Sitrep for Feb. 6-9, 2026 (as of 6:30 a.m. UTC+3)
Frontline Situation Update
Russian forces continue to create new small bridgeheads in the Sumy and Kharkiv regions and expand existing ones. Russia’s Ministry of Defense claimed the capture of the border village of Popivka in the Sumy region; however, it is unclear which Popivka they meant—one located north of the village of Vysoke, captured around the same time as the village of Hrabovske (in late December), or another situated much farther south of Hrabovske, which would indicate an attempt to establish a new bridgehead. Ukrainian servicemen recorded a video with a flag in the Popivka north of Vysoke, but, judging by maps, there are no houses there, so it remains unclear where the Russian video was filmed. Pro-Russian Telegram channels have also been unable to determine this, although most lean toward the first version.
According to DeepState, Russian forces have expanded their bridgehead southward in the area of Hrabovske and captured the village of Dehtiarne in the Kharkiv region, which we reported on three weeks ago as the target of an attempted seizure. In addition, DeepState noted that the RuAF crossed the border near the villages of Kucherov and Milayevka. According to Ukrainian researcher Shalin, Ukrainian forces had previously been present in the border area on the Russian side in that sector.
Thus, across the entire area of responsibility of the Group of Troops "North"—from the village of Komarivka to the village of Milove—tiny bridgeheads are being created, ostensibly to form a "buffer zone" (a so-called "security strip"). Small border villages are regularly declared captured; in our view, the main purpose of this is to provide reports to the General Staff that create the appearance of constant advances. This would mean a "buffer zone" stretching hundreds of kilometers—far more than the Group of Troops "North" could realistically hold. If all these micro-bridgeheads were connected, the zone would be roughly 400 kilometers [248.55 mi] long, while the current line of contact is about 1,000 kilometers [621.37 mi]. Creating such a zone would make sense only if the Sumy and Kharkiv directions were the main axes of advance and long salients had formed there, vulnerable to flanking strikes. In that case, it would be logical to widen their bases to prevent supply lines from being cut. Even if Russian forces were to expend major resources to establish such a "buffer zone," it would not, in the long run, help protect Russian territory, since its width would not exceed about 15 kilometers [9.32 mi]—similar to the bridgeheads near the town of Vovchansk and the village of Yunakivka. Even drones could easily cover that distance, not to mention rocket artillery. Further expansion of the zone appears practically impossible for Russian forces in their current condition.
Russian forces are gradually advancing in the Sloviansk-Kramatorsk direction near the village of Yampil and farther south, near the villages of Nykyforivka and Bondarne.
The presence of Russian assault troops has been reported southwest of the occupied town of Huliaipole: in the village of Zaliznychne in the Zaporizhzhia region. These troops are under attack by AFU drones.
According to French researcher Clément Molin, the highest concentration of fresh shelling and airstrikes on Sentinel-2 satellite imagery indicates three main directions of the Russian offensive: Pokrovsk-Dobropillia, the Huliaipole area and Stepnohirsk-Prymorske-Komyshuvakha.
As Molin demonstrates, the map indicates strikes conducted directly along the line of contact, where the contested zone near the frontline shows the highest density of strikes by both sides, numerous AFU strikes against Russian rear areas and RuAF strikes against Ukrainian rear areas. Notably, there are relatively few markers of the latter. Molin explains this by noting that the range of Russian artillery is insufficient for denser fire, while moving closer to forward positions is hazardous. On the map, yellow ovals mark sections of the frontline where Ukrainian positions remain. According to Molin’s estimates, the RuAF uses artillery almost twice as often as the AFU.
Molin shows how pincers are gradually forming on the Zaporizhzhia axis: the RuAF are intensifying pressure from the western flank near Stepnohirsk and from the eastern flank near Huliaipole and the village of Ternovate, as reflected in the large number of shelling incidents and airstrikes. This suggests that for this year and the next, Russian forces have been tasked with forming these pincers and gradually beginning to encircle the town of Orikhiv.
A large number of recorded shell impacts, in particular, demonstrates the current priority of the RuAF in this sector—Komyshuvakha. The RuAF intend to advance toward the H-08 highway in order to cut off Ukrainian supply lines to Orikhiv. In recent weeks, they have advanced toward the village of Lukianivske, northeast of Stepnohirsk, and further toward the village of Mahdalynivka.
In the Pokrovsk direction, according to Molin’s infographic, the main area of focus for Russian forces lies to the north and northwest of Pokrovsk—around the village of Hryshyne, as well as around the towns of Rodynske and Bilytske. By advancing there and pushing the frontline away from Pokrovsk, the RuAF would be able to use Pokrovsk fully as a logistics hub.
The researcher was unable to examine the part of the Zaporizhzhia region adjacent to the Dnipro River due to cloud cover in the imagery. It is also worth noting that the data on which Molen relies are incomplete, as it is quite difficult to count strikes on already destroyed settlements—their traces are not as easy to detect as those of strikes on forest lines.
After the introduction of so-called "white lists," all Starlink terminals that are not registered in Ukraine—including those used by Russian forces—have stopped working. To get around the restrictions, Russian soldiers have begun relying on so-called "drops": intermediaries inside Ukraine who register terminals in their own names, whether for money, for ideological reasons or under pressure and threats. Relatives of soldiers held in Russian captivity, as well as of those listed as missing in action, are particularly vulnerable to such coercion, since personal information about them can often be found online. In theory, some people may also be drawn into registration schemes after falling victim to phone scammers. As we have previously noted, in Russia such victims have gone as far as selling their apartments and even throwing Molotov cocktails at military draft offices.
