Sitrep for Jan. 16-19, 2026 (as of 10:30 a.m. UTC+3)
Frontline Situation Update
The Russian Group of Troops "North" continues to enter Ukraine’s border areas in order to seize small villages located in the contested area. After advancing into Hrabovske and Komarivka in the Sumy region, the group attempted to move into the village of Dehtiarnе in the Kharkiv region, east of the town of Vovchansk. This time, however, Ukrainian border guards detected the advancing Russian infantry under cover of artillery and drones early on and repelled the attack.
We still believe that incursions into Ukrainian border villages are driven solely by the need to regularly report the capture of new settlements. For example, Russia’s Minister of Defense Andrey Belousov visited the command post of the Group of Troops “West” and asked its commander, Colonel General Sergey Kuzovlev, whether the town of Kupiansk is indeed "currently undergoing a clearing operation." In response, Kuzovlev claimed that all districts of the town are under Russian control, despite what he described unsuccessful enemy attempts to break into Kupiansk. Although this claim is completely untrue and not even the most pro-government milblogger channels believe it, Belousov’s words are close to the truth in one respect: a clearing of Kupiansk is indeed ongoing—but it is being carried out by Ukrainian forces.
A video released by the 10th Army Corps of the Armed Forces of Ukraine shows a clearing operation in Kupiansk: soldiers move through the streets, check houses and capture Russian soldiers.
The Russian Officers Killed in Ukraine project recently recorded the death of Major Dmitry Shutov, who served as a press officer for the Moscow Military District (part of the Group of Troops "West"), on Dec. 25 in the Kupiansk direction. By that time, most of the town and some nearby villages were already under Ukrainian control, contrary to statements by Russia’s MoD. It is hard to imagine the circumstances under which a press officer ended up on the frontline, but it is quite possible that he was sent to film a report—for example, about Kupiansk residents supposedly grateful for their "liberation."
In the Lyman direction, the Russian MoD claimed to have captured the village of Zakitne located on one of two supply routes to Lyman. The other route leads to Izium via the villages of Novoselivkaand Sviatohirsk. This may be true, as the area has long been contested, and further advances there are more than expected. However, Russian forces have only shown footage of a soldier with a flag from there. At the end of last year, the MoD claimed the capture of the village of Dibrova (west of Zakitne), and videos from there have recently emerged.
In the Kostiantynivka direction, the situation has barely changed in recent days: Russian assault troops continue to accumulate in the area of the villages of Oleksandro-Kalynove and Yablunivka, from where they are advancing towards the villages of Stepanivka, Illinivka and Berestok, aiming to gradually approach the western outskirts of Kostiantynivka. Until recently, there was no visual evidence confirming this—now footage of a strike on Russian positions filmed near Illinivka has appeared. A similar situation in Pokrovsk previously led to numerous reports of infiltrations and the destruction of sabotage and reconnaissance groups, but in the case of Kostiantynivka, there is significantly less such informational noise.
On the Zaporizhzhia axis, Russian troops have claimed the capture of the village of Pryluky northwest of Huliaipole, where we previously reported advances. They appear to have gained a foothold and likely taken the village. We are increasingly leaning towards the conclusion that Huliaipole has been fully captured by Russian troops. Although DeepState shows the western part of the town as still contested, we have not seen footage confirming the presence of Ukrainian troops there for a long time, whereas Russian military vehicles transporting munitions are now appearing in Huliaipole. Entering a contested town in such a manner is extremely difficult, as such equipment is usually destroyed on the approaches.
Recently, combat operations have noticeably slowed down. This has been influenced by freezing weather, which makes it difficult to conduct an offensive without armored vehicles using small assault groups, making dashes of several kilometers from one position to another. In winter, it is difficult to find cover, making it easier for drones to detect the enemy, and while holding positions, personnel can easily suffer frostbite. On the other hand, fallen snow allows soldiers to obtain at least some drinking water and avoid dying of thirst in the absence of supplies. The supply problem is also exacerbated by frost: a UAV can deliver bottles of water, but they freeze. A pile of such bottles was discovered by a Russian soldier, as reports indicate that, in the Kupiansk direction, where he tried with all his remaining strength to obtain water.
Ukrainian and Russian Strikes
In the Chernihiv region, approximately 60 kilometers [37 mi] from the border with the Russian Federation, Russian soldiers used reconnaissance UAVs to discover a HIMARS MLRS and carried out a strike using jet-powered Shahed drones. The first drone missed slightly, allowing the crew of the system to escape. However, the impact of the second caused a secondary detonation, proving that it was not a decoy but a real launcher.
The pro-Russian Telegram channel Fighterbomber [associated with the Russian Air and Space Force] has published a video showing air-dropped anti-submarine bombs being released from a Be-12 amphibious aircraft against what are claimed to be Ukrainian unmanned surface vessels. Previously, videos of these aircraft conducting patrols over the Black Sea had appeared multiple times, but this is the first instance in which they are observed in a bomber role. It is worth noting that in September 2025, Ukraine’s Main Directorate of Intelligence reported a strike on two Be-12 aircraft at an airfield in Crimea.
