Sitrep for Jan. 26-Feb. 2, 2026 (as of 11:00 a.m. UTC+3)

Frontline Situation Update

In the Kupiansk direction, reality continues to diverge more and more from the picture described by Russia's General Staff. On Jan. 26, General Valery Gerasimov, Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, claimed that Russian forces had captured the village of Kupiansk-Vuzlovyi, located south of the town of Kupiansk in the Ukrainian rear. This was refuted by Ukrainian servicemen: Roman Kovalyov, commander of the 413th Separate Rifle Battalion of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, recorded a video in the center of the village without body armor or a helmet, and no sounds of combat could be heard in the background.

Pro-Russian bloggers did not dispute the authenticity of the video and expressed outrage at the RuAF command's false reports. In response, the leadership of the Group of Troops "West" did not send significant reinforcements for a counteroffensive, but rather sent soldiers from the 153rd Tank Regiment to record videos, including ones with a flag. As a result, some soldiers were captured before reaching their objective, some were killed, and the regiment’s flag was burned. A video published on Jan. 31 showed only the presence of a small number of Russian troops in the northern part of Kupiansk-Vuzlovyi—a position that was later cleared by Ukrainian forces.

In the Kostiantynivka direction, Russia’s MoD has claimed the capture of the village of Berestok, south of the town of Kostiantynivka. This has not been confirmed, but the advance in this area is consistent with what we have described in our previous sitreps: in recent weeks, Russian forces have been building up their presence around Berestok, Stepanivka and Illinivka in order to gradually push into the western outskirts of Kostiantynivka.

According to researcher Playfra, the importance of capturing Berestok lies in a former Ukrainian checkpoint located on tactically high ground, while Kostiantynivka, the village of Oleksiievo-Druzhkivka and the town of Druzhkivka lie in a lowland area. If Russian forces take this checkpoint, they could position drone operators there to strike the Ukrainian supply route into Kostiantynivka, which runs through this low-lying terrain. It is worth noting that Russian troops often deploy UAV operators in close proximity to the line of contact.

In addition, according to Playfra, the fog that set in on Jan. 31 likely facilitated further infiltration of Russian assault troops into the town, as UAV operations were significantly hampered.

It is worth noting that late last year, an operational-level defense crisis emerged for the AFU in the Huliaipole direction, marked by scandals involving territorial defense brigades failing to hold positions.
Assault units redeployed there could not stabilize the situation, ultimately leading to the full capture of Huliaipole by the RuAF. The danger lies partly in Huliaipole being the last major settlement before Orikhiv. As in other cases, Russian forces target weak spots in enemy defenses, such as the junction between the AFU’s 20th and 17th Army Corps, often causing confusion over which unit should deploy reserves or drones.

The Russian MoD announced advances from Dobropillia northwest to Ternuvate and its capture, releasing footage of RuAF soldiers with flags throughout the village. Given this, we assess Ternuvate may indeed be captured, though DeepState acknowledges infiltration while stating the AFU regularly mop up the village. We also allow for potential delays in the project’s reporting in this direction.

Russian forces on this sector of the Zaporizhzhia axis are advancing toward the Donetsk–Zaporizhzhia highway. On the western flank, the Russian MoD reported the capture of Richne, though unconfirmed, with fighting ongoing. We previously discussed advances near Prymorske late last year. We assess the RuAF’s objective is to reach Kamyshuvakha and establish fire control over the road from Zaporizhzhia.

Advancing toward Richne is dangerous as it lies only about 15 km [9 mi] from the regional capital. Russian UAVs already reach Zaporizhzhia (reportedly including ambush drones), and the closer the RuAF get, the more intense drone strikes on the city will become.

By early February, various analytical projects had compiled statistics for January on the pace of the RuAF’s advance. However, contrary to our forecast of a record-low advance rate for that month, data from DeepState suggests otherwise. Although January's figures were almost half those of December and November, they were similar to those in October and September of 2025. The lowest advances in 2025 were recorded in March, at nearly half the current rate.

According to the pro-Russian Slivochny Kapriz project, the pace of advances in January remained the same as in December. This is due to the RuAF's regular practice of marking any territory where Russian soldiers have been spotted as controlled.

Recently, footage has emerged showing Russian soldiers wearing strange white capes resembling tents (dubbed "penguins" online), as well as a UAV strike against one such soldier. It turned out that troops are purchasing these anti-thermal ponchos to hide from enemy drones at night. However, it is unclear why a soldier would wear such a poncho during the daytime—the attempt to make themselves less visible to a drone clearly failed.

Peace Talks

The New York Times published an article on the so-called "energy truce," indicating that no formal agreement was signed and that only a verbal arrangement existed. It is unclear who initiated this arrangement: the article states that Trump asked Putin not to strike Ukrainian cities for a week, and Putin agreed, while Zelenskyy learned about this agreement from the news. However, it is later claimed that the pause in attacks was proposed by Ukrainian representatives during negotiations with the Russian delegation in Abu Dhabi. The date on which the week-long truce was supposed to begin and end is also unclear. According to Russian President’s spokesman Dmitry Peskov, Trump asked Putin to refrain from striking Kyiv until Feb. 1 in order to create favorable conditions for negotiations. Meanwhile, according to Zelenskyy, the next trilateral meetings in Abu Dhabi are scheduled for Feb. 4 and 5.

