Sitrep for July 24-27, 2026 (as of 10 a.m. UTC+3)

Frontline Situation Update

According to a statement by the Russian Ministry of Defense, the first Russian army assault units have entered the village of Oleksiievo-Druzhkivka in the Kostiantynivka direction. Although there have indeed been increasing reports of small assault groups infiltrating the village recently, it is too early to conclude that they have established a foothold there. It is even more premature to infer that the town of Kostiantynivka has been captured. At present, we see no evidence that the Russian Armed Forces control the town. Fighting appears to be ongoing in some areas and may last through the end of summer. Researcher Playfra, who is in contact with Ukrainian military personnel, has likewise reported that the fighting for Kostiantynivka is ongoing. According to Playfra, the situation for the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the town continues to slowly but steadily deteriorate, while the small number of Russian assault troops that infiltrated Oleksiievo-Druzhkivka were targeted by heavy Vampire UAVs.

On July 22, a large-scale Russian assault in the Dobropillia direction was repelled. The attack was launched from the village of Novoekonomichne toward the village of Shakhove and involved armored vehicles, tanks and rocket artillery, including BM-21 Grad MLRS launchers and Sarma systems, as well as various drones, including Gerbera and Lancet, with air support. As researcher Moklasen noted, Ukrainian forces operating in the Velyka Novosilka (Oleksandrivka) direction observed the RuAF concentrating troops for offensive operations in the Dobropillia direction. Since these forces included units of the 90th Tank Division, which had been opposing Ukrainian counterattacks, the AFU intensified their own offensive operations in an effort to draw part of the division away from the Dobropillia direction. In our previous sitrep, we covered part of this large-scale assault—specifically, the destruction of two tanks near the village of Maiak, north of Novoeconomichne.

As we previously mentioned, during a Russian mechanized assault, the AFU knocked out a new Sarma MLRS, a rough equivalent to the American HIMARS. Reports last year first revealed the existence of this mobile, lightweight launcher designed for high-precision missile strikes rather than area saturation fire. The Sarma resembles the Tornado-S, but features six guide rails instead of twelve. As a result, the systems can easily be mistaken for one another, which is what happened in a Ukrainian military video documenting the aforementioned assault. This marks the first time the Sarma has been spotted on the frontline.

It remains unclear whether the production of precision-guided munitions for this MLRS has been established, and if so, how large stockpiles are. Unconfirmed reports suggest these launchers are also capable of firing the D-30SN UMPB, a 300-mm universal inter-branch gliding munition designed for deployment from both aircraft and ground-based launchers, serving as an equivalent to the American GLSDB.

This represents the second recent innovation from the Russian military-industrial complex to appear on the frontline, following the spotting of the Arena-M active protection system on a tank destroyed near Maiak. Whether this new equipment will impact combat operations depends on production scales and the availability of matching munitions.

It is worth noting that we previously pointed out that May and June are traditionally periods of intensified Russian offensive operations. This year, however, we observed that Russian forces failed to intensify their offensive during these months, suggesting a deterioration in the recruitment of contract soldiers into the Russian army. However, based on the large-scale Russian mechanized attack toward Shakhove that was repelled, we can cautiously hypothesize that this year the "window" for attempting to break through Ukrainian defenses may have shifted to July and August. We emphasize that this is only a hypothesis that future RuAF actions will either confirm or disprove.

We have argued against the inevitability of mobilization in the fall by stating that the situation does not appear threatening to the RuAF command. There is no acute shortage of personnel or an urgent need to stabilize the frontline. In fact, Russian forces even had sufficient resources to launch a large-scale offensive involving multiple branches of the military. In our view, this indirectly supports the hypothesis that, by the fall, the Russian command will not be in such a desperate position as to mobilize hundreds of thousands of people. However, if after nine months it becomes clear that recruitment is significantly lagging behind the target and there are not enough new contract soldiers to replace losses, nothing would prevent the resumption of mobilization, with several tens of thousands of people being called up each month. Nevertheless, we continue to believe that a new wave of mobilization would not enable Russia to achieve a strategic breakthrough or turn the tide of the war.

