Blood on the Negotiating Table: Civilian Casualties in 2025
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Since the fall of 2023, a team of CIT volunteers has been collecting all publicly available information on civilian casualties on both sides of the frontline resulting from the indiscriminate use of force. The data are published daily in a dedicated Telegram channel, "Strikes on Civilian Infrastructure in Ukraine and Russia, CIT Volunteer Summary." Based on those records, we have prepared a report summarizing key statistics and our main observations for 2025. We previously released a similar report for 2024.
Over more than two years of daily reporting, our database has grown to more than 14,000 entries each representing an attack or shelling in which at least one person was killed or injured. In 2024, the database contained just over 6,000 such incidents.
Key Findings
The year 2025 was the deadliest for the civilian population since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022. On both sides of the frontline, at least 2,919 civilians were killed and another 17,775 people were injured. Compared with 2024, the number of people killed rose by 12 percent, while the number of injured increased by more than 25 percent.
Despite ongoing talks about peace as well as numerous negotiations and meetings formally devoted to reaching peace agreements, the intensity of strikes on civilian infrastructure increased in 2025, reaching peak levels for several months—the highest recorded since our monitoring began in late 2023.
Seventy-nine percent of all civilian deaths and injuries occurred in territories controlled by Ukraine’s official authorities. While the total number of casualties in the occupied territories of Ukraine and in Russia itself fell by six percent in 2025 compared with 2024, in areas controlled by Ukraine’s official authorities it increased by 35 percent.
Although the AFU have a smaller arsenal than the RuAF, the gap is not sufficient to fully explain the observed pattern. In our assessment, the findings point, at minimum, to systematic disregard for the laws of war by Russian forces and, in a number of cases, to deliberate war crimes.
The deadliest attacks in 2025 were Russian missile strikes on Ukrainian cities, including Ternopil, Sumy and Kyiv. Among the hardest-hit areas were frontline regions and the capital region, which is regularly subjected to large-scale drone and missile attacks.
In the Kherson region, despite the absence of active large-scale ground combat and, at the same time, the large-scale rotation of RuAF units, carried out in 2025, the number of civilian casualties has continued to rise. This indicates that the terror campaign against civilians is not an isolated incident or the criminal practice of individual RuAF units, but is rather approved and likely supported at least at the level of the Group of Troops "Dnepr."
In the occupied territories of Ukraine, the Donetsk and Kherson regions recorded the highest number of casualties. In Russia, the most affected area was the Belgorod region. Residents there, like those in the Kherson region, have regularly been attacked by small UAVs.
In 2025, drone strikes killed 1,376 people and injured another 10,089—more than all other types of weapons combined. Compared with 2024, the number of people injured by UAVs increased more than threefold, while the number of fatalities rose by a factor of 2.85.
The findings suggest that the spread of high-precision munitions does not lead to a reduction in humanitarian harm and, in some cases, is associated with higher civilian casualty levels. This underscores a basic reality: the harm inflicted on civilians depends first and foremost on the choices made by those who employ the weapons, and only secondarily on the technical characteristics of the weapons themselves.
If trends observed in 2025—particularly the growing use of UAVs and the continuation of air campaigns—persist, civilian casualties are likely to continue rising in 2026, regardless of the course of ground combat.
Key Metrics
According to the data we collected, at least 2,919 civilians were killed by shelling and strikes involving various types of weapons on both sides of the frontline in 2025, including 96 children. Another 17,775 people were injured, including 1,000 children. Therefore, the total number of civilian casualties reached 20,694.
Despite ongoing talk of peace and numerous negotiations and meetings formally devoted to reaching peace agreements, the past year turned out to be significantly bloodier than 2024—the first full year of our monitoring and data collection. That year, 2,600 people were killed in attacks on civilian infrastructure (including 115 children), and another 14,155 were injured (including 842 children). Since then, four have succumbed to their injuries in hospitals. According to our calculations, 2025 saw 319 more civilian deaths than 2024—an increase of 12 percent. The number of injured rose by more than 25 percent, an increase of 3,620 people.
As in the previous year, the intensity of attacks was not uniform. During the winter period, the number of people killed and injured declines, although in 2025 this trend was less pronounced than in 2024. In December, the total number of casualties was nearly twice as high as in the same month the previous year. The first two months of 2025 were also notably deadlier for civilians than the same period in 2024.