We continue to believe that not all field communications in the Russian Armed Forces rely on Starlink. It is important to stress that the shutdown did not result in chaos or a loss of command and control, although some units did face serious difficulties after losing communications entirely. Truly large-scale disruption would likely have produced visible Ukrainian counteroffensives along multiple sectors of the front.
On the Zaporizhzhia axis, for example—where reports of communications problems had circulated—Ukrainian assault units carried out mechanized counterattacks near Ternuvate and Huliaipole. If Russian reconnaissance had in fact been "blinded" by a total loss of communications, Ukrainian armored vehicles would have had a chance to catch Russian forces by surprise. Instead, judging by available footage, the vehicles were detected and attacked by Russian drones relatively quickly. Ukrainian troops later released a video showing a flag at the entrance to Ternuvate, prompting some outlets to claim that the settlement had been cleared.
It is worth recalling that Ukraine’s new defense minister, Mykhailo Fedorov, had already spoken in early 2024 about the need to address the Russian military’s use of Starlink terminals. There may be several explanations for why the white-list system was introduced only after Russian forces began equipping their drones with the terminals on a large scale.
The Wall Street Journal, citing data from a report by Ukrainian military intelligence, reported that North Korean soldiers are now engaged not only in mine-clearing operations in Russian border territories but also in operating reconnaissance drones, as well as firing tube and rocket artillery from Russian territory. Accordingly, they are again taking an active part in combat operations, although they do not enter occupied territories. According to the South Korean company SI Analytics, based on satellite imagery analysis, an increase in exports of North Korean weapons to Russia has been observed in recent months. Since October 2025, activity has significantly increased at the port through which Pyongyang primarily exports artillery to Moscow. Analysts suggested that this increase in supplies is linked to the intensification of Russia’s winter offensive against Ukrainian energy infrastructure and the return of North Korean troops to combat operations. It is worth noting that on Jan. 30, NK News reported a sharp decline in deliveries of North Korean weapons to Russia. The reports likely refer to different time periods: from October through the end of December, supplies may have increased, but in January, due to poor weather conditions, they may have sharply decreased.
Ukrainian and Russian Strikes
As previously reported in our last sitrep, on the evening of Feb. 6, following a strike on energy infrastructure in the Belgorod region, disruptions to water, heating and power supplies occurred. Governor Vyacheslav Gladkov did not plan to open heating centers on Feb. 6 or during the day of Feb. 7, but after repairs proved slow, such centers were opened on the evening of Feb. 7, with several more added on Feb. 8. It was also decided to drain water from heating systems in approximately 500 buildings connected to the heavily damaged Belgorod Thermal Power Plant. Due to the lack of heating, some educational institutions switched to remote learning on Feb. 9.
A video has emerged showing what appears to be a HIMARS MLRS rocket approaching the Belgorod TPP and detonating in mid-air without striking the facility. This may have been due to interception by an anti-drone net, although an airburst warhead cannot be ruled out (however, its use against major infrastructure is of questionable strategic value).
In the early hours of Feb. 7, the Burshtyn TPP in the Ivano-Frankivsk region, the Dobrotvirska TPP in the Lviv region and other energy facilities were damaged. Russia is attempting to disrupt electricity imports from Europe by striking substations in western Ukrainian regions, with power outages lasting 18-20 hours in many areas. According to Ukraine’s Ministry of Energy, Kyiv residents receive electricity on average just 1.5 to 2 hours per day.
According to Yurii Ihnat, Spokesman of the AFU Air Force Command, adverse weather conditions on Feb. 7 negatively affected the ability to deploy fighter aircraft and drone interceptors against aerial attacks.
According to verified Russian casualty figures compiled by BBC News Russian in collaboration with Mediazona and a team of volunteers, over 173,000 Russian servicemen have been killed since the full-scale invasion began; our estimate places the total number of buried personnel at over 350,000.
On the morning of Feb. 6, an attempted murder was carried out in Moscow against General Vladimir Alekseyev, First Deputy Executive of the Main Directorate (ex-GRU) of the General Staff. On Feb. 8, the Federal Security Service (FSB) released CCTV footage showing the alleged attacker. According to the Investigative Committee, the shooter was Lyubomyr Korba, a native of Ukraine’s Ternopil region, who was detained in the UAE on Feb. 8 and extradited to Russia. An alleged accomplice, Viktor Vasin, was also detained in the Moscow region; he is said to have provided the weapon used by the shooter. According to a post by investigative journalist Christo Grozev, Vasin worked at the Atlas Scientific and Technical Center, which produces specialized technical equipment for the FSB. His archived 2014 CV states that he graduated from the Russian Military Academy of Command and Staff Communications. We do not believe that the mere fact of employment at an enterprise linked to the security services unequivocally proves that the attempted murder was planned by the FSB as a false flag operation in order to accuse Ukraine of sabotaging negotiations. Zinaida Serebritskaya is also named as a possible accomplice; she rented an apartment two floors above the scene and allegedly passed the door-phone access code to the shooter and gathered information on the Alekseyev’s movements. At the same time, despite similarities to past attacks, there is still no definitive evidence that this attempted murder was an operation conducted by Ukrainian intelligence services (although this appears quite plausible).
Details have also emerged regarding a new modification of the FAB-500T equipped with the Universal Gliding and Correction Module (UMPK), designated UMPB-5. It is reported that the variant without a jet engine has a range of up to 160 kilometers [99.41 mi], while the variant with a jet engine—reportedly designated UMPB-5R—has a range of up to 200 kilometers [124.27 mi]. According to the Kharkiv Regional Prosecutor’s Office, such munitions were used in a strike on Lozova in October 2025. Meanwhile, the Polkovnyk Henshtabu [Colonel of the General Staff] Telegram channel claims that "UMPK with a jet engine" had already begun to be used as early as spring-summer 2025.
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