Sitrep for Aug. 27-31, 2026 (as of 10 a.m. UTC+3)
Frontline Situation Update
Although summer is drawing to a close, the military campaign continues to intensify, and active fighting will most likely continue at least until the leaves fall and the muddy season sets in—possibly until the end of December, as was the case last year. Therefore, there is little point in discussing the results of the "summer offensive," nor should reports of yet another alleged deadline set by Putin for the capture of the Donbas be taken seriously. Even if such orders were issued, they were not followed by any significant acceleration of the offensive, nor were there noticeable personnel consequences for failing to meet the deadlines.
In the Donetsk region, in the Dobropillia direction, Russian assault troops have reached the southwestern outskirts of Dobropillia, as well as the settlement of Sviatohorivka and the villages of Rubizhne and Zolotyi Kolodiaz, according to an infographic published by Playfra. So far, they have not managed to gain a foothold there, but reports of infiltration have been confirmed.
Playfra’s sources also reported the presence of assault troops near the villages of Vesele Pole and Novovodiane, but this has not yet been confirmed. Meanwhile, on Aug. 29, the Russian Ministry of Defense claimed the capture of Rubizhne. Thus, the situation for the Armed Forces of Ukraine in this direction is steadily deteriorating, while Russian forces continue to infiltrate Ukrainian rear areas.
Ukrainian and Russian Strikes
The Ukrainian mid-strike campaign against Russian military logistics at operational depth is also continuing. Its stated aim is to cut off Crimea from supplies and Russian units in the south of the occupied territories from logistics routes running through Crimea. Strikes not only on the R-280 highway but also on trucks traveling along roads in the occupied territories began as early as late spring. Russian forces took various measures to protect them: they stationed soldiers armed with assault rifles along the roads, deployed jammers and provided vehicles with mobile fire team escorts.
Only now has Volodymyr Saldo, the Russian-appointed governor of the occupied part of the Kherson region, shown nets installed over roads in the occupied part of the region, although their necessity had been discussed long ago. On the one hand, they appear very thin; on the other, they may prevent a drone from detonating upon impact. In that case, the drone would become entangled without creating an opening for the next UAV, after which Russian sappers would neutralize it.
Russian forces in the Kherson region continue to terrorize civilians with UAV strikes: on the morning of Aug. 27, a UAV attacked a man riding a bicycle in the Korabelnyi district of Kherson. According to information from the Kherson Regional Prosecutor’s Office and the city military administration, the man was killed on the spot. The fact that the victim was riding an ordinary civilian bicycle cannot, by itself, conclusively establish that he was a civilian, while the released footage shows the body blurred, making it impossible to determine what clothing he was wearing. Nevertheless, we have little reason to doubt that the victim was not a serviceman—the established practices and reputation of the RuAF speak for themselves. It is worth noting that deliberate strikes against civilians are often not even concealed: the Telegram channel From Mariupol to the Carpathians regularly posts threats against civilians, as well as first responders and repair crews.
A similar incident recently occurred in the Donetsk region, where a Russian UAV attacked a cyclist wearing civilian clothing. The footage published by the Telegram channel 3rd CAA of the RuAF shows no indications that the victim belonged to the military or territorial defense forces. However, after independent journalists drew attention to the video, it was deleted.
Meanwhile, Ukrainian forces are attempting to strike military facilities. On Aug. 26, a missile strike hit an underground parking garage in Donetsk. The use of at least four or five missiles indicates the significance of the target. According to the AFU General Staff, the targets were Russian forces’ primary and secondary command posts. Apparently, the command post was located in an underground parking garage beneath an unfinished residential complex. A strike was also carried out against an abandoned building at 97 Ilyicha Street. The second military facility hit was likely located there.
An obituary has appeared for Lieutenant Colonel Andrey Moiseenko, a senior officer in the command organization section of the Operations Department at the headquarters of the 41st Combined Arms Army. This confirms that a command post was indeed hit. However, it remains unclear whether it belonged to the 41st CAA, the 51st CAA, as initially claimed by Ukrainian Telegram channels, or the Center Grouping of Forces.
