Sitrep for Feb. 23-March 2, 2026 (as of 11:00 a.m. UTC+3)
Frontline Situation Update
As a new month begins, various analytical projects have summed up the results for February. Although we had expected January to mark a record low in Russian territorial gains, that distinction ultimately went to February. According to the DeepState Ukrainian monitoring project, Russia captured 126 square kilometers—its lowest monthly figure since July 2024. For comparison, Russia captured 245 square kilometers in January 2026 and 445 square kilometers in December 2025. Even according to the pro-Russian Slivochny Kapriz project, the pace of Russian advances in February dropped by more than half compared to January—from 560 to 255 square kilometers.
In our view, this was not simply due to the shorter calendar month, but rather to the typical winter slowdown, as well as the impact of the ongoing Ukrainian offensive operation (even though the territory recaptured by Ukrainian forces was not large enough to significantly affect the overall statistics). As spring approaches and the snow melts and roads dry out, an increase in combat activity can be expected—potentially as early as late March.
In the Orikhiv direction, Russian forces are advancing toward the town of Orikhiv, according to Ukrainian military observer Kostiantyn Mashovets. The offensive is being carried out by the Group of Troops "East" from the direction of the town of Huliaipole and the village of Zaliznychne, and by the Group of Troops "Dnepr" from the direction of the villages of Stepnohirsk and Prymorske, although the pace of advances in these sectors has recently varied significantly.
In the area around Prymorske—along the Dnipro River and the Konka River—the advance has effectively stalled. Until recently, there had been discussions that the Russian Armed Forces might attempt to cut the road from the city of Zaporizhzhia to Orikhiv, which would complicate logistics for Ukrainian troops.
On the eastern flank of this direction, Russian forces are attempting to advance westward from Huliaipole. They have reportedly entered the village of Hirke, although it is still not marked as part of the contested area on the DeepState map. At the same time, the risk of a Ukrainian flanking strike remains, as the Armed Forces of Ukraine’s offensive operation in the Dnipropetrovsk region continues.
All of this suggests that the plan to encircle Orikhiv may not unfold as intended, as the RuAF are unlikely to be able to envelop the town from two sides simultaneously. Reaching the necessary positions at different times could give Ukrainian forces an opportunity to launch counterattacks against whichever flank advances more quickly.
Similarly, during the offensive on the Sloviansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration, the RuAF aim to reach the initial lines from three directions: the Lyman direction (by the Siverskyi Donets River), the Siversk direction (where recent advances have been observed) and the Kostiantynivka direction (in addition to capturing the town of Kostiantynivka, they have to take Oleksiievo-Druzhkivka and Druzhkivka). It is already clear that synchrony should not be expected, as the volume of tasks varies across the different directions, and the RuAF will not be able to accomplish them simultaneously. This complicates the encirclement by Russian forces of the last uncaptured agglomeration in the Donetsk region, while also easing the AFU's defensive task and opening opportunities for counterattacks.
During the AFU’s offensive operation in the Dnipropetrovsk region, the last days of winter have seen new Ukrainian attacks in the area of Berezove and south of Verbove in the direction of the village of Zlahoda (until 2024—Pershotravneve). These are marked on the map of French investigator Clément Molin.
The Russian Ministry of Defense has released video footage of strikes on Ukrainian positions south of Vyshneve. Based on all this information, it can be asserted that the AFU have already taken control of at least Vyshneve and Verbove.
Although Russian drones targeted Ukrainian mechanized columns in the Berezove and Zlahoda areas, the AFU might have managed to advance further. However, it is difficult to judge the success of these particular attacks.
The arrival of spring will make it more difficult for our team, Molin and other researchers studying satellite imagery to detect traces of shelling and strikes. When the snow melts and the soil becomes wet and soggy in places, it will be harder to see these traces. Against the backdrop of snow, they are much more visible.
Ukrainian and Russian Strikes
Footage has emerged of a Russian strike on Kostiantynivka employing incendiary munitions, which leave trails in the sky visually resembling fireworks. Based on the video, 9M22S incendiary rockets for the BM-21 Grad MLRS were used—apparently for the first time after a prolonged pause. These cluster-type rockets carry incendiary submunitions rather than white phosphorus as has sometimes been claimed. In addition to constituting a war crime, the strike appears militarily ineffective, given the absence of foliage on trees that could readily ignite. For the same reason, Dracarys drones, which disperse burning mixtures over forest lines, have not been employed in recent months.
On Feb. 27, a missile alert regime was introduced for the first time in the Sverdlovsk and Perm regions. Similar alerts were declared in Russia’s constituent republics of Tatarstan, Udmurtia, Bashkortostan and the Orenburg region. This is reportedly linked to the declared 3,000 km [1864 mi] operational range of the Flamingo cruise missile system. Due to their very low-altitude flight profile, such cruise missiles can be difficult to track and may temporarily drop from radar coverage. It is presumed that, upon detection, missile threat warnings are issued across all regions potentially within reach of their projected flight path.
Ukraine's Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov stated that the Shahed UAV guidance network operating from Belarusian territory has been neutralized. Ukrainian military expert Serhii Flash Beskrestnov clarified that Russian UAVs communicate with one another via radio channels, forming mesh-topology networks. The destruction of several drones does not sever connectivity; however, such networks require ground-based Internet uplink nodes. These uplink nodes, reportedly located on communication towers in southern Belarus, were identified by Ukrainian signals intelligence and, according to Ukrainian sources, subsequently destroyed—presumably by UAV strikes.