While in 2024 the most severe period was from May to September—when the total number of people killed and injured did not drop below 1,600 per month—in 2025 the number of casualties exceeded 1,550 in nine out of twelve months. April, June and July were the deadliest months, with at least 2,000 people killed or injured in each. May stands out in contrast. That month, Russia simulated intensive negotiations, during which Putin announced a ceasefire tied to the celebration of the 80th anniversary of victory in the Great Patriotic War [a term used in Russia and some other post-Soviet states to describe the Eastern Front of World War II]. The Russian Armed Forces refrained from large-scale strikes on Ukraine during the May talks, which had a positive effect on casualty figures for that month. Putin had also announced an earlier ceasefire in connection with the Easter holidays at the end of April. However, this did not affect the statistics, and April became one of the three deadliest months of the year, primarily due to two ballistic missile strikes on Ukrainian cities during the first weeks of the month.
On April 4, a strike hit a playground in the city of Kryvyi Rih, killing 20 people, including nine children, and injuring 74 others, including 11 children. Russia’s MoD claimed it had struck "a venue hosting a meeting with unit commanders and Western instructors in one of the city’s restaurants." However, surveillance footage later released from a nearby restaurant showed that no such meeting was taking place at the time of the strike. Since then, no information has emerged about any Ukrainian or NATO officers being killed in the city that day.
A little over a week later, on April 13, the city of Sumy was struck with ballistic missiles. The attack, which came at the start of Easter week, killed 35 people, including two minors, and injured another 129 civilians, including 17 children. This time, Russia’s MoD claimed the strike targeted an award ceremony for servicemen taking place in a local university building. The ceremony did indeed occur, but none of the military personnel present were harmed because they were all in a shelter. As in the strike on Kryvyi Rih, Russian forces used missiles equipped with warheads containing prefabricated shrapnel. These warheads detonate upon impact with an obstacle or in the air and are ineffective against protected targets, such as reinforced buildings, deep basements or bunkers. However, they are highly effective against soft targets—namely, civilians who were outdoors or in vehicles at the time of the strike.
The deadliest incident was a large-scale air strike on Ternopil on the morning of Nov. 19. Two Kh-101 cruise missiles struck two apartment buildings: one caught fire on a massive scale, while the other partially collapsed. As a result, 38 people were killed in the blaze and under the rubble, including eight children. Many families lost multiple relatives at once, often very young children. Three civilians are still listed as missing, and another 92 people were injured, including 18 children.
The highest number of casualties we recorded occurred during a cruise missile strike on Dnipro on June 24. The attack killed 21 people and wounded another 319 civilians. Extensive damage was reported across the city, and one of the missiles struck near a passenger train, injuring many of those on board. Below is a list of the strikes that resulted in the highest numbers of people killed and injured in 2025.
Breakdown by Area
In compiling the statistics, we distinguish three macro-regions: non-occupied territories of Ukraine, occupied territories of Ukraine and the territory of the Russian Federation.
It is worth noting that the indiscriminate use of force has resulted in far higher numbers of civilian casualties in Ukraine’s non-occupied territories. According to our data, total casualties there in 2025 amounted to 16,300 people (2,348 killed and 13,952 injured). By comparison, casualties in the occupied territories of Ukraine totaled 2,049 people (298 killed and 1,751 injured), while in Russia the figure was 2,345 (273 killed and 2,072 injured). In other words, four out of five people killed or wounded were hit in areas under the control of Ukraine’s official authorities. According to the United Nations, the past year was the deadliest for Ukraine’s civilian population since 2022.
For the previous year, 2024, the corresponding figures were 1,918 killed and 10,174 injured (12,091 total) in Ukraine’s non-occupied territories; 452 killed and 2,352 injured (2,804 total) in the occupied territories of Ukraine; and 234 killed and 1,628 injured in Russia (1,862 total). Thus, while 72 percent of all casualties in 2024 occurred in areas controlled by Ukraine’s official authorities, that share rose to 79 percent in 2025.
Moreover, the total number of civilian casualties in the occupied territories of Ukraine and in Russia in 2025 fell by six percent (272 people) compared with 2024, while in areas controlled by Ukraine’s official authorities it increased by 35 percent (4,209 people).
Ukraine’s Regions
While the Rivne, Chernivtsi and Zakarpattia regions recorded no deaths or injuries in 2024, no such regions remained in 2025—with the exception of fully occupied Crimea and the Luhansk region, of which the RuAF control more than 99 percent. Frontline regions predictably registered the highest number of casualties. While the Donetsk region suffered the most deaths, with 756 fatalities amid the fiercest fighting, the Kherson region led in injuries, with 2,903 civilians wounded. These figures were recorded even though the frontline there has not noticeably shifted since 2022, as the Dnipro River divides the opposing sides and severely hinders ground operations.