Following the strikes, debris was recovered that was initially identified as Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG missiles due to the presence of markings from their manufacturer, MBDA France. The use of such missiles against an underground facility would be logical, given their penetrating warheads. Other fragments indicate the use of ERAM missiles, which recently appeared in Ukraine’s inventory. There is also a theory that the attack involved new JDAM-LR powered glide bombs with a reported range of up to 370 km. The JDAM-ER glide bombs currently available to Ukraine have a shorter range, which would not allow them to strike targets in Donetsk. JDAM-LR glide bombs reportedly completed testing only in Apr. 2026, and production plans reportedly call for just 35 such air-dropped bombs in 2026 and 2027 combined.
Apparently in response to this strike, Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova stated that "in response to Ukrainian strikes using British weapons against Russian territory, any British military facilities and equipment in Ukraine and beyond could become targets." It is worth noting that Russian authorities consider Donetsk part of the Russian Federation’s territory. We expect that such threats could result in an increase in sabotage operations across Europe and the United Kingdom.
One such suspected act of sabotage near Leipzig has reportedly prompted German authorities to prepare to publicly accuse Russia of involvement in an attempt to attack a Ukrainian aircraft with a UAV and to take some form of retaliatory action, potentially through new sanctions or additional arms deliveries to Ukraine, as reported.
Last weekend, the Ukrainian Air Force resumed reporting the number of ballistic missiles launched by Russian forces. It is worth noting that, as previously reported, it stopped doing so on Aug. 11. In the early hours of Aug. 29, Russia launched one Iskander ballistic missile against Ukraine from occupied Crimea, and in the early hours of Aug. 30, it launched two Iskander missiles from the Kursk region. None of these ballistic missiles were intercepted, although Ukraine recently received a new batch of interceptor missiles. These Iskanders likely targeted areas where either no Patriot systems were deployed or the batteries stationed there lacked suitable interceptors.
Ukrainian military expert Serhii "Flash" Beskrestnov published an infographic showing the routes taken by hundreds of Russian jet-powered Shahed drones. All of them flew toward Kyiv along virtually the same route: they entered the Chernihiv region and traveled along the border with Belarus. Beskrestnov’s working hypothesis is that the drones use LTE modems that connect to mobile network base stations in Belarus. This raises another question for us: why are Ukrainian forces not making efforts to shoot down these drones while they are following a known route? Strictly speaking, we do not know whether such efforts are being made.
Beskrestnov also reported that Russian forces launched around 1,500 Shahed drones against Ukraine in July and more than 2,500 in August. Since June, Russia has largely stopped launching conventional Shahed-136 (Geran-2) loitering munitions and switched to jet-powered versions because Ukraine had been successfully intercepting virtually all of the drones. Judging by launch data, Russia appears to have significantly increased production of new Geran drones over these months.
Russia has continued striking Ukrainian warehouses and commercial facilities. On Aug. 28, the following sites were hit:
- Nova Poshta sorting centers in Sumy and the Kyiv region;
- the Karavan shopping center in Kharkiv;
- an Epicentr DIY shopping center and the Khortytsia distillery in Zaporizhzhia; the distillery is reportedly beyond repair.
On Aug. 29, an Agromat warehouse in the Kyiv region was damaged; it stored ceramic tiles, plumbing fixtures, and home-improvement supplies. On Aug. 31, a large Nova Poshta logistics terminal in Odesa was hit.
Thus, Russia is seeking not only to damage Ukraine’s economy but also to disrupt the supply of everyday necessities and food. Footage of empty shelves in some Ukrainian stores is already emerging, and some retail chains have introduced limits on retail purchases. Restoring logistics takes time, so temporary shortages may occur immediately after warehouses are destroyed. However, we do not expect such shortages to last long.
French researcher Clément Molin, in his tentative assessment of the summer, paid particular attention to Ukrainian actions that have had negative consequences for Ukraine itself. He included among them the campaign of strikes on Wildberries warehouses and Russian commercial vessels in the Black Sea—and, in fact, the Sea of Azov as well. At the height of the harvest season, Russian forces intensified strikes on Ukrainian ports, warehouses, supermarkets, and other logistics facilities, creating substantial problems for the civilian economy and agricultural exports.
