Sitrep for Feb. 16-20, 2026 (as of 10:30 a.m. UTC+3)
Frontline Situation Update
Two weeks have passed since the start of the Ukrainian operational-level offensive in the Zaporizhzhia and Dnipropetrovsk regions. Looking at the interim results, it's clear that most of the progress was made during the first week. In the second week, the pace slowed and there were no major changes on the ground.
In the Oleksandrivka direction, the most noticeable changes have been recorded. According to DeepState, Ukrainian forces have pushed back the contested area and recaptured some positions near the villages of Ternove, Berezove, Verbove and Vyshneve.
In the Huliaipole direction, Ukrainian counterattacks took place around the village of Dobropillia—on both sides of it—as well as slightly farther south, near the villages of Pryluky and Varvarivka. Reports indicated that Pryluky had been fully liberated, while only the northern part of Varvarivka was recaptured. At the same time, farther south—in the areas of the town of Huliaipole and the village of Zaliznychne—DeepState has, on the contrary, mapped Russian advances near the villages of Tsvitkove, Sviatopetrivka and Staroukrainka.
At this stage, we do not expect the offensive to develop significantly further, although it is entirely possible that the AFU will recapture additional positions. In response to the Ukrainian counterattacks, Russian forces have redeployed additional units to contain them—including, according to some reports, the Rubikon unit, which has contributed to slowing the AFU’s advance. It is still too early to assess how successful this operation has been for Ukraine, as there is no reliable data on losses.
One of the operation’s objectives was to halt Russian advances in the Huliaipole direction. Another, it appears, was to demonstrate to Donald Trump that the AFU are capable not only of defending, but also of launching offensive actions, even if on a limited scale. This, in turn, is meant to show that Ukraine’s position is not so dire as to justify agreeing to a ceasefire on unfavorable terms.
In the Pokrovsk direction, where some Ukrainian forces were redeployed to the Zaporizhzhia and Dnipropetrovsk regions, no significant changes have been recorded. On Feb. 17, DeepState mapped an expansion of Russian-controlled territory in the town of Myrnohrad. At present, only a small area in the northern part of the town, covering about 0.7 square kilometers, remains outside Russian control.
At this point, most analysts agree that Myrnohrad has been fully captured. According to researcher Playfra, Russian drone operators are now among those deployed in high-rise buildings in the town. Some Ukrainian troops who remained in positions on the northwestern outskirts have ended up surrounded within territory controlled by Russian forces, making evacuation extremely difficult. It appears that an orderly withdrawal of Ukrainian troops from the town—which we argued was necessary as early as last fall—never took place, despite repeated statements by Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi that while territory matters, soldiers’ lives matter more.
Northwest of the town of Pokrovsk, in the center of the village of Hryshyne, footage was recorded showing a Ukrainian Leopard 2A4 tank moving along a street and engaging Russian infantry shelters with direct fire. This represents a relatively rare instance of heavy armored vehicles being employed not from rear areas in indirect fire roles, but in close urban clearance operations. According to reports, the tank was subsequently targeted by a UAV, sustained non-critical damage, and was able to withdraw to rear positions.
In the Kostiantynivka direction, according to Playfra, the RuAF have begun positioning artillery in the area of the village of Predtechyne, east of the town of Kostiantynivka, in order to shell the city. Slightly further south, the village of Oleksandro-Shultyne has reportedly become a staging area for assault troops, who are advancing toward AFU positions in the southeastern part of the town, so far without significant success. Reports also indicate that RuAF are attempting to advance from Ivanopillia toward the university complex in southern Kostiantynivka (apparently referring to a branch of Donetsk National University). In addition, Playfra noted that Russian troops have entrenched themselves near the villages of Illinka and Stepanivka, and have secured a checkpoint situated on tactically elevated terrain near the village of Berestok, previously assessed as strategically significant. This position may now be used as a launch point for Russian UAV operators, enabling more effective strikes on Kostiantynivka and potentially influencing the course of subsequent combat operations.
