Sitrep for April 6-10, 2026 (as of 9 a.m. UTC+3)
Frontline Situation Update
Over the past week, there have been no significant changes along the frontline. Notably, for an entire week—from the Russian Ministry of Defense’s April 1 announcement of the capture of the village of Boikove in the Zaporizhzhia region up to the time of recording this sitrep—the Russian MoD has not announced the "liberation" of a single settlement.
In the Kupiansk direction, Russian forces continue their attempts to advance on the town of Kupiansk from the north: assault troops regularly reach the outskirts but are quickly detected and neutralized by Ukrainian drones. Russian forces also continue to attack from the east, near the village of Pishchane.
In the Kostiantynivka direction, according to Playfra, pressure on Kostiantynivka is increasing. Russian forces have brought the supply route north of the town—near the village of Oleksiievo-Druzhkivka—within firing range, further straining Ukrainian logistics. As a result, it has now become virtually impossible to reach Ukrainian positions in the town by vehicle without sustaining damage or casualties, and the situation for the garrison is likely to continue deteriorating.
The Finnish independent Black Bird Group, following several other analytical projects, has published its statistics on Russian Armed Forces advances for March. According to the analysts, the pace of Russian advances in March increased compared with the record-low (and negative) figure recorded in February, but still amounted to only 25 square kilometers [9.7 square miles]. In other words, the trend mirrors that identified by DeepState, whereas statistics published by the pro-Russian Slivochnyy Kapriz [Creamy caprice] Telegram channel, by contrast, indicate a slowdown in March relative to February.
Another exchange of the bodies of killed soldiers has taken place: Ukraine received the remains of 1,000 soldiers, while Russia received the remains of 41. The above-mentioned Slivochnyy Kapriz Telegram channel published a chart of all body exchanges since 2023. This stark disparity is largely due to Russian forces being on the offensive and occupying territory where many bodies remain; evacuating them during a retreat would be extremely difficult. Summing up all available data on transferred bodies over this period amounts to nearly 23,000 Ukrainian bodies and 1,749 Russian bodies. We have no reason to doubt these figures. Although there have been cases where bodies transferred from Russia were not those of AFU soldiers, we have not seen any official refutations of the overall totals.
This is significant in the context of discussions about various estimates of AFU losses. For example, according to official figures cited by Volodymyr Zelenskyy in an interview with France 2, 55,000 soldiers have been killed in the war, with many others listed as missing. However, the number of returned bodies calls this estimate into question. The UALosses project has currently counted 180,000 obituaries for Ukrainian soldiers killed during the full-scale war, though the actual AFU losses are clearly higher.
Commander-in-Chief of the AFU, General Oleksandr Syrskyi, stated that for four months, beginning in December, "unmanned systems units have been destroying more enemy personnel than the enemy can recruit." This figure accounts only for casualties inflicted by drones, excluding those from artillery, airstrikes and other weaponry. According to the general, total enemy losses caused by drone units rose by 29 percent in March compared to February. Even if drones account for 90 percent of all losses, such an increase appears excessive, particularly as there is no evidence of corresponding vulnerabilities within the RuAF, much less a collapse of the frontline. It is worth noting that in December and January, reports circulated that drone-inflicted losses had surpassed the RuAF recruitment rate; meanwhile, Ukraine's Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov called for the elimination of 50,000 Russian soldiers per month, a target that seems effectively unattainable.
In the same post, Syrskyi reported that as of early April, the strength of Russia’s unmanned systems forces had grown to 101,000, with plans to increase that number to 165,500 by the end of 2026. Taken together with the claims of losses exceeding recruitment, this defies standard logic: new recruits are typically used to offset current casualties before resources are channeled into the creation of new units. If nearly all recruits are being funneled into drone forces, however, a reduction in the number of assault troops should already be apparent.
Despite claims of large-scale Russian losses, their impact on the frontline remains invisible: the Ukrainian offensive in the Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhzhia regions has nearly stalled, and the RuAF are now counterattacking near the villages of Ternove and Berezove, both of which are currently contested. New attacks have also been launched west of the town of Huliaipole.