Like us, Molin notes that such strikes have been carried out regularly since the beginning of the full-scale invasion, but they have now become far more frequent, and Ukraine was unprepared for this. They have also become more destructive, as Russia has begun using ballistic missiles, jet-powered Shaheds, and the new Banderol missiles on a large scale, while Ukraine’s shortage of missile interceptors has become more acute. In addition to the almost daily strikes on civilian infrastructure, there have recently been several high-profile hits on military facilities: two ammunition storage facilities near Kyiv and a public military exhibition, where numerous experts and industry representatives were killed.
During a dispute with the authors of the 414 Ptakhy Madyara Telegram channel and Jakub Janovsky, a contributor to The Oryx Project, Molin explained: "I am not saying the strikes on Wildberries were unjustified or ineffective; I am saying that the Russian response was underestimated and that the Ukrainians are suffering the consequences."
We disagree with the first part of this assessment: strikes on marketplaces do not offer a definite military advantage, destroy civilian businesses and, in our view, constitute war crimes—just as Russian attacks on Nova Poshta facilities, stores and shopping centers do.
Responding to the argument that the RuAF have always struck Ukrainian logistics, Molin cited the following figures: from January 2025 to July 2026, Russian forces struck an average of 33 warehouses and similar facilities per month, only 5–10 of which were civilian. In August 2026 alone, however, 126 damaged warehouses have already been geolocated, including 80 civilian facilities. The scale and concentration of these attacks have changed: rather than targeting different categories of facilities, the RuAF have concentrated on destroying Ukrainian civilian logistics. Any operation must take into account a potential adversary response. Its anticipated benefits should be weighed against the likely damage from retaliation. If the operation is nevertheless carried out, potential targets should be warned, alternative logistics routes established, and their protection and fire safety improved.
Dmytro Putiata drew attention to the expanding range of relatively inexpensive Russian air- and ground-launched cruise missiles. These include the Banderol cruise missile we previously mentioned, with a range of about 500 kilometers; the S-71K and S-71M missiles with a stated range of 500 to 800 kilometers; and the new Dan-T cruise missile.
Putiata published a rendering of the presumed appearance of a ground-based launcher for two Dan-T missiles. According to available information, this missile can be launched both from the ground and from aircraft, has a range of up to 500 kilometers, and carries a warhead weighing about 135 kilograms — more than that of a regular Shahed, whose warhead weighs approximately 90 kilograms. In addition, the RuAF's arsenal now includes the Geran-5 cruise missile and the Filin visual-optical interference station, the detailed characteristics of which remain unknown.
Thus, Russian air attacks are intensifying both through the increased number of weapons launched and the expanding range of weapons used.
In this case, the Russian leadership is acting more competently: it evaluates Ukraine's possible response in advance and prepares for it. The Russian MoD has effectively announced a new large-scale campaign of strikes against the Ukrainian energy sector. Typically, such attacks intensify in late autumn with the onset of cold weather, but officials have already announced them. Starting around early July, we observed preparations for Ukraine's response to this campaign: Russian authorities expanded the powers of regional headquarters to assess damage to energy facilities, and the Rostec state corporation presented mobile substations to restore power after attacks. That is, instead of denying the enemy's possible response, planners account for it in advance when planning the operation.
The most severe consequence of Russian strikes over the week was an attack by a jet-powered Shahed drone on an ammunition storage facility in the Kyiv region, which caused a massive secondary detonation. Nearby was a nursing home with elderly people with limited mobility who could not be evacuated in time; at least 38 people were killed. The Russian MoD stated that the facility housed boosters for long-range FP-1 and FP-2 UAVs, and indeed, such boosters are visible among the debris and in a video showing scattering munitions leaving a white smoke trail. Additionally, a local resident showed what appeared to be crates of heavy machine gun ammunition, which could have been intended for mobile fire teams. A photo of a missile fragment, likely from a Flamingo missile, also emerged. Why long-range strike and air defense assets were stored together and close to residential areas remains unknown. The Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) opened a criminal case over negligence in military service, and Volodymyr Zelenskyy promised to find out how such a facility ended up next to a nursing home.
The AFU struck the Belgorod Thermal Power Plant on Aug. 30. Video footage shows smoke rising over the facility after the attack.
