Sitrep for March 9-13, 2026 (as of 10:30 a.m. UTC+3)

Frontline Situation Update

Russia’s Group of Troops "North" continues active operations in Ukraine’s border areas, primarily in the Sumy region. Many of the settlements reportedly captured there effectively no longer exist and are barely visible even in satellite imagery. In our view, the creation of a "buffer zone" less than 15 km [9.3 mi] deep—through the expansion of contested areas and the capture of tiny border villages—is of limited military value. Nevertheless, this appears to be what the Russian military command is demanding. Ukrainian forces, for their part, are attempting to defend this territory. However, given the shortage of resources and the difficulty of reinforcing the border grouping, we believe a different approach might be more effective. The first step would be the forced evacuation of the remaining civilians from the border strip. In addition, areas where Russian forces are concentrating could be mined, after which advancing troops entering these minefields could be targeted with artillery and drone strikes. Under such a strategy, the Armed Forces of Ukraine would effectively create their own buffer zone—one that would function as a "kill zone" for Russian troops attempting to enter it. Ukrainian infantry would then engage in direct combat only when absolutely necessary. In our view, this approach could be more effective than attempting to repel assaults with territorial defense forces, particularly in villages where civilians are still present.

In the Sloviansk-Kramatorsk direction, Russian forces are continuing to advance near the village of Fedorivka Druha, east of the city of Kramatorsk, according to the DeepState monitoring project. As a reminder, last week we reported the start of tube artillery shelling of the city. On the morning of March 10, three air-dropped bombs struck the center of the city of Sloviansk, with one of them hitting a multi-story residential building. The attack killed four civilians and injured 21. Since Sloviansk and Kramatorsk are among the main targets of the Russian Armed Forces this year, various types of attacks on the two cities are likely to intensify in an effort to make the agglomeration unlivable and disrupt logistics for the AFU.

According to Ukrainian military observer Bohdan Myroshnykov, Russian forces in this sector have shifted from "rapid breakthroughs of 5-7 km [3.1-4.3 mi]" to a methodical, slow pressure against Ukrainian defensive lines. Recently, Russian units established salients east of the agglomeration near the villages of Nykyforivka, Fedorivka Druha, Pryvillia, Zakitne and Kalenyky. Following these advances, their immediate operational objective became securing and strengthening the flanks. Additionally, the Russian grouping on this flank is advancing faster than the two neighboring formations, giving it the ability to allocate more effort toward straightening and consolidating the frontline.

In the Pokrovsk direction, Russian troops have been confirmed on the southern outskirts of the town of Bilytske, as evidenced by geolocated video footage. Furthermore, DeepState reports Russian advances southwest of Pokrovsk, near the village of Udachne, where the Pokrovske mine administration complex is located. In this sector, Russian forces are attempting to push north from Udachne toward the Pokrovsk-Pavlohrad highway, gradually outflanking Ukrainian positions around the villages of Novooleksandrivka and Hryshyne.

During a Ukrainian offensive operation in the Zaporizhzhia and Dnipropetrovsk regions, the AFU attacked Russian positions in the village of Novohryhorivka. The presence of snow or ice in the footage suggests the video was recorded as late as the end of February. Subsequently, the RuAF launched counterattacks and may have cleared those positions. Fighting in this sector is ongoing.

Judging by satellite imagery, Russian forces are actively shelling and conducting airstrikes on territory near the villages of Solodke, Zlahoda and south of Verbove, further indicating that heavy fighting is taking place there.

Ukrainian and Russian Strikes

On Sunday, March 8, Ukraine launched a record number of drones against Russia—if all figures announced by the Russian Ministry of Defense are added together, 458 UAVs were reportedly shot down on March 8. On March 9, Interfax, citing the MoD, reported that 754 UAVs had been intercepted over the course of a single day. This clearly indicates an increase in the production of strike drones in Ukraine.

Researcher Jembob, studying satellite imagery, concluded that since approximately December 2025, virtually all oil refineries in Russia within a radius of 1,500 km [932 mi] of Ukraine have been equipped with air-defense positions, mainly Pantsir-S1 surface-to-air missile and anti-aircraft artillery systems. It should be noted that such point defense anti-air assets cannot reliably protect a facility from UAVs. At many plants, additional protective measures such as nets have been installed in order to minimize damage from explosions.

At the same time, given limited resources, Ukrainian forces must regularly update their targets, determining which ones are currently less well-protected and more easily reachable by drones. This means that each strike requires planning a route from the border to the target that, where possible, bypasses dangerous areas where air-defense and electronic warfare systems are deployed. In our view, these difficulties help explain the irregular nature of such strikes.

Pro-war blogger Razvedos and pro-Russian Telegram channel Fighterbomber [associated with the Russian Air and Space Force] have also highlighted the difficulties faced by Russian air defenses. According to them, it is possible to fully cover the border only with ground surveillance radars, not with missile launchers, as Russia simply does not possess enough launching systems. As a result, operators can only detect passing UAVs and relay information about them. The decision on whether to shoot the drone down must then be made by higher-level officers because surface-to-air missiles are expensive and in short supply. This decision must be taken quickly. However, transmitting information along the entire chain—from the radar operator to the responsible officer and, after approval, to the operator of the relevant air-defense combat vehicle—takes time. In some cases, this delay may be sufficient for the drone to reach and strike its target.

On March 10 and 11, Ukrainian forces continuously attacked targets near the city of Sochi, Krasnodar region, with drones for more than 28 hours. Several energy facilities were targeted, including the Russkaya compressor station, which supplies gas to the TurkStream pipeline, and the Beregovaya station near Tuapse, which is part of the Blue Stream pipeline.

