villages of Myrne, Radkivka and Kindrashivka were liberated, while Sobolivka was cleared. Although the Russian side had officially claimed to have captured Sobolivka, Russian forces were unable to gain a foothold there.

It is worth noting that we previously pointed out the vulnerability of Russian positions in Kupiansk to flanking attacks, though this was possible only if the AFU had sufficient reserves. Apparently, such reserves were found and struck at the base of the salient formed by Russian forces in Kupiansk, complicating supply for the Russian assault troops remaining in the town.

We have not yet seen video footage from the aforementioned villages; however, these advances are consistent with the logic of combat operations, and we see no reason to doubt them. Moreover, Volodymyr Zelenskyy visited Kupiansk, recording a video at the town’s southwestern entrance.

We consider doubts voiced by some pro-Russian bloggers about the timeliness of the recording to be unfounded, including because late-autumn landscapes are clearly visible in the footage. In his address, Zelenskyy congratulated Ukrainian soldiers on their successes in the counteroffensive in this direction and on the Day of the Ground Forces of the AFU, and also visited the headquarters of the 101st and 14th brigades.

In the town of Vovchansk in the Kharkiv region, no significant changes have been recorded recently.

In the Siversk direction, Russian forces have effectively seized the part of the town of Siversk east of the Bakhmutka River. They have also appeared in the western part of the town, but available videos showing flag photo-ops do not indicate that they have established a foothold there, despite claims by the Russian MoD of full control over the town.

The current situation—roughly half of the town captured and the other half remaining contested—is reflected, among other sources, on the maps produced by Playfra and DeepState.

The Siversk direction does not appear to be a priority for the RuAF, but in recent weeks they have advanced there at a fairly rapid pace. This is primarily due to a shortage of personnel and the lack of proper reinforcements for the 54th Mechanized Brigade of the AFU fighting in the area. Once Russian forces recognized the depleted state of the defenders, they redeployed additional troops to the sector, increasing pressure. Russian drone operators operating from the long-captured Serebrianske Forestry brought Ukrainian supply routes into Siversk under fire, further complicating the position of the AFU. As a result, Ukrainian forces withdrew beyond the Bakhmutka River to establish a defensive line along the water obstacle and subsequently pulled back even farther west.

In the Dobropillia direction, Russian forces have for many weeks been attempting to cross the Kazenyi Torets River, regularly coming under Ukrainian strikes. A video recently emerged from the area of the village of Novotoretske showing a drone strike on an abandoned heavy mechanized bridge that was apparently intended to establish a crossing over the river. Despite the fact that most of these attempts resulted only in losses, the RuAF nevertheless managed to advance slightly: on Dec. 12, DeepState marked progress beyond the river in the area of the villages of Volodymyrivka and Pankivka.

In the Pokrovsk direction, DeepState analysts noticeably shifted the frontline, marking the areas around the villages of Lysivka and Sukhyi Yar as captured. Since reports of the AFU beginning their retreat from there emerged a month ago, the map update, as of Dec. 12, did not reflect new changes, but rather clarified information regarding the line of contact. Ukrainian troops remain encircled in Myrnohrad. As far as we know, no orders have been received for withdrawal or rear-guard fighting to organize a retreat for the main forces. An unorganized retreat will likely lead to greater losses than if other units fought to break through a corridor to exit the encirclement and cover the withdrawal from enemy attacks.

Footage has appeared of an attempted advance by RuAF paratroopers from the 76th Air Assault Division towards the village of Hryshyne, northwest of Pokrovsk.

They moved in a column of about ten quad bikes and motorcycles with approximately 40 infantrymen but were forced to halt upon reaching an improvised trench and other engineering obstacles blocking the road. At that moment, Ukrainian forces shelled the column with artillery and targeted the vehicles with drones. Even such light motor vehicles, which are more mobile than AFVs, are easy to track when moving in columns, which condemns such an attack attempt to failure.

In the Huliaipole direction in the Zaporizhzhia region, fighting for the town of Huliaipole, which is divided by the Haichur River, continues. Russian forces keep attacking the northeastern outskirts but have so far been unable to gain a foothold. At the same time, infantry units occasionally cross the river and penetrate the eastern outskirts as well. In some cases, Ukrainian drone operators detect not groups but individual assault troops. The RuAF, continuing their infiltration tactics, are trying to send as many soldiers as possible so that they gradually accumulate in all possible areas of the town.