We expect the Belgorod region to once again face retaliatory strikes and serious blackouts with the start of Russia's large-scale campaign against Ukraine's energy infrastructure, as it did last winter. Given the increase in Ukraine's long-range strike capabilities, attacks may also affect energy facilities in the Kursk and Bryansk regions. The campaign spreading to more distant regions, including the Moscow region, currently appears less likely. During the same attack, an Ozon warehouse also
caught fire, while other facilities in Belgorod were hit as well. According to the authorities, a man and a teenager were killed, and another 15 people, including nine teenagers, were injured.
Starting Sept. 10, Ozon will introduce a new system under which cancelled or unclaimed goods will remain in storage directly at order pickup points and be put back on the marketplace. If another customer purchases the item, it will be sent to the appropriate pickup point. This allows the company to distribute goods across numerous small premises, reducing their concentration in warehouses and the potential damage from attacks. Ukraine's Nova Poshta is launching a similar model: according to Yevgeny Tafiychuk, the company's director, it is moving to decentralized storage, turning ordinary freight and postal offices across Ukraine into local warehouses.
The Vyorstka media outlet calculated that from August 2025 through July 2026, Ozon users ordered more than 2 million dual-use and military-purpose items—body armor, helmets, drones, and other products—worth more than 25 billion rubles [$291 million]. However, without comparing these figures with the marketplace's overall turnover, they create a misleading impression of the scale of military-related trade: in 2025, Ozon's turnover exceeded 4 trillion rubles [$46 billion], meaning that such goods accounted for about 0.6% of sales. Nearly 2.5 billion orders were placed through the marketplace in total, with military goods accounting for about 0.08%.
However, this share alone does not determine whether a strike is lawful: a warehouse may become a military target if there is reliable information that military goods are being stored there. At the same time, only the specific military objective may be attacked, and the anticipated military advantage must justify the incidental damage. We consider the destruction of a giant warehouse containing civilian goods in order to destroy a small batch of easily replaceable fiber-optic cable reels, without providing any tangible military advantage, to constitute a war crime.
Russia has begun serial production of the Volna Kupol Garant electronic warfare system, designed to disrupt communications with Starlink satellites rather than the terminals themselves (due to its large size, the system is easy to detect). The decision to put it into serial production suggests that it performed well during testing or combat use. Its stated operating range is about 20 km, so the system cannot protect an entire region and is intended primarily to defend individual facilities.
Ukraine's General Staff reported the destruction of a Russian Pantsir-S1 surface-to-air missile and anti-aircraft artillery system near the village of Kletnya in the Bryansk region, roughly 120 kilometers from the Ukrainian border. Signal relay stations were reportedly used to maintain communication with the attack drone operating at that depth. According to the Dos’ye Shpiona [Spy Dossier] Telegram channel, the Pantsir-S1 was providing cover for a 9K720 Iskander mobile short-range ballistic missile system; one Russian serviceman was killed and another was injured in the strike. Ukrainian forces likely discovered the Iskander launcher first, opting to eliminate the air defense system protecting it before attempting to strike the launcher itself.
A ruling by the Kyiv Court of Appeal, published on the Clarity Project legal database and dated June 24, 2025, has shed light on claims surrounding Ukraine's Lima electronic warfare (EW) system. The commander of the Nichna Varta [Night Watch] unit had previously attributed extraordinary capabilities to the system, claiming it could neutralize Shahed drones and even Kinzhal air-launched ballistic missiles. According to the commander, the Lima system had helped neutralize 61 Kinzhal missiles by feeding them spoofed target coordinates and forcing them into high-g maneuvers that caused structural failure—claims that appeared highly dubious from the outset.
According to the court ruling, procurement of the Lima EW system for the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) began in 2023 without full-scale testing due to an urgent demand for EW equipment. Under combat conditions, however, the system proved ineffective, failing to jam either Shahed drones equipped with anti-jamming Kometa satellite navigation antennas or ballistic missiles. In fact, deploying even 20 units simultaneously failed to protect a single target site. Full-scale technical trials in 2024 also confirmed the system’s ineffectiveness. Furthermore, investigators suspect the manufacturer of siphoning off sales revenues through shell companies and front individuals. The heavily promoted system ultimately failed to meet its declared specifications—offering another example of why claims by Fire Point and other manufacturers about creating "best-in-class" missiles, drones, or EW systems should be treated as marketing until verified by independent testing and combat use.
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