The high number of injuries and 359 deaths in the Kherson region stem primarily from a RuAF drone campaign against civilians launched in the summer of 2024, which has been dubbed the "human safari." Massive artillery attacks on Kherson, the only regional capital located directly on the frontline, also caused a significant number of casualties. We detailed these events in our previous review. Major Western media outlets (including NYT, WSJ, AP and Le Monde), think tanks like Chatham House and the Atlantic Council, as well as human rights organizations such as HRW have also covered this topic. We note that the situation has only deteriorated over the year: the death toll rose by nearly 21 percent compared to 2024, while the number of injured increased by 35 percent, moving the region to first place for total casualties in 2025 from third in 2024. The situation remains unchanged despite a large-scale rotation of RuAF units and formations in this sector carried out in late summer and early fall (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7). This indicates that the terror campaign against civilians is not an isolated incident or the criminal practice of individual RuAF units, but is rather approved and likely supported at least at the level of the Group of Troops "Dnepr," led by the commander of the Russian Airborne Forces, Colonel General Mikhail Teplinsky.
As mentioned earlier, the Donetsk region recorded the highest number of civilian casualties, with 756 deaths and 2,339 injuries. In 2024, the figures stood at 584 deaths and 1,880 injuries. It is worth noting that the data for this region are likely the most incomplete. In 2025, the main fighting was concentrated around major urban centers, such as the town of Kostiantynivka and the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad agglomeration. Even during periods of intense urban combat, hundreds, if not thousands, of civilians remained in these areas. Because of the intensity of hostilities, including massive artillery fire and air-dropped bomb strikes, local authorities and emergency services are often unable to conduct search and rescue operations, evacuate civilians or clear debris. As a result, many of the deceased are buried by surviving neighbors in the yards of destroyed homes (1, 2), as was the case in the city of Mariupol in 2022. It is also highly likely that a significant number of bodies remain under rubble. These casualties are not included in official reports and are therefore not in the statistics we collect.
The situation showed some improvement in the Kharkiv region, which had recorded the highest number of civilian casualties in 2024, with 397 deaths and 2,614 injuries. In 2025, we recorded 279 deaths and 2,305 injuries in the region. This improvement is likely linked to the significantly lower intensity of fighting in the northern part of the Kharkiv region, where the Russian army launched an unsuccessful offensive in May 2024. At that time, combat operations were accompanied by an increase in Russian strikes, including the use of air-dropped bombs, against the city of Kharkiv and other major settlements in the region. As fighting around the two established bridgeheads subsided, the number of air strikes declined. However, active combat operations continue in the eastern part of the region around the town of Kupiansk, as well as regular strikes on Kharkiv. As a result, the Kharkiv region ranks third in terms of total civilian deaths and injuries.
Also among the regions most severely affected are the frontline Dnipropetrovsk region (229 killed and 1,834 injured), the Zaporizhzhia region (159 killed and 1,155 injured) and the Sumy region (202 killed and 1,129 injured). In all three regions, a significant increase in the number of casualties was observed compared to 2024 (by 72 percent in the Dnipropetrovsk region, by 91 percent in the Zaporizhzhia region and by 76 percent in the Sumy region). A substantial number of casualties were also recorded in the border Chernihiv region (41 killed and 219 injured). There, despite the absence of ground combat operations, the situation has also significantly worsened over the year—in 2024, according to our data, 29 people were killed and another 131 civilians were injured. Thus, in 2025, the number of casualties increased by almost 63 percent.
As noted above, residents of other regions of Ukraine are also suffering as a result of the massive air campaign conducted by the RuAF. In the capital region (Kyiv city and the Kyiv region), the number of casualties (184 killed and 1,151 injured) is comparable to that of frontline regions—the area is subjected to large-scale drone and missile attacks almost weekly. In 2024, the situation was less severe, with 51 civilians killed and 352 injured. Thus, the number of fatalities increased by more than 3.5 times and the number of injuries increased by almost 3.3 times in 2025 compared to the previous year. The Odesa region was also heavily affected (46 killed and 328 injured), although the situation there has somewhat improved compared to 2024, when 104 people were killed and 417 were injured.
