Sitrep for March 16-20, 2026 (as of 10:30 a.m. UTC+3)
Frontline Situation Update
The radicalization of rhetoric among many Russian pro-war bloggers due to internet shutdowns and other issues in Russia, according to our assessment, will not influence the position of the authorities or lead to a halt of the war.
General Valery Gerasimov, Chief of Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, stated during a meeting at the command post of the Group of Troops "South" that more than 60 percent of the town of Kostiantynivka is already under the control of the Russian Army.
This is entirely untrue, as the RuAF are only present in certain neighborhoods and outskirts, where soldiers occasionally advance from the sides of the villages of Berestok, Illinivka, Stupochky, Predtechyne and OleksandrĐľ-Shultyne. In December, nearly four months ago, it was claimed that control had been established over 45 percent of the buildings there. This once again underscores the inconsistency of statements by the RuAF.
Gerasimov also stated that in the Kupiansk direction, the Group of Troops "West" continues "the elimination of remnants of Ukrainian units blocked on the eastern bank of the Oskil River," and that only a small bridgehead near the villages of Kivsharivka and Novoosynove, measuring 2.5 km [1.6 mi] by 3 km [1.9 mi], remains to be mopped-up. Everything else, allegedly, has already been fully captured by the Russian army, including the villages of Hlushkivka, Pishchane, Petropavlivka, Podoly and Kupiansk-Vuzlovyi.
Although the Russian MoD frequently claims control over populated areas it has not even come close to capturing, there are occasional opposite cases. For instance, the ministry announced the capture of the village of Sopych in the Sumy region only ten days after DeepState reported it.
Statements that strain credibility are also occasionally voiced from the Ukrainian side. For instance, Volodymyr Zelenskyy recently claimed that Russia "mobilizes" (i.e., recruits under contract) 40,000-45,000 personnel per month. This would amount to roughly half a million annually. However, this contradicts earlier statements indicating that last year’s recruitment rate stood at 30,000-35,000 per month, totaling approximately 410,000 personnel. As for the current year, Ukraine’s Commander-in-Chief, General Oleksandr Syrskyi, stated that 409,000 personnel are planned to be recruited. In our assessment, this inflation by Zelenskyy may be an attempt to justify the consistent overestimation of Russian losses by the General Staff of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.
On the Zaporizhzhia axis, in the vicinity of the village of Vozdvyzhivka, northwest of Huliaipole, footage has emerged showing a large number of destroyed AFU ground robotic platforms along a roadway. It is worth noting that Ukrainian forces have been attempting to shift their logistics toward robotic systems, as the heavy presence of UAVs has rendered resupply and casualty evacuation using larger vehicles nearly impossible. As a result, these "ground drones" have now become priority targets for Russian UAVs.
In the Pokrovsk direction, near the captured village of Hryshyne, the use of two MT-LB multi-purpose armored vehicles and motorcycles was observed. As anticipated, with the drying of the ground, the RuAF have resumed mechanized assaults.
Similarly, in the Sloviansk direction, an offensive attempt was conducted using MT-LB vehicles and motorcycles advancing from the town of Siversk.
In the Lyman direction, a large-scale mechanized assault was carried out. Reports indicate that Ukrainian UAVs destroyed 2 tanks, 5 armored personnel carriers, 7 infantry fighting vehicles and 40 armored vehicles.
According to analyst Jompy and others, in order to reduce personnel losses, the RuAF are expected to revert to mechanized assaults. UAVs will continue to detect and strike advancing forces, but the use of armored vehicles is intended to reduce troop casualties. We do not fully concur with this assessment. Michael Kofman has noted that the same pattern recurs annually: in spring (typically April, or slightly earlier as observed now), a wave of such assaults begins, only for them to later prove excessively costly and ineffective, leading to their eventual abandonment.
Amid the intensification of mechanized assaults, Robert "Madyar" Brovdi announced that the RuAF’s spring–summer offensive is partially underway. It is worth noting that we do not categorize offensives strictly by season. Based on established patterns, once ground conditions improve, the RuAF increase operational tempo along the frontline. Their offensive activity is likely to continue, in one form or another, through most of the year.
Ukrainian and Russian Strikes
On March 18, the Russian Aerospace Forces carried out a strike with two aerial bombs on a residential area and a sleeping district in the city of Kramatorsk. According to the head of the city administration, 10 people were injured as a result.
The National Police of Ukraine released a video filmed in the town of Dobropillia, showing the scale of destruction after months of Russian strikes. Although the town is not located directly on the frontline, it is already nearly destroyed. The footage shows police officers attempting to evacuate elderly civilians who refuse to leave despite requests from their relatives. The presence of civilians in towns that opposing forces intend to advance into is not only deadly for the civilians themselves, but also complicates defensive preparations. The AFU could mine houses and roads in evacuated settlements in order to detonate them once the enemy enters. The same approach would make sense in border areas, as noted in a recent sitrep.
Denis Shtilerman, co-founder of Fire Point, reported that the company has already conducted the first launch of its new FP-7 ballistic missile and is now moving on to testing it against Russian targets. According to him, the FP-7 is an analogue of the American ATACMS tactical ballistic missile, with a range of up to 300 km [186 mi], but costs roughly half as much. He also noted that the company manufactures all components of the missile itself, except for the warhead.