Information has also emerged regarding the results of an inspection conducted by a commission from the Russian General Staff in the Kupiansk direction, tasked with verifying whether the reported line of contact corresponded to the actual situation on the ground. According to pro-Russian military correspondent Romanov, the commission assigned to the Group of Troops "West" identified no discrepancies, fully meeting our expectations.
Meanwhile, Associated Press published an interview with former Commander-in-Chief of the AFU Valerii Zaluzhnyi, in which he described the origins of tensions in his relationship with Volodymyr Zelenskyy, arising shortly after the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion over issues related to organizing Ukraine’s defense. According to Zaluzhnyi, the conflict culminated in an incident in which dozens of officers from the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) entered his command post to conduct a search. He interpreted the move as pressure against him. The SBU, for its part, acknowledged that investigative measures had taken place in the building but stated they were unrelated to the Armed Forces of Ukraine and instead concerned organized crime and a strip club previously located at the site. Reports indicate that Zaluzhnyi even contacted Andriy Yermak, former Head of the Office of the President, demanding that the search be halted. However, journalists were unable to independently verify or refute the account, and the Office of the President of Ukraine declined to comment.
In addition, Zaluzhnyi expressed his view on Ukraine’s unsuccessful counteroffensive in the summer of 2023. According to him, the plan developed jointly with NATO partners failed because the country’s leadership did not allocate the necessary resources. The plan envisaged delivering the main strike along a single axis in the Zaporizhzhia region, intending to sever Russia’s land corridor to Crimea. To achieve this, Ukrainian forces were to concentrate near Orikhiv, break through defenses in the Tokmak area, advance toward Melitopol and reach the Sea of Azov. The strategy required a concentration of forces and the achievement of tactical surprise.
However, the political leadership insisted on dispersing forces across multiple directions, thereby weakening the main strike potential. As a result, offensive operations were conducted not only from Orikhiv toward Melitopol, but also near Bakhmut, on the left bank of the Dnipro River, and in the vicinity of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant. This assessment has been independently corroborated and we have discussed this previously. Indeed, no major success was achieved, largely because several axes of attack were chosen instead of one primary direction.
From early 2023 onward, Zaluzhnyi had repeatedly emphasized the need for a counteroffensive and the acute shortage of military vehicles. At the time, Western deliveries were delayed, and debates continued over the provision of tanks. Sufficient volumes of weapons reached the AFU only by the summer. During this period, while the planned offensive was widely discussed and not a secret, Russian forces had time to construct extensive defensive fortifications in the Zaporizhzhia region.
Bohdan Krotevych, former commander of the Azov Brigade of the National Guard of Ukraine, criticized the interview. He argued that attributing responsibility to circumstances, a strong adversary, or resource shortages could be used to justify any mistake, including flawed planning, lack of experience and misunderstanding of the nature of modern warfare. In his view, the choice of this direction was ill-advised from the outset, as six fully developed defensive lines had been constructed there, along with a prepared all-around defense of Tokmak. This indicated that the adversary expected an attack in that area, making tactical surprise impossible. Decision-making centers, he argued, failed to take this into account.
Another significant problem was that newly formed units consisted almost entirely of mobilized soldiers who had received Western military vehicles (such as Leopard tanks, YPR armored vehicles and M113 carriers) without adequate training. According to Krotevych, mobilized personnel sometimes drove vehicles into their own trenches or abandoned it in contested areas after nearby mortar strikes. They also reportedly left behind weapons, communication equipment and company-level command maps. At the time, many analysts argued that full combined-arms operations were not effectively demonstrated, that command and control were chaotic, and that adjacent units often lacked awareness of developments in neighboring sectors.
In his assessment, Krotevich contended that the primary failure lay not in a scarcity of resources, but in a breakdown of operational cohesion that led to the abandonment of functional vehicles. He noted that a prohibition was placed on evacuating machinery from the contested area, and military vehicles that were successfully recovered were subsequently seized by military counter-intelligence. Krotevich himself attempted to ensure that salvaged vehicles remained—at least temporarily—with its original unit, but his request was denied. Consequently, the RuAF used mortars to destroy the abandoned assets. The evidence suggests that while resources were available, the breakdown occurred in their distribution and tactical employment. From our perspective, while the necessary vehicles were present at the start of the operation, the fundamental issue was that they arrived in Ukraine far too late. Discussions regarding the necessity of a counteroffensive began as early as February and March, yet the campaign remained stalled by a lack of armor and weaponry. It was only after the delivery of essential supplies in May and June that offensive operations became viable. It appears that General Zaluzhnyi’s core argument was precisely this: the resources arrived so late that Russia had ample time to fortify its defenses.