Deputy Head of the Office of the President of Ukraine Pavlo Palisa said in an interview with RBC-Ukraine that the AFU are currently using 30 percent more UAVs on the frontline than the RuAF. This estimate is virtually impossible to verify using open-source data: the methodology behind the calculation has not been disclosed, and there has been no confirmation from independent military analysts such as Michael Kofman, Rob Lee, Konrad Muzyka or Dara Massicot.
An example of how reality is sometimes shaped to fit a striking headline can be found in publications by the Main Intelligence Directorate of Ukraine’s Ministry of Defense regarding the alleged destruction of the railway ferry Slavyanin in the Kerch Strait. In a post dated April 8, it was claimed that in the early hours of April 6, drones had "finished off" the last remaining ferry in the strait—the Slavyanin—while a previous ferry had supposedly been disabled by drone strikes in the early hours of March 14. However, in the earlier post referenced in the April 8 publication, it was stated that the Slavyanin had been "burned," while the Avangard had been damaged. We consider it inappropriate to claim the destruction of the same asset twice without acknowledging that an earlier assessment may have been incorrect, especially given that the ferries are very similar in appearance and the published footage is insufficient to confirm the long-term disabling of either vessel.
Ukrainian and Russian Strikes
Russian Telegram channels have shown the use of the Geran-5 jet-powered UAV against oil and gas infrastructure in the Sumy region. According to claimed specifications, its range is over 600 km [373 mi], and its warhead is over 60 kg [132 lbs], which is slightly less than the 90 kg [198 lbs] warhead of standard Shahed drones. A video has also been published of another jet-powered drone, the Geran-4, targeting energy infrastructure in the Chernihiv region—an act that constitutes a war crime. With a claimed range of over 550 km [342 mi], the Geran-4 has a warhead weighing over 50 kg [110 lbs]. Such specifications may raise the question of why Russia is producing such similar strike systems. We believe these are likely experimental models currently undergoing testing and evaluation for effectiveness, ease of use, production cost, etc. It was also mentioned that the Geran-5 was planned to be launched from aircraft.
In recent weeks, we have increasingly seen Russian Shahed drones striking Ukrainian mobile fire teams, which typically consist of a pickup truck equipped with an anti-aircraft gun or machine gun in the bed. These units are highly mobile and are often used to intercept Shahed-type drones—yet the UAVs are now actively hunting them. Published videos show green squares around the target, which some claim is automatic target acquisition. However, Ukrainian military expert Serhii "Flash" Beskrestnov disputes this. It is also likely that the drones are operator-controlled.
Ukraine’s Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov stated that in March 2026, Ukrainian air-defense drones destroyed more than 33,000 Russian UAVs, more than double the number recorded in February. This underscores the critical role of interceptor drones as an element of air defenses. The primary challenge at present is posed by jet-powered Shahed-type UAVs, referred to above as Geran-4 and Geran-5, for which new countermeasure technologies are currently under development.
At the same time, despite the increasing effectiveness and growing interception rate of Ukrainian interceptor drones, Russian UAV strikes continue to result in significant civilian casualties. Further details can be found in our volunteer summaries of strikes on civilian infrastructure in Ukraine and Russia.
On the morning of April 7, a Russian UAV struck a bus in the downtown of the city of Nikopol, killing four people and injuring 17 others. Body-camera footage from a first responder during the evacuation confirms the continued practice of double-tap strikes targeting emergency services. It should be noted that the bright yellow bus was clearly a civilian vehicle, and the UAV operator could not have failed to recognize that it was targeting non-combatants.
Later that day, in a village within the Chervonohryhorivka community, another UAV strike hit a minibus operating on an intercity route from Nikopol. Four passengers were wounded, along with the driver of a nearby vehicle passing by at the time of impact.
Also on April 7, the shelling of the Korabelnyi district of the city of Kherson resulted in four killed and 13 wounded. Video footage of first responders operating at the scene has also been published (warning: graphic content).