In total, in regions that do not share a border with the Russian Federation and where combat operations are not taking place, a total of 324 people were killed and 2,066 more were injured. In 2024, 213 people were killed and 1,139 were injured. The infographic below presents data for each region separately for 2025.
Occupied Territories of Ukraine
In the occupied territories of Ukraine, the Donetsk and Kherson regions recorded the highest number of casualties by a significant margin. The Kherson region saw the highest death toll, with 144 people killed and another 541 civilians injured. In terms of total casualties, the Donetsk region ranked first, with 82 people killed and 870 injured. The situation in the Donetsk region improved considerably over the year, with casualties declining by 44 percent (compared to 232 deaths and 1,457 injuries in 2024). This is likely linked to the frontline moving away from major cities: Horlivka, Donetsk and Makiivka. These areas are now targeted only by medium- and long-range UAVs, and reports of casualties from there have become rare. At the same time, cities captured by the Russian army have virtually no civilian population remaining, and their infrastructure has been completely destroyed, rendering them uninhabitable and unsuitable for any potential return of residents. All of this has contributed to a decline in civilian casualties. In the Kherson region, by contrast, the situation worsened. While 101 people were killed and 343 were injured there in 2024, casualties rose by 54 percent in 2025. Since the frontline here has not shifted, the only explanation is an intensification of attacks and UAV strikes, mirroring what is occurring on the opposite, right bank of the Dnipro. The situation in the Luhansk region improved. While 68 people were killed there in 2024, in 2025 the figure was exactly half that: 34 people. The number of injured people declined from 244 in 2024 to 176 in 2025. In the occupied territories of the Zaporizhzhia region, 33 civilians were killed and 145 were injured—the situation there remained largely unchanged from a year ago (44 killed and 144 injured).
Russia
In Russia, the Belgorod region was once again the most affected area by a wide margin. In 2025, 134 people were killed there and another 1,202 civilians were injured. The situation improved somewhat—a year ago, comparable figures were 176 killed and 1,339 injured (13 percent higher). Next came two other border regions: the Kursk (61 killed and 327 injured) and Bryansk (24 killed and 181 injured) regions. In 2024, casualties were significantly lower: in the Kursk region, nearly half as many (46 killed and 149 injured), and in the Bryansk region, more than five times fewer (three killed and 36 injured). As in the Kherson region, there are virtually no combat operations in these three regions. Despite this, civilians continue to fall victim to attacks, primarily from short-range drones, such as FPV kamikaze drones and munitions dropped from Mavic-type UAVs. Regardless of which side is carrying out the attacks, deliberate strikes on civilians constitute a grave war crime and must be stopped, with the perpetrators held accountable, as the cameras on even small UAVs allow operators to reliably distinguish targets in the vast majority of cases. This applies to the Kherson region, regardless of which bank of the Dnipro River, as well as to the border regions of both Russia and Ukraine.
All other Russian regions are located at a significant distance from the frontline and can be reached only by long-range UAVs and missiles. The latter, however, accounted for a negligible share of the Ukrainian arsenal in 2025. Meanwhile, UAV production, as in the Russian Federation, increased significantly. This, in turn, affected the number of regions impacted by attacks. Whereas in 2024, in addition to the three frontline regions, casualties were recorded in 12 other federal subjects, in 2025 this number rose to 24. The total number of fatalities in these regions in 2025 amounted to 47 people, with another 346 injured. To put this into perspective, in the Odesa region alone, 46 people were killed over the year and another 328 were injured. In 2024, by contrast, there were eight fatalities and 115 injured in Russia’s non-frontline regions. As in 2024, the region with the highest number of casualties was the Krasnodar region (five killed and 63 injured; in 2024—four killed and 22 injured). It is followed by the Rostov region (13 killed and 54 injured; in 2024—three injured). Both regions are located close to the Russia-Ukraine border, which makes them accessible to UAVs carrying relatively powerful warheads. At the same time, they host numerous military facilities and a significant number of fuel and energy infrastructure sites. Statistics for each affected Russian region are presented in the infographic below.
Munition Types
We also analyzed data on the types of weapons used in the attacks on civilians included in our statistics: artillery (barrel and rocket artillery, including tanks and mortars), UAV (including both small short-range drones and large strike UAV such as the Shahed-136/Geran-2 loitering munition), air-dropped bombs and missiles. In a number of cases, combined strikes involving several types of weapons were reported. Since it is impossible in such cases to distinguish casualties by a specific type of munitions, these casualties were included in the statistics for each of the relevant categories. In total, 327 civilians were killed and another 1,884 were injured as a result of combined attacks. We were unable to determine the weapons used in strikes that resulted in the deaths of 447 people and injuries to another 2,029. For comparison, we also provide data for 2024.