At the beginning of the week, images appeared of Lancet UAV debris discovered in Kyiv, marked with colored circles. Advisor to Ukraine’s Minister of Defense Mykhailo Fedorov and Ukrainian military expert Serhii "Flash" Beskrestnov called on people to report sightings of such debris from Kyiv to Chernihiv. The distance from Kyiv to the nearest Russian territory exceeds 200 km [124 mi], while the range of the Lancet drone is about 50 km [31 mi]. According to Beskrestnov, if the Lancet’s relatively small warhead were replaced with an additional battery and the drone were launched from Belarus, approximately 90 km [56 mi] away, it could potentially reach Kyiv. Although the purpose of such a flight remains unclear.
According to Defense Express, an entire swarm of such drones was launched, and the colored circles were used to allow them to identify one another via machine vision. However, the claim that around 40 drones were launched appears doubtful to us. According to the pro-Russian project LostArmour, slightly more than 100 Lancet drones are used across the entire frontline each month, and it seems unlikely that a third of them would be deployed in a single day for such an unclear goal as simply "reaching Kyiv."
Beskrestnov suggests that Russian officials need to provide Putin and the Russian public with at least some symbolic news, which led to the creation of the informational narrative "Lancet over Kyiv." As part of this information operation, Lancet debris may have been dropped over Kyiv by Shahed-type UAVs. We also find this version doubtful, as it is unlikely that the Russian public would care which specific type of drone debris was found in Kyiv. Though this may matter to UAV manufacturers and officials responsible for government procurement.
The Russian MoD and Moscow Mayor Sergey Sobyanin reported large-scale Ukrainian drone raids on Moscow on March 14-17, claiming that more than 300 UAVs were used in total. At the same time, unlike previous attacks, there was no major disruption at airports (only minor delays were reported), and the number of published videos showing drone flights, air defense activity and interceptions was limited. It remains unclear whether Russian authorities are overstating the number of UAVs, or whether far less eyewitness footage is reaching the internet due to messaging app restrictions and mobile network shutdowns. The objective of striking such a well-protected region as the Moscow region is also not entirely clear.
The Prymary special unit of Ukraine’s Main Intelligence Directorate reported striking a Valdai ground surveillance radar in Crimea. The system is used to detect and counter drones. They also reported destroying an electronic warfare station and a relay station used for UAVs such as the Geran-2 (Shahed-136) and Gerbera. We assess that this was likely not the only such radar in Crimea, but even the destruction of a single station weakens the overall air threat detection system.
In the early hours of March 19, Ukrainian drones struck the Granit plant, part of the Almaz-Antey [Russian state-owned concern in the arms industry], in Crimea. According to the CyberBoroshno project, at least six FP-1/FP-2 drones hit laboratory and production facilities as well as a design center in the plant’s southern wing, while two more struck the northern wing. The facility is involved in the repair and maintenance of air defense systems and radio-electronic equipment.
Vazhnyye Istorii [IStories, independent Russian investigative media outlet] and the UK-based Open Source Centre have published a joint investigation into maritime shipments of munitions from North Korea to Russia. Based on satellite imagery of the Russian Far East and North Korea, as well as shipping records, Russian vessels may have transported between 8 and 11 million munitions from September 2023 to January 2026. These included shells for tube artillery (122mm and 152mm), rocket artillery and tank shells.
Since the start of 2026, analysts have identified only a single shipment. They attribute this to a sharp increase in Russia’s domestic production of artillery ammunition, reducing the need for North Korean supplies. We have not seen evidence of such a significant increase in production. It is possible that most of the shipments consisted of 122mm shells, which may have later fallen out of favor due to their limited range and lower effectiveness. Another possibility is that shipments were redirected to the railway link between Russia and North Korea. A further plausible explanation, suggested by the investigators, is that North Korea may have exhausted the specific types of munitions needed by the RuAF.
Throughout the years of the war, the Ukrainian military has amassed significant expertise and developed sophisticated technologies to counter Shahed drones, deploying interceptor UAVs and acoustic systems to track targets within their airspace. Yet, current projections suggest the US Army will continue to source such capabilities from its own domestic manufacturers, including interceptor drones like the Merops. This pivot reflects a strategic prioritization of the American defense industrial base, a desire for technological sovereignty, and the necessity of meeting established certification standards. This domestic focus persists despite the fact that American military advisers have been on the ground in Ukraine since the onset of the Russian invasion, analyzing Ukrainian combat experience in both anti-Shahed defense and FPV drone tactics. Notably, on Jan. 3, 2025, the US Marine Corps established its own Attack Drone Team. The United Kingdom has charted a different course, opting for a joint venture with the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine to launch A1 Defense AI Center—an engineering and analytical facility. The center is designed to provide continuous analysis of combat operations, forecast the maneuvers of the Russian army, and develop next-generation command-and-control systems.
Meanwhile, Zelenskyy reported that 201 Ukrainians are currently stationed across the Middle East and the Persian Gulf, with another 34 prepared for deployment. These teams of military experts, specialists in defending against Shahed strikes, are currently active in the UAE, Qatar and Saudi Arabia, and are currently en route to Kuwait. Zelenskyy added that these experts were deployed at the request of international partners, specifically the United States. He characterized the assistance as part of the "Drone Deal"—a proposal Ukraine extended to the United States which, according to the President, remains on the negotiating table. As noted in a previous sitrep, the US has thus far declined to adopt Ukrainian UAV counter-technologies, a move attributed to the powerful lobbying interests of American manufacturers.
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