Sitrep for April 4-6, 2026 (as of 9 a.m. UTC+3)
Frontline Situation Update
Video from the Lyman direction has surfaced showing a Ukrainian Mil Mi-8 helicopter tossing unguided air-to-surface rockets using a "pitch-up" maneuver, lofting the munitions by pulling its nose upward. This method of fire is largely ineffective and, in some respects, resembles the use of a multiple-launch rocket system. The rationale for employing helicopters in this manner is unclear, particularly given the maneuver’s inherent danger. A Russian Kamov Ka-52 (Hokum B) attack helicopter was recently shot down while performing a similar strike. Such operations are equally perilous for Ukrainian aircraft, especially as this helicopter flew close to the "gray zone" west of the village of Drobysheve, where Russian drones are active. The decoy flares deployed by the Mi-8 offer little protection against such drones.
As we have noted previously, in our view, the offensive against the Sloviansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration will most likely come from the east and, where possible, from the south, which would first require the capture of the towns of Kostiantynivka and Druzhkivka. From the north, however, the Russian Armed Forces will likely advance as far as the bank of the Siverskyi Donets River but are unlikely to attempt a river crossing in order to attack the city of Sloviansk from that direction. Instead, we expect them to position drone operators along the river, from where they could strike Sloviansk and the surrounding roads, thereby supporting operations in other sectors of the front.
Footage has emerged showing what appears to be a fiber-optic UAV strike on a Ukrainian HMMWV in the town of Mykolaivka, east of Sloviansk. The strike was reportedly carried out by the 169th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade of Russia’s 25th Combined Arms Army, which is responsible for the Lyman direction. However, Sloviansk and Mykolaivka do not appear to fall within its designated area of responsibility, but rather within that of the 3rd Combined Arms Army, which is advancing from the east. This suggests one of two possibilities: either the drone crossed beyond its assigned sector while searching for a target, or Russian drone operators have already taken up positions along the bank of the Siverskyi Donets River and are using such strikes to support allied units.
Developments have also been reported in the Pokrovsk direction, where last week the 425th Skelia Assault Regiment carried out an unsuccessful mechanized assault south of the village of Hryshyne. At the time, the military stated that the purpose of the attack was to relieve Ukrainian troops still holding positions in the town of Pokrovsk. According to Ukrainian military observer Kostiantyn Mashovets, small infantry groups from the Air Assault Forces of Ukraine are indeed continuing to hold positions in the northern part of Pokrovsk, in an area that DeepState still marks as a small contested zone. These troops are reportedly positioned in a residential area between the cemetery and the Agroprodukt-LTD company. Against that backdrop, the stated objective of the Skelia assault becomes even harder to understand: the armored column was moving toward the town’s northwestern outskirts, while the Ukrainian positions in question are located in the north.
A deputy battalion commander from the AFU’s 82nd Air Assault Brigade detailed to hromadske how an offensive operation was carried out in the Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhzhia regions.
Late last year, the Russian army identified a vulnerability in the Ukrainian lines near the town of Huliaipole, launching an attack and achieving a rapid advance. To halt the Russian forces in that sector, the Ukrainian military struck their flank in the Dnipropetrovsk region. Ultimately, the officer noted, the element of surprise was a key component of the operation and a primary reason for its success. While the Russian military was aware of the 82nd Brigade's redeployment, its exact destination remained unclear until the last moment. Small groups of Ukrainian infantry launched deliberate attacks across various sections of the frontline to keep the opposing forces off balance.
During the first month of the offensive, the AFU made relatively rapid advances. This was partly because Russian motorized rifle units holding the frontline were exhausted and had severely limited resources. Reinforcements arrived only several weeks later, and the deployment of Russian naval infantry provided substantial fire support, which slowed the tempo of the Ukrainian advance. Despite this, the operation remains ongoing. The RuAF continue to hold defensive positions, while assault groups periodically penetrate deep into Ukrainian rear areas. Recent reports indicate a Russian presence near the villages of Ternuvate and Boikove. The latter was also claimed as captured, though this claim was denied by the AFU. Nevertheless, according to a Ukrainian serviceman, the initiative in this sector remains with the Ukrainian side.
