Sitrep for Feb. 20-23, 2026 (as of 11:30 a.m. UTC+3)

Frontline Situation Update

Ukraine’s Air Assault Forces have issued a statement regarding the ongoing offensive operation by Ukrainian troops. According to the statement, the primary objective of the Air Assault Forces is to disrupt Russia’s plans for further advances in the Dnipropetrovsk and the Zaporizhzhia regions, defeat the Russian grouping in this sector of the front and push it back beyond the administrative borders of the Dnipropetrovsk region. As a reminder, active combat in this region is currently confined to a relatively narrow strip, and Russian forces have not managed to advance deeper into the region since the summer. The statement also claims that, as a result of the operation, the Air Assault Forces—together with adjacent units—have regained control of more than 300 square kilometers [116 square miles] of territory, "clearing it of enemy sabotage and reconnaissance groups." This wording underscores that Russian forces had not captured these areas but that they remained contested.

According to Dmytro Filatov, commander of the AFU’s 1st Assault Regiment, Ukraine’s defense forces are focused on systematically clearing territory rather than pushing as deeply as possible. The AFU’s objective is to stabilize the situation and eliminate enemy infiltration so that by spring—when foliage returns—they can secure the most advantageous tactical positions and force Russian troops to commit reserves not where they had planned, but in response to Ukrainian actions.

Meanwhile, French researcher Clément Molin has updated his map marking artillery and air-dropped bomb strikes and concluded that, as a result of the operation, the AFU have managed to regain control over most of the defensive line built in 2022 in the Dnipropetrovsk region. Molin’s map presents a more optimistic picture than that of DeepState—particularly in the areas around the villages of Danylivka, Vyshneve and Verbove. In his assessment, Ukrainian forces have established control over the liberated territory. By contrast, John Helin of Black Bird Group believes the AFU have merely expanded the contested zone, leaving the question of firm territorial control unresolved. In our view, it would be prudent to wait for greater clarity on the ground before drawing definitive conclusions.

Footage has emerged showing Ukrainian forces operating in the village of Ternove. Video has been published of Russian UAV strikes targeting AFU personnel who appear to have established positions inside the settlement. Their likely next objective is the village of Zaporizke. In addition, analysis of newly released satellite imagery, indicating fresh munition impact signatures, suggests that AFU elements have reached the village of Berezove.

Satellite imagery further confirms that Russian forces have advanced west of the town of Huliaipole and entered the village of Hirke, as evidenced by the shift of artillery fire toward tree lines west of the settlement.

In our assessment, the Ukrainian operation can thus far be characterized as tactically successful, although AFU casualties remain unknown. Its significance lies in the potential to threaten the entire Russian offensive west of Huliaipole. By attacking near Ternove, the AFU are effectively striking the flank of RuAF units. Should Ukrainian forces maintain momentum along this sector, they could advance toward the village of Uspenivka and interdict the road leading to the village of Velyka Novosilka, a key logistics artery supporting RuAF operations. Combined with continued flank pressure, such action could destabilize the Russian grouping advancing westward.

On the Sloviansk-Kramatorsk axis, according to Ukrainian military observer Kostiantyn Mashovets, advances by units of the Russian Group of Troops "West" north of the Siverskyi Donets River near the villages of Dibrova and Ozerne, enabled forces of the Group of Troops "South" to push further south from the village of Zakitne toward the villages of Kryva Luka and Kalenyky. Further south along this sector, they managed to capture the villages of Novomarkove and Minkivka and improve their positions, gradually advancing westward. According to DeepState, in this sector the RuAF advanced toward the village of Lypivka from the direction of the village of Nykyforivka. The objective of Russian forces here is to reach the town of Mykolaivka, the village of Vasylivska Pustosh, and the villages of Nikonorivka and Vasiutynske. The Group of Troops "South" has approached the initial line necessary for a further attack on the Sloviansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration. Before advancing on it, however, they will need to wait until the Group of Troops "North" reaches its positions along the Siverskyi Donets to support the offensive with UAV strikes and shelling of Sloviansk. Additionally, it will be necessary to wait until other Russian units capture the towns of Kostiantynivka and Druzhkivka. Only after that will the RuAF be able to reach the city of Kramatorsk. Thus, fighting for the last remaining major unoccupied urban agglomeration in the Donetsk region is likely to begin only after all of the above conditions are met.

As noted by Molin, near Zakitne the RuAF have been actively using artillery and air-dropped bombs, enabling gradual advances. The impact of artillery and air-dropped bombs is also highlighted by AFU serviceman Oleksandr Solonko: the constant bombardment prevents Ukrainian forces from using multi-story buildings as defensive positions during urban defense. Despite the inaccuracy of most strikes, their volume allows the RuAF to capture areas with large reinforced structures more quickly and efficiently, since deploying troops there becomes impossible. Meanwhile, the AFU lack the capacity to deliver comparable quantities of air-dropped bombs on Russian positions, for example, in Pokrovsk, because Western allies are unable to produce and supply sufficient volumes of munitions to Ukraine.

On Feb. 21, The commander of the Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces, Robert "Madyar" Brovdi, posted a video claiming the destruction of a Russian Tornado‑S multiple‑launch rocket system. According to the Oryx project, the target was actually a BM‑30 Smerch MLRS. Both the Smerch and the Tornado‑S are high‑precision, long‑range systems typically positioned far from frontlines, making their detection and neutralization extremely difficult. The Oryx project has recorded only three confirmed destructions of the BM‑30 Smerch MLRS.

It is worth noting that back on Oct. 17, 2025, the Lasar’s Group UAV unit of Ukraine’s National Guard announced the destruction of a BM‑30 Smerch MLRS and published a confirming video. In December, ground photographs emerged that allowed a more precise identification of the system, which turned out to be the Tornado‑S. This therefore marked the first confirmed destruction of a Tornado-S system.

