Sitrep for Nov. 28-Dec. 1, 2025 (as of 10:30 a.m. UTC+3)

Frontline Situation Update

The advance of Russian forces continues in the Huliaipole direction. The influence of Ukrainian assault units that were deployed to stabilize the situation has not yet been reflected on the DeepState map. In contrast, advances were recorded on Nov. 29 near the village of Rivnopillia and in Huliaipole itself.

Additionally, new information indicates that fighting is already taking place on the eastern outskirts of the town and that Russian Armed Forces assault troops are attempting to infiltrate the northern outskirts as well. According to the hromadske media outlet, Russian soldiers are gathering in the village of Zatyshshia for this purpose. For further advancement toward Huliaipole, the RuAF will need to cross the Haichur River. Therefore, stabilization in this direction can be expected once the RuAF reach the river, though this will primarily be due to topographical factors rather than the arrival of Ukrainian reinforcements.

Reports about the Armed Forces of Ukraine's blocking units have not yet been confirmed.

According to DeepState's summary of November's results, 40% of advances occurred in this direction.

In the Novopavlivka direction, the 37th Marine Brigade of the AFU mopped up the village of Ivanivka in the Dnipropetrovsk region, north of Zelenyi Hai.

According to brigade servicemen, they captured 19 Russian soldiers. Russian troops had infiltrated Ivanivka at the end of September after crossing the Vovcha River. They continued to hold their positions, but were unable to seize the village, which remained contested throughout. Nevertheless, the pro-Russian Slivochny Kapriz [Creamy Caprice] Telegram channel marked part of the village as under Russian control. Interestingly, on Nov. 28, analysts from that project expanded the claimed Russian control zone, basing their conclusion on videos of Ukrainian strikes on Russian troops. Only one conclusion can be drawn from these videos: the positions shown were not being held. On Oct. 22, the Russian Ministry of Defense announced the capture of Ivanivka, though Slivochny Kapriz only reported an advance and the raising of a flag in the village center.

In the Dobropillia direction in recent weeks, the RuAF have been attempting to force the Kazennyi Torets River: over the weekend, they tried to establish crossings in the area of Maiak, as well as the villages of Pankivka and Novotoretske. The military vehicles approaching the river in the open were quickly detected by Ukrainian forces, falling under intense drone attacks. The strikes targeted tanks, bridge-layers, Ulan vehicles on LADA Niva chassis, and Bukhanka UAZ vans. Russian forces are seeking to transfer troops to the left bank to launch subsequent attacks on Shakhove and Pankivka.

The widely discussed demand from Russia for Ukraine to withdraw from the remaining part of the Donetsk region—whether to establish full control over the area or a demilitarized zone—is currently a central topic. In this context, it is important to note that, as French researcher Clément Molin observed on the map, few fortifications have been built behind (or sometimes ahead of) the administrative boundary.

If the AFU withdraws behind this border, the RuAF will gain access to numerous ready-made fortifications, leaving Ukraine unprotected against future threats on this axis. This clearly demonstrates why Ukraine’s withdrawal from the unoccupied part of the Donetsk region is unacceptable. Even with security guarantees similar to Article 5 of NATO's charter, a future invasion could occur. In that case, fortifications would play a crucial role.

There have been no significant changes on other sections of the frontline. In Kostiantynivka, attacks continue on the southeastern outskirts, with ongoing fighting around the railway depot.

In the Kharkiv region, combat activities are intensifying in the direction of Borova south of Kupiansk, where no significant developments had been observed for some time. This could be due to the redeployment of certain AFU units to more challenging directions.

Ukrainian and Russian Strikes

Yurii Ihnat, spokesman for the Air Force Command of the AFU, said Russia has ample resources to carry out large-scale airstrikes against Ukraine once or twice a week.

In the early hours of Nov. 30, the Kyiv-region town of Vyshhorod was hit by Shahed-type drones, which struck residential buildings. At least one person was killed and 19 were wounded, including four children. According to the military analyst Serhii "Flash" Beskrestnov, all three drones involved in the attack were fitted with fragmentation submunitions with an externally scored casing, in addition to a standard high-explosive warhead. The discovery came after one of the drones crashed onto the roof of an apartment building without detonating. Its warhead was later rendered safe by Ukraine’s State Emergency Service.

