Sitrep for Feb. 9-13, 2026 (as of 11:30 a.m. UTC+3)

Frontline Situation Update

This week, Russian forces continued attempts to bring the real situation in the Kupiansk direction into line with official reports. On Feb. 9, Russian troops carried out a mechanized attack near the villages of Petropavlivka and Podoly. As a result, according to Ukrainian servicemen, a column of Russian military equipment, including two MT-LB multi-purpose armored vehicles, 11 quad bikes and two buggies, was destroyed. Seventeen soldiers were reportedly killed and four wounded. Earlier, advances east of the town of Kupiansk had been reported only "on paper."

Pro-Russian military correspondent Vladimir Romanov said the same day that a commission from the Russian General Staff had arrived at the Group of Troops "West" to verify whether the real situation on the forward positions and in Kupiansk corresponds to what had previously been reported. However, in the days since, there have been no reports on the results of this inspection, nor any news of personnel changes. We (as does Romanov himself) believe that the commission may have been prevented from seeing the real situation by some means—for example, through bribery. As a result, Russian authorities are likely to continue making statements that do not reflect reality about having full control over Kupiansk or the village of Kupiansk-Vuzlovyi.

On the Sloviansk-Kramatorsk axis, Russian forces continue minor advances near the villages of Nykyforivka, Fedorivka Druha, Pryvillia and Riznykivka (west of Siversk).

In the Pokrovsk direction, the RuAF persist in gradual progress toward Hryshyne, Rodynske and Bilytske. DeepState analysts still do not recognize Pokrovsk as fully captured, as small peripheral areas remain a "gray zone"—a term they use to denote infiltration zones. We assess that Pokrovsk was effectively lost by the Armed Forces of Ukraine by late last year, as their presence on the outskirts no longer influences the town’s situation or hinders Russian deployment of equipment. For instance, a 2S9 Nona-S self-propelled mortar from the 76th Air Assault Division was detected in central Pokrovsk and struck by Ukrainian drones. The movement of armor and artillery into Pokrovsk, in our view, may be part of preparations for a spring offensive west and northwest of the town.

On the eastern flank of the Zaporizhzhia axis, starting around Feb. 8, video evidence began to emerge showing Ukrainian attacks, including the use of armored vehicles, which were repelled by Russian forces. The attacks appear to have commenced following the deactivation of unregistered Starlink terminals. Footage has been published showing an FPV-drone strike against an abandoned Abrams tank in the area between Zaliznychne and Dorozhnianka. Available data indicate that Ukrainian equipment advancing toward Russian positions is detected in advance by Russian UAVs and engaged. Based on the observed evidence, the shutdown of Starlink terminals did not result in a breakdown of field communications, and the AFU failed to achieve tactical surprise on this axis.

Subsequently, following Russian reports alleging the onset of a Ukrainian counteroffensive, the AFU officially denied these claims, stating that troops were conducting clearance operations in populated areas into which Russian assault troops may have infiltrated. In contrast, on Feb. 10, the commander of the 1st Separate Assault Regiment, Dmytro Filatov, stated that Ukrainian forces had achieved certain successes on the Huliaipole axis, though details could not yet be disclosed.

Earlier, Commander-in-Chief of the AFU, General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated in an interview that the situation on this sector of the front would change significantly in the near term. His remarks likely gave rise to assumptions regarding the initiation of a full-scale counteroffensive.

According to Ukrainian military observer Kostiantyn Mashovets, as of Feb. 11 it was neither possible to confirm nor refute reports of alleged "16 km [9.9 mi] breakthroughs" on the Zaporizhzhia axis, while the AFU’s counterattacking actions are "fairly limited in nature and scale." In his view, their objective is the elimination of infiltrated assault troops. On the one hand, we agree that there is no indication of a large-scale counteroffensive, as was the case, for example, in the summer of 2023, when forces from several brigades were involved and large columns of military equipment advanced. On the other hand, we are also not prepared to describe this as a routine clearing operation, since it was precisely to this sector of the front that the AFU command redeployed the 475th Assault Regiment, whose UAV units are considered among the best. At the end of 2025, they were actively involved in operations in the Kupiansk direction. Near the village of Rivnopillia, they struck UAV positions of Russian operators from the Rubicon unit. The elite 82nd Air Assault Brigade of the AFU, which had previously fought in the Donetsk region, was also redeployed there. In addition, a video has emerged showing the destruction, as reports indicate, of a CAESAR self-propelled howitzer. We assume it belonged to one of the artillery brigades that are part of the AFU’s assault forces, which was also transferred to the Huliaipole axis. The aforementioned Abrams tank was likewise assigned to the assault forces. Thus, we observe a significant reinforcement of the AFU grouping on this sector of the front, partly at the expense of the Pokrovsk direction, from which some units were withdrawn. It cannot be ruled out that the RuAF may take advantage of this and intensify pressure near Hryshyne and Rodynske.