It has also been reported that, in operations against Iran, that the United States employed LUCAS loitering munitions—Shahed-type drones equipped with Starlink terminals—in operations against Iran.
A potential conflict pitting the United States and Israel against Iran is unlikely to dampen the tempo of Russia’s drone campaign, as the production of Shahed loitering munitions has long been localized and direct imports from Tehran have largely ceased. Furthermore, Moscow has established robust, clandestine supply chains to procure drone components while bypassing international sanctions, leaving it with a greater capacity for mass production than Iran itself.
However, Kyiv’s arsenal may face a separate squeeze. Shipments of PAC-3 interceptors for the Patriot missile defense system could falter as Washington prioritizes the protection of its own bases in the Middle East, potentially leading the US to scale back sales to Ukraine.
The battlefield has also become a laboratory for exportable tactics. While the United States is expected to study Ukrainian techniques for intercepting Shahed drones—following a similar request for assistance from Great Britain—Moscow may reciprocate by sharing its own innovations with Tehran. This tech transfer could include sophisticated evasion algorithms designed to help Shaheds dodge interceptor drones.
New visual evidence has emerged regarding the 9M729 missile, a weapon long suspected of breaching international arms control standards. Reuters has recently published fresh photographs of a 9M729 missile wreckage. This follows a report from the Ukrainian Prosecutor General’s Office last November, which informed Reuters that a 9M729 launched by Russia on Oct. 5, 2025, traveled more than 1,200 kilometers [745 miles].
Speculation that Russia was violating the terms of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty has circulated for years. As recently as 2024, some observers doubted the existence of a new long-range Russian missile, citing a lack of recorded use on Ukrainian territory. However, the strike on the village of Lapaivka in the Lviv region on Oct. 5 appears to have provided the "smoking gun." Analysts and journalists now have photographic confirmation of the missile's 1,200-km range, and of its continued deployment; at least four more of these missiles were reportedly launched against Ukraine in February 2026.
According to a recent report in The Economist, a high-stakes tactical evolution is unfolding between Ukrainian air defense units and Russian drone operators. Commanders describe a "cat-and-mouse game" that has pushed capabilities beyond those of most Western militaries.
The RuAF are reportedly iterating on their hardware and tactics every few months. When Russian operators realized that Ukrainian Merops interceptor drones were attacking from below—using the bright sky as a high-contrast backdrop to spot their targets—they adjusted the Shahed-136 (Geran-2) loitering munitions to fly at lower altitudes. More recently, the drones have begun executing evasive maneuvers every few minutes to defeat the interceptors' tracking algorithms.
Ukrainian engineers examining downed craft report that these UAVs are now utilizing local cellular and Wi-Fi networks to refine their positioning, relying on inertial navigation systems when connectivity is severed. There are growing concerns that Russia may eventually share these specialized navigation and evasion technologies with Iran.
According to the Air Force of the AFU, in February 2026, they conducted more than 112 combat sorties for fire missions to engage the enemy and provide aerial support to their troops. For comparison, according to the General Staff of the AFU, on Feb. 27 alone, the Russian Aerospace Forces dropped 328 glide bombs. Given that one Russian aircraft is typically equipped with four air-dropped bombs, this corresponds to 82 sorties per day—20 times more than Ukraine. In the previous summary, we quoted AFU serviceman Oleksandr Solonko, who demonstrated how a significant advantage in the number of air-dropped bombs and artillery allows the RuAF to capture areas with permanent buildings more quickly and effectively.
Ukraine’s largest metallurgical plant, ArcelorMittal Kryvyi Rih, is halting the operation of its foundry and mechanical plant in the city of Kryvyi Rih. Mines near the town of Pokrovsk have been idle for about a year, forcing the plant to import coking coal, while the cost of electricity has also increased significantly this winter. As a result, the plant's production profitability has dropped sharply, and it is scheduled to shut down in three months, which will deprive the city of jobs and tax revenues.
According to an article published by UNITED24 based on leaked documents from the Perm Gunpowder Plant, Russia is not facing a shortage of Kamov Ka-52M attack helicopters. Even after the start of the full-scale invasion, in April 2022, documentation was prepared for the delivery of 48 Ka-52M attack helicopters to China, for which the gunpowder plant was to produce 96 PZ-37 pyrotechnic cartridges. Similar documents, published by the Bumaga media outlet in July 2024, confirm plans to supply 48 helicopters between 2025 and 2027. These documents demonstrate that Russia's defense industry continues to plan multi-year export programs amid active combat operations and sanctions pressure.
In the early hours of March 1, Belgium and France carried out an operation in the North Sea to intercept a tanker belonging to Russia’s "shadow fleet." The Belgian Ministry of Defense stated that the reason was a violation of the ban on vessels sailing under a false flag or no flag. Such vessels cannot claim the right of innocent passage through Belgium’s exclusive economic zone, and the government authorized the boarding of the ship. The patrol vessel Pollux intercepted the tanker, after which members of the Special Operations Forces boarded it. Two NH90 helicopters of the Belgian Air Force and two French Navy aircraft provided air support for the operation. The vessel was escorted to the port of Zeebrugge. The fate of the tanker remains unknown, but in several previous cases involving similar incidents, the vessels were released a few days after paying a fine.
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