At the Staff meeting on Dec. 6, Zelenskyy announced a new principle for manning the AFU that is intended to ensure fair distribution of resources. However, on December 11, it was revealed that, on the instructions of Commander-in-Chief of the AFU General Oleksandr Syrskyi, Ukrainian soldiers who have gone AWOL from the frontline will now be returned either to the unit they left, to one of 11 assault units, or to one of two assault brigades of the Ground Forces (the 3rd or 5th). Previously, servicemen dissatisfied with their commanders and denied a transfer would go AWOL and later return to the army by joining a different unit. The new decision effectively bans this method of transfer and, in the opinion of Ukrainian soldiers and experts, will lead to servicemen no longer returning at all. OSINT analyst Moklasen believes that in this way Syrskyi is attempting to circumvent Zelenskyy’s order on the fair distribution of reinforcements.

On Dec. 10, Ukraine’s Prosecutor General’s Office classified statistics on the number of people fleeing the frontline.

The Ukrainian operation against Russia-affiliated tankers continues. On Dec. 10, unmanned surface vessels Sea Baby of the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) struck the tanker Dashan, which was en route to Novorossiysk through Ukraine’s exclusive economic zone in the Black Sea. On the one hand, tankers involved in the so-called shadow fleet are generally old, cheap, and available in large quantities, so the loss of two or three such empty vessels per week does not cause significant damage to the Russian economy. On the other hand, such attacks may lead companies cooperating with the Russian Federation to reassess their level of risk.

On Dec. 12, Ukraine’s Special Operations Forces reported that they had carried out the "special military operation," which resulted in the destruction of two Russian vessels transporting weapons and military vehicles in the Caspian Sea off the coast near Kalmykia [Russia’s constituent republic]. The Kompozitor Rakhmaninov and Askar-Saryzha are owned by MG-Flot, a Russian shipping company under US and European sanctions for transporting Iranian weapons and munitions to Russia. The Insider [independent Russian investigative media outlet] reported that the attacked vessels themselves are also subject to US restrictions. Since early fall 2025, the dry cargo ship Askar-Saryzha has entered Iranian ports at least three times, while Kompozitor Rakhmaninov has also regularly operated on routes from Russia to Iran. According to the statement by Russia's Special Operations Forces, the insurgent Black Spark movement participated in the operation, providing detailed information on the cargo and the vessels’ routes.

Also on Dec. 12, Russian forces attacked a vessel belonging to the Turkish ferry operator Cenk Shipping in the port of Chornomorsk, in Ukraine’s Odesa region. The company specializes in the transport of trucks and trailers. According to some reports, the ship was en route to Romania carrying freight trucks; according to others, it was delivering generators and other energy equipment to Ukraine. The same day, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, in a meeting with President Vladimir Putin, proposed that Russia and Ukraine declare a moratorium on strikes against ports and energy infrastructure. On Dec. 13, Turkey’s Foreign Ministry said that steps were needed to de-escalate tensions in the Black Sea, "including attacks directed against the safety of navigation and the energy and port infrastructure of both sides."

We expect that attacks on vessels operating in Russia’s economic and military interests will continue into next week.

In the early hours of Dec. 11, drones operated by the Prymary [Ghosts] special unit of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ukrainian MoD struck a Russian Antonov An-26 aircraft used as a flying laboratory to test airfield radio-technical equipment at the Kacha military air base in Crimea. Unlike a previous strike by the unit, in which the operational status of the target was uncertain, the An-26 was on the runway with its engines running at the time of the attack. Based on comments circulating on social media, the strike resulted in casualties, including fatalities and injuries.

As we have previously reported, Belgium—home to the Euroclear depository, where most seized Russian assets are held—has been blocking the issuance of a "reparations loan" to Ukraine, fearing that it would bear sole responsibility and could be forced, in the event of litigation, to repay the funds to Russia from its own budget. Russia’s central bank has filed a lawsuit against Euroclear in the Moscow Arbitration Court. This may be the first step required before pursuing a case in international courts.

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