All of this casts doubt on the notion that Ukraine’s military command is limiting its plans to localized counterattacks and small-scale clearing operations. While a large-scale counteroffensive does not appear likely, the evidence suggests preparations are underway for an offensive operation of an operational-tactical or even operational scope. It remains unclear whether Ukrainian forces will be able to achieve success comparable to the operation in the Kupiansk direction in late 2025, around Kupiansk, but the recapture of at least some positions appears plausible. In that context, the 33rd Assault Regiment of the AFU released video footage showing clearing operations in the village of Kosivtseve, near Ternuvate. On Feb. 12, Mashovets said that Ukrainian forces were no longer merely clearing territory but continuing counterattacks, advancing in the area of Ternuvate, crossing the Haichur River, liberating Dobropillia and fighting north of it— reports echoed by pro-Russian sources. According to the Ukrainian researcher Shalin, Ukrainian troops also liberated the village of Pryluky; Shalin published a map showing known Ukrainian advances in the area. It can be inferred that Ukrainian forces are seeking to reach the Yanchur River, east of the Haichur. There have also been reports of fighting near the villages of Berezove and Verbove in the Dnipropetrovsk region.

As Shalin and several Ukrainian Telegram channels reported on Feb. 9, Ukraine’s commander in chief, Oleksandr Syrskyi, told journalists that Valentyn Manko would no longer command the assault forces and that his successor would not be selected from among publicly known figures. However, according to those same reports, no final decision has yet been made, and the Ukrainian outlet TSN later deleted its story on the matter. No information about Manko’s dismissal has appeared on General Syrskyi’s official accounts or those of the General Staff, nor on Colonel Manko’s own Facebook page. We were also unable to locate video of the reported exchange with journalists, and some media outlets have described the claims as unconfirmed.

Serhii "Flash" Beskrestnov, an adviser to Ukraine’s Minister of Defense Mykhailo Fedorov, reported that Russian units have begun receiving urgent deliveries of satellite internet terminals. The satellite dishes, which operate via the Yamal and Express spacecraft, are significantly larger than Starlink terminals, cannot be used with protective covers and must be oriented to the southeast or south. At the same time, he noted that such terminals can be positioned deeper behind the frontline and connected to forward positions via a Wi-Fi bridge.

It is reported that Ukrainian activists created Telegram bots through which users could allegedly register Starlink terminals to bypass blocking measures. In this way, they reportedly collected "2,420 data packets on enemy Starlinks and the precise positions of opposing forces," as well as nearly $6,000 from Russian soldiers who were "desperately looking for a solution to their communications problems" (journalists were only able to confirm transfers totaling $250).

On Feb. 12, we published a comprehensive report on attacks against civilian infrastructure in 2025. According to the tally, compiled by our volunteers, 2,919 civilians were killed and more than 17,775 others were injured over the past year on both sides of the frontline as a result of attacks on civilian infrastructure. Compared with 2024, the number of people killed rose by 12 percent, while the number of injured increased by more than 25 percent. The year 2025 was the deadliest for the civilian population since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022. Last year saw a sharp increase in casualties caused by UAV strikes. This was driven both by the growing scale of UAV production and by a failure of the RuAF to attempt to avoid collateral civilian casualties. Instead, the report indicates that high-precision munitions have in many cases been deliberately used against civilians. Despite the large-scale rotation of Russian units responsible for operations around the Kherson region throughout 2025, what is described as a "human safari" has continued, with Russian Telegram channels regularly posting videos of drone strikes targeting civilians. This suggests a systematic policy of terror against the population, supported at least at the level of the Group of Troops "Dnepr." At the same time, the Russian MoD and some pro-war Telegram channels insist that they comply with international humanitarian law, publishing videos in which drone operators refrain from striking vehicles after identifying civilians inside.

Recent satellite images of the Novorossiysk naval base have shown that the Varshavyanka-class submarine, which was attacked and damaged by Ukrainian underwater drones on Dec. 15, 2025, changed its location twice in recent days. It is possible that the submarine has been repaired and is now operational again, or that the damage was not critical from the outset.

The European Parliament has approved a €90 billion loan for Ukraine for 2026-2027. The loan will be financed through EU borrowing on financial markets, and the interest is expected to be covered by the EU budget. It is worth noting that this loan had previously been reported as agreed on Dec. 18 at the European Council summit.

Negotiations in Abu Dhabi appear to have reached a deadlock. In an interview with The Atlantic on Feb. 12, Volodymyr Zelenskyy stated that he would not agree to a deal that would be disadvantageous for Ukraine. Russia’s demand that the AFU withdraw from the Donbas is unacceptable for Kyiv.

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