Sitrep for Dec. 26-29, 2025 (as of 10:30 a.m. UTC+3)

The next sitrep will be released on Jan. 12, the 1,419th day of the war. On that day, Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine will surpass the Great Patriotic War in duration.

Frontline Situation Update

On Dec. 27, it was revealed that Vladimir Putin had visited a Russian Armed Forces command post, where he was briefed on the alleged capture of the towns of Myrnohrad, Huliaipole and Rodynske, as well as the village of Stepnohirsk. These statements were likely intended to impress Donald Trump ahead of his meeting with Volodymyr Zelenskyy by showing that Russian forces are successfully advancing along the frontline.

In Myrnohrad, videos have appeared showing a Russian soldier dressed as Ded Moroz [Father Frost] demonstrating a flag amid the ruins.

Although Russian soldiers have been recorded in different parts of the town, we are not yet ready to confirm that the RuAF have established full control. Modern combat conditions allow for so-called "flag photo ops" even in areas that remain under the enemy’s fire control, even if such groups are often subsequently eliminated by drone strikes. We will continue monitoring whether footage emerges showing both Russian and Ukrainian soldiers operating in the same locations, which would indicate that these areas remain contested rather than captured. We also note that on Dec. 28 and 29, DeepState expanded the area of Russian control on its map in Myrnohrad and near the village of Krasnyi Lyman.

The situation in Rodynske is even more ambiguous. In recent months, control over individual neighborhoods has repeatedly shifted between the two sides (as we reported last month), making it difficult to assess how close the RuAF actually are to full control. According to a researcher from the UA Control Map project, Rodynske has already been captured, citing the presence of Russian flags in multiple locations and the apparent absence of AFU units. In the researcher’s view, this may well indicate that the AFU withdrew from Myrnohrad during the Christmas holidays.

The situation in Huliaipole remains very difficult for the AFU: Russian soldiers are present in various parts of the town, while Ukrainian forces may remain only in its western part. Under these conditions, Huliaipole, much like Pokrovsk, may already be effectively captured. However, in a Dec. 29 post, DeepState analysts described the town as contested, stating that AFU units remain present across much of the area.

Recently, Ukrainian society has been widely discussing scandals related to the Huliaipole direction. We believe this is driven in part by a desire to identify a "scapegoat." While many place the blame on territorial defense units for the collapse of the defense in this sector, in our assessment the problem is somewhat deeper. These troops held their positions for a long time and suffered extremely heavy losses over recent months, yet were not rotated to the rear for rest and reconstitution. Holding positions under such conditions eventually became almost impossible, especially when Russian forces intensified their pressure. Assault units sent to the Huliaipole direction in November were unable to fully stabilize the situation. Although the RuAF’s advance slowed for several weeks, we cannot be sure this was due to the arrival of the assault units. Rather, it was most likely caused by a water obstacle, the Haichur River, which prevented the RuAF from continuing the offensive at the same pace. However, the RuAF later advanced from the direction of the village of Marfopil as well, and the tempo of the offensive increased again. One of the main problems in this direction is chaos in command and control, which is exacerbated by the practice of attaching individual battalions to other brigades. For example, one of the battalions of the 106th Brigade deployed in the Sumy direction was transferred to the operational control of the 102nd Territorial Defense Brigade.

In addition, the Russian MoD announced the capture of Stepnohirsk in the Zaporizhzhia direction, which is not a priority for Russian forces. In recent months, the RuAF have attempted to advance there, including along the shoreline of the former Kakhovka Reservoir, but without achieving any significant success. In our view, Stepnohirsk is more likely located in a contested zone rather than under firm Russian control.

Beyond announcements of the capture of the aforementioned settlements, Putin stated that it is gradually losing its meaning to demand that the AFU withdraw from the still-unoccupied parts of Donbas, since the RuAF allegedly will be able to seize them in the near future anyway. This statement is another attempt to influence Trump, intended to signal that Russia’s negotiating demands will shift in a direction less favorable to Ukraine the coming year. Although the war is developing in a non-linear manner, it is conceivable that within a year to a year and a half, the RuAF could occupy the remaining part of the Donetsk region. However, the question of the cost remains open. According to Mediazona, Russian losses in 2025 alone will exceed 100,000 killed. Apparently, such a price for rather modest territorial gains is acceptable to the Kremlin, and Russia still appears to have sufficient human resources to continue combat operations.

Trump held a phone call with Putin ahead of his meeting with Zelenskyy. According to Trump, the conversation was "very productive." Putin’s aide Yury Ushakov stated that both presidents agreed that the option of a temporary ceasefire proposed by Ukraine and Europe in order to prepare for a referendum in Ukraine would "lead to a prolongation of the conflict."

Following the meeting between Trump and Zelenskyy, both sides stated that 90-95% of all issues had been agreed upon, while the territorial question remained unresolved. Since this issue has been the main stumbling block throughout the entire negotiation process, we believe that no meaningful progress was achieved at this meeting. The remaining matters, including security guarantees and post-war reconstruction, are comparatively easier to resolve.

In recent days, Russian forces have also advanced in the Dnipropetrovsk region. It happened near the village of Novopavlivka, where, according to the DeepState map, the contested area has expanded. Additional advances were observed near the villages of Filia and Dachne.

In the previous sitrep, we reported that Russian soldiers were looting in the town of Pokrovsk, but their crimes are not limited to looting. It has become known that drunken soldiers broke into a civilian home, tortured and shot a man, and raped his wife—the woman herself recounted what happened. Such incidents are not exceptions but rather typical behavior by Russian soldiers in "liberated" territories. It is still unclear whether those responsible will be held criminally liable. A similar crime was committed by a Russian serviceman in the Belgorod region; he was detained and placed in a pre-trial detention center, where he later took his own life. It should also be noted that murderers and rapists are often sent to the war instead of serving sentences in penal colonies, and after returning they continue to commit similar crimes (one such individual was recently sentenced to life imprisonment).