The submunitions—tubular charges with scored lines designed to split apart and send lethal fragments outward—were apparently meant to be released mid-flight before the drone continued on to its final target. However, this modification seems strange given that such fragments are effective against personnel and vehicles, not buildings.

Defense Express reported on May 20, 2025, that Russia had begun equipping Shahed-type drones with combined shaped-charge, fragmentation, high-explosive, and incendiary warheads, which could be used, for example, to strike ammunition depots and trigger secondary explosions. In October, Ukrainian officials also reported sightings of Shaheds carrying pre-formed fragments and an incendiary warhead housed in a tank similar in design to the Gerbera UAV fuel reservoir; earlier, in early 2024, reports described thermobaric warheads on similar drones.

What military advantage such warheads might offer in urban areas remains unclear. Both types of munitions increase the damage to civilian infrastructure and the toll on civilians, partly because they hinder rescue operations. Their use in residential districts constitutes a war crime.

In the morning of Nov. 29, Ukrainian unmanned surface vessels attacked the mooring system of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium’s (CPC) marine terminal in Novorossiysk, halting oil shipments. CPC’s press service stated that the "CPC Single Point Mooring SPM-2 received significant damages. Further SPM-2 operation is impossible," and that "offloading operations at the terminal will proceed in line with the established rules as the drone boat and flying drone threat is lifted."

The purpose of the attack on this terminal is not entirely clear, since 90% of its capacity does not serve Russia but instead transports oil from Kazakhstan’s fields on the northeastern shores of the Caspian Sea. Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressed its "protest over yet another deliberate attack on the critical infrastructure of the international Caspian Pipeline Consortium in the waters of the Port of Novorossiysk," noting that this is already the third act of aggression against an exclusively civilian facility whose operation is guaranteed by international law. Given the importance of Caspian oil exports for Kazakhstan’s economy, Ukraine risks seriously damaging relations with the country.

Also on Nov. 29, Ukrainian Sea Baby unmanned surface vessels struck two Russian "shadow fleet" tankers, the Kairos and the Virat, in the Black Sea.

There were no official statements, but according to Ukrainian media, this was a joint operation by the 13th Main Directorate of Military Counterintelligence of the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) and the Ukrainian Navy. At the time of the attack, both vessels were sailing empty, en route to load oil in the port of Novorossiysk. Neither ship was sunk, but both sustained significant damage. No crew members were harmed.

Turkey’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressed concern over the attacks. These incidents, which occurred in Turkey’s exclusive economic zone in the Black Sea, pose a serious threat to maritime safety. Civilian vessels belonging to neutral states, sailing in neutral waters, are not lawful targets for USVs. Pro-Russian bloggers have argued that these attacks require a response—for example, by preventing Ukrainian ships from leaving the port of Odesa and exporting Ukrainian grain.

During an overnight aerial attack on Ukrainian territory in the early hours of Nov. 17, Russian drones damaged the Turkish tanker Orinda, which was carrying liquefied petroleum gas (a propane–butane mix), in the port of the town of Izmail in the Odesa region. Ukraine's subsequent strike on Russia's "shadow fleet" vessels may have been a direct response to this attack.

Peace Talks

On Nov. 30, negotiations took place in Florida between the Ukrainian and US delegations. Following the meeting, the head of the US delegation, Secretary of State Marco Rubio, stated that for a peaceful settlement, Ukraine needs long-term security guarantees.

Five diplomats from various European countries, who requested anonymity, told Politico that Belgium is likely receiving a secondary benefit by keeping frozen Russian assets in Euroclear’s depository, thereby collecting tax revenue from the profits generated by those assets. The diplomats question whether Belgium is using its regular tax income to support Ukraine, as other European states do, or if it relies on taxes from Russian reserves instead.

Unfortunately, we do not see a large-scale, guaranteed support plan for Ukraine for 2026. Discussions on a reparations loan have stalled. So far, the total amount of promised support from different European countries remains below what was secured in 2025 to replace the halted US assistance. There is also no visible progress in negotiations, even though the terms currently under discussion are more favorable for Ukraine than those mentioned in 2024: a larger army size and no restrictions on the types of weapons allowed. As we noted in the previous sitrep, we believe that Ukraine can buy time and achieve more favorable conditions for freezing the war by resolving its command issues and personnel shortages.

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