Rob Lee, a Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, observed that the RuAF have been actively deploying Starlink terminals on tanks and other armored vehicles. The hardware is reportedly used to transmit real-time video feeds from the vehicles directly to command posts. Because these sorties often represent a driver's first experience in combat, they frequently rely on continuous guidance from headquarters to avoid becoming disoriented. While the removal of Starlink access would complicate such maneuvers, it is reasonable to expect that the impact of the blacklisting may be limited, given the relative scarcity of mechanized assaults over the last 18 to 24 months. This reliance on remote video links for tank management was further corroborated by the pro-Russian milblogger Kirill Fyodorov.

Closer to the border, the Dva Mayora [Two Majors] pro-Russian Telegram channel reported a mass delivery of Yolka interceptor drones to frontline units. These interceptors were reportedly active during the defense of the Belgorod region against drone attacks on Feb. 22. The compact, high-velocity drones are designed to neutralize targets through kinetic impact rather than explosive warheads, and they appear to be equipped with sensors capable of automated target acquisition and terminal guidance.

Ukrainian and Russian Strikes

On Feb. 21, a fire broke out at a warehouse of the Saransk Instrument Works plant in Russia’s constituent Republic of Mordovia. The Astra media outlet and the Ukrainian source Exilenova+ reported a fire at the neighboring Electrovypryamitel plant, which produces semiconductor components for the defense industry, suggesting it may have been the intended target. No official cause for the fire has been announced.

Also on Feb. 21, a Ukrainian UAV was spotted 600 meters [0.37 mi] from the Radiopribor plant in Almetievsk, Russia’s constituent Republic of Tatarstan. Reports indicate the attack was repelled.

The General Staff of the AFU stated that, in the early hours of Feb. 21, Flamingo cruise missiles were launched at the Votkinsk Machine Building Plant in Udmurtia, Russia's constituent republic. This facility produces Iskander-M ballistic missiles, Kinzhal air-launched ballistic missiles and others. Such missiles are actively used in the ongoing war; for example, in the strike on Ukraine in the early hours of Feb. 22, four Zircon missiles and 22 Iskander-M missiles were employed.

The technical evolution of the war is also visible in the deployment of the Flamingo missile. Den Shtilerman, the chief engineer and co-founder of Fire Point, recently published footage showing the missiles being launched from a ground-based platform. The video reveals a massive solid-fuel booster and prominent wings—features that increase the missile's visibility and make it a far easier target for air defense systems. Multiple smoke trails in the footage suggest a multi-missile launch; however, while the Russian MoD claimed to have downed five Flamingo missiles, it did not disclose the total number of missiles fired.

Satellite imagery of the aftermath, published by the CyberBoroshno project, appears to show a single hit on Workshop No. 19—a facility dedicated to galvanizing and metal stamping. This workshop is a critical node in the manufacturing cycle, responsible for the stamping and forming of metal components, the fabrication of missile hull elements and the electroplating of parts. Damage to such a facility could have a critical impact on production, as it handles the foundational construction and technological preparation required before final assembly. Given that only one hit is visible on the plant’s grounds, it is likely that the remaining missiles were intercepted. Furthermore, the substantial size of the breach in the workshop’s roof points to a missile with significant warhead mass.

Despite the intensity of individual strikes, the scale of the program remains in question. It is worth noting that the General Staff of the AFU has officially reported the use of Flamingo missiles only six times to date. Even accounting for multiple missiles per launch, the actual volume of production appears to be considerably lower than publicly claimed.

Financial Times has reported that Iran has concluded a secret agreement with Russia for the supply of Russian man-portable air defense systems. The agreement, signed in December 2025, provides for the delivery of 500 Verba MANPADS and 2,500 9M336 missiles for them over the course of three years. It is reported that the negotiations involved Ruhollah Katebi, an official of Iran’s Ministry of Defense and Support of the Armed Forces. He previously took part in a deal under which Iran sold Russia hundreds of Fath-360 short-range ballistic missiles. The delivery of these missiles was reported in the fall of 2024, however, no evidence of their actual transfer or use has emerged. It is possible that the launchers were never delivered.

In the early hours of Feb. 22, a terrorist attack took place in the city of Lviv. An explosive device had been planted near a store. Police officers responded to a call about a break-in at the store, after which two explosions occurred. A policewoman was killed, and at least 25 other people were injured. The suspect has been detained. According to Volodymyr Zelenskyy, the terrorist attack was organized by Russian special services, and the perpetrator was recruited via Telegram. Judging by the video, the woman’s behavior while planting the bomb does not resemble that of a specially trained individual experienced in handling explosives.

The New York Times has published a report on a Russian citizen who, with the assistance of Russian intelligence officers, led the planning and execution of several acts of sabotage in Poland, Lithuania, the UK, Germany and potentially other countries. Aleksey Kolosovsky, 42, has ties to criminal groups involved in hacking, the sale of forged identity documents and car theft. According to security services from five European countries, Kolosovsky recruited a network of agents via Telegram, including a Ukrainian teenager, to plant incendiary devices at an IKEA store in Vilnius and at a large commercial center near Warsaw; a similar attack was also planned in Riga. While based in Krasnodar, he organized the delivery of detonators and bomb-making equipment to lockers in railway stations, where they were collected by individuals he had recruited. This is far from the first case in which Russian intelligence services have used not professional spies but individuals connected to criminal networks or loosely affiliated operatives to carry out acts of sabotage. The article notes that the promotion of Major General Andrey Averyanov, head of the 29155th military unit subordinated to the GRU [Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation] and engaged in sabotage operations abroad, to Deputy Head of the Main Directorate signals to Western intelligence services that Russia is placing significant emphasis on such activities.

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