In the town of Kupiansk, unlike other settlements that Russian sources have claimed as "captured," Russian soldiers cannot even stage conventional flag photo ops. Instead, they record videos inside buildings, clearly reluctant to venture outside for fear of being struck by UAVs, although they claim that it is the enemy who has "holed up in their burrows." Such videos cannot be geolocated, but there is no doubt that a patchy RuAF presence remains in the town center. This is acknowledged even by pro-Russian Telegram channels, some of which state outright that the troops there are fully encircled. In addition, the MoD is passing off footage of soldiers withdrawing from Kupiansk as evidence of having taken the town under control. Meanwhile, a scandal is unfolding within pro-war milblogger circles around General Sergey Kuzovlyov, commander of the Group of Troops "West." Some bloggers are defending him, while others are accusing both the general himself and those who support him.

In the Lyman direction, after capturing the town of Siversk, Russian forces are advancing to the northwest and approaching the village of Zakitne, which lies on the bank of the Siverskyi Donets River along one of Lyman’s two supply routes. The other route runs through the village of Novoselivka, to which the frontline has long since drawn close. Progress in the Lyman direction is a key development for the coming year, as it is expected to become the northern flank of a future offensive toward the Sloviansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration, which will likely be the main objective of the 2026 military campaign.

Heavy snowfall has occurred along almost the entire frontline. First, the presence of snow now makes it easier to distinguish recent videos from older ones. Second, such weather—like fog and rain—has hindered the use of drones, prompting both sides to once again employ armored columns more frequently. For example, footage has emerged showing a mechanized assault by the AFU near the town of Dobropillia, north of Huliaipole.

The use of horses on the frontline has recently become a widely discussed topic: videos that have been published show both the transport of animals and soldiers moving on horseback near forward positions, where they are attacked by Ukrainian drones. We believe that using horses is justified only in rear areas as pack animals. Conducting assaults on horseback appears highly impractical: an assault trooper on a horse is an extremely visible and vulnerable target for drones. If reinforcements are deployed on horseback into contested areas, it remains unclear how the animals are to be handled at forward positions. Interestingly, at the same time the Russian MoD has shown the use of tracked ground robotic systems for transporting personnel.

Recently, the head of Ukraine’s Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense, Kyrylo Budanov, visited the Zaporizhzhia axis, where he awarded military personnel. A few days later, on the same axis, according to preliminary reports, the head of the Russian Volunteer Corps, Denis Kapustin, was killed in an FPV-drone strike. In recent months, the Russian Volunteer Corps, which is affiliated with the Main Intelligence Directorate, has participated in combat more frequently and has sustained heavier losses than at the beginning of the war, when its activities were largely media-oriented, as was the case, for example, with the Freedom of Russia Legion. Despite this, reports of actual combat involving the Russian Volunteer Corps appear far less often than news of criminal prosecutions linked to the organization. For example, on Dec. 26, a resident of Novosibirsk region was sentenced to 14 years in prison for alleged cooperation with the Corps. In many such instances, those accused had in fact been communicating not with Ukrainian recruiters but with provocateurs from the Federal Security Service (FSB).

Ukrainian and Russian Strikes

After Ukraine began attacking tankers of Russia’s shadow fleet, Russia launched an "operation of retaliation." Since Dec. 10, the city of Odesa and the Odesa region have been struck every day except Dec. 15, resulting in widespread power outages and a decline in grain exports.

In the early hours of Dec. 26, Russian drones attacked, among other targets, a train and a locomotive depot at Kovel station in the Lviv region. The station is located on a railway line connecting Ukraine and Poland. On the same day, President Zelenskyy told journalists that Russian UAVs were bypassing Ukrainian air defenses with the help from Belarus. On the same day, Ukrainian military expert Serhii “Flash” Beskrestnov also reported that although the drones are launched from Russia, they are controlled from Belarus. Theoretically, the closer a UAV operator is to the drone, the more stable the connection and the easier the control. In recent months, we have increasingly observed that Shahed-136 (Geran-2) loitering munitions are not flying strictly along pre-programmed routes but are instead guided to their targets by operators during the final phase. This suggests that either the operators themselves or relay stations are located on Belarusian territory. Such deployment would provide the RuAF with a significant technical advantage.

In the early hours of Dec. 27, Ukraine was subjected to another massive air attack, with Kyiv and Kyiv region as the primary targets. During the nine-hour strike, nearly 500 drones and more than 40 missiles were launched, including Kinzhal air-launched ballistic missiles. Kyiv’s hydroelectric power plant, thermal power plants and Naftogaz gas production facilities were attacked. As a result, about 750,000 consumers in Kyiv and more than 350,000 in the surrounding region were left without electricity. Numerous strikes on residential buildings were also recorded. Although in each individual case it is difficult to determine whether these were deliberate attacks, the result of electronic jamming or technical failures, we are observing a systematic pattern of drones striking residential buildings in Kyiv and other populated areas of Ukraine.

Sources of the Ukrainian outlet NV claim that the former Commander-in-Chief of the AFU, now Ambassador to the United Kingdom, General Valerii Zaluzhnyi, plans to leave his post in January. He reportedly discussed various possible future positions with Zelenskyy—from prime minister to head of the Presidential Office—but has so far shown no interest in them. Zaluzhnyi’s media adviser, Oksana Torop, has denied the reports of his impending resignation.

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