According to Dmytro Putiata, a former Ukrainian marine and one of the authors of the Two Marines blog, certain changes within the RuAF could indicate preparations for mobilization. In some brigades, for example, tank battalions are being reduced to tank companies, which frees up some heavy military equipment for the formation of new units. Since a battalion may have 30 tanks while a company has 10, the freed-up tanks could be enough to form two additional tank companies of mobilized soldiers.

Nevertheless, we see another possible explanation for these changes. They may reflect an adaptation of the force structure to the current nature of combat operations. For quite some time now, the main tactic has been to send small assault groups to attack or "infiltrate" between enemy positions. Armored vehicles are needed less frequently and in smaller numbers than at the beginning of the current war. The changes to the organizational structure may therefore reflect the reduced role of heavy armored vehicles along the frontline—or even a decline in the number of operational tanks (in this case the paperwork is simply being brought into line with the reality on the ground).

In a recent address, Volodymyr Zelenskyy cited intelligence data indicating that Putin is preparing the conditions for expanding mobilization in the fall due to excessive manpower losses surpassing contract recruitment rates. Reports indicate that, in the first seven months of 2026, the RuAF recruited 221,000 people while suffering losses of 225,500. It should be noted that Zelenskyy previously referred to all recruitment into the RuAF as mobilization.

First, talk of an upcoming mobilization shortly before the elections in the Russian Federation could be part of a political and psychological operation aimed at creating additional tension in Russian society.

Second, Ukrainian statements regarding the size of the RuAF and its losses often contradict one another. We have previously encountered this in statements by General Oleksandr Syrskyi, and now Zelenskyy's words are somewhat contradicted by data from Commander of the Unmanned Systems Forces of the AFU Robert "Madiar" Brovdi. His data indicate that the number of Russian assault troops on the frontline in July increased by 18 percent compared with May and by 12 percent compared with June. Taken together with previous similar statements, this leads to the conclusion that after nearly half a year of a catastrophic situation in which losses exceeded recruitment, the number of assault troops began to grow rapidly in the summer.

At the same time, statements regarding low recruitment (with a 20 percent drop) in the first quarter of 2026 are confirmed by regional and national budget data. As expected, recruitment stabilized in the second quarter, but did not grow significantly enough to lead to a substantial increase in the number of assault troops on the frontline. In the above-mentioned statement, Volodymyr Zelenskyy said that, as part of ongoing military cooperation between Russia and North Korea, 30,000 North Korean troops have reportedly been preparing to deploy to Russia’s Voronezh region since June. If this is true, we doubt that the deployment is driven by a Russian request for additional manpower. Rather, it is more likely motivated by Kim Jong-un’s desire to further expand North Korea’s practical experience in modern warfare following the likely revision of military manuals and troop training. While 30,000 personnel is relatively small in the context of the entire frontline, it is a significant reinforcement for a single operational direction.

In addition, according to Zelenskyy, North Korea is preparing to supply Russia with additional launchers for ballistic missiles. At the same time, the Polkovnyk Henshtabu [Colonel of the General Staff] Telegram channel reported that additional KN-23 ballistic missiles are also being transferred. This would be entirely consistent with current trends. Russian forces continue to make extensive use of ballistic missiles against targets in Ukraine and, as the colder season approaches, are likely to resume long-range strikes against energy infrastructure and gas production facilities while seeking to make these attacks even more massive. We also have not seen the use of North Korean ballistic missiles for quite some time, suggesting that previously supplied stocks have likely been exhausted.

Ukrainian and Russian Strikes

Videos have been published showing the Dutch Ruta Block 1 cruise missile flying over Russian territory, along with photographs of its wreckage. This relatively small cruise missile carries a warhead weighing up to 150 kg [330 lbs] (or 100 kg [220 lbs], according to some reports), has a range of approximately 300 km [186 mi], and is launched from a ground-based launcher.