As the data presented shows, in 2025 attacks involving various types of UAVs resulted in by far the highest number of casualties. A total of 1,376 people were killed and another 10,089 civilians were injured by UAV strikes—more than from all other types of weapons combined. Compared with 2024, the number of people injured by UAVs increased more than threefold, while the number of fatalities rose by a factor of 2.85. This surge is an obvious consequence of the increasingly widespread use of unmanned systems in the current war, both in the tactical zone and in strategic air campaigns. Over the course of the year, both sides significantly expanded production of these weapons and have partially substituted them for other means of attack. As we noted earlier, the use of these theoretically high-precision munitions unfortunately does not lead to a reduction in civilian casualties.
The number of casualties caused by artillery fire declined somewhat in 2025: 483 people were killed by shelling (compared to 632 in 2024), and 2,190 were injured (2,332 in 2024). Missile strikes in 2025 killed 472 people and wounded another 3,108—roughly comparable to 2024 figures (504 killed and 3,180 injured). Air-dropped bombs resulted in the deaths of 481 civilians, while 2,167 others were injured. Compared to the previous year, the number of fatalities (346 in 2024) increased by nearly 40 percent, while the number of injured (2,241 in 2024) remained virtually unchanged.
Regarding the ratio of those killed to those injured by different types of munitions, the ratio for artillery and air-dropped bombs stands at approximately 1:4.5, for missiles at 1:6.6 and for UAV attacks at 1:7.3. In 2024, the corresponding ratios were 1:3.7 for artillery, 1:6.5 for air-dropped bombs, 1:6.3 for missiles and 1:6.8 for UAVs.
When examining the data by the macro-regions we distinguish, one striking feature is the near absence of casualties from air-dropped bombs in the occupied territories of Ukraine and within the Russian Federation. All 18 casualties recorded on Russian territory were caused by Russian air-dropped bombs. Seven civilians were killed and four were injured in a strike on a boarding school in the town of Sudzha, Kursk region, occupied at the time by Ukrainian forces. The remaining seven casualties resulted from Russian air-dropped bombs equipped with Universal Gliding and Correction Modules (UMPK) that malfunctioned and fell from Russian bombers. The casualties recorded in the occupied territories of Ukraine stemmed from a single incident in which a UAV dropped a high-explosive air-dropped bomb on a private residence in Horlivka. The observed pattern is readily explained. Ukraine does not possess a significant number of glide bombs. Moreover, under pressure from Russian fighter aircraft, Ukrainian Air Force jets are forced to conduct bombing runs from low altitudes, thereby reducing their maximum strike range. As a result, all known Ukrainian strikes have targeted forward positions and nearby Russian rear areas. Russia, by contrast, is capable of conducting strikes at distances of dozens of kilometers, placing major cities such as Zaporizhzhia and Kharkiv within the range of Russian air-dropped bombs. In total, 2,627 people were killed or injured by Russian air strikes in non-occupied territories.
A similar pattern is observed with missiles. Although Ukraine has announced the development and deployment of several types of missiles, production volumes appear to remain extremely limited and their use infrequent. At the same time, stocks of missiles supplied by Western allies have largely been depleted, and the United States has halted deliveries of ATACMS tactical ballistic missiles. As a result, the missile arsenal available to the AFU has been severely constrained. Meanwhile, Russia’s large-scale missile campaign led to 3,430 people being killed or injured. It is slightly more than in 2024, when 3,309 people became casualties of missile strikes. It is worth noting that all of the attacks described at the beginning of this report that resulted in the highest numbers of casualties were carried out using missiles.
Artillery attacks resulted in 2,166 civilian casualties in areas under Kyiv’s control. In occupied territories, 456 were recorded, with a further 51 civilians killed or injured in Russia. Despite the growing dominance of drones on the battlefield, artillery remains one of the primary means of destruction. Given its high destructive power, artillery cannot be considered a precision weapon even when guided by UAVs. This is especially true of multiple-launch rocket systems, whose use against residential areas is prohibited under international law. However, such attacks continue to occur, primarily by the RuAF, which employ these indiscriminate weapons against major cities including Zaporizhzhia, Kherson and Kharkiv. Ukrainian forces have also used these systems to shell Donetsk and Belgorod, however, in 2025 such strikes were isolated incidents.