That evening, artillery strikes on the Dniprovskyi district of Kherson caused blast and fragmentation injuries to two medical personnel.
The Ukrainian Navy released footage of a missile strike against the Syvash offshore oil and gas platform in the Black Sea in the early hours of April 6. Ukrainian Telegram channel Vodohrai assessed that the strike was carried out with RBS 15 anti-ship missiles developed by the Swedish company Saab Bofors Dynamics. Sweden had announced its intention to transfer these systems to Ukraine approximately two years ago, but there have been no confirmed reports of their delivery to the AFU.
On the morning of April 8, following a drone attack, an oil depot in Feodosia caught fire. In an eyewitness video filmed before the strike, a Pantsir-S1 surface-to-air missile and anti-aircraft artillery system was visible. The fact that the depot burned despite the presence of this system does not necessarily indicate its ineffectiveness. No air defense system is capable of intercepting all incoming drones, and a large number of simultaneously launched targets can overload even layered defenses.
On April 7, the commander of Ukraine's National Guard, Oleksandr Pivnenko, reported that drone operators of the NGU's 23rd Brigade had detected and destroyed a Pantsir-S1 system deep in Russian rear areas. The following day, Ukrainian officer Robert "Madyar" Brovdi wrote that the AFU's Unmanned Systems Forces had destroyed a Buk-M3 air defense system, a TOR-M2 surface-to-air missile system and a Zoopark-1M counter-battery radar system. Such videos help explain why successful Ukrainian UAV strikes on Russian targets continue—for instance, the attack on the port of Ust-Luga in the early hours of April 7. The destruction of each air defense system leaves a particular section of the frontline less protected, requiring Russia to redeploy assets from deeper rear areas.
French researcher Clément Molin has calculated that March 2026 became the first month in which Ukraine launched more long range drones than Russia. According to his data, the threshold of 1,000 drones per month was crossed in August 2024, 3,000 drones per month in July 2025, and in March 2026 the figure surpassed 7,000. At the same time, we do not see a significant increase in civilian casualties within Russian territory because, unlike the RuAF, the AFU primarily targets infrastructure such as oil refineries, ports, and bridges rather than residential areas.
Since Ukrainian drones no longer reach the Russian capital, we do not believe that Vladimir Putin fears potential Ukrainian attacks on the May 9 parade in Moscow, particularly as air defenses are expected to be significantly reinforced during the event. We also suggest that Putin could declare a ceasefire for Victory Day, which Ukraine might feel compelled to observe in order to avoid straining relations with the US administration.
Putin has already declared an "Orthodox Easter ceasefire" from 4 p.m. on April 11 until the end of April 12. In response, Volodymyr Zelenskyy stated that the AFU would also halt fire for Easter, having previously issued repeated calls for a ceasefire that were ignored by the Kremlin. However, we assess that such a brief truce is unlikely to have a meaningful impact on the situation and anticipate that both sides may continue UAV strikes on frontline settlements even during the declared ceasefire.
The pro-Russian Telegram channel Fighterbomber [associated with the Russian Air and Space Force] confirmed our assessment that the March 31 crash of an Antonov An-26 aircraft in Crimea was caused by pilot error. According to the channel, the crash resulted from human factors: the crew began their descent prematurely while preparing to land and struck a cliff approximately 30 kilometers [19 miles] from the airfield.
Western Assistance
It has emerged that Norway has not delivered any of the six F-16 fighter aircraft it pledged to Ukraine in August 2023. In May of last year, reports suggested that some of the aircraft had already been transferred. Following the decision to supply them, two aircraft were sent to Denmark for Ukrainian pilot training and were later transferred to a repair facility in Belgium, where the remaining four aircraft had already been delivered. Repairs are expected to take at least a year. Such discrepancies between pledges and actual deliveries complicate efforts to assess the impact of promised weapons supplies on the course of the war. In many cases, military equipment has arrived at the AFU significantly later than announced—or not at all. We apply similar caution to projections based on Fire Point’s statements about its new FP-9 ballistic missiles, noting that previous timelines and production volumes have often diverged substantially from those outlined in press releases.
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