Sitrep for March 13-16, 2026 (as of 10:00 a.m. UTC+3)
Frontline Situation Update
In the Pokrovsk direction, available data indicate that the Russian Armed Forces have fully captured the village of Hryshyne, located northwest of Pokrovsk. Fighting is now underway for the village of Novooleksandrivka. This is corroborated by both Andrii Babichev, a serviceman of the 93rd Mechanized Brigade of the Armed Forces of Ukraine known for his Moto Life UA vlog, and a geolocated video showing Russian soldiers on the northern outskirts of Hryshyne, published by the pro-Russian Slivochny Kapriz project.
Notably, between March 10 and 13, Slivochny Kapriz recorded a negative value in its calculation of Russian territorial gains (previously, near-zero advancement had been recorded by the project in November 2025). Although counting captured territory every four days seems meaningless, it's notable that a pro-Russian project, which usually exaggerates RuAF successes, would make such an assessment. Even when, in February, the Finnish analytical Blackbird Group reported a negative monthly advance by the Russian army, Slivochny Kapriz still claimed positive figures.
In the Zaporizhzhia region, fighting continues in the village of Novohryhorivka, where the AFU are advancing, and northwest of Huliaipole, where Russian forces are pushing forward. In the areas of the villages of Varvarivka, Sviatopetrivka, Zelene and Staroukrainka, thermal anomalies, indicative of fires, are visible on NASA’s Fire Information for Resource Management System (FIRMS), and burned patches of terrain are discernible on satellite imagery. Thus, our primary focus remains on these areas, where Russian forces near the border of Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhzhia regions are attempting to halt the Ukrainian offensive, and further south, to consolidate their captured positions and straighten the frontline.
Ukrainian and Russian Strikes
The Militarnyi reported that Ukraine’s Defense Procurement Agency has secured long-term contracts with unnamed domestic manufacturers for the supply of cruise and ballistic missiles. Only two such companies are known to currently exist: the Luch State Kyiv Design Bureau, which produces R-360 Neptune subsonic cruise missiles, and Firepoint, the maker of the Flamingo, FP-2 UAVs, and, as reports indicate, FP-5 ballistic missiles. Given that these systems were already in production, the agreement likely represents the signing of new contracts to replace those that have expired. Foreign-made missiles, meanwhile, continue to be supplied as military aid from allies.
Ukrainian and Russian Strikes
Over the past week, the General Staff of the AFU announced that drones struck Iskander ballistic missile launchers in Crimea. While available footage does not provide definitive confirmation, analysts at Ukrainian CyberBoroshno Telegram channel geolocated the strikes and cross-referenced them with reports from local residents regarding the timing of ballistic missile launches from the peninsula. They noted that these launches were reported in settlements relatively close to the aforementioned strike locations. This led to the suggestion that Ukrainian drones did indeed hit Iskander launchers rather than, for example, S-300 or S-400 SAM systems. Ground surveillance radars were also hit in Crimea. This is significant, as these systems allow for the detection of UAVs and cruise missiles; their loss will make it more difficult for Russian air defenses to spot incoming aerial threats.
The pro-Russian Telegram channel Voyenny Osvedomitel [Military Informant] claimed that the drones used to strike ground surveillance radars were equipped with Starlink terminals, though it did not name the specific drone types. This assertion is based on the drone's interface, visible in strike footage—specifically, a green cross in the center of the screen. This indirectly confirms a stable video signal without the interruptions typical of standard radio communication. Since Starlink does not operate in Crimea, it is entirely possible that the drones utilized Starshield terminals, which were developed by SpaceX for military needs and classified communications and do not have the same geographic restrictions as civilian terminals. Unlike Starlink, Starshield is not available for public sale, but the AFU did get it.
According to an infographic by French researcher Clément Molin, a significant number of strikes against targets in Crimea have been recorded over the last two and a half months. These include ammunition storage facilities, maritime vessels, missile launchers (marked in red), air defense systems (white), and ground surveillance radars (orange). The data also shows all hits on aircraft (in yellow), including those that did not result in destruction and strikes on non-operational aircraft. Molin believes this volume of successful strikes was made possible by launching UAVs from unmanned surface vehicles, which can approach the peninsula relatively closely.
The Main Directorate of Intelligence [GUR] of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine reported that Russian Slavyanin and Avangard ferries were struck in the early hours of March 14. According to the claim, Slavyanin was completely destroyed, while Avangard sustained damage.
No imagery confirming the aftermath has yet been released. Identification of the vessels from available strike footage has not been possible, as the ferries appear nearly identical. It is worth noting that following the Ukrainian sabotage of the Crimean Bridge in 2022, the RuAF ceased transporting fuel and explosive materials across the bridge. Instead, these cargoes have been moved via the ferry crossing in Kerch. In May, July, and August 2024, the AFU repeatedly targeted ferries operating on this route. In several instances, the attacks temporarily disrupted ferry operations, complicating logistical support to RuAF. Russian logistics in southern Ukraine are also sustained via the Rostov–Donetsk–Mariupol–Berdiansk railway corridor, linking the cities of Donetsk, Mariupol and Berdiansk. However, any suspension of ferry operations would likely further strain Russian supply lines.