The Ukrainian offensive operation has also succeeded in slowing Russian advances west of Huliaipole and Zaliznychne. This has enabled rear-echelon units to construct a substantial defensive line, identified by analyst Clément Molin along the Verkhnia Tersa River. The defensive line extends for approximately 100 kilometers [62 mi] and, unlike other Ukrainian fortification systems, is largely continuous. It is integrated with natural terrain features such as tree lines, lakes and ponds. Exceptions exist where roads intersect the fortifications; however, these controlled gaps are intentionally maintained for Ukrainian logistical use and require strict defense and reinforcement.
Conscription, Mobilization and Contract Military Service
By April 2026, the named list of war fatalities compiled by Mediazona [independent Russian media outlet], BBC News Russian and a team of volunteers had reached 207,552 individuals. In its latest report, the BBC paid particular attention to the 18-25 age group. A law introduced in 2023 allowing young people to sign military contracts immediately after finishing school upon turning 18 failed to generate the required number of recruits. However, the number of fatalities among individuals aged 18-25 began to rise steadily from March 2024, following the adoption of an amendment that allows individuals detained on suspicion of a crime to avoid trial and criminal prosecution by agreeing to sign a military contract. Notably, this trend has not been observed in other age groups. The majority of those convicted in Russia on drug-related charges are young people aged 18-29, many of whom go to war in an attempt to avoid criminal punishment. They are often assigned to separate assault units marked with the designation "V" within various military formations and are typically deployed first to carry out the most difficult tasks at forward positions, contributing to high casualty rates.
At least 502 individuals on the named list were initially conscripted into the army and subsequently killed in action. In addition, conscripts are often coerced into signing military contracts through pressure, threats and physical abuse; cases of forged signatures on such contracts have also been documented. For those seeking to avoid conscription, we recommend contacting verified support initiatives such as Idite Lesom!, Kovcheg and the Movement of Conscientious Objectors.
Ukrainian and Russian Strikes
Kyrylo Budanov, head of the Office of the President of Ukraine, stated in an interview with Bloomberg that allies have asked Ukraine’s Defense Forces to halt strikes on Russian oil refineries. He did not specify which countries made this request or whether Ukraine is prepared to comply.
In the early hours of April 6, during a raid on Novorossiysk, one of the drones struck a residential building, with 10 people reported injured. As a result of the strikes, a fire broke out in the port of Sheskharis, through which oil and petroleum products are exported.
Ukrainian journalist Andriy Tsaplienko published Russian documents obtained from his own sources regarding the results of Ukrainian strikes on the ports of Primorsk and Ust-Luga in the Leningrad region. While we cannot independently verify their authenticity, the documents appear plausible. It is worth noting that all UAV flight routes in these documents are shown as passing over Russian territory, without the use of European airspace.
In our report on the statistics of attacks on civilian infrastructure for 2025, we suggested that the number of civilian casualties would continue to rise in 2026. Unfortunately, this forecast is proving accurate. In previous sitreps, we have already noted that raids are becoming so prolonged and large-scale that, on some days, the Ukrainian Air Force publishes two reports on Russian strikes within a single 24-hour period. We are observing an intensification of the terror campaign against Ukraine’s civilian population and attribute it to increased production of drones and missiles.
In Kherson, although no active combat is taking place inside the city, the situation— long described as steadily grim—has deteriorated sharply, with civilian casualties surging in recent days. Air-dropped bombs, kamikaze drones, including fiber-optic ones, and tube and rocket artillery (the latter’s use against residential areas is banned under international humanitarian law) are all being employed against the city.
In the early hours of April 4, an attack on the city of Sumy involving four Gerbera drones with warheads injured 29 people, including 19 children.
On the morning of April 4, UAVs attacked a market in the city of Nikopol: five people were killed and 27 injured.
In addition, drones in Nikopol have begun targeting civilian vehicles, similar to the "human safari" tactics seen in Kherson. Both localities fall within the area of responsibility of the Group of Troops "Dnepr," commanded by former Airborne Forces commander Colonel General Mikhail Teplinsky.
In the early hours of April 6, As a result of a RuAF strikes on the city of Odesa, at least three people were killed, including a two-year-old girl, and 16 others were injured.
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