On July 26, a Banderol miniature cruise missile struck a residential area in the city of Kharkiv. The attack killed one person and injured nine others. The missile carries a 114 kg [251 lbs] warhead, has a range of 500 km [310 mi], and is launched from the Orion UAV.

In a previous sitrep, we reported that the primary manufacturing bottleneck for PAC-3 interceptors used in Patriot systems lies in the shortage of radar seeker heads produced by Boeing. Axios reports that the company plans to increase production to 850 units this year. It is worth noting that increased production does not guarantee these surface-to-air missiles will be sent to Ukraine, as they may instead be allocated to replenish US Army stockpiles and allies in the Persian Gulf. Axios and The New York Times report that Trump suspended strikes against Iran due to dwindling interceptor stockpiles and a desire to reach an agreement with Tehran.

Photos of debris bearing markings on electronics have been published, confirming that the AFU possess ERAM cruise missiles.

The VChK-OGPU Telegram channel published a video showing the vehicles of a mobile fire team near a Wildberries warehouse in the Moscow region. Since the team is using Chinese pickup trucks, we speculate that this is a private air defense unit funded by Wildberries itself, rather than a BARS (Special Combat Army Reserve) or a MoD unit.

On July 25, an unsuccessful attempt was made to strike a Wildberries warehouse in the city of Yekaterinburg: UAVs hit the parking lot in front of the warehouse.

On July 24, six people were killed and 32 injured as a result of a strike by FP-5 Flamingo missiles on the Avitek plant in Kirov. This military plant is involved in the production of Tor SAM systems and Kh-59 cruise missiles. Satellite imagery of the aftermath shows a hole in the roof of one of the workshops, but the extent of the damage to the equipment remains unknown.

On July 24, the RuAF struck a weapons exhibition at a private shooting range near Kyiv with ballistic missiles. As a result, 10 people were killed and 100 others were injured. The announcement of the exhibition, including the venue’s address, had been published publicly; the and the exhibition organizer has since been detained. According to Yurii Ihnat, head of the Communications Department of the Air Force of the AFU, the exhibition was held at an AFU training range but on the territory of a private sports complex. Therefore, responsibility for the event lies not with the AFU but with a private company.

On July 20, the RuAF struck the Epicentr hypermarket in the city of Sumy, and on July 26, the Epicentr hypermarket in the city of Kryvyi Rih. On the afternoon of July 26, an ATB supermarket in the city of Chernihiv was attacked; two fatalities and 25 injuries have been reported. As in many similar cases, we saw no military facilities nearby, so we cannot explain these strikes as anything other than terror against the civilian population.

On July 25, the AFU struck a recreation center in Kyrylivka, located in the Russian-occupied part of the Zaporizhzhia region. According to Yevgeny Balytsky, the Russian-appointed head of the occupied region, the strike killed 12 people, including four children, and injured 19 others, including five children. The attack is reminiscent of the strikes on Starobilsk on May 22, 2026, and on Khorly on New Year's Eve 2026, both of which also resulted in civilian casualties. We consider it possible that a Russian command post or temporary deployment positions were located nearby, as Russian forces often choose seaside resorts for such purposes. However, in our view, Ukrainian intelligence appears to have made errors in planning strikes of this kind by failing to conduct sufficient follow-up reconnaissance and target verification. As a result, civilians—including children—were killed.

In our sitrep two weeks ago, we reported on Ukrainian strikes against the Caspian Pipeline Consortium marine terminal near the city of Novorossiysk, which primarily serves the interests of Kazakhstan and the United States and exports virtually no Russian oil. According to The Wall Street Journal, the Trump administration subsequently asked Ukraine not to target non-Russian vessels in the Black Sea. It is worth noting that, following Ukrainian strikes on the CPC oil terminal in Novorossiysk in November 2025, the US Department of State delivered a formal diplomatic protest to Kyiv.

Recently, two prominent MAGA influencers, Tim Pool and Laura Loomer, sharply changed their positions and began speaking in support of Ukraine. It can be assumed that such statements are linked to the upcoming elections and the Republican Party's need to win back voters who were dissatisfied with Trump's pro-Putin stance.

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