In Krotevich’s estimation, the 2023 offensive was marred by several critical errors: a poorly chosen primary axis of attack, deficient planning, and an irrational distribution of vehicles and personnel that ignored the experience and morale of the troops. He also pointed to a lack of flexibility once the operation lost its initial momentum. When it became clear that the primary direction was bogged down, he argues, the command should have pivoted, shifting reserves to areas where dynamic gains were still possible.
However, it feels somewhat imprecise to judge the strategic choices of that period through the sobering lens of 2025 and 2026. By now, it has become clear that a single, sweeping counteroffensive capable of strategically altering the war's trajectory—leading to an outright victory or a favorable freeze of the conflict—is nearly impossible to execute. Today, offensive actions are generally undertaken with more modest objectives: reclaiming limited territory, checking Russian advances, and demonstrating to the international community that the Ukrainian military remains a viable fighting force capable of results if properly supported.
In 2023, however, the prevailing logic assumed a breakthrough was possible—a push to the Sea of Azov that would slice the frontline in two. Such a scenario would have dealt a devastating blow to the Russian army, particularly the grouping in the Kherson region, which would have been severed from its primary supply lines. This, in turn, could have created the conditions to gradually push Russian forces out of the Kherson region and apply mounting pressure on southern Zaporizhzhia and the Donetsk regions.
In column for Foreign Affairs, Michael Kofman argues that despite Russia’s tactical adaptations, its combat efficiency is not improving. Until 2025, about 30% of contract soldiers recruited to the Russian Armed Forces could be used to build new units; in 2025, however, nearly the entire monthly intake—30,000 to 35,000 personnel—has been used to replace losses. By December, unrecoverable casualties (those killed and seriously injured) began to exceed monthly recruitment. We are not yet prepared to draw far-reaching conclusions based on data from December and January, as winter recruitment is historically lower. If spring figures return to last year’s average and losses remain high, "equilibrium" may re-emerge. Kofman said that his past predictions that Russia would exhaust its manpower, ammunition or military vehicles proved wrong. However, if current casualty rates are sustained, the RuAF might have to reduce offensive intensity or the number of axes it tries to push in 2026. The AFU continue to hold what remains of the Donbas, though it is losing territory in the Zaporizhzhia and Dnipropetrovsk regions. A key challenge for Ukraine remains Russia’s strike capabilities beyond 20 miles, while Ukrainian forces often lack affordable and effective long-range strike options. In our view, Russia’s manpower shortage is exacerbated by the Group of Troops "North," which, since 2024, has been tasked with establishing a buffer zone to protect the Belgorod and Bryansk regions from AFU strikes. The group is now expanding this buffer zone through small bridgeheads and has captured Komarivka, Sydorivka, Hrabovske, Pokrovka, Kharkivka in the Sumy region and Chuhunivkain the Kharkiv region.
Nevertheless, the border areas of the Belgorod and Bryansk regions remain under attack, stretching the frontline and requiring additional defensive forces. Russia therefore faces a dilemma: withdraw from these exposed positions and risk appearing weak or resolve its recruitment shortfall. Financial incentives have maintained, but not increased, recruitment levels over the past 18 months, while regional budgets are under strain. The Ministry of Defense has proposed legislation that would count one day of service as a "special military operation participant" as three days toward pension eligibility for state service, professional experience and total work history. If recruitment deficits persist for months without alternative solutions, Russian authorities may theoretically consider a second wave of mobilization.
The Institute for the Study of War has claimed that Putin is preparing Russian society for a new "partial mobilization." In its view, this preparation is reflected in legislation adopted at the end of last year allowing the MoD to draw on a two-million-strong mobilization reserve, as well as in the fact that the inflow of contract soldiers no longer compensates for frontline losses. Such conclusions, however, demonstrate an insufficient understanding of Russian realities on the part of some Western analysts.