Ukrainian and Russian Strikes

On Feb. 2, strikes by Shahed drones on an electrical substation in Cherkasy were reported. Pro-Russian war correspondent Aleksandr Kots wrote about strikes on energy facilities in various regions of Ukraine in the early hours of Feb. 2 and suggested that the "energy truce" had ended.

On Jan. 30, Zelenskyy stated that starting that night, strikes on energy facilities had ceased almost entirely across all Ukrainian regions. On Feb. 2, he confirmed that, despite attacks on energy facilities in frontline and border areas, there had been no targeted strikes by Russian missiles or Shahed drones against energy infrastructure over the previous 24 hours.

Instead of targeting energy infrastructure, the RuAF have begun attacking logistics. Numerous strikes were carried out on a highway critical for the AFU that connects Pavlohrad and the town of Pokrovsk, in particular the section from the village of Petropavlivka to the village of Bohuslav. Burned-out trucks and passenger cars can be seen along the road. In our view, due to the "energy truce," the available stock of drones was redirected to other targets, including civilian buses.

Thus, on Feb. 1, two Russian drones attacked a DTEK service bus carrying miners home after their shift in the Dnipropetrovsk region. At least 12 people were killed. Since a bus is a moving target, the UAV must have been controlled by an operator rather than following a pre-programmed route. There is no doubt that the operators saw that the people in front of them were civilians. Accordingly, this was a deliberate war crime.

On Jan. 30 in the city of Kherson, a minibus came under attack from MLRS fire, presumably a BM-21 Grad MLRS: the driver was killed and five passengers were wounded.

The RuAF have also stepped up strikes on railway infrastructure. In the early hours of Jan. 30, Russian drones struck a train in the Dnipropetrovsk region. During the raid, people took shelter under railcars. Also on Jan. 30, a video showing the aftermath of a strike on the Synelnykove station in the Dnipropetrovsk region was published, along with official statements by Ukrainian Railways (Ukrzaliznytsia). Additionally, several days before the "energy truce," on the evening of Jan. 27, a train in the Kharkiv region was attacked by drones, killing six people and injuring two more.

Furthermore, on Feb. 1, a UAV attacked a maternity hospital in Zaporizhzhia, injuring six people.

The AFU continue to regularly strike transportation targets in Russia’s border regions. For example, on Feb. 1, a Ukrainian drone hit a car in the Belgorod region. As a result, four people were injured, one of whom later died in the hospital. We believe that a war crime was committed in this case as well, as the operators could see that the vehicle was civilian.

On Jan. 30, Zelenskyy criticized Western partners for delays in delivering air-defense missiles caused by payment issues, saying the hold-ups had contributed to disruptions in Ukraine’s electricity supply. On Jan. 20, however, he had said that Ukraine had received the necessary interceptor missiles, on the eve of another large-scale attack.

New footage has emerged showing Russian BM-35 drones equipped with Starlink terminals striking decoys of fighter jets and ground-surveillance radar systems in the Poltava region, as well as footage from the launch site of one of the drones.

As concerns grow over the use of Starlink terminals on Russian drones, Ukraine’s new defense minister Mykhailo Fedorov has appealed to SpaceX—and personally to Elon Musk—for help in addressing the problem. Initial "emergency" measures have already been introduced: once a terminal exceeds a speed of 75 kilometers per hour [45 mph], its data-transfer rate is sharply restricted, and at speeds above 90 kilometers per hour [90 mph] the terminal is disabled. Fedorov also said that a registration system is being prepared—a "white list" of verified Starlink terminal serial numbers that will be allowed to operate, while all others will be blocked. Serhii "Flash" Beskrestnov, a Ukrainian military expert, wrote that some Ukrainian service members are afraid to disclose that they possess Starlink terminals, fearing that their commanders would confiscate them.

The specialized outlet NK News reported that deliveries of North Korean weapons to Russia slowed sharply in January 2026. According to Planet Labs satellite imagery, only one Russian vessel—believed to be involved in the military supply network—entered the port of Rason in northeastern North Korea during the month, compared with at least three visits per month by Russian vessels from October through December. A similar drop was also observed in January 2025. The slowdown may have been caused by weather conditions. Cargo from Rason is typically shipped to the port of Vostochny in Russia’s Far East. While the port was partially ice-free in early January, by Jan. 24 its harbor was almost completely frozen, potentially creating navigational risks for smaller vessels. Satellite imagery, however, also shows low activity among larger ships. Against this backdrop, the use in recent weeks of S-300 and S-400 air-defense missiles in ground-attack roles has been observed more frequently than North Korean KN-23 ballistic missiles, which had been more commonly used in previous months.

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