Year-End Overview of the War in Ukraine

To summarize the results of the outgoing year 2025, we will sequentially analyze the successes and failures of each side.

Russia’s successes

Despite heavy personnel losses, the near-total abandonment of armored vehicles, and a shift to infantry assaults, the Russian Armed Forces have advanced at approximately 1.5 times the pace of last year. Russia has sustained the current offensive for nine months, since spring 2025. The most significant territorial acquisitions were in the top-priority Donetsk region, as well as in the Zaporizhzhia region, where Ukrainian defensive positions were weak. Additionally, the Kursk bridgehead was fully eliminated.

The Russian army was able to adapt to Ukrainian tactics involving "kill zones" and drone walls by switching to "infiltration" tactics—the use of small assault groups consisting of two to three people. Although such tactics lead to high casualties, they allow for offensive operations, and, as stated above, the pace of advancement has increased compared to last year. The abandonment of mechanized assaults made it possible to build up reserves of armored vehicles and deploy them in relatively rare instances.

The RuAF significantly strengthened their unmanned unmanned capabilities, including both long-range drones, of which more than 500 were used in the latest attack on Kyiv, and operational-tactical drones. The range of drones used has expanded. For example, inexpensive Molniya fixed-wing kamikaze drones capable of carrying anti-tank mines have become widely used. Tactics for using drones have improved, as have battlefield implementation and personnel training. A new branch of forces was formed—the Unmanned Systems Forces (their establishment was completed by November, but staffing is ongoing). According to sources from BBC News Russian, the commander is businessman and pro-war volunteer Yury Vaganov, who has neither military education nor experience. While we don't believe separating UAV operators into a distinct branch will lead to a significant increase in drone production and supply, one can expect unification of experience, planned procurement, and operator training.

Contrary to expectations, the Russian Ministry of Defense managed to maintain a stable recruitment pace of around 400,000 people per year, which allowed for the continuation of intensive attacks. In mid-December, Kyrylo Budanov, Chief of the Main Intelligence Directorate of Ukraine's Ministry of Defense, reported that 403,000 contract soldiers had already been recruited, exceeding the original plan for 2025. Next year, according to Ukrainian intelligence, it is planned to recruit 409,000 people.

At the same time, we observed budget savings for the first time: several regions of the Volga Federal District significantly reduced payments for signing contracts with the MoD at the end of the year, but have already announced their reverse increase starting in January 2026.

Russia’s Failures

Russia's military failures include a low pace of advancement, with all successes being only tactical and local, lacking any major breakthrough. Despite holding significant advantages in nearly all areas, the RuAF are unable to properly capitalize on them. The offensive is being conducted inefficiently, and advances are accompanied by enormous losses. This year, the number of Russian soldier fatalities will likely exceed 100,000, with a more precise assessment possible by mid-2026.

The RuAF air campaign was also ineffective. Despite the large number of drones and missiles deployed, Ukraine has not suffered critical damage that would alter the political situation. Prolonged power outages occur only at the district level and do not impact weapons production or the logistics of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. This is attributed to the extremely low professional level of Russian intelligence. Despite possessing a vast arsenal of strike assets, the Russian army cannot create a relevant and similarly scaled target bank. Consequently, scarce weapons like Iskander short-range ballistic missiles are used against grain carriers allegedly transporting drones, restaurants allegedly frequented by NATO generals, and kindergartens allegedly used to raise funds for the AFU.

Ukraine's Successes

Ukrainian forces have conducted several successful local counteroffensive operations: the elimination of the Dobropillia breakthrough, the de-blockade and near-complete mopping-up of Kupiansk, and the halting of the Russian army's advance in the Sumy region.

The AFU have also maintained the continuity of their defensive lines throughout the year and, as noted above, prevented an operational-strategic-level "collapse" of the defense and large-scale Russian breakthroughs. Crises occur only at the tactical level on specific frontline sectors like Huliaipole or Siversk.

Like Russia, Ukraine is increasing the potential of its long-range weaponry, both in production volume and in the diversity of drones and unmanned surface vessels. The effectiveness of new missile developments like the FP-5 Flamingo, Neptune and Sapsan cannot yet be assessed, as there is currently more publicity than actual damage to Russian military facilities. However, thanks to enhanced strike capabilities, a fairly successful campaign is being conducted against Russian oil refineries and shadow fleet tankers.

Ukraine’s Failures

The main reason for the negative dynamics on the frontline is the shortage of AFU personnel. The current mobilization intake does not allow for a steady stream of reinforcements, while the problem of mass desertion is only worsening. Ukraine’s inability to halt the Russian advance negatively affects how the US administration perceives its position.

Using the "no step back" tactic leads to unnecessary personnel and vehicle losses. In the Kursk region, for example, the AFU lost a significant amount of equipment, and personnel losses were also extremely high. Several of the best brigades lost their combat effectiveness for an extended period, yet the bridgehead still had to be abandoned. There are many similar examples on a smaller scale, such as the situation in the town of Myrnohrad today. These losses negatively affect both soldiers’ morale and Ukrainians’ willingness to join the AFU.

Despite being a sound idea, the AFU’s transition to a corps-based system has not delivered the expected results and has proven largely nominal. The practice of splitting brigades and deploying units from the same formation across different sections of the frontline continues, further complicating command and control. Additionally, there are persistent problems with the availability of corps-level enablers, such as artillery and UAVs. Attempts are being made to create these enablers by expanding companies and battalions, but progress is slow.

The air defense problem remains unresolved while Russia’s long-range strike capabilities continue to grow. This leads to disruptions in the energy sector and prolonged, albeit localized, power outages. By the end of December, millions of people were still without electricity, and sometimes even heating, for several days. It should be noted that Russian air attacks involve an enormous number of drones and missiles launched simultaneously. This scale would put any army in the world, including the US military, under severe strain.

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