Sitrep for Jan. 12, 2026 (as of 10 a.m. UTC+3)

Jan. 12 marks the 1,419th day of Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine. Today, the war has become one day longer than the Great Patriotic War.

Frontline Situation Update

Over the two weeks since the previous sitrep, little has changed in the Kharkiv region, specifically in the Kupiansk direction. The Russian Armed Forces have failed to break through to their assault units encircled in the town of Kupiansk. On Jan. 11, the DeepState project map recolored territory liberated in late 2025 from blue to green, indicating stable control by the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

Although the commander of the Group of Troops "West," Colonel General Sergey Kuzovlyov, promised Vladimir Putin to destroy the Ukrainian grouping near Kupiansk in January-February, such an outcome appears unrealistic under current conditions. This is primarily because the Kupiansk direction presently lacks significant strategic importance and serves mainly a propaganda purpose, given that both Putin and Chief of the General Staff of the RuAF Valery Gerasimov have repeatedly claimed the capture of the town. For the RuAF, advances in the Kharkiv region are far less important than operations in the Donetsk region. The Group of Troops "West" is operating there along the Lyman direction, neighboring to the Kupiansk one, from which Russian forces are expected to advance toward Sloviansk and Kramatorsk. As a result, redeploying reserves from the Lyman direction—even to relieve encircled troops—would be disadvantageous for the Russian command. Nevertheless, several days ago it became known that additional units of the 47th Guards Tank Division of the 1st Guards Tank Army had been redeployed to the area. These reinforcements, however, failed to break through to the isolated Russian soldiers.

On Jan. 8, the Russian Ministry of Defense announced the capture of the village of Podoly, east of Kupiansk, releasing a video showing a soldier waving a Russian flag from the window of a private house and later in what appeared to be a courtyard. In our view, a single instance of infiltration into the Ukrainian rear does not even meet the threshold for classifying the area as contested. It is worth noting that, on paper, Russian forces claimed to have captured the neighboring village of Kucherivka in early December (and earlier still, Petropavlivka) as part of their advance from the village of Pishchane. On Jan. 11, a similar video was used to "prove" progress into the village of Kurylivka.

Such videos are relatively easy to produce under modern battlefield conditions, particularly given Ukraine’s manpower constraints. Small Russian assault groups frequently bypass Ukrainian positions and penetrate settlements located in the rear of the AFU.

In the Borova direction (south of Kupiansk), the RuAF attempted a new "pipeline" operation between the villages of Bohuslavka and Novoplatonivka in the Kharkiv region. Russian soldiers emerging from the Soyuz gas pipeline were detected in time by Ukrainian forces, attacked by drones, and shelled with artillery. The AFU reported that 40 enemy soldiers were killed. On Dec. 30, Russia’s MoD made an unsubstantiated claim that Bohuslavka had been captured; this advance remains unconfirmed.

In the Lyman direction—one of the most important for the coming months—the RuAF face the task of isolating the AFU’s foothold near Lyman (northeast of the Siverskyi Donets River). To do this, they need to cut the remaining supply routes to Ukrainian forces: the southeastern route via the village of Zakitne, which has effectively already been cut, and the northwestern route from the town of Lyman through the town of Sviatohirsk, which is currently a contested zone. A video recorded north of Sviatohirsk on the outskirts of the village of Oleksandrivka has recently emerged. In the footage, Russian soldiers moving calmly are struck by Ukrainian drones. Russian activity in this sector now includes not only drones but also infantry.

After the capture of Lyman and the elimination of the aforementioned foothold, the Russian command is expected to deploy the Rubikon UAV unit there. This would complicate AFU logistics in Sloviansk and Kramatorsk. Rubikon is already known for its relatively effective ability to place supply routes under fire control and to exert a significant influence on combat operations.

At present, this unit is actively operating on the southern flank of the future Sloviansk-Kramatorsk axis, particularly in the areas of the towns of Kostiantynivka and Druzhkivka. Recent footage shows strikes on AFU equipment, communications systems and drones. At the same time, the fighting for Kostiantynivka itself remains roughly at the same stage as before: Russian assault troops have still failed to break into the town center, even though combat operations in the Santurynivka neighborhood began several months ago.