New satellite imagery has emerged of the Atlant Aero plant in Taganrog, which was attacked in the early hours of Jan. 13. The images show two damaged buildings and one that has been destroyed. We do not believe that this strike significantly affected the production capacity of the Molniya drones. An article by the Ukrainian outlet Oboronka notes that Molniya is a very inexpensive platform that can be manufactured without being tied to a specific facility. Its simplicity allows for large-scale manual assembly at sites that do not require complex equipment.
While technological capabilities and production volumes for tactical UAVs and FPV drones have largely reached parity, the main contest at present is unfolding in the segment of middle strike drones. These systems conduct attacks at distances of 20-50 kilometers—and in some cases up to 80 kilometers—from the front line, creating serious challenges for logistics. On the Russian side, the key solution in this segment is the Molniya platform. On the Ukrainian side, it includes the Brave1 platform, Darts and others, including an improved copy of the Molniya known as the Blyskavka ("Lightning"), though its production has not been successfully scaled.
In modern warfare, decisive factors are no longer the peak tactical or technical characteristics of an individual system, but rather the speed of adaptation, scalability and cost-effectiveness. A weapons system is assessed not only by its standalone performance, but by how quickly it can be brought into mass production, modified to meet changing conditions, and lost without critical consequences. At present, Ukraine has not managed to establish large-scale production of middle strike drones comparable in volume to Russia’s output of Molniya systems.
The new Minister of Energy of Ukraine, Denys Shmyhal, stated that there is not a single undamaged power plant [electricity generating facility] left in Ukraine—everyone has been targeted by Russian attacks. Level II protection, i.e. substantial reinforced-concrete structures, has been built at almost all substations [distribution facilities]. Virtually every concrete structure has withstood Shahed drone strikes; some structures have endured up to 20 UAV hits and even missile strikes.
According to Volodymyr Zelenskyy, as of Jan. 15, Ukraine’s electricity consumption was about 18 GW, while generation capacity was only 11 GW. Since the beginning of 2026, Kyiv and the Kyiv region have experienced the most severe electricity shortages. Boryspil was without power 77% of the time, Brovary 63.5%, and Kyiv itself 46%. According to an analysis by Ekonomichna Pravda, with the onset of freezing temperatures the situation has become critical.
The Ukrainian outlet Hromadske published a report about residents of an apartment building on Kamianska Street in Kyiv, for whom daily life has turned into a choice between warmth and food. There is not enough electric power to run both electric heating and cook a meal at the same time; residents cannot meet even basic human needs. Even when choosing heating, it is impossible to warm an apartment during the one to two hours of electricity supply, and it gradually becomes colder—the temperature in apartments has dropped to +0.5-3.5C [+33-37.4F].
According to the report, while extinguishing a fire in an apartment on the top 12th floor and on the building’s roof, water poured down the walls and froze; icicles hung from railings and the exterior parts of air conditioners, and the stairwell was completely covered with ice.
Power and heating outages are also being observed in the occupied territories such as Donetsk. On Jan. 17, the AFU struck a distribution facility in Melitopol, leaving many districts without electricity by the next morning. On Jan. 19, after a drone attack on Kursk, a fire broke out near CHP-1, and one of the city’s districts lost power.
The International Committee of the Red Cross stated that recent strikes on critical infrastructure in Ukraine and Russia have left millions of people virtually without electricity, water and heating amid subzero air temperatures in Kyiv, Dnipro, Donetsk, Belgorod and other localities. The organization recalled that attacks causing disproportionate harm to the civilian population, in particular depriving it of services essential for survival, such as electricity and heating in winter, are prohibited.
Ukraine’s Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha called the statement "shameful" and said that false moral equivalence between the aggressor and the country defending itself is unacceptable. It should be noted that although the scale of damage to civilian infrastructure in Ukraine, Russia and the occupied territories is not comparable, from the standpoint of international law the ICRC statement is correct.
New high-resolution satellite images of Donetsk Airport show that Russia is expanding a launch site for Shahed-type drones.
Trump announced that the time has come to "get the Russian threat away from Greenland." He also considers Canada vulnerable in the Arctic to threats posed by the PRC and the Russian Federation.
Dmitry Medvedev [Deputy Chairman of Russia’s Security Council] reported that in 2025 more than 422,000 people signed contracts with the Ministry of Defense, and another 32,000 became volunteer fighters. At the same time, on Dec. 24, 2025, Medvedev stated that over the year about 417,000 people signed contracts, and more than 36,000 others joined "volunteer units."
According to calculations by German economist Janis Kluge based on regional budget data, the Russian Armed Forces recruited approximately 407,000 people over the past year. It is worth noting that, according to Kluge, significantly fewer people are always recruited in January than in other months. It can be expected that this also contributes to the slowdown in the pace of the war in winter, as almost all newly recruited contract soldiers are immediately sent to replace current losses in Russian army units on the frontline.
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