The mobilization manpower reserve does not include all men who have completed statutory military service and remain formally in the reserve. Rather, it consists of citizens who have signed separate contracts to serve in the country’s combat army reserve (BARS). Previously, units staffed by reservists could be used only during mobilization or under martial law. However, after the State Duma [lower house of Russia's Federal Assembly] adopted amendments to the Law "On Defense" in October 2025, reservists can be engaged in carrying out MoD tasks in peacetime—for example, to protect critical infrastructure and other essential facilities from drone attacks. The special training assemblies for reservists are likely to provide only a very limited personnel inflow, who moreover are not expected to be deployed to the frontline but instead assigned to guard oil refineries and similar facilities. It is worth noting that reservists are called up annually for military training irrespective of whether the country is at war; this practice in itself does not signal preparations for a new wave of mobilization.
Investigative projects of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty—Schemes and Sistema—have published a report on the torture of captured AFU soldiers. Journalists examined an archive of correspondence from Major General Roman Demurchiev (now deputy commander of Russia’s 20th Combined Arms Army) covering the years 2022-2024. In these messages, he described to fellow servicemen and relatives the torture and killing of Ukrainian prisoners of war. According to the report, on Oct. 18, 2022, Demurchiev wrote that he had taken a strongpoint that had been under assault for three days and had captured four Ukrainian soldiers. He then sent his wife a photograph of severed and blackened human ears hanging from a metal pipe. In December 2024, his correspondence included thermal-camera drone footage in which Russian servicemen—former convicts—hacked three Ukrainian prisoners to death with entrenching tools after the latter had raised their hands and surrendered. Demurchiev showed the video of the murder to his immediate superior, General Oleg Mityaev, commander of the 20th Army. Voice messages cited by journalists contain the following exchange:
— Well, I reported to you. Two former convicts entered the strongpoint, the position—three Ukrainians. They took them prisoner and hacked them to death with shovels. <...> Take a look—execution with entrenching tools.
— The former convicts who took the position chopped them up with shovels—God willing they survive, definitely submit them for awards. Quietly keep pushing forward, well done. <...> Good job, keep pressing, crush the bastards.
This article further confirms the systemic nature of the practice of encouraging war crimes by the Russian military command. In our report featuring statistics on attacks against civilian infrastructure in 2025, we also show that despite the rotation of Russian units responsible for operations around the city of Kherson throughout the year, the so-called "human safari" has continued. This systematic policy of terror against the civilian population appears to be encouraged by the leadership of the Group of Troops "Dnepr." The data we have collected indicate that the RuAF do not attempt to minimize collateral damage and, moreover, deliberately use precision weapons against civilian targets.
A Ukrainian serviceman, author of the Officer Telegram channel, reported that Russian soldiers began using LTE communications to control FPV drones. The use of mobile internet to control FPV drones has been known for a long time; current reports likely refer specifically to the high-speed LTE standard. According to Ukrainian military expert Serhii "Flash" Beskrestnov, FPV drones are mounted on loitering munitions, such as the Geran, Molniya or Gerbera, and are released over targets in areas with stable mobile network coverage. The drone is controlled by an operator from Russia via Ukrainian SIM cards, and the flight time lasts several minutes.
A video has been published showing a Russian interceptor drone destroying a Russian Molniya UAV that was carrying two FPV drones.
President Zelenskyy stated that Ukraine has imposed sanctions against Belarus's Alyaksandr Lukashenka for assisting the RuAF and for plans to deploy the Oreshnik IRBM system on the territory of Belarus. Zelenskyy also reported that in the second half of 2025 a network of relay stations for controlling drones used in attacks on the northern regions of Ukraine—from the Kyiv region to Volyn—was deployed in Belarus. According to him, some strikes, particularly against energy facilities and railway infrastructure in these areas, were made possible only with Belarusian assistance. Potential Belarusian involvement in carrying out air strikes was reported at the end of last year. However, at that time it remained unclear whether this involved the deployment of UAV operators on Belarusian territory or a network of relay stations.
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