Currently, the RuAF are advancing on Kostiantynivka not only from the direction of the villages of Stupochky and Predtechyne, but also from the direction of the villages of Stepanivka, Illinivka and Rusyn Yar, as well as Berestok, which constitutes the western flank of the Kostiantynivka direction.

According to DeepState, in the first days of January the most significant changes along the frontline occurred in the Dobropillia direction: the RuAF are gradually advancing not only near the villages of Shakhove and Nove Shakhove, but also around the town of Rodynske. Control over Rodynske is essential for accelerating the withdrawal of AFU units from the suburbs of Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad, as the road to the towns of Bilytske and Dobropillia runs through it. Fierce fighting for Rodynske continues: parts of the town are repeatedly taken by one side and then recaptured by the other.

Although DeepState still marks the northern outskirts of Myrnohrad as a contested zone, the Ukrainian Telegram channel In Factum claims that the AFU have left the area. At this stage, we cannot confirm either version and are awaiting further visual evidence from this sector of the front.

On the western flank of the Pokrovsk direction, Russian advances have also been recorded—toward the village of Hryshyne and on the northern outskirts of Pokrovsk. At the same time, Ukrainian forces have been reportedly attempting to demonstrate control over certain areas by sending drones to drop flags. Russian forces, in turn, have been disrupting such actions by deploying their own UAVs to intercept or destroy the flags. Since drone-based "flag photo ops" inevitably attract enemy attention, such activity can also serve as cover for the movement of sabotage groups.

In the Huliaipole direction, Russian forces have identified another weak point in Ukraine’s defenses—south of the village of Zelene. They have forded the Haichur River, thereby outflanking the town of Huliaipole from the north. The fighting for the town now appears to be entering its final stage: RuAF units are advancing almost to the village of Staroukrainka west of Huliaipole and are attacking the eastern outskirts of the village of Zaliznychne. AFU assault units have so far failed to stabilize the situation in this sector.

Further north, near the village of Pryluky, footage has emerged showing soldiers of the 108th Territorial Defense Brigade assaulting Russian positions. Although these fighters reportedly underwent additional training at the training center of the 225th Assault Regiment, it remains striking that the main assault operations are being carried out not by dedicated assault units, but by territorial defense personnel, whose doctrinal role is to secure positions and hold the second line of defense.

At the end of last year, the Commander-in-Chief of the AFU Oleksandr Syrskyi announced plans to restructure territorial defense brigades, reducing the number of infantry battalions and adding two unmanned systems battalions to improve their ability to hold the frontline. While this reform appears positive, the main problem of the Territorial Defense Forces has been the lack of proper reinforcements and exhaustion after prolonged combat operations.

Another important reform in the Ukrainian army is the disbandment of Ukraine’s International Legion within the AFU. Its personnel will be redistributed among assault units. As a result, the only units within the AFU retaining a special status will be those subordinated to the Main Directorate of Intelligence, such as Russian Volunteer Corps.

In the Zaporizhzhia direction, Russian forces have advanced east of Stepnohirsk toward the village of Lukianivske (which Russia’s MoD has already claimed to have captured), and along the former shoreline of the Kakhovka Reservoir in the village of Prymorske, which is now entirely in the contested zone.

The city of Zaporizhzhia, south of which Prymorske is located, is increasingly coming under Russian drone strikes. Zaporizhzhia is now less than 20 km [12.4 mi] from the line of contact, allowing low-cost Molniya UAVs to reach it. At the end of the year, Putin explicitly stated during a meeting that Russian forces are pushing a road toward Zaporizhzhia, thereby confirming intentions to advance on the city.

Ukrainian and Russian Strikes

According to reports, ballistic missiles were used in an airstrike on the city of Kharkiv on Jan. 10, and were intercepted by Patriot air defense systems; debris from the newly provided PAC-3 MSE interceptor missile was later found. Previously, such missiles could not be shot down over Kharkiv because the city lacked Patriot batteries.