Attacks involving UAVs killed or injured 8,560 people in non-occupied territories, 888 in occupied territories and 2,017 in Russia. As noted above, both sides are increasingly employing UAVs on a large scale, including both short-range systems and long-range strike drones. This is the only area in which Ukraine does not lag behind and, in some respects, even surpasses the RuAF. The sole exception is long-range strike UAVs: Russia has scaled up mass production of Geran drones, sharply increasing the number deployed in 2025. Ukraine is actively attempting to close this capability gap, but the difference remains significant. In our view, however, this capability gap, particularly given the near parity in short-range UAVs, does not sufficiently explain the stark differences in civilian casualties from UAV strikes across different territories. This is especially evident in regions far from the frontline. Even accounting for differences in warhead size and the average number of UAVs used per attack, the data suggest that Ukrainian forces use this category of weapons more restrainedly. While Ukrainian UAV strikes on Russian regions do sometimes hit residential buildings and result in civilian casualties, this is nothing compared to Russian air campaigns, where such strikes are routine, if not daily. In some cases, multiple UAVs have struck the same residential building, suggesting deliberate targeting. Based on our assessment, the targeted use of FPV drones and munition drops against civilians by Ukrainian forces has not reached the scale observed among Russian forces, although in regions such as the Belgorod region, such practices have become relatively widespread.
Conclusion
Regrettably, the fourth year of the war will not be its last. The peace discussions that began in the winter of 2025, and US efforts to pressure the warring parties into ending the war, have not brought the fighting to a halt and have not even produced an inkling of de-escalation. The trend, if anything, has moved in the opposite direction. This shift has been felt most acutely by civilians. The number of civilians killed and injured rose sharply in 2025 compared with 2024. Casualties were recorded both in frontline regions and in areas far away from the battlefield. The data show that strikes on civilian infrastructure have caused many times more civilian casualties in Ukraine’s non-occupied territories than in occupied areas or in Russia itself. In our assessment, such a disparity cannot be explained solely by differences in the firepower available to the two sides. It points instead to a far more extensive use of indiscriminate force by the RuAF than by the AFU, and, in many cases, to the commission of outright war crimes. Another clear trend is the growing role of drones in the terrorization of civilians, including both small UAVs and loitering munitions. The spread of modern technologies that allow greater control over unmanned weapons has, paradoxically, not reduced civilian suffering. It underscores a basic reality: the harm inflicted on civilians depends first and foremost on the choices made by those who employ the weapons, and only secondarily on the technical characteristics of the weapons themselves.
In conclusion, we would like to express our gratitude to the volunteers who have been meticulously collecting, processing and preparing information for publication for over two years on such an emotionally difficult topic as the deaths and injuries of civilians, including children. Without the daily efforts of our volunteers, the publication of this report would not have been possible.
Note: In compiling this data, we rely primarily on statements by official authorities—or, in the case of Russian-controlled areas of Ukraine, by representatives of the occupation administrations. We also collect available photos and videos from media outlets, Telegram channels and other open sources and, where possible, geolocate the strikes. We cannot guarantee that our summaries capture 100 percent of incidents, particularly in cases where local authorities did not report them. When there are strong grounds to believe that a strike hit a military target and that the number of civilian casualties is proportionate to the military advantage gained, we classify such incidents as legitimate uses of force and do not include the affected civilians in our statistics. Given the scale of destruction and the limits of our resources, we are unable to conduct a full, case-by-case verification of every incident. As a result, with the exception of a number of cases examined in detail as part of our main sitreps, we do not assign responsibility for indiscriminate attacks to either side. In some instances, however, one of the parties publicly claims responsibility. In particular, Russia’s Ministry of Defense, when reporting long-range missile and drone strikes on Ukrainian cities, routinely describes them as "group" or "mass" attacks on "critically important energy infrastructure facilities of Ukraine." We classify such strikes as war crimes, because attacks on energy infrastructure, even when parts of that infrastructure supply military facilities or defense-industry sites, do not offer a military advantage proportionate to the harm inflicted on civilians and therefore constitute an indiscriminate use of force. We apply the same principles when assessing actions by the Armed Forces of Ukraine. For example, when Ukrainian forces publish videos of strikes on electrical substations in occupied territories, we treat such reports as acknowledgments of responsibility by the party carrying out the attack.
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