Over the past two weeks, Ukrainian strikes on chemical plants have become more frequent:

• On March 4, Liutyi drones struck the Uralchem plant in Kirovo-Chepetsk, Kirov region, which produces ammonia, among other products.
• On March 9, the Acron chemical plant in Veliky Novgorod, which produces ammonium nitrate, was attacked.
• On March 11, drones targeted the KuibyshevAzot plant in Tolyatti, Samara region, and the Metafrax plant in Gubakha, Perm region, which also produces ammonia and ammonium nitrate.

Ammonia and ammonium nitrate are widely used in the defense industry for producing explosives and other components necessary for weapons manufacturing. Ukrainian strikes on facilities that produce such materials could, in theory, create shortages and slow Russian military production of explosives, air-dropped bombs, missiles and other weapons.

On March 10, the AFU conducted a missile strike on the Kremniy El microelectronics plant in Bryansk. According to some sources, eight to ten SCALP-EG/Storm Shadow cruise missiles were used; a delivery of such missiles to Ukraine was previously reported in November 2025. Some missiles missed the factory, striking nearby areas instead. Four civilians were killed and four others were injured in these off-target hits. Overall, seven people were reported dead and 42 wounded. Dashcam footage captured a missile strike on a road, with a "GPS NO SIGNAL" warning visible, suggesting the presence of electronic jamming in the area. Whether this interference caused the missiles to deviate remains unconfirmed. Satellite imagery published by the CyberBoroshno project shows damage to one of the plant’s buildings, with visible holes in its structure.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and the AFU General Staff stated that the Kremniy El plant produced military components, including missile guidance systems. Earlier, the plant’s then-director Oleg Dantsev remarked: "If we suddenly disappear today, a whole range of military products will cease to exist."

This military plant is a legitimate target, but its employees—civilian personnel—are not. Therefore, international law requires that strikes on military plants be carried out in a way that minimizes collateral damage as much as possible. One option is to conduct such strikes at night, when there are fewer people present and there is a possibility that the plant is not operating—unless it runs three shifts, which could well be the case.

Drone footage and satellite images have appeared showing the aftermath of a strike on a Shahed warehouse and a facility used for their preparation and launch near Donetsk Airport on March 7. According to sources cited by the Astra Telegram channel, several seconded employees of the UAV manufacturing plant located in the Alabuga Special Economic Zone in Russia’s constituent Republic of Tatarstan were injured. Four GROM Kaskad UAV Brigade fighters were also wounded. Additionally, satellite images were published showing the aftermath of a strike on a former car dealership near the Tochmash plant on March 8, where the 1st Motorized Rifle Brigade of the RuAF had been assembling ground robots.

Serhii Beskrestnov, a prominent Ukrainian military expert known by the call sign "Flash," reports that Russian forces are increasingly deploying Molniya fixed-wing kamikaze drones, which have proven exceptionally difficult to neutralize through EW. According to Beskrestnov, the challenge lies in the drone’s communication architecture. The aircraft is designed to receive commands without transmitting telemetry back to its pilot, making its operational frequency difficult to identify. Because operators are often positioned 20 to 40 miles [30-60 km] from the target, the signal reaching the drone is faint and virtually indistinguishable from background radio noise across the spectrum. While the signal is sufficient for the drone to execute maneuvers, it remains too subtle for standard EW tools to isolate. Curiously, the Molniya does transmit a live video feed; we remain puzzled as to why this particular signal has not been effectively jammed to disorient Russian operators.

Meanwhile, newly released footage from a Russian "ambush drone"—deployed to wait for targets near a roadway—has captured an encounter with a Ukrainian UAV that appeared to be illuminating the ground below. Some observers have speculated that the Ukrainian craft was equipped with a laser designed to sever fiber-optic cables. However, technical experts note that while industrial lasers can cut such materials, they typically operate in the infrared spectrum rather than the visible light seen in the video. It is more probable that the Ukrainian drone was attempting to detect enemy units by searching for the reflective glint of cables or by utilizing "structured light" scanning.

On-screen data from the Russian "ambush" drone’s interface reveals a sudden, sharp spike in electrical current and throttle as the Ukrainian craft approached. The most plausible explanation for the Russian drone's subsequent failure is that the operator, realizing they were about to be discovered, attempted an abrupt takeoff. This maneuver likely overloaded the drone’s electronic speed controller, causing it to burn out under the sudden strain.

New data from Doug Madory, the director of internet analysis at the IT firm Kentik, shows that traffic on a specific Starlink network plummeted by approximately 75 percent following SpaceX’s decision to deactivate terminals in occupied regions of Ukraine. While some observers interpreted the data to mean that three-quarters of the terminals in these areas were Russian-operated, analysts suggest this is unlikely. Russian forces possess a relatively small number of terminals, which are acquired through circuitous routes via third countries and typically function only near the frontline, rather than in rear-echelon cities like Donetsk or Luhansk. Given that tens of thousands of Ukrainian terminals are in active use, the theory that a much smaller Russian contingent generated triple the traffic is viewed as improbable. A more likely explanation is that after "white-listing" protocols were implemented for Ukrainian forces, those registered terminals migrated to a different network configuration, thereby vanishing from the specific traffic charts monitored by Kentik.

We have previously expressed concerns that the war in Iran could complicate the supply of PAC-3 missiles for Patriot air defense systems and APKWS guided rockets to Ukraine, as they would be required to protect US bases in the Middle East from Iranian missiles and drones. Germany has organized the delivery of 35 PAC-3 interceptors to Ukraine. It should be noted that this quantity will not last long, as intercepting a single ballistic missile often requires about two interceptor missiles.

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