Intercepting ballistic missiles requires PAC-3 interceptors, yet there had been no prior reports that Ukraine had received this newest version of the missile. The MSE variant has a longer range, greater maneuverability and, as a result, higher effectiveness. It is possible that these interceptors were supplied against the backdrop of Russia’s large-scale air attacks on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure.

Ukraine’s Main Intelligence Directorate said that in early 2026 Russia used for the first time a new jet-powered UAV, the Geran-5, with a warhead weighing about 90 kilograms [200 lbs] and a range of roughly 1,000 kilometers [620 miles]. The agency said the RuAF are exploring options to launch these drones from aircraft—including Sukhoi Su-25 attack aircraft—in order to extend their range and reduce operating costs. While we agree that this could theoretically increase range, launching UAVs from ground-based catapults is inherently cheaper than developing mechanisms to integrate them with attack aircraft, covering sortie costs, and assuming the risk of losing both aircraft and pilot when operating close to the frontline.

In the early hours of Jan. 9, Russian forces carried out a large-scale air attack on Kyiv, resulting in four deaths and 26 injuries. Strikes hitting the middle of a residential building indicate a deliberate attack on a residential area, rather than an accidental impact from drones deviating from their programmed flight paths. It is also worth noting that last year, Ukraine experienced only four days without Russian air strikes. This systematic pattern demonstrates that strikes on residential neighborhoods are not incidental but constitute an established method of warfare, with the sole plausible objective being the terrorization of the civilian population.

In Kyiv’s Darnytskyi district, emergency services responding to the initial strike were subjected to a follow-up attack. A 56-year-old medic was killed, and four more ambulance personnel, five first responders and a police officer were injured. It is worth noting that in 2025, we have seen numerous targeted attacks on Ukrainian first responders.

This winter is significantly colder than previous ones, placing a heavier load on the power grid. As a result, each successful strike against energy infrastructure produces more serious consequences, including prolonged power outages in affected areas.

Following an attack on the Belgorod region in the early hours of Jan. 9, Russian officials also reported disruptions to the local electricity supply.

On Jan. 9, Russia used a medium-range ballistic missile known as the Oreshnik against Lviv airport—also known as the Sknyliv airfield—and the Lviv State Aircraft Repair Plant. As in its first use in November 2024, the missile carried an inert payload. In our assessment, the strike was less of a combat employment than a political one: a military target was chosen as close as possible to the EU border, apparently to once again underscore Russia’s capacity to deploy intermediate-range nuclear weapons. As we have noted before, from a military standpoint strikes with Iskander missiles or North Korean KN-23s are more effective than using the Oreshnik with kinetic payloads. We continue to believe that frequent use of this missile should not be expected, as it lacks any clear practical purpose.

Peace Talks

On Jan. 6, at a meeting in Paris, France, the UK and Ukraine signed an agreement on the deployment of "multinational forces" on Ukrainian territory. The number of personnel was not specified, but according to some European officials’ estimates, it could reach 15,000-30,000. It was expected that the US would also sign a joint statement on security guarantees. However, the final declaration was signed only by the Coalition of the Willing. It was assumed that the US would guarantee logistics, support and supply for the European forces deployed in Ukraine in the event of a new Russian threat. However, this part of the agreement was not signed, and the US will oversee only the component responsible for monitoring and control.

German Chancellor Friedrich Merz stated that the deployment of multinational forces in Ukraine is impossible without Russia’s consent. Meanwhile, Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova said that the presence of Western troops, military facilities or other military infrastructure in Ukraine would be considered "an intervention that poses a direct threat to security." In practical terms, the negotiations produced no meaningful progress.

Notably, when asked about threats to seize Greenland, Donald Trump avoids answering whether the US would withdraw from NATO. At the same time, he makes it clear that he does not want to intervene in the affairs of the Eastern Hemisphere. Furthermore, since European countries are not prepared for the threat of confrontation with Russia without American assistance, they do not want to send troops to Ukraine.

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