Although the frontline remains relatively static, the tempo of Russian air strikes against Ukrainian territory has not declined. One possible explanation is the current pause in peace negotiations, reducing the need for Vladimir Putin to demonstrate restraint toward Donald Trump.
On the evening of March 12, Russian UAVs struck port infrastructure in the Odesa region, damaging a food storage warehouse within the port area. No casualties were reported.
Despite the onset of spring and a reduced load on Ukraine’s power grid—making strikes on energy facilities less operationally effective—Russia continues to target such infrastructure. In the early hours of March 14, the Trypilska Thermal Power Plant near Kyiv came under attack.
Mutual strikes against rail infrastructure are also ongoing. On March 12, in the Luhansk region, Ukrainian FP-2 drones struck a train reportedly transporting fuel and munitions. The locomotive sustained heavy damage, several tanker cars caught fire, and both the locomotive driver and his assistant were wounded.
In addition, the 422nd Separate Battalion of Unmanned Systems of the AFU released footage of a drone strike on a grain train on March 13, reportedly somewhere in the southern occupied territories.
For some reason, Russia prefers to attack passenger trains rather than freight trains. In the early hours of March 14, a Russian drone attacked a suburban train in the Kharkiv region, injuring three train drivers and one assistant. On the same day, a Russian UAV struck a locomotive at the rear of a passenger train in the Sumy region. Luckily no one was injured.
Other attacks on civilian infrastructure over the past weekend are compiled in our summary.
Ukrainian forces continue to target Russia’s chemical industry. Early on March 13, the AFU struck the Nevinnomyssky Azot plant, a major Russian chemical manufacturer, in the Stavropol region. This plant has been attacked at least five times since the beginning of the war.
In the early hours of March 16, Ukrainian drones set off a fire at an oil refinery in Labinsk in the Krasnodar region.
We believe that after the Russian Ministry of Defense reports numerous Ukrainian drones in its summaries, in some cases a Ukrainian missile strike on a factory or plant can be expected within the next several hours (up to a day). A swarm of cheap aerial targets is intended to overload air defenses and help the missiles reach their targets. Additionally, we assume that Ukraine did not use all of the SCALP-EG/Storm Shadow missiles it received in November for the March 10 strike on the Kremniy El microelectronics plant in Bryansk. It is reasonable to expect similar strikes on Russian industrial facilities in the coming weeks.
The Impact of the War in Iran on the War in Ukraine
As we previously reported, the countries of the Persian Gulf asked Ukraine for assistance in countering Iranian UAVs. When a Fox News host asked Trump whether Ukraine was helping the United States to combat drones, Trump replied in the negative, explaining that the US did not require assistance—it knew more about drones than anyone else and had the best drones in the world. We attribute the refusal to use Ukrainian UAV countermeasure technologies to strong lobbying by American manufacturers. It is worth noting that American anti-aircraft drones Merops, which were previously deployed in Poland and Romania, have now been redeployed to the Middle East (they cost an order of magnitude more than their Ukrainian counterparts).
Trump said that Putin may be "helping Iran a little" because he believes the United States is helping Ukraine. We do not think this will affect Trump’s attitude toward Putin. It appears that the American president sees this as part of the rules of the game and accepts it.
At the beginning of the war, fake reports surfaced in Iran claiming that Russian Shahed drones had been shot down in Dubai and Cyprus. In reality, these were fragments of drones that had been shot down in Ukraine (in one case, the footage was generated by AI). Last week, there were reports claiming that Russia had begun launching fewer Shahed drones because it had sent some of them to Iran. However, these assumptions are not supported by statistics. According to Volodymyr Zelenskyy, 1,770 strike drones were launched against Ukraine last week and 1,750 the week before. We are confident that the Russian army does not have large stockpiles of drones that could be sent to Iran since the debris of Russian Shahed drones found in Ukraine indicate that launches occur roughly within a month of production.
In the previous sitrep, we discussed the Tempest air defense system equipped with Hellfire missiles. At the BEDEX defense technology exhibition in Brussels, the French company Thales demonstrated a similar short-range air defense system used in Ukraine. It is equipped with FZ123 and FZ275 missiles. The latter are analogues of Hydra-70 missiles with the APKWS kit, which converts an unguided air-to-surface rocket into a high-precision laser-guided one. Since the war in the Middle East may lead to difficulties in supplying APKWS modules to Ukraine, it is possible that systems such as this air defense system from Thales will be actively purchased and used in Ukraine.
Trump has called on China, France, the UK and other countries to send warships to the Strait of Hormuz to ensure the security of shipping.
Due to rising oil prices, the US has temporarily eased sanctions on the sale of Russian oil. At the same time, Trump stated that once the crisis in the Middle East ends, the sanctions will be reinstated.
"Mr. Nobody Against Putin," a film about the militarization of Russian schools, has won the Oscar for Best Documentary Feature. Russian censored media outlets did not mention